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Abstract
Despite the fact that in the United Kingdom (UK) regulators adopt the ideology of 
"self-regulation within a statutory framework", while the Taiwanese government opts 
for the American Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) model, both English and 
Taiwanese law place heavy reliance nowadays on mandatory disclosure as a tool to 
regulate the public issue of securities and publicly issuing companies. The objectives of 
this thesis are to (1) justify the regulation of mandatory disclosure, (2) provide the 
guidelines for the design of the content of disclosure, and (3) analyse the elements of 
civil liability for non-disclosure and untrue statements.
Chapter One sets out the reasons for taking up this topic for research, its 
methodology, and the contribution and limits of the work. Chapter Two is devoted to 
describing briefly the English and Taiwanese legal frameworks in order to identify the 
research scope and provide readers with some general background. The impact of the 
European Community (EC) legislation on UK company law and securities regulation is 
also examined, as well as its implementation history. Accordingly, these two chapters 
taken together constitute the background for the thesis.
The core of the thesis is in Chapters Three to Six. Chapters Three and Four 
examine thoroughly the defects of the general law and the economic debate on 
mandatory disclosure with a view to establishing the justification of mandatory 
disclosure. Chapter Five goes further by analysing the guidelines of disclosure content; 
through the finding of materiality, it is argued that governmental regulation should only 
deal with material information. The problem of unsatisfactory accountancy in Taiwan is 
also not forgotten. Chapter Six discusses civil liability for misrepresentation, criticises 
the current flaws in English and Taiwanese law, and proposes amendments to them. 
Finally, conclusions are drawn in Chapter Seven.
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Chapter One
Introduction
This thesis deals with the regulation of disclosure on the public distribution of 
securities. The research covers the regulation of disclosure on both primary 
distribution of securities and secondary markets where transactions of issued securities 
take place. The objectives of the thesis are three-fold: (1) to justify the regulation of 
mandatory disclosure, (2) to provide the guidelines for the design of the content of 
disclosure, and (3) to analyse the elements of civil liability for non-disclosure and 
untrue statements.
The crucial nature of capital markets clearly demonstrates the importance of 
such a subject. As they provide resources for economic development by channelling 
surplus units (i.e. savings) to demanding units (e.g. industries) and are the “situs” in 
which public investors earn their return, any turbulence or movement of capital 
markets and any illegal events happening there brings about a domino effect. The 
investing public is the first group to suffer damage, and then the effect goes on to harm 
companies and the national economy. One could never over-emphasise the importance 
of this type of chain influence. As a result, in the wave of internationalisation and 
deregulation sweeping main capital markets in free market economy countries, careful 
attention must be paid to the way in which an efficient and comprehensive control and 
supervision system is established. Current developments in the main capital markets 
(e.g. USA and UK) suggest that the key lies in the principle of disclosure. And this is 
why this subject was chosen for this thesis.
Such a subject is multi-dimensional and highly dynamic. Why so? This is due to 
the fact that the problem itself is not the "private preserve" of legal academics; instead,
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financial economists, corporate financial experts, and accounting professionals all 
endeavour to look into this topic in-depth from their professional perspectives. It 
follows that materials relating to this field in these disciplines are overwhelming, 
sometimes more fruitful than those of legal research. Accordingly, to a limited extent, 
we expand our work to grapple with some financial economics, corporate finance, and 
accounting articles provided that they are closely relevant to and echoed by legal 
thinking.
For English materials, even though securities transactions have a long sustained 
history in the UK, it is only within the last decade that there has been a comprehensive 
and systemic statute in operation (the Financial Services Act 1986) and securities 
regulation has become an independent subject of study attracting increasing 
contribution from academics. Consequently, although there are quite a few cases 
covering securities fraud (especially fraudulent prospectuses), the few articles or books 
bearing intimate analyses of the subject have not been particularly productive in terms 
of ideas or solutions to the various legal problems. Accordingly, theories developed in 
other relevant fields (e.g. directors' fiduciary duties, disclosure requirements under the 
law of contract and tort, materiality in misrepresentation, causation problems, measure 
of damages, etc.) are all precious to our research and will be examined and fitted into 
the thesis in order to develop the arguments advanced by the thesis.
Taiwan is not immune from the same problem of insufficient research up to the 
present stage and the same approach would be adopted. The Taiwanese securities 
regulation springs from American law and largely imitates the American model. 
Consequently, domestic scholars whenever publishing articles or delivering talks on 
this field would quote the American counterpart regulation or theories. This sometimes 
serves a positive role as a comparative study. But it also can have a stultifying effect: in 
that the localisation of a set of regulations and the operation of the regulatory machine 
vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, a fact that has not been appreciated and even
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been unduly underestimated. Taking the Securities and Exchange Commission (the 
SEC) as an example (although this will not be dealt with in this thesis), there is an SEC 
in American federal government and there is one in Taiwan as well. Even if two 
institutions bear the same name and are backed by similar regulations, they may not 
play the same role or have the same importance, given their different human resource 
and executive or semi-judicial power. Therefore, Taiwan's own legal system is the 
cornerstone of the thesis with a view to analysing and criticising the Taiwanese 
regulation of disclosure. The habit of constantly referring back to American law is 
resisted.
Even more, in a country like Taiwan bearing the mark of the civil law system, 
the close relationship between commercial law and civil law cannot be ignored. It is 
true that American law is the blueprint of the Taiwanese securities regulation. It is 
equally true that the consistency and comprehensiveness of the whole legal system 
deserve preservation. That the securities regulation has been departing from the norm 
of traditional legal concepts causes us concern. For instance, in the Civil Code and 
theories, there is found a well-developed system dealing with civil liabilities, such as 
the elements of liabilities, the causation requirement, and the measure of damages. 
Nonetheless, the elements of civil liability and measure of damages are different in the 
securities regulations from the normal type of civil liability but no clear reasoning of 
such deviation is ever provided. Only when we come across American law we notice 
where the root of the new rules stems from. It is sensible to cast doubt on this 
importation, as the background of these two countries regarding civil liabilities is so 
different (the fundamental difference between American common law and Taiwanese 
civil law). What we expect is a legal system with consistency; any specific rule could 
only be developed after a thorough study. That is, new rules are permitted but must 
result from the specific characteristic of a problem, and we have sufficient reasons to 
mark a difference. To justify any "evolution" simply based on foreign legislation is not 
persuasive.
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On the other hand, fortunately, the UK, USA, and Taiwan (in principle) are 
free market economy jurisdictions. Thus, some common theories in respect of certain 
topics could be applied to all these three jurisdictions. Taking the justification of 
mandatory disclosure as an example, the theories dealing with the justification of
mandatory disclosure are, both pro and con, developed principally by American
scholars, which are capable of providing us with a sound argument base and of filling 
the gap left by current insufficient materials in the jurisdictions of the UK and Taiwan. 
That is, this thesis analyses some common theories in addition to the comparative 
study of English and Taiwanese law.
A comparative approach is adopted throughout the whole thesis. Functions of 
English and Taiwanese law regarding mandatory disclosure requirements in the general 
law, standards for mandatory disclosure, and the appropriate civil liability are analysed, 
contrasted, and compared. Different usage of terms, if any, will not cause any serious 
problems to this study as we focus on the meaning and function of terms rather than on 
their superficial definitions. During comparison, we find that regarding some issues 
these two legal systems each have their own way of resolving puzzles and obtaining 
reasonable outcomes. But sometimes we notice that their individual methodologies
suffer from defects. In this situation, this thesis endeavours to provide, after analysing
their defects and merits respectively, better answers to certain problems.
After confirming the research direction, we construct a readable and 
comprehensible thesis structure. Some questions arise from both a theoretical and a 
practical point of view:
a: from the theoretical aspect: 1. What theories support the principle of 
mandatory disclosure? 2. If the principle of mandatory disclosure is really sound, what 
form should it take and how should it be put into practice? 3. What type of civil
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liability is appropriate to the breach of mandatory disclosure rules? Are the principles 
of liability for damages and the measure of damages developed under the traditional 
category of contract and tort suitable for cases of securities misrepresentation?
b: from the practical aspect: 1. Can disclosure effectively achieve all its goals?
2. In practice, does anything else need to be taken into account? 3. If the answer to 1. 
is negative, and to 2. is positive, what are the problems? 3. As securities markets 
always fluctuate, how can the law cope with this phenomenon when measuring 
damages?
To answer these questions, first, we should clarify that there are three topics 
calling for examination as mentioned above. Second, in analysing the three topics, a 
background study (Chapter Two) is necessary. That is, an initial analysis and 
introduction of the two legal frameworks regarding the regulation of disclosure on the 
public distribution of securities are discussed. Since the UK is required to fulfil her 
Community obligations as one of the EC members, the impact of the EC on the UK in 
terms of company law and securities regulation, i.e. the regulation of disclosure, is 
addressed simultaneously. Third, the justification of mandatory disclosure is tackled 
mostly from the legal aspect. In addition to developing the traditional arguments, this 
thesis shifts the battle to the legal argument based on the insufficiency of the general 
law, which has not been done before (Chapter Three). And then for the sake of 
completeness, we add a small chapter introducing and analysing the theories from the 
discipline of financial economics (Chapter Four). However, this chapter avoids an 
endless economic debate regarding mandatory disclosure. Afterwards, we apply the 
theory of materiality to establish the guidelines for the content of mandatory disclosure 
(Chapter Five). The last main chapter (Chapter Six) then focuses on civil liability for 
non-compliance. This thesis consequently discovers the defects existing between the 
theories and their application, and endeavours to find out a practical answer to solve 
such defects. Finally, conclusions are prompted in Chapter Seven.
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Some explanations are warranted regarding the reasons for not dealing with 
administrative or criminal liability in the context of non-compliance with mandatory 
disclosure. To begin with, administrative discipline has no direct effect on mandatory 
disclosure in the light of public issue of securities. Instead, it focuses on regulating 
market participants (i.e. people who carry on investment business) in order to maintain 
market integrity and protect investors.
Second, when criminal liabilities are concerned, either they have no theoretical 
difficulties or they provide a different insight which in a practical sense is not closely 
related to mandatory disclosure. Many sections in the Companies Act 1985 (the CA 
1985) and the Financial Services Act 1986 (the FSA 1986) demonstrate the former 
situation. For instance, a company, its shareholder, or its director may be punished 
because of non-disclosure (e.g. ss. 210(3), 211(10), 231(7), 232(4), 314(3), 317(7), 
324(7), the CA 1985); if listing particulars or prospectuses are published without a 
copy of them having been delivered for registration to the Registrar of Companies, any 
person who is knowingly a party to the publication shall be guilty of an offence (e.g. ss. 
149(3), 154A, the FSA 1986). However, all these do not require any further 
discussion.
On the other hand, insider dealing, the most important occasion for criminal 
liability, is far from easy to be caught. The insurmountable task regulators and the 
courts encounter is how to connect the trader with the information resource. It is not 
argued whether there should be disclosure. Nonetheless, s. 47 of the FSA 1986 does 
deal with the criminal liability for misleading statements. This will be discussed when 
materiality is examined in Chapter Five.
In effect, for investors, what concerns them most is the way they can recover 
their position and this is sought mainly through civil litigation. Even more, the issue of
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civil liabilities bears close relevance to mandatory disclosure. As a result, limited by the 
volume of this thesis, the topic of civil liability undoubtedly is more valuable to our 
analyses.
This thesis is intended to contribute to research on securities regulation in a 
number of ways. First, we justify mandatory disclosure regulation from a new 
perspective, i.e. the inadequacy of the general law. Second, it is suggested that 
materiality should be the guiding principle of designing the content of mandatory 
disclosure. Third, this thesis analyses the civil liability for non-compliance with 
disclosure requirements and proposes: (1) the scope for protection of investors in the 
aftermarket; (2) the resolution to the issue of reliance; (3) the ideal definition of 
damage; and (4) the appropriate way of measuring damages.
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A General Description of Mandatory Disclosure on the Public Distribution 
of Securities and on Publicly Issuing Companies
This chapter features the English and Taiwanese regulatory framework relating to 
mandatory disclosure. As the UK has to fulfil her obligation in the EC, the impact of 
the EC legislation on the UK (throughout the whole thesis, the expression UK with 
reference to a legal system should be taken as referring, unless the context otherwise 
requires, to England and Wales) in company law and securities regulation has to be 
considered. This is also addressed below.
2.1 The United Kingdom
Corporate disclosure is controlled mainly by five sets of regulations: the Companies 
Act 1985, the Financial Services Act 1986 (hereinafter referred to as the FSA 1986), 
the Public Offers of Securities Regulations 1995 (the POS Regulations), the Yellow 
Book, and the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers. The first three sets are statutes 
or statutory instruments, while the Yellow Book1 which contains the listing rules has 
legal effects because of the authorisation made by the FSA 1986.2 The City Code,3 
although it has no formal statutory standing, is in reality markedly persuasive through 
the operation of the Stock Exchange, the Securities and Investment Board (SIB), the 
self-regulating organisations (SROs), and the Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI).4
1 The Stock Exchange's Admission of Securities to Listing. The title of the "Yellow" Book comes 
from the colour of the cover.
2 s. 142(6).
3 The Code is published and administered by the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers which is not a 
statutory body.
4 First, the Stock Exchange inserts the City Code into the Yellow Book (even though the Code is not 
treated as part of the Listing Rules); non-compliance may result in suspension or withdrawal of the 
listing; second, the SIB and SROs have incorporated into their rulebooks the "cold-shouldering" rules
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Each this body of rules has its own specific concern. As a general rule, the 
Companies Act 1985 covers all kinds of companies, e.g. annual disclosure of all 
companies, disclosure of interests in shares, and acquisition and merger accounting.5 
Nonetheless, in the process of public distribution of securities, Part IV of the FSA 
1986 and the POS Regulations provide a more comprehensive regulatory framework, 
and thus transcend the Companies Act 1985 when listing particulars and prospectuses 
are considered. Besides that, once a company becomes listed, in addition to the 
requirements in the CA 1985, it must comply with the Yellow Book respecting 
continuous disclosure. Finally, the City Code sets out details of disclosure contents 
when an offeror initiates a bid, which regulates disclosure in takeovers and mergers.
Therefore, when one considers English law in relation to corporate disclosure, it 
may be apposite to classify it into three groups: disclosure at the time of public 
distribution of securities, disclosure after the public issue, and the correlative problem 
of disclosure when securities transactions are involved. The latter two groups are 
conceded as continuous disclosure under the mandatory disclosure regime.
2.1.1 Disclosure at the Time of Public Distribution of Securities
Any company which intends to publicly distribute its securities has to prepare a 
prospectus;6 if listing on the Stock Exchange is pursued, it has to prepare listing 
particulars unless the company offers its securities to the public in the UK for the first 
time, and then it has to publish a prospectus instead of listing particulars.7
which require their members not to act in connection with transactions regulated by the City Code for 
persons whom they believe would not comply with the takeovers rules; third, the Panel can report to 
the DTI any wrongdoing which may cause the latter to investigate the matter. See Graham Stedman, 
Takeovers, 1993, pp. 58-60; Michael Blair, Financial Services: The New Core Rules, 1991, p. 11.
5 See ss. 221-262A (Sched. 4), 198-220, and Sched. 4A respectively.
6 reg. 4(1) of the POS Regulations.
7 s. 144(2) of the FSA 1986.
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The current rules on prospectuses and listing particulars appear in the POS 
Regulations8 and Part IV of the FSA 1986. According to the POS Regulations, when 
securities are offered to the public in the UK for the first time, the offeror shall make a 
prospectus available to the public from the time he first offers the securities until the 
end of the period during which the offer remains open.9 Before a prospectus is 
published, it should be delivered to the Registrar of Companies for registration.10
Here it is worth mentioning briefly the history of disclosure regulation in 
company law. The Joint Stock Companies Act 184411 introduced the requirement for 
prospectuses and thereby for the first time applied the disclosure as a method to 
regulate companies.12 However, the 1844 Act did not compel companies to register 
prospectuses before their publication; nor did it require companies to issue 
prospectuses at the time of offering. To prepare prospectuses was only one of the 
conditions of obtaining the complete certificate (of incorporation). Moreover, the 
format and contents of prospectuses were not provided.
Not until 1929 were the provisions as regards the exact contents of a prospectus 
laid down in the Companies Act. It required every prospectus to state the matter 
specified in Part I of the Fourth Schedule to this Act and set out the reports specified 
in Part II of that Schedule.13 The Companies Act 1985 takes this as its model. The
8 S.I. 1995/1537, made on 14 June 1995 by the Treasury under s. 2(2) and Sched. 2 to the European 
Communities Act 1972, operative from 19 June 1995, repealing Part V of the FSA 1986.
9 reg. 4(1) of the POS Regulations.
10 reg. 4(2) of the POS Regulations.
11 7 & 8 Viet. c. 110(1844).
12 Such legislation could be attributed to the Gladstone report (1844 B.P.P., Vol. VII) and this in turn 
was triggered by numerous scandalous frauds. See L.C.B. Gower, Principles o f Modern Company 
Lccw, 5th ed., 1992, p. 39. The Report aimed to pursue the declared end of the better security of the 
public and to improve the legal and equitable remedies at that time available to companies and to their 
directors and shareholders, (see p. 3 of the Report). The first part of the Report focused on the minutes 
of evidence as to the case of West Middlesex General Annuity Assurance Company. The statement of 
the witnesses who were merchants, bankers, lawyers conversant with mercantile transactions, clearly 
indicated that disclosure would protect investors from fraud, (see pp. 21-3, 36-7, 64-5, 125, 130, 161, 
166-7, 193-4 of the Report) The great advantage anticipated from compulsory publication of corporate 
financial information was its approximation to the facts (p. 65) and that would be in the nature of a 
check upon fraud.
13 C f the repealed s. 56(1) of the CA 1985.
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progress of the Companies Act 1929 revealed that the development of prospectuses 
was very advanced in the era of the 30's in the UK. Now, the job of regulating 
prospectuses has been shifted from the Companies Act 1985 to the POS Regulations.
As regards listing particulars, the FSA 1986 lays out its general contents and 
leaves the details with the Stock Exchange. For example, the Act emphasises the 
necessity of including material information in particulars, i.e. any information that is 
reasonably expected by investors and their professional advisers for the purpose of 
making an informed assessment of the assets and liabilities, financial position, profits 
and losses, and prospects of the issuer, as well as the rights attaching to those 
securities.14 So far as the contents of listing particulars are concerned, the Stock 
Exchange assumes the task of deciding.
2.1.2 Disclosure following Public Offers
(1) the Companies Act 1985
First, it is noteworthy that disclosure requirements in the Companies Act are based on 
the type of companies, that is, public or private, and on the size of companies, small, 
medium or neither. This implies that whether or not a company has publicly issued its 
securities will not affect its obligation of disclosure. Second, the Companies Act in 
principle centres on annual accounts and directors' reports. It does not regulate half- 
yearly or quarterly reports. They are not required under the Companies Act.
In principle, both public and private companies carry the same obligations 
concerning the preparation of accounts and reports. The only privilege private 
companies possess is that they can elect to dispense with the laying of these documents
14 s. 146(1) of the FSA 1986.
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before the company at general meeting.15 Such an elective solution by no means 
relaxes the obligation of preparing accounts and reports on private companies. This 
"equal" treatment between public and private companies derives from a long history of 
evolution which reflects the attitudes of the legislature towards private companies. The 
reason is that if the size of a private company is not limited, its members should not be 
deprived of their rights of accessing corporate information only because the company 
is "private". To re-state, when a private company is possibly larger than a public 
company, members of the private company are not counted as inferior to those of the 
public company in the context of information availability, and this justifies the equal 
treatment.16
15 s. 252 of the CA 1985.
16 The Companies Act 1908, which was substituted for the Companies Acts of 1898, 1900, and 1907, 
drew a line between private companies and public companies in relation to the disclosure obligation. 
Private companies were created by the Companies Act 1907, s. 37, which was replaced by s. 121 of 
Companies Act 1908. They were defined as companies with no more than fifty members whose right 
to transfer the shares was restricted and were prohibited from publicly distributing their shares and 
debentures. A private company enjoyed the privileges and gained exemption from many of the 
obligations imposed on public companies. In its annual summary, a statement in the form of a balance 
sheet was not required (s. 26) and it didn't need to file or forward to its members the statutory report 
(s. 65). As to the requirement of prospectus, it was even not asked to issue any statement in lieu of 
prospectus. All the privileges enjoyed by the private company were justified on the basis of its "non­
public" nature. It was not required to make its information public because it could not invite the public 
to subscribe to its shares or debentures. Non-disclosure was presumed not harmful to investors in this 
situation. In addition, the private company would be found extremely useful in the case of partners 
wishing to have the benefit of the protection of limited liability, and yet not wishing to disclose its 
information. See L. Worthington Evans and F. Shewell Cooper, Notes on the Companies Act 1907, 
1907, p. 50. The privileges previously extended to all private companies exempting them from the 
obligation to include in the annual return a copy of the balance sheet and annexed documents were 
restricted to a new form of company called the "exempt private company" in the Companies Act 1948. 
The basic condition for exemption was that no body corporate was the holder of any of its shares or 
debentures and that no person other than the holder had any interest in any of those shares or 
debentures (s. 129(4)). Whether this exemption should be repealed was debated. Grounded on the 
consideration that "publication of the accounts of small companies would give large concerns valuable 
information about the finances of their smaller rivals while the latter do not gain any corresponding 
advantage from the publication of accounts of the larger concerns ... the large concern may be able to 
drive the small out of business, but the latter can do little harm to the former ... Many small private 
companies are at least as much in competition with partnerships and individuals as with other 
companies, and this, in our opinion, is a sufficient reason for continuing the exemption while 
restricting its scope" (see Report o f  the Committee on Company Law Amendment (Cohen Report), 
Cmnd. 6659, 1945, p. 27), it was decided that the privileges were limited to the "exempt private 
company" and the reason for exclusion of those private companies with corporate holders was to 
prevent public companies from abusing this system by trading through subsidiary private companies. 
The privileges to the "exempt private company" were finally abolished by the Companies Act 1967. 
This step was due to the doubt which arose in the course of examining whether the definition of the 
private company had worked out as intended. It was said that of the 387,000 private companies 
registered in 1961, some 269,000 that had at the end of 1961 claimed the status of exempt private 
companies were not very small in membership or in capital or in the extent of their undertakings and
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Consequently, the Companies Act 1981 (and continued by the CA 1985) drew a 
distinction based on the size of companies. As will be discussed in section 2.2.1, small 
and medium companies enjoy certain exemptions regarding the preparation and 
delivery of corporate accounts and reports. The new exemption rules make their 
contribution to small and medium size companies, in that they are less burdensome. 
The new rules, however, ignore the fact that a small or medium company may publicly 
distribute its securities if it is a public company. This possibility, although not 
substantial, cannot be eliminated, and thus, the exemptions are worth reconsideration.
The Companies Act 1985 requires companies to prepare annual accounts and 
directors' reports. Among these, annual accounts should include the balance sheet and 
the profit and loss account.17 In fact, early in the Joint Stock Companies Act 1844, it 
provided that every registered company had to audit its balance sheet and books of 
accounts, and these documents provided by directors of the company comprised half- 
yearly (or other periodical) accounts and the balance sheet.18 However, the details of 
the balance sheet were not developed until the Companies act 1856, which increased 
the items contained in the reports to shareholders.19 Finally, the formats of the balance 
sheet and profit and loss account are set out by the CA 1981 and followed by the CA 
1985.
the very complexity of the definitions not only made its application uncertain but also produced 
unfairness because some of those private companies were not entitled to it. See S.W. Magnus, and M. 
Estrin, The Companies Act 1967, 1967, p. 19. The Jenkins Report (Cmnd. 1749, 1962, p. 21) looked 
at this argument and recommended the termination of this distinction. The Report argued: "We 
appreciate the argument that the filing of accounts may cause embarrassment or inconvenience to 
some exempt private companies ... We think that in general such disadvantage as there may be should 
be accepted because disclosure is right in principle and necessary to protect those who trade with and 
extend credit to limited companies."
17 Part VII and Sched. 4 of the CA 1985.
18 s. 38 of the Joint Stock Companies Act 1844.
19 See Table B of the Companies Act 1856, 19 & 20 Viet. c. 47 (1856).
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(2) the Yellow Book
The "Listing Rules" regulate only listed companies. As a consequence, any unlisted 
public companies which publicly issue securities are not required to prepare any extra 
disclosure documents other than the annual report. This may have effects on deterring 
companies from applying for listings, and also discriminate against shareholders in 
those unlisted public companies.
The Yellow Book proceeds in two steps: first, it sets out the contents of listing 
particulars and prospectuses together with their circulation and publication; second, it 
requires all listed companies to disclose certain information continuously, which 
includes half-yearly and immediate disclosure, in addition to annual reports.
In the first place, regarding the duty for immediate reporting, it is established that 
any information which will affect the price movement should be disclosed to the Stock 
Exchange without any delay;20 for the purpose of preventing insider dealing or any 
unfairness which may have a negative impact on market integrity, such information is 
not allowed to be given out before disclosure is made to the Stock Exchange.21 The 
exceptional case is the communication between the company and its advisers or 
counterparts in negotiation with respect to the effecting of a transaction or raising 
capital. The company, however, must advise the recipients of such information that it is 
confidential and that they should not deal in the company's securities before the 
information has been made available to the public.22
Second, listed companies must prepare half-yearly reports. Only group 
companies have this obligation.23 Generally, half-yearly reports should be prepared on
20 Chapter 9 of the Yellow Book.
21 9.7, id.
22 9.4 and 9.5, id.
23 12.46, id.
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a basis consistent with that of the annual accounts; if not, directors have to make a 
statement to the effect that, according to their opinion, the report enables investors to 
make an informed assessment of the results of activities of the group companies.24 The 
report must be published within four months of the end of the period to which it 
relates, either by sending it to securities holders and making copies available at the 
registered office of the company in the UK and at the offices of any paying agents of 
the company in the UK, or by inserting the report as a paid advertisement in at least 
one national newspaper.25
2.1.3 Disclosure in Connection with other Securities Transactions
(1) disclosure of interests in shares
Early in the Companies Acts 196726 and 1976,27 directors of all companies and 
substantial shareholders of listed companies were required to disclose their interests in 
the companies.28 The Companies Act 1985 continues this requirement29 and extends its 
application to all public companies with regard to the disclosure obligation of 
substantial shareholders.30 The Companies Act 1989 amended the Companies Act 
1985: the threshold of shareholding to notify the company by substantial shareholders 
is reduced from five per cent to three per cent.31 The time within which such 
notification must be given is also reduced from five days to two days.32
24 12.47, id.
25 12.49, id.
26 ss. 27-9, 33, of the Companies Act 1967.
27 ss. 24-7 of the Companies Act 1976.
28 See Robert R. Pennington, The Companies Acts 1980 and 1981, 1983, p. 1.
29 Sections 324-8 regulate the disclosure duty imposed on directors.
30 ss. 198-220 of the Companies Act 1985.
31 The Companies Act 1989, s. 134(2) amended the CA 1985, s. 199(2); the CA 1985, s. 201 was 
repealed by the CA 1989, s. 212 and Schedule 24.
32 the CA 1989, s, 134(3) amended the CA 1985, ss. 202(1), (4) and 206(8).
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This disclosure mainly serves two functions: to deter insider dealing, and to 
detect takeovers at an early stage. A director (including a shadow director) is obliged 
to notify the company in writing of his interests in corporate securities at the time he 
becomes a director, which includes the number of shares of each class and the amount 
of the debenture of each class of the company. He also has to notify the company if his 
interests in securities are in any other body corporate which is the company's subsidiary 
or holding company or a subsidiary of the holding company.33
Subsequent to that, if he becomes or ceases to be interested in corporate 
securities, he has to notify the company about this event, as well as about any 
securities transactions he makes 34
The definition of an "interest" is set out in Schedule 13, Part I, where it states 
that a director has an interest even if he only enters into a contract to obtain securities, 
or he is entitled to exercise any right conferred by the holding of the securities. For 
example, if he is only appointed as a proxy to vote or represents a company at any 
meeting, these will not constitute an interest of his. Directors have to fulfil this 
requirement within five days following the day they know the existence of the 
interest.35
On the other hand, a substantial shareholder (though, significantly, not debenture 
holder) is obliged to notify the company when he becomes interested in shares 
comprised in a public company's relevant share capital, as well as when he ceases to be 
so or there is any increase or decrease in such interest.36 Relevant share capital denotes
33 s. 324(1) of the CA 1985.
34 s. 324(2) of the CA 1985.
35 Part II of Sched. 13 of the CA 1985, which were amended to implement Directive 88/627/EEC (the 
Major Shareholding Directive), OJ 1988 L 348/62.
36 ss. 198-220 of the CA 1985.
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that company's issued share capital of a class carrying rights to vote in all 
circumstances at general meetings of the company.37
The difficulty arising is that the calculation of interests is based on the proportion 
of the total nominal value of shares held by a shareholder to the aggregate nominal 
value of the issued shares comprised in that class, and it is not easy for a shareholder to 
know when his shareholding will exceed the percentage provided by law or fall below 
that percentage. Therefore, this obligation is subject to the knowledge of a substantial 
shareholder.
Besides that, for detecting takeovers and preventing the evasion of the 
notification obligation, the Act requires the so-called "concert parties" to notify the 
company when the conditions mentioned below are met.38 First, there is an agreement 
between several parties; the meaning of an agreement is very broad, embracing any 
undertakings, expectations, and understandings, no matter express or implied, absolute 
or not. However, the agreement must be legally binding.39 Second, according to the 
agreement, any one or more of the parties will be obliged to acquire shares of a 
particular public company.40 Third, the agreement must also include provisions 
imposing obligations or restrictions on any one or more of the parties to it with respect 
to their use, retention or disposal of their interests in that company's shares acquired in 
pursuance of the agreement.41 The term "use" signifies the exercising of any rights or 
of any control or influence arising from those interests.42 Fourth, shares have been in 
fact acquired by any of the concert parties.43
37 s. 198(2) of the CA 1985.
38 ss. 204-5 of the CA 1985.
39 s. 204(6) of the CA 1985. It provides that "this section does not apply to an agreement which is not 
legally binding unless it involves mutuality in the undertakings,..." But if there is mutuality, there is 
supposed to be valuable consideration which makes the agreement legally binding. See L.C.B. Gower, 
supra note 12, p. 616.
40 s. 204(1) of the CA 1985.
41 s. 204(2)(a) of the CA 1985.
42 s. 204(3), id.
43 s. 204(2)(b), id.
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Therefore, once any acquisition occurs, the concert parties can no longer conceal 
their agreement. The continuous obligation referred to above is to notify the company 
when their aggregate interests are over 3 per cent, not individually. In the notification, 
each party not only has to provide his own information, but also inform the company 
of the interests of the other parties. Even more, they have to keep each other informed 
about their interests apart from the agreement. All these obligations depend on the 
obligors' knowledge.
(2) disclosure in takeovers
The Take-over Panel was formally established in 1968 due to the event of Aberdare 
Holdings' tender offer for Metal Industries and the City Code was promulgated in the 
same year by it (before that, the regulation work was left to the Prevention of Fraud 
Act (1939 & 1958)). The Panel is a designated authority regarding the disclosure of 
information.44 Half of the City Code's 10 General Principles relates to disclosure.45 For 
example, General Principle 4 lays down the fundamental requirement that shareholders 
must be given sufficient information and advice to enable them to reach a properly 
informed decision and must have sufficient time to do so; no relevant information 
should be withheld from them. General Principle 5 asks for the highest standards of 
care and accuracy with regards to the preparation of the disclosure documents. 
General Principle 6 prohibits the creation of a false market and prevents shareholders 
from being misled. Even more, in Rules 3, 19, 20, 23, 25, 27, and 29, the Code 
provides a set of rules to help shareholders make an informed judgment.46
44 See Financial Services (Disclosure of Information) (Designated Authorities No. 2) Order 1987 (S.I. 
1987/859), made under the FSA 1986, s. 180(3), (4).
45 They are Principles 2, 4, 5, 6, and 9.
46 See Chapter Three.
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Shareholders of a target company are, therefore, assured of obtaining sufficient 
information before they make decisions as to the offer. Besides that, if the 
consideration being offered consists of securities for which listing will be sought, 
listing particulars may be required.47 By way of contrast, if unlisted securities are 
offered as consideration, no prospectuses are called for 48 In addition, the offer itself is 
an investment advertisement; consequently, it must be issued or approved by an 
authorised person unless the listing is pursued.49
2.2 The Impact of the EC on the UK
The British legislature, in order duly to perform the duties of a Member State of the 
EC, has obligations to or not to enact or amend its national law. So far as regulations 
of the EC are concerned, that the British legislature is prohibited from implementing 
them in principle was made clear in Commission v. Italy.50 This is due to the 
characteristic of "direct applicability" of regulations bestowed by the EC Treaty (The 
Treaty establishing the European Community). The second paragraph of Article 189 of 
the Treaty provides: "A regulation shall have general application. It shall be binding in 
its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States". Based on this Article, 
national courts must take cognisance of regulations as legal instruments and the 
legislative duplication of regulation is impermissible, because this can ensure that 
regulations will be brought into effect simultaneously in all Member States and will not 
be distorted by individual national legislation. Only thus can the uniform application of 
regulations in all Member States be guaranteed.
47 ss. 142-57, the FSA 1986. The Yellow Book, 8.15-8.17, 10.45-10.49 (listing particulars and 
supplementary listing particulars).
48 reg. 7(2)(k) of the POS Regulations.
49 ss. 57(1), 58(l)(d) of the FSA 1986.
50 Case 39/72 [1973] E.C.R. 101. See also Case 34/73, Fratelli Variola v. Amministrazione italiana 
delle Finanze [1973] E.C.R. 981.
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By contrast, given the nature of EC directives, they need implementation by the 
Member States. Article 189, paragraph three, explicitly states that a directive shall 
leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods; the binding effect of a 
directive on the Member States only concerns "the result to be achieved".
Since the harmonisation of company law and securities regulation among the 
Member States is carried out mainly through the issue of directives, the major task of 
the British government is to implement these directives. However, the English courts 
should be aware that if a directive is not implemented, in certain instances the directive 
may have "direct effect" and thus give rise to rights in individuals against the "State",51 
and when a directive has been implemented the principle of consistent interpretation 
should be followed.52
The term "direct effect" means that some provisions of directives can give rise to 
rights in individuals or impose (if allowed)53 obligations on individuals.54 In other
51 The European Court of Justice extends the scope of the "State" to "public body" which is not 
confined to direct emanations of the State and will include a body carrying out a public regulatory 
function even though it may take the form of a private body. See Case C-188/89, Foster v. British Gas 
[1990] E.C.R. 1-3313. See also D.D. Prentice (ed.), EEC Directives on Company Law and Financial 
Markets, 1991, p. 4. For example, Directives 79/279 and 80/390 require the Member States to 
designate the national authority or authorities to exercise a regulatory function on the events of 
admissions to listing and listing particulars (Art. 9 and Art. 18 respectively). The UK designates the 
Securities and Investment Board (SIB) and the London Stock Exchange as the competent authorities. 
The Secretary of State made an order (The Financial Services Act 1986 (Delegation) Order 1987 (S.I. 
1987/942)) to delegate part of its power to the SIB pursuant to s. 114 of the FSA 1986. Based on s. 
142 (6), the Stock Exchange becomes the competent authority. See Official Listing of Securities 
(Change of Competent Authority) Regulations 1991 (S.I. 1991/2000, regs. 1(1) and 3(l)(b)).
52 Macarthys Ltd. v. Smith [1979] 3 All E.R. 325; Garland [1983] 2 A.C. 751, p. 771; Pickstone 
[1989] 1 A.C. 66, p. 126; Case 51/76, Verbond [1977] E.C.R. 113, p. 128. para. 30; Case 106/77, 
Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal S.pA. [1978] E.C.R. 629, p. 644, para. 21; 
Case 61/81, Commission v. United Kingdom o f Great Britain and Northern Ireland [1982] E.C.R. 
2601, p. 2616, para. 9; Case 270/81, Felicitas [1982] E.C.R. 2771, p. 2786, para. 25; Case 14/83, Von 
Colson [1984] E.C.R. 1891, p. 1909, para. 2; Case C-106/89, Marleasing v. La Comercial [1990] 
E.C.R. 1-4135, p. 4159, para. 8, etc. See also P.P. Craig, "Sovereignty of the United Kingdom", Year 
Book o f European Law 1991, 221-55, 1992, p. 242.
53 This mainly relates to the problem of horizontal direct effect.
54 See A. Dashwood, "The Principle of Direct Effect in European Community Law", in 16 J.C.M.S., 
229-45, 1978, p. 229; J. Steiner, "Direct Applicability in EC Law — A Chameleon Concept", in 98 
L.Q.R., 229-48, 1982, p. 239, it is called "effect utile"; J. Steiner, "Coming to Terms with EC 
Directives", in 106 L.Q.R., 144-59, 1990, p. 145; Rose M. D'Sa, European Community Law and Civil 
Remedies in England and Wales, 1994, chapter 5.
42
Chapter Two: A General Description
words, individuals can invoke their rights based on these provisions in certain 
situations.55 If the opposite party is the "State", then this is referred to as "vertical 
direct effect" to denote the relationship between a citizen and the State; if individuals 
can be sued as defendants, then it is called "horizontal direct effect" to denote the 
relationship between individuals.
Whether a directive has direct effect is not stated in the EC Treaty. Instead, the 
applicable principle was mainly developed by the Court during the seventies and early 
eighties. The criteria which a provision of the directive must satisfy if it is to be directly 
effective have been re-iterated by the Court on numerous occasions. The Court stated 
that in order to decide whether a provision has direct effect, it is necessary to examine, 
in every case, whether the nature, general scheme and wording o f the provision in 
question are capable o f having direct effect on the relations between Member States 
and individuals.56 Analysing and categorising this, the provision concerned should be 
clear and unambiguous,57 unconditional, and not dependent on further action.58
Up to this point, the vertical direct effect is well accepted by the Court, but not 
the horizontal direct effect. Article 189, paragraph three, of the EC Treaty provides. 
"A directive, shall be binding ...upon each Member State to which it is addressed..." It 
is obvious that, from this, the addressees of directives are the Member States, not 
individuals. Thus, if directives can give rise to rights in individuals, the obligors will be 
limited to the "State" only. That is why the vertical direct effect has been well- 
established by the case law of the Court. Individuals enjoy the right while the Member 
States bear the burden. Admittedly, before the directive is incorporated into the
55 Case 33/70, SACE v. Italian Ministry for Finance [1970] E.C.R. 1213, p. 1223, para. 15; Case 
9/70, Franz Grad v. Finanzamt Traunstein [1970] E.C.R. 825, p. 837, para. 5; Case 41/74, van Duyn 
[1974] E.C.R. 1337, p. 1349, para. 15; Case 43/75, Defrenne v. Sabena [1976] E.C.R. 455, p. 475, 
paras. 33-4; Case 148/78, Ratti [1979] E.C.R. 1629, p. 1641, para. 19; Case 8/81, Becker [1982] 
E.C.R. 53, p. 70, para. 21; Case 152/84, Marshall [1986] E.C.R. 723, p. 749, para. 47.
56 Case 41/74, van Duyn [1974] E.C.R. 1337, p. 1348, para. 12.
57 The Court uses the term "sufficiently precise". See Case 8/81, Becker [1982] E.C.R. 53, p. 71, para. 
25.
58 See T.C. Hartley, The Foundations o f European Community Law, 3rd ed., 1994, pp. 199-206.
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national legal system, the Member States traditionally have international obligations 
under the Treaty to the Commission59 and other Member States.60 Since the individual 
is the beneficiary of those directives which aim to require the Member States to bestow 
rights on the individual, to extend the traditional view and allow the individual to 
invoke his own right before the national court is not abnormal. As a result, it is not 
difficult to admit the existence of the relationship between the State and the individual 
once the fact mentioned above is appreciated. But the relationship between individuals 
regarding direct effect of directives, generally called "horizontal direct effect", has not 
yet been recognised by the case law of the Court. More than that, the Marshall case 
has finally laid all speculation about horizontal direct effect to rest.61
In case R. v. International Stock Exchange, ex p. Else (1982) Ltd.,62 with regard 
to whether the case should be referred to the European Court for preliminary ruling on 
the construction of Article 15 of Directive 79/279 (Admission Directive),63 the court of 
appeal ruled in favour of the Stock Exchange that the case did not need to be referred 
to the Court, because the national court could interpret Article 15 of Directive 79/279 
confidently. In other words, the court believes that this Directive does not give rise to 
the right of judicial review in shareholders of companies concerning the cancellation of 
listing of companies' shares.
59 Article 169 of the EC Treaty provides: "If the Commission considers that a Member State has failed 
to fulfil an obligation under this Treaty, it shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the matter after giving 
the State concerned the opportunity to submit its observations. If the State concerned does not comply 
with the opinion within the period laid down by the Commission, the latter may bring the matter 
before the Court of Justice."
60 Article 170 of the EC Treaty provides: "A Member State which considers that another Member 
State has failed to fulfil an obligation under this Treaty may bring the matter before the Court of 
Justice."
61 D. Wyatt and A. Dashwood, European Community Law, 3rd ed., 1993, p. 74. See also Case 80/86, 
Kolpinghuis Nijmegen [1987] E.C.R. 3969, p. 3985, para. 9. However, it is worthwhile to mention 
here that this issue has been reopened in Dori v. Recreb Sri. (Case C-91/92 [1994] E.C.R. 1-3325). 
The court insisted on its position taken in Marshall and held that no horizontal direct effect could 
occur (p. 1-3355, para. 20). But in the opinion of the Advocate General Jacobs (delivered on 27 
January 1994) regarding Case Nicole Vaneetveld (Case C-316/93 [1994] E.C.R. 1-763), the Advocate 
General strongly supported the view that directives should have horizontal direct effect. It is 
impossible to predict at this moment whether the Court will change its attitude or not in the future; 
this remains to be observed.
62 [1993] 1 All E.R. 420.
63 OJ 1979 L 66/21.
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This case concerned a company named Titaghur pic. whose shares were listed on 
the Stock Exchange and were cancelled by the panel of the Quotations Committee of 
the Stock Exchange. Several shareholders of the company applied for judicial review. 
One of the central issues on this appeal was: "Are the applicants as shareholders 
entitled in Community law to challenge the Committee's decision to cancel the 
company's listing?"
Shareholders under the domestic law are not endowed with this right. The 
problem is whether they can claim their rights in front of the court based on the 
Directive. Article 15(1) of this Directive provides:
"Member States shall ensure decisions of the competent authorities refusing 
the admission of a security to official listing or discontinuing such a listing 
shall be subject to the right to apply to the courts."
In this provision, persons entitled to apply to the courts are not identified. The court 
indicated that this Directive only regulated relations between competent authorities 
(here the Stock Exchange) and companies or issuers; there was nothing to suggest that 
competent authorities may have direct relations with investors. It held:
"Although this Directive expressly recognised the responsibility of competent 
listing authorities to protect the interests of investors, which was always to be 
the overriding concern of a competent authority when exercising its powers in 
dealing with conditions imposed and obligations undertaken by companies 
whose securities were admitted to listing, the primary purpose of the 
Directive was to co-ordinate the listing practice of competent authorities in 
member states with a view to establishing a common market in securities and 
not in any direct way to provide additional protection for investors."64
Following this reasoning, the court declared that only companies and issuers were 
entitled to claim the right of judicial review.
64 Id., p. 421.
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Additionally, no provision in this Directive requires competent authorities to 
provide investors with information of their decisions; no provision deals with problems 
arising from the principle that a company is a legal entity separate and distinct from its 
shareholders and that a shareholder could not as such act on behalf of or enforce the 
rights of the company; there is also no provision to define "investors". Thus the court 
has concluded that shareholders did not have this right.
However, it is likely that this judgment is based on policy considerations more 
than the reasons mentioned above. Since the Directive is aimed at partly to protect 
investors, based on a purposive construction, it is not impossible to construe that 
shareholders are protected by Article 15. The real problem is that there are thousands 
of shareholders; if the company itself does not want to challenge the decision, while 
minority shareholders want to do so, it may be against the will of majority shareholders 
and the company. It is also true that courts may not wish to interfere with the internal 
management of a company acting within its powers. In addition to this, the court wants 
to ensure the administrative expedience and efficiency of the competent authorities, 
which are also the goals of this Directive.65
2.2.1 The Impact of the EC on UK Companies Acts
The harmonisation of the company laws in the Member States began in the 1960s. 
Early in 1966, a Report entitled "The Development of a European Capital Market" has 
indicated the importance of disclosing corporate information. It mentions:
"Certain groups of financial institutions have set up joint research units to 
guide their own and their associated investment houses' investment policy and
65 See the preamble to the Directive: "Whereas there should be the possibility of a right to apply to the 
courts against decisions by the competent national authorities in respect of the application of this 
Directive, although such right to apply must not be allowed to restrict the discretion of these 
authorities."
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have placed the information so collected at the disposal of their clients. 
Similarly, financial analysis companies have been formed, precisely for the 
purpose of circulating to their subscribers comparative information on 
securities in various countries. But in spite of these praiseworthy initiatives, 
the quality of published information unfortunately still suffers only too often 
from the inadequacy o f the basic data disclosed by companies. "66 (emphasis 
added)
This points out two problems: one is that the inadequacy of information is 
attributed to the hesitance of providers, namely, companies; the other is that the quality 
of information is inadequate. This might partly result from the lack of comparability of 
information.
Some of the following directives concerning company law harmonisation were 
triggered by these considerations. Directive 68/15167 (the First Council Directive) 
adopted in 1968, aiming to mitigate the first problem, created a system of public 
disclosure applicable to all companies (public and private), and ensured the publication 
of certain information in an official gazette. This device made the same type of 
information available to the public in respect of all companies in the Community.68 
Business firms feared that more exhaustive disclosure of their affairs would weaken 
their competitive position unless their rivals were put under the same situation. Thus, 
that the First Council Directive mandated all companies to do so in practice mitigated 
this problem. This caused the UK to implement it by s. 9(3) of the European 
Communities Act 1972 and subsequently codify in the Companies Act 1976, ss. 1 and 
6.69 Directive 77/9170 (the Second Council Directive) supplemented the First Council
66 See Report of a Group of Experts appointed by the EEC Commission, The Development o f a 
European Capital Market, 1966, p. 227.
67 SpEd 1968(1) p. 41.
68 The disclosure items being required include the instrument of constitution, statutes and their 
amendments, the balance sheet, profit and loss account for each financial year, etc. See Article 2(1) of 
the First Council Directive. Article 3(1) provides: "In each Member State a file shall be opened in a 
central register, commercial register or companies register, for each of the companies registered 
therein." And Article 3(4) requires that the disclosure documents shall be effected by publication in 
the national gazette.
69 See Company Accounting and Disclosure, A Consultative Document (Green Paper), Cmnd. 7654, 
1979, p. 10. Section 1(7) of the Companies Act 1976 provides: "...the directors of the company shall
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Directive regarding the information which should be disclosed in the statute or the 
instrument of incorporation of the company, inter alia, the information about shares 
and capital.71 It was implemented by the Companies Act 1980 and now in the 
Companies Act 1985, s. 117(3)(c) and (d).72
The principle of the First Council Directive was extended to new categories of 
documents for information by the subsequent directives. For example, Article 47(1) of 
Directive 78/66073 (the Fourth Council Directive) requires that the annual accounts, 
duly approved, and the annual report, together with the opinion submitted by the 
person responsible for auditing the accounts, shall be published in accordance with the 
First Council Directive; Article 38 of Directive 83/34974 (the Seventh Council 
Directive) has the same requirement with regard to consolidated accounts and 
consolidated annual report together with the opinion submitted by the person 
responsible for auditing.
As regards the second problem, if accounting documents issued by companies in 
different Member States are comparable and equivalent, the quality of information will 
be improved. The reasons are considered below. The instruments mainly used by 
companies to communicate information to existing or potential shareholders and 
creditors are financial statements which include annual accounts and annual reports. 
The annual report in the UK is similar to the directors' report. Given the situation in 
the European Community, investors may engage in cross-border investments. They
deliver to the Registrar of Companies a copy of every document required to be comprised in the 
accounts of the company in respect of that period..." (Eliz. 2, 24 & 25 c. 69).
70 OJ 1977 L 26/1. The Second Council Directive is principally concerned with the formation of 
public companies, and the maintenance and alteration of their capital.
71 Articles 2 and 3 of the Directive.
72 s. 4 of the Companies Act 1980, and now Companies Act 1985, section 117(3)(c) which states that 
the statutory declaration must specify the amount, or estimated amount, of the company's preliminary 
expenses and the persons by whom any of those expenses have been paid or are payable and (3)(d) 
requires it to specify any amount or benefit paid or given, or intended to be paid or given, to any 
promoter of the company, and the consideration for the payment or benefit.
73 OJ 1978 L 222/11.
74 OJ 1983 L 193/1.
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have to assess another country's political, economic and financial situations and 
prospects, and short-term outlook of particular industries. This is not without 
difficulty. As regards foreign shares, they have the additional problem of interpreting 
the facts and figures published by foreign companies.75 Thus, the harmonisation of 
accounting standards can help investors understand the information they have been 
given, because that is similar to their home country's system. Based on this, the 
necessity of harmonising the preparation of corporate accounts can be easily advocated 
and this was done by the Fourth Council Directive and the Seventh Council Directive. 
The former emphasises the harmonisation of accounting preparation and minimum 
requirements of disclosure, while the latter supplements the former in connection with 
consolidated accounts.
The Fourth Council Directive had a considerable effect on UK legislation. It not 
only brought about the enactment of the Companies Act 1981 but also introduced 
many different ideas new to the UK. It had two main purposes. First, it attempted to 
harmonise the different regulations co-existing in the Member States, which in turn 
aimed to enhance the freedom of establishment and to ensure that investors would be 
protected by access to more comprehensive and standardised information. Second, it 
was intended to relieve both medium and small companies of accounting and disclosure 
obligations.76
However, the Companies Act 1981 adopted a somewhat different attitude 
towards medium and small size companies.77 The Fourth Council Directive permits the 
Member State to give exemptions both with regard to the drawing up and the
75 See supra note 66.
76 In its preamble, it reveals its goals as follows: 1. to achieve simultaneous co-ordination because it is 
necessary in these fields for these forms of companies whose activities frequently extend beyond the 
frontiers of their national territories; 2. for the protection of members and third parties of the 
companies; 3. to establish in the Community minimum equivalent legal requirements as regards the 
extent of the financial information that should be made available to the public by companies.
77 Before the enactment of the Companies Act 1981, there was a consultative document, i.e., 
Company Accounting and Disclosure, Cmnd. 7654, 1979.
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publication of the accounts to small and medium size companies.78 According to ss. 5 
and 6 of the Companies Act 1981, these companies were only entitled to the benefit of 
the exemption with respect to the delivery to the Registrar of Companies under section 
l(7)(a) of the Companies Act 1976 of accounts and other documents in respect of the 
accounting reference period by reference to which that financial year was determined.79 
In other words, they were subject to the same obligation of drawing up the accounts 
circulated to the shareholders as large companies.80
Even so, this Act is important because of its embodiment of some provisions for 
the first time. It also marks a radical departure in respect of the whole area of company 
financial statements in the UK.81 For example, for the first time, English law prescribes 
precise formats for the presentation of company accounts and lays down rules for 
calculating the amounts at which items are to be stated in those accounts,82 and one of 
the most significant changes brought about by the Act is the requirement for company 
accounts to follow the standard format.83
The idea of a standard presentation of the principal accounting statements was 
new to the UK for companies.84 It was unprecedented that UK company law regulated 
the publication of a company's accounts in circumstances other than where a company 
delivers its accounts to the Registrar of Companies.85 This Act also inserted some 
accounting rules and this helped to strengthen the accountants' position.86 Britain
78 Articles 11, 27, and 47. The reason why the Community wants to simplify the administrative 
procedures imposed on small and medium-sized undertakings is to improve the business environment 
and to promote the development of enterprises.
79 ss. 6 (2) and (7) deal with small and medium size companies respectively.
80 This has been changed. The Companies Act 1985 (Accounts of Small and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises and Publication of Accounts in ECUs) Regulations 1992 (S.I. 1992/2452) give small-size 
companies concessions on drafting the balance sheet, the notes to the accounts, and the directors' 
report. See regs. 1 and 4(3) of the Regulations; s. 246(1A) and (IB) of the CA 1985.
81 See George W. Eccles and Jenny Cox (eds.), Tolley's Companies Act 1981, 1982, p. 9.
82 See Alan Hardcastle and Michael Renshall (eds.), The Companies Act 1981 Handbook, 1985, p. 2.
83 See the Companies Act 1981, Sched. 1, Part I.
84 See Peter N. McMonniew, The Companies Act 1981, a practical guide, 1982, p. 5.
85 s. 11 of the Companies Act 1981. See also Alan Hardcastle and M. Renshall (eds), supra note 82, 
pp. 80-3
86 The Companies Act 1981, Sched. 1, Part II.
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traditionally adopts the "permissive" approach, but after this Directive, the British 
legislation has to adjust itself to the continental "prescriptive" approach.87
The Seventh Council Directive harmonises the issue regarding consolidated 
accounts by specifying the way and the circumstances in which consolidated accounts 
must be prepared. As in group companies, the way to provide investors with accounts 
fulfilling the requirement of having a true and fair view is to prepare a consolidated 
account, it can be said that the aim of co-ordinating the legislation governing 
consolidated accounts is to protect the interests subsisting in companies with share 
capital.
This Directive resulted in the Companies Act 1989 which has no single objective 
but a number of principal themes in addition to the above mentioned one.88 It entirely 
replaced Part VTI of the Companies Act 1985 by its Part I with regard to accounts and 
audit.89 To improve the provisions concerning the consolidated accounts, aimed at by 
the Directive, the law has a new definition of so-called subsidiary "undertakings". Since 
they are named as undertakings, they are no longer necessarily limited to include only 
companies, instead they can be partnerships, limited partnerships and so on. This
87 The permissive approach means that the law only asks the accounts to give a true and fair view of a 
company's financial performance and financial status instead of providing comprehensive definition 
of form and content, while the prescriptive approach asks for not only form and content of accounts 
but also permitted concepts and methods of accounting measurement being defined. When the 
Companies Act 1981 was passed, the then Minister for Trade Mr. Cecil Parkinson said: "The 
technical accounting provisions... represent a much more detailed and prescriptive statutory approach 
than we are familiar with in this country. The Government has, however, been at pains to impose the 
minimum change necessary in actual accounting practice and, so far as is consistent with the 
directive, to leave more flexibility and freedom as possible for the development of that accounting 
practice..."(Hansard: Sixth Series, Vol. 5 (1980-81), p. 647). See Stephen Bare and Nicholas Bowen 
(eds.), Tolley's Company Law, 1993, A1503.
88 See Christopher Swinson, A Guide to the Companies Act 1989, 1990, p.l. These are (1) to extend 
deregulation and to simplify administrative requirements for smaller companies such as s. 379A of 
CA 1985 (s. 116 of CA 1989) and 366A of CA 1985; (2) to improve existing regulatory powers by the 
extension of existing powers of investigation such as s. 434 of CA 1985, and the introduction of 
procedural reforms for merger control (s. 152 of CA 1989); (3) to improve market efficiency through 
the clarification of the law relating to insolvency and financial markets and amendment of the 
Financial Services Act 1986, for example, 47(A) of the FSA 1986.
89 The Companies Act 1989 amended the Companies Act 1985 by inserting provisions in ss. 221-262 
and changing Scheds. 4 to 10 of the Companies Act 1985.
51
Chapter Two: A General Description
demonstrates that the control relationship has been decided, based not only on legal 
control but also on factual control. Thus this creates a comprehensive scope to 
regulate the drawing up and publication of the consolidated accounts of group 
companies.
The Companies Act 1989 also has some important extensions to disclosure 
requirements regarding directors' emoluments and other benefits.90 Additionally, the 
new law requires public companies and large private companies to disclose in notes to 
the accounts whether the accounts have been prepared in accordance with applicable 
accounting standards.91
Turning to Directive 84/25392 (the Eighth Council Directive) which also 
constitutes a part of the Companies Act 1989, the first point that needs to be 
mentioned here is that the purpose of this Directive is to help the Member States 
establish a legal framework for the qualifying requirements and supervision of auditors. 
Second, the Act removed the prohibition on bodies corporate acting as auditors.93 
Auditors are required to be independent and the Act permitted the Secretary of State 
to make regulations defining "independence".94 Third, auditors' rights to information 
are increased.95
90 See Nigel Furey, The Companies o f 1989, A Practitioners' Guide, 1990, p. 12. It is enacted in s. 
6(3) of the CA 1989. And in s. 232, and Sched. 6, Part I-III, CA 1985. The definition of emoluments 
is in Sched. 6, Part I, para. 1(4) which defines the term as including: (a) fees and percentages; (b) 
sums paid by way of expenses allowance; (c) contribution paid in respect of him under any pension 
scheme; and (d) the estimated money value of any other benefits received by him otherwise than in 
cash. Moreover, emoluments in respect of a person's accepting office as a director ('golden hellos') 
must now be included in a director's overall emoluments.
91 s. 19 of the CA 1989; s. 256(2) CA 1985. This is recommended by the Making o f Accounting 
Standards Report (Dealing Report), para. 10.3 (a).
92 OJ 1984 L 126/20.
93 ss. 25(2) and 53(1) of the CA 1989.
94 s. 27(1)(2) of the CA 1989.
95 s. 120 of CA 1989 and s. 389A of CA 1985. See Slaughter and May, "The Companies Act 1989", 
in Corporate Brief, 4(2), 32-5, 1990.
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Although the Fourth and Seventh Directives are company-law-oriented 
Directives, they do greatly help the later Directives regarding the public distribution of 
securities because they deal with the most fundamental problem, that is, the assessment 
of information. Without this, any further requirement on disclosure is useless as 
information provided by companies in different Member States is not comparable.
2.2.2 The Impact of the EC on the FSA 1986, Parts IV, and the Public 
Offers of Securities Regulations 1995
(1) Background
The importance of the free circulation of financial products lies in its great contribution 
to the integration of the capital market. In turn, the integration of the capital market 
has been employed as one of the methods for the achievement of an internal market, 
which is the paramount goal of the Community at the present stage of its 
development.96 The White Paper of 1985 (Completing the Internal Market)97 proves 
this by clearly stating that the Commission's principal objective in relation to capital 
markets is to liberalise financial services. This integrating process of the capital market 
is not just about improving internal infrastructures within the Community but also 
about propelling "Europe onto the blustery world stage of the 1990s."98
In fact, the concept of free circulation was first emphasised in the field of free 
movement of goods. For example, the Court in Cassis De Dijon99 and its following 
case Gilli & Andres100 gave a general definition of the barriers to free trade which were 
prohibited by the provisions of Article 30 et seq. of the EC Treaty. That is, non- 
discriminatory national rules may themselves amount to measures having equivalent 
effect to quantitative restrictions on imports prohibited by the Treaty unless they can
96 See Commission,^ Business Guide to the Single Financial Market, 1992.
97 Dated June 14, 1985, COM (85)310.
98 See Financial Times Conferences, European Securities Markets in the 90s, 1991, p. 1.1.
99 Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral v. Bundesmonopolverwertung fur Branntwein [1979] E.C.R. 649.
100 Case 788/79 [1980] E.C.R. 2071.
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be justified under certain circumstances.101 This caused the Commission to declare that 
goods lawfully manufactured in one Member State are to be admitted to the markets of 
other Member States.102 Using a more familiar term to describe this development, it is 
the "mutual recognition" by the Member States of other Member States' standards. 
More recently, the free circulation of "financial products" has been increasingly 
emphasised.103
Although the precondition for the free movement of financial services is the 
freedom of capital movement, the latter can only grant investors the right to purchase 
any financial product circulating on Community markets and to approach any supplier 
of financial services or products for that purpose.104 This does not automatically give 
the same right to suppliers of financial products, because they may be hindered by the 
three most serious obstacles within capital market: (1) Full access to markets can 
therefore involve fifteen different authorisation requirements with their associated rules 
of supervision and conduct of business; (2) There are significant differences in national 
rules as to the types of business which different forms of enterprises can carry on in 
different markets; and (3) There are restrictions in some member states relating to the 
types of financial products which may circulate.105 For instance, an issuer of securities 
may want to apply for listing in one or more Member States; if listing rules in each 
Member State are different, the issuer will have to spend much time and money in 
fulfilling the requirements of those countries; meanwhile, securities which are allowed 
to circulate in some Member States may not have access to other Member States' 
markets due to different regulations. These obstacles need to be abolished.
101 Such as public morality, public health, fiscal supervision, the fairness of commercial transactions, 
the defence of the consumer, etc. See Article 36 of the Treaty and the case Cassis de Dijon. That 
discrimination is not an essential characteristic of national measures contrary of Article 30 is made 
clear in Case 61/84, Cinetheque ([1985] E.C.R. 2605).
102 See Commission Notice, OJ C 256/2, 1980.
103 See the White Paper o f 1985, supra note 97, paras. 102, 109; Eva Lomnicka, "The Internal 
Financial Market and Investment Services", in EC Financial Market Regulation and Company Law, 
S. Kenyon-Slade and M. Andenas (eds), 1993, p. 85.
104 See R. M. Buxbaum, Marina Hertig, Alain Hirsch, and Klaus J. Hopt (eds.), European Business 
Law, 1991, p. 8.
105 Id.
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One possibility is put forward by some scholars. Their opinion is that the 
Community eventually should have a "European securities market", where "Eurolist" 
shares would be traded simultaneously on each of the fifteen EC Member States 
markets, and a "European index" based on "Eurolist" could be set up to provide a basis 
for arbitrage and hedging.106 To achieve this idea is not impossible provided that the 
conditions indispensable for this goal are fulfilled. In other words, when procedures 
and conditions of listing applications in the Member States are more and more 
harmonised, the techniques of mutual recognition and EC passport are widely 
employed,107 and other regulations regarding financial intermediaries are co-ordinated 
to some extent, then, the time for a "European securities market" may be mature.
(2) The Directives
Four Directives constitute the cornerstone of disclosure of the public distribution of 
securities. Such a concept of disclosure could be traced back to the Report in 1966.108 
It points out that in all Member States, an essential factor in the expansion of the 
capital market is that the public be given better information on securities and 
familiarised with the machinery of the stock exchange. This shows the necessity of 
harmonising the conditions required for official listings and the information needed to 
be disclosed if the Community attempts to enhance its capital markets.
The first directive passed in 1979 is the Admission Directive.109 It establishes the 
minimum conditions for the admission of securities to official listing on stock
106 See supra note 98, p. 2.2. This idea was first mooted by Regis Roussells in April 1989. "Eurolist" 
would comprise major corporations whose shares are listed on EC bourses.
107 See I. Fraser and P. Mortimer-Lee, "The EC Single Market in Financial Services", in 33 Bank o f  
England Quarterly Bulletin, 92-7, 1993, pp. 92-6; J.A. Usher, "The Implications of the Single 
European Market for Banking and Finance: an Overview", in The Single Market and the Law o f  
Banking, R. Cranston (ed.), 2nd ed., 1995. The term EC passport denotes a situation in which once a 
business has been authorised by one Member State, it should be free to operate in another Member 
States as if a natural person who holds a passport of any Member State is free to travel within the 
Community.
108 See supra note 66.
109 Directive 79/279, OJ 1979 L 66/21.
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exchanges situated or operating in the Member States. It is applied to those securities 
which are admitted to official listing or are the subject of an application for admission 
to official listing on a stock exchange situated or operating within a Member State.110 
However, Member States may exclude units issued by collective investment 
undertakings other than the closed-up type; they may also exclude governmental 
securities111 from the scope of the Directive. There are four Schedules in this 
Directive. Schedule A regulates the conditions for the admission of shares to official 
listing on a stock exchange; Schedule C regulates the obligations of issuing companies 
once their shares are listed. Schedules B and D are concerned with the equivalent 
forms of regulation for debt securities. The Member States are allowed to make more 
stringent or additional conditions provided these are applied generally for all issuers or 
for individual classes of issuers.112 The Directive provides that the Member States shall 
designate the national authority or authorities competent to regulate the issues 
mentioned in the Directive and ensure that the competent authorities have such powers 
as may be necessary for the exercise of their duties.113 Additionally, it has numerous 
provisions dealing with the information to be provided by the issuers.114
Directive 80/390115 (the Listing Particulars Directive) was adopted in 1980. Its 
preamble shows that listing on the stock exchange has become an important means of 
access to capital markets, and that the operations of what the Directive refers to as 
"undertakings" have been enlarged to embrace the whole Community. Thus, 
corresponding to this development and for the protection of the interests of actual and 
potential investors, undertakings which offer their securities to the public are required 
to provide information which is sufficient and as objective as possible explaining the 
financial circumstances of issuers and particulars of the securities either at the time of
110 Article 1(1).
111 Article 1(2).
112 Article 5(1) and (2).
113 Article 9.
114 Scheds. C, D.
115 OJ 1980 L 100/1.
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their offer or of their admission to official stock exchange listing. The Directive then 
prescribes the information to be provided in the listing particulars.
Directive 82/121116 (the Interim Reports Directive), concerning information to be 
published on a regular basis by companies, further enhances the protection of 
shareholders. Since it only applies to shares117 and just covers the half-yearly report,118 
it affords no additional protection to the holders of other securities.
These three Directives were implemented by the Stock Exchange (Listing) 
Regulations 1984 (coming into effect on 1 January 1985).119 The Regulations were 
made by the Secretary of State, being a minister designated for the purposes of s. 2(2) 
of the European Communities Act 1972. It designated the Council of the Stock 
Exchange as the competent authority for all purposes under the directives and the 
Council should have all the powers required to be conferred on.120 The FSA 1986 as 
amended by the Companies Act 1989 substituted the Stock Exchange for the Council 
of the Stock Exchange as the competent authority.121 When the FSA 1986 was 
enacted, the legislature repealed the Stock Exchange (Listing) Regulations 1984 by 
passing Part IV of the FSA 1986, s. 142(6) of which authorises the Stock Exchange to 
promulgate "Listing Rules" with regard to the official listing of securities. Thus, these 
three Directives are now implemented by Part IV of the FSA 1986 and the Listing 
Rules of the Stock Exchange, ordinarily called the "Yellow Book".122
Before turning to Directive 89/298123 (the Public Offers Directive), one directive 
is shortly mentioned here. Directive 88/627 124 on the information to be published 
when a major holding in a listed company is acquired or disposed of is not a new idea
116 OJ 1982 L 48/26.
117 Article 1.
118 Article 2.
119 S.I. 1984/716.
120 reg. 4(1).
121 s. 142(6) of the FSA 1986.
122 The Stock Exchange's Admission of Securities to Listing.
123 OJ 1989 L 124/8.
124 OJ 1988 L 348/62.
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to English company law. The Companies Act 1985 requires a shareholder to notify the 
company of his interest when his shareholding has been over 3 per cent.125 This 
Directive requires that shareholders who, directly or indirectly, own shares in listed 
European Community companies must disclose their holdings when they reach any of 
five thresholds (10%, 20%, 331/3%, 50%, 6 6 2 /3% ).126 The UK has promulgated two 
regulations to implement this Directive.127
The Public Offers Directive did considerably affect the then existing legal 
framework in the UK. This Directive requires a prospectus containing specified 
information about the relevant issuer and securities to be published when securities are 
first offered to the public.128 In the UK, such prospectuses originally were regulated by 
Part III of the Companies Act 1985; but this principle did not survive the enactment of 
the FSA 1986. In the first place Part IV of the FSA 1986 has appropriated the whole 
subject of prospectuses in relation to official listing (known as listing particulars in the 
FSA 1986) away from the Companies Act 1985. Secondly, it was originally intended 
that Part V of the FSA 1986 should take the place of Part III of the Companies Act 
1985. Part V never came into force, and this intention was only finally achieved by the 
enactment of the POS Regulations which repealed Part V of the FSA 1986 and thus 
replaced Part III of the Companies Act 1985. As it turned out when the Directive 
appeared, it became clear that Part V of the FSA 1986 would never have satisfied the 
requirements of the Community in any event.
First, the concept of "public offer" in the Directive and Part V of the FSA 1986 
was not identical. The Directive does not define the term "public offer" and leaves this 
to the Member States. What it does state is that for securities "offered to the public for 
the first time" this Directive shall apply.129 The problem was that Part V of the FSA
125 s. 198 et seq.
126 Article 4.
127 The Disclosure of Interests in Shares (Amendment) Regulations 1993 (S.I. 1993/1819) and the 
Disclosure of Interests in Shares (Amendment)(No 2) Regulations 1993 (S.I. 1993/2689).
128 Article 1.
129 Article 1.
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1986 employed the term "advertisement offering securities"; it thus included not only 
an invitation to subscribe or acquire securities but also any advertisement which 
contained information calculated to lead directly or indirectly to a subscription or 
purchase.130 This concept was, beyond doubt, broader than any kind of interpretation 
of an offer.131 At first sight, there was no conflict between UK legislation and the 
intention of the Directive. The difficulty was that the UK required the issue of 
prospectuses only when the agreement could be entered into in pursuance of the 
advertisement,132 but the Directive requires the preparation of prospectuses whenever 
there is a public offer. Therefore, if an advertisement in the UK fell into the general 
concept of public offer but no agreement could be entered into in pursuance of it, the 
issuer would have been exempted from the obligation of preparing the prospectus 
under the FSA 1986 (if it had come into force). This clearly conflicted with the 
Directive.
Second, the meaning of secondary offer in Part V of the FSA 1986 was too 
narrow to cover those issues regulated by the Directive. Generally, a secondary offer 
means that securities were already issued by the company to investors and now 
securities holders want to offer these securities for sale. However, Part V restricted its 
application to those securities which were first issued to an investor or a predecessor 
with the intention of offering them to the public and not holding them for 
investment.133 This demonstrates that the meaning of the secondary offer of the 
Directive is wider; it covers all offers whenever they are offered to the public fo r  the 
first time, and the intention of the initial buyers is disregarded. If the UK had not 
amended these conflicting provisions, there would have been difficulty when Part V 
came into force. This was the reason why the DTI originally intended to amend Part V
130 s. 158(4) of the FSA 1986.
131 The narrow meaning of an offer is to invite the other party's acceptance; the broader sense could 
include contractual invitation, that is, invite the other party to make an offer.
132 s. 160(l)(b) (repealed).
133 s. 160(3) (repealed).
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and some provisions of Part IV (listing particulars) as the tool to implement this 
Directive,134 but eventually decided to introduce the POS Regulations.
Both these problems have been resolved by the enactment of the POS 
Regulations. In the Regulations, the term "prospectuses" is re-installed and "for the 
first time" is clearly employed concerning the public offer and thus the problems raised 
above are resolved. The Regulations go further by defining the meaning of offers and 
public offers. A person would be regarded as offering securities if, as principal, he 
makes an offer which, if accepted, would give rise to a contract for the issue or sale of 
the securities by him or by another person with whom he has made arrangements for 
the issue or sale of the securities; or he invites a person to make an offer.135 And an 
offer is public if it is made to persons in the UK, i.e. any section of the public, whether 
selected as members or debenture holders of a body corporate, or as clients of the 
person making the offer, or in any other manner.136
The original proposal of the Directive also attempted to make a pre-vetting 
system mandatory in respect of all prospectuses even for those securities which were 
not to be listed. The UK strongly opposed this suggestion on the ground that there was 
hardly any public issue of non-listed securities and this requirement would be wasteful 
and unnecessary.137 However, it was claimed that this argument was unconvincing. On 
the basis of statistical information, Gower opposed the argument advocated by the UK. 
He wrote that about 29.6 per cent (from 1978 to 1982) of all registered prospectuses
134 See DTI, Listing Particulars and Public Offer Prospectuses, Consultative Document, July 1990. 
The Public Offers Directive covers all public offers, listed or unlisted. So, when a listing involves a 
public offer, it is the prospectus rather than the listing particular that should be published. In other 
words, the DTI has to substitute the term "prospectuses" for the term "listing particulars" in some 
provisions regarding a listing with public offers.
135 reg. 5, the POS Regulations.
136 Id., reg. 6. As regards the details of the Regulations, see Chris Bates, "The New UK Prospectus 
Rules", in Butterworths J. o f International Banking and Financial Law, 10(7), 296-303, 1995 (Parti) 
and 10(9), 426-31, 1995 (Part II); Judith Cseh-Menczer, "The Public Offers of Securities Regulations 
1995", in European Financial Services Law (E.F.S.L.), 2(6), 174-5, 1995; Charles Abrams, "The 
Public Offers of Securities Regulations 1995: non-UK issuers", in E.F.S.L., 2(8), 238-40, 1995.
137 See L.C.B. Gower, Review o f Investor Protection, Report: P arti, 1984, reprinted 1990, p. 139.
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related to securities not listed or admitted to the USM (now the Alternative Investment 
Market, the AIM)138 and pointed out that this was certainly not a small figure. 
However, the final version of the Directive did not ask for mandatory pre-vetting of 
prospectuses. The Directive was approved in 1990 and was due for implementation by 
17 April 1991. Thus in July of 1990, the DTI issued a report entitled "Listing 
Particulars and Public Offer Prospectuses, A Consultative Document" to deal with the 
problem of implementation.
Before turning to the proposal of the DTI regarding the pre-vetting system, it is 
helpful to consider two Directives: 87/345139 (the Mutual Recognition Directive) and 
90/211140 (the Second Mutual Recognition Directive). xAlthough Article 24 of Listing 
Particulars Directive requires the competent authorities of Member States to co­
operate and endeavour to agree a single text for the listing particulars for use in all the 
Member States, the Community is not satisfied with this and attempts to simplify the 
procedure of application for listing on the stock exchange among Member States. 
Thus, it further employs the concept of mutual recognition after the fundamental work 
of harmonisation has been done.141 The first Mutual Recognition Directive provides 
that listing particulars, subject to any translation and to the addition of purely local 
information, must be recognised by other Member States in which admission to official 
listing has been applied for, without its being necessary to obtain the approval of the 
competent authorities of those States and without their being able to require that 
additional information be included in the listing particulars.142 As regards prospectuses,
138 Id., pp. 139-40. The total number of registered prospectuses in these five years (1978-1982) was 
245, 249, 321, 368, and 345 respectively; while the number of securities not listed or on USM was 72, 
81, 112, 94, and 94 respectively. Even the number of foreign companies' securities was excluded, 
there was still 41, 48, 58, 46, and 38 British companies' securities concerned in the five years which 
still counted for 17.7% of the total number of registered prospectuses.
139 OJ 1987 L 185/81.
140 OJ 1990 L 112/24.
141 Mutual recognition cannot be used unless there is a minimum standard existing in the Community 
which ensures that each Member State has at least a more comprehensive and civilised national legal 
system. This will make the Member States with higher legal standard less reluctant to recognise other 
Member States' legislation. See also Benn Steil, Erik Berglof, et al., The European Equity Markets: 
The State o f the Union and an Agenda for the Millennium, 1996, pp. 113-4.
142 See Article 24a(l).
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if drawn up in accordance with the Listing Particulars Directive,143 they should be 
recognised as listing particulars144 and even more be recognised as prospectuses 
according to the Public Offers Directive.145 The most important premise for listing 
particulars and prospectuses to be recognised in other Member States is that they must 
be approved by the competent authorities within the meaning of whichever the 
directives are applicable. That is to say, if the UK has no pre-vetting system with 
regard to prospectuses, issuers will not be able to enjoy the benefits brought about by 
these Directives. This will impose additional obstacles on UK companies which wish to 
broaden their European financial base, and may put them at some comparative 
disadvantage to companies based in other Member States where pre-vetting of 
prospectuses is carried out.146
For these reasons, the opinion of the DTI is that there should be a pre-vetting 
system for the prospectus and that the Stock Exchange be designated as the competent 
authority since it has discharged the obligation of pre-vetting with regard to listing 
particulars, and this can ensure the same standard to be executed in order to make use 
of the great advantages given by the Directives.
The Public Offers Directive and other ancillary directives forced the UK to 
change its Companies Act and the FSA 1986, i.e. to prescribe a set of disclosure 
requirements which is more comprehensive and can protect investors better than 
before. They also stop the debate on pre-vetting. They eloquently show that if the UK 
wishes to keep its leading status in the European financial markets, it should consider
143 In Directive 89/298, Article 2 is read as "in accordance with Article 7, 8, or 12."
144 The condition for mutual recognition of listing particulars as listing particulars is that the 
applications for admission to official listing on stock exchanges situated or operating in two or more 
Member States are made simultaneously or within a short interval (Article 24 of Directive 87/345). 
For prospectuses, the applications are also needed to be made simultaneously or within a short interval 
and that prospectus must be drawn up and approved by the competent authorities three months 
preceding the application for admission in that State (Article 24b(l) of Directive 87/345). The latter is 
extended to the situation where application is only made to one Member State (Article 2 of Directive 
90/211).
145 Article 21.
146 See supra note 134, p. 9.
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the possibility of adopting the pre-vetting system. This does not need to be mandatory; 
instead, it can be initiated by issuers who want to broaden their scope of business. The 
government only needs to provide them with the tools. This is the principle that the 
UK has finally opted for. As amended by the POS Regulations, the new s. 144(2) of 
the FSA 1986 has substituted "prospectuses" for "listing particulars"; that is, an issuer 
applying for listing of securities to be offered to the public in the UK for the first time 
must publish a prospectus rather than listing particulars before admission.147 Therefore, 
when pre-vetting of prospectuses is at issue in the context of the above examination, it 
should be careful not to misconceive the identity of prospectuses. The prospectuses we 
analysed above only refer to those which are to be published in relation to securities 
offered to the public in the UK for the first time and in respect of which no application 
fo r  admission to listing (in the UK) has been made, and the securities are to be offered 
to the public or are to be the subject of an application for admission to official listing, 
in another member state simultaneously with, or within a short interval o f  the offer in 
the UK. In this case, the issuer or offeror (with the consent of the issuer) may apply for 
approval by the Exchange.148
2.2.3 The Impact of the EC on other UK Regulations
Finally, Directive 89/592149 (the Insider Dealing Directive) and the Draft Thirteenth 
Directive on Take-overs150 deserve mention. The former Directive aims to ensure that 
the market operates smoothly and effectively because the importance of the secondary 
market in transferable securities has been appreciated. In fact, before the enactment of 
the Insider Dealing Directive, a quite advanced insider dealing regulation has been 
established in the UK from the EC point of view. According to the Consultative
147 The POS Regulations, regs. 1,17, and Sched. 2, para. 2(1).
148 Id., reg. 4(3), s. 156A of the FSA 1986, and the Yellow Book, Rules for approval of prospectuses 
where no application for listing is made, after chapter 26.
149 OJ 1989 L 334/30.
150 COM (95)655 final, 07.02.1996. The new proposal emphasises the principle of subsidiarity and 
calls itself a "framework Directive".
63
Chapter Two: A General Description
Document issued by the DTI in 1991, "The Law on Insider Dealing", it seems that with 
regard to the requirement of disclosure, English law needs minimum change. For 
example, Article 7 of the Directive extends the provisions of Schedule C, 5(a) of the 
Annex to Admission Directive to all markets covered by the Insider Dealing Directive, 
rather than just official listing. Schedule C, 5(a) provides that:
"The company must inform the public as soon as possible of any major new 
developments in its sphere of activity which are not public knowledge and 
which may, by virtue of their effect on its assets and liabilities or financial 
position or on the general course of its business, lead to substantial 
movements in the prices of its shares."
This Article regulates official listing securities only. Since Article 7 of this 
Directive has extended this requirement to all markets wherever they are regulated and 
supervised by authorities recognised by public bodies, operate regularly and are 
accessible directly or indirectly to the public. This requires disclosure of information to 
the public in order to reduce the potential opportunity for insider dealing. The UK has 
implemented this Directive by means of promulgating the Traded Securities 
(Disclosure) Regulations 1994151 and substituting the Criminal Justice Act 1993 for the 
Companies Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985, and at this stage, nothing in the new 
Act reveals any infringement of the Directive.
Regarding the Draft Take-overs Directive, due to the fact that the City Code has 
a very complete set of rules regulating the disclosure requirements on take-overs and 
mergers,152 the impact which may occur when the Draft becomes a directive would be 
trivial in the context of disclosure requirements. The more serious debate would lie in 
the change of the nature of regulation rather than in the substantive rules. That is, the 
traditional self-regulation on take-overs may be shifted to a statutory control; this will 
undoubtedly irritate the current UK regulators and they have been resisting its passing 
strongly. They are concerned seriously with the possibility of losing the flexibility,
151 S.I. 1994/188.
152 See infra page 85.
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expedience, and efficiency resulting from self-regulation. This problem is not examined 
in detail here as it is outside the scope of the thesis.153
2. 3 Taiwan
Securities legislation in Taiwan, departing from company law, started with the 
"Regulations for the Administration of Securities Brokers in Taiwan" in 1954.154 In 
1968, the Securities and Exchange Law (SEL) was enacted (amended three times in 
1981, 1983 and 1988 respectively), the draft was inspired by the Japanese Securities 
Exchange Law, American Securities Act 1933 and Securities Exchange Act 1934. As 
Japan also adopted the American system, Taiwanese securities law is in fact heavily 
influenced by American legislation. The amendment in 1981 was unimportant because 
it related to some technical problems only, while the 1983 amendment simply improved 
the control over "proxies".155 The current disclosure system of the SEL was mainly 
introduced by the 1988 amendment.
153 The literature available for those interested in this topic includes: Stephen Kenyon-Slade and 
Mads Andenas (eds.), The EC Financial Market Regulation and Company Law, 1993, Chapters 9 & 
10; Trade and Industry Committee, House of Commons, Take-overs and Mergers, Minutes o f  
Evidence, 1991, etc. The reason why the statutory structure will decrease the flexibility, expedience, 
and efficiency is explained by the Report issued by the Panel on Take-overs and Mergers in 1987. It 
said: "If we had a legislative system, the rules would either have to be less strict, so giving less 
protection to shareholder, or they would be wide-ranging as at present but without the ability to 
mitigate their potential harshness in appropriate cases." See Kenyon-Slade, p. 154.
154 In 1929, the government promulgated the Stock Exchange Law in mainland China; the Law 
ceased to be applicable in a practical sense after the government retreated from China to Taiwan (no 
stock exchange existing at that time in Taiwan). On the other hand, the development of the stock 
market in Taiwan started during the colonial period under Japanese rule. Yet neither of these had any 
impact on the development of the current securities law and markets which were triggered by the 
reform of the agriculture policy.
155 Article 25-1 was inserted. Its first section provides: "The use of proxies in publicly issuing 
companies for attendance at general meeting shall be regulated by the Competent Authority; the rules 
governing such matters shall be prescribed by the Competent Authority." Before this new article, 
proxies had been popularly used by those who aimed to take control of the board of directors. Abuse 
arose when shareholders "sold" their voting rights in exchange for pecuniary payment without being 
supplied with any relevant information; the general meeting became formal and no longer represented 
opinions of shareholders. This eroded the corporate structure, thus impelling the government to 
intervene in this process. According to the authorisation, the Competent Authority (the Securities and 
Exchange Commission) issued the "Rules on the Usage of Proxies at General Meeting of Publicly 
Issuing Companies" (1984), which sets the format of proxies, requires information to be accompanied, 
and requires those who solicit proxies to notify the SEC.
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As regards the problem of disclosure relating to public offers and publicly issuing 
companies, the Law deals with it from three perspectives: the regulation of 
prospectuses, the requirements of continuous disclosure, and registration of 
shareholding. The last amendment in 1988 made great progress on disclosure, 
especially on the latter two issues.
2.3.1 Prospectuses
Prior to 1984 only a few provisions existed regulating prospectuses. Article 30 of the 
SEL required an issuer to submit a prospectus when it applied for approval of public 
offers; the required information therein was to be prescribed by the Competent 
Authority. The "Competent Authority" is the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), which is a governmental institution under the control of the Ministry of 
Finance. Based on such authorisation, the SEC issued the "Rules on the Contents of 
Public Offer Prospectuses" in 1968, which only contained three articles: Article 1 
described the source of the authorisation of the Rules, Article 2 prescribed the contents 
of the prospectus in rough outline, and Article 3 set the date the Rules would take 
effect. The contents of the prospectus were very simple and insufficient concerning the 
information required by investors. Thus, in 1984, the Rules were refined and have been 
amended twice since then. The current version has provided investors with more 
information, which will be discussed in Chapter Five.
2.3.2 Continuous Disclosure
It was not until the 1988 amendment that the importance of protecting investors on the 
secondary market came to be emphasised.156 The state of regulatory ignorance which
156 There are two kinds of markets: one is the primary market and the other is the secondary market. 
The former is the place where companies or governments for the first time publicly distribute their 
securities to investors, while the latter is the place where issued securities are traded. Before 1988, the 
SEL emphasised its regulation of the primary market, such as requiring the issuer to prepare the 
prospectus for subscribers. Subsequently, however, the legislature and the administrative realised that
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preceded this amendment can be contributed to two circumstances: (1) for a 
developing country, the most important function of the capital market is to help 
enterprises solicit capital; thus the primary market by nature becomes the major 
concern of regulators; and (2) in this situation, as a general rule, the secondary market 
may attract the attention of regulators at a later stage, which is especially possible if 
the secondary market has a certain degree of fraud and manipulation. However, such 
market abuse may not happen unless a substantial amount of securities traded, and this 
in turn, depends on the full development of the primary market. This is why the 
Taiwanese government and legislature, for a long time, did not shift their focus to the 
secondary market, because the development of the primary market took several 
decades.
The most important change was brought about by the amendment of Article 36 
of the SEL. Under the original Article 36, publicly issuing companies had to file with 
the SEC and announce to the public, within fifteen days following the preparation of 
accounts, financial reports which had been duly audited and certified by a certified 
public accountant (CPA) and approved by the general meeting. But if an issuer was 
also a listed company, it had to comply with extra obligations; that is, it was required 
to file with the SEC and announce to the public, within fifteen days following the close 
of each half fiscal year, financial reports which had been duly audited and certified by a 
CPA, then approved by the issuer's board of directors and ratified by its supervisors.157 
Copies of the reports publicly announced and filed with the SEC also had to be sent to 
the stock exchange(s) and the association of securities dealers for the public's review.
In other words, before the amendment of Article 36, unlisted publicly issuing 
companies only had the obligation of annual disclosure, while listed companies had
the secondary market was no less important than the primary market because it provides investors 
with a market where they can transfer their securities efficiently. And following this, in the 1988 
amendment, the disclosure requirements in the secondary market were strongly emphasised by 
amending Article 36 of the SEL.
157 As regards the definition and function of supervisors, see infra Chapter Three, footnote 101.
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both annual and half-yearly disclosure obligations. Obviously, the Law distinguished 
listed companies from unlisted companies and imposed more obligations on the former. 
This policy, however, contained a serious flaw. It was true that listed companies had a 
broader trading market and thus concerned more investors, but this did not necessarily 
mean that investors who purchased shares of unlisted companies publicly were not 
entitled to enjoy the same protection as their counterparts in listed companies. 
Moreover, as indicated above, to protect investors is to provide them with information 
immediately and completely; the annual and the half-yearly reports could hardly meet 
such a requirement. Hence, Article 36 needed to be amended.
The amended Article 36 abolishes the distinction made by the old law between 
listed and unlisted companies with regard to the obligations of disclosure. It also 
imposes additional obligations on both of them. According to the new provision, all 
companies which have publicly offered their securities, listed or unlisted, must comply 
with the obligations of annual, half-yearly, quarterly, and monthly disclosure.158 
Among these reports, both annual and half-yearly financial reports need to be approved 
by the issuer's board of directors and ratified by the issuer's supervisors; the CPA's 
audit and certification are also indispensable before the issuer files with the SEC. In 
contrast, the quarterly report does not need to be audited or certified by the CPA — 
the review of the CPA is enough; the monthly report does not even require approval of 
the board of directors. The latter two relaxing provisions are aimed at reducing the 
burden of companies, because it is not easy for them to ensure that such frequent
158 Article 36(1), SEL, now reads: "An issuer under this law shall announce to the public and file 
with the Competent Authority, within four months following the close of each fiscal year, financial 
reports which have been duly audited and certified by a certified public accountant and approved by 
the issuer's board of directors and ratified by its supervisors. Unless otherwise approved by the 
Competent Authority, an issuer shall also comply with the following requirements:
1. within two months after the close of each half fiscal year, publicly announce and file with the 
Competent Authority, financial reports duly audited and certified by a certified public accountant, 
approved by the board of directors and ratified by the supervisors;
2. publicly announce and file with the Competent Authority financial reports duly reviewed by a 
certified public accountant within one month after the end of the first and third quarters of each fiscal 
year;
3. publicly announce and file with the Competent Authority the issuer's business circumstances of the 
preceding month before the 10th day of each calendar month."
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reports (quarterly and monthly) have been duly audited and certified, which costs 
companies much. The contents of all these reports are to be prescribed by the SEC.
For the sake of rapid provision of information to the public, the obligation of 
"immediate disclosure" was inserted into Article 36; as a result, publicly issuing 
companies are obliged to announce publicly and file with the SEC within two days 
from the date of the occurrence of any of the following events:159
1. regarding the annual financial reports approved by the annual meeting of 
shareholders, if a report approved by shareholders is found to be inconsistent with an 
earlier version of the annual financial reports announced to the public and filed with the 
SEC; or
2. any matter, the occurrence of which has had a significant impact on shareholders' 
equity or the price of the securities.
As indicated above, the annual financial report had to be approved by the general 
meeting before the issuer filed it with the SEC under the original Article 36(1). This, 
however, was changed by new Article 36(1). According to the new rule, the issuer has 
to file the reports with the SEC within four months following the close of each fiscal 
year, whether it has been approved by the general meeting or not. Should the report 
have been approved or altered by the general meeting before the issuer files it with the 
SEC, it is clear that the issuer has to file with the SEC the report so approved or 
changed. But if such a report is changed by the meeting at a later stage, for example, 
shareholders discover errors and rectify them by resolution (supposing that they have 
enough votes),160 this change, according to Article 36(2), must be filed with the SEC 
within two days from the date of the resolution being passed and also announced to the 
public.
159 Article 36(2), SEL.
160 Article 174 of the Company Law provides: "A resolution at a shareholders' meeting shall, unless 
otherwise provided for in this law, be adopted by a majority vote of the shareholders present, who 
represent more than one-half of the total number of issued shares."
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The other situation where the issuer has to make a public announcement and an 
immediate filing with the SEC is concerned with "urgent" cases. If any matter arises, 
the occurrence of which has a significant impact on shareholders' equity or the price of 
the securities, the issuer has to inform the SEC and the public as soon as possible. This 
provision declares two principles of securities regulation: first, insiders should not be 
given opportunities to use inside information to make profits by concealing information 
from the public; second, the importance of information is dependent on its impact on 
shareholders' equity or prices of securities.161 The former relates to the prohibition of 
insider dealing, while the latter is related to market efficiency. Both of these topics as 
justification of disclosure will be discussed in Chapter Three — the equal treatment of 
investors and the expected efficient market.
2.3.3 Registration of Shareholding
Before the 1988 amendment, the Law required a publicly issuing company to file with 
the SEC and announce publicly, upon its registration of incorporation, the class, 
numbers and par value of the shares held by its directors, supervisors, managers, and 
holders of shares representing an equity in excess of five per cent of the total issued
161 Events which can cause great impact on shareholders' equity or prices of securities and thus a 
company has to file with the SEC within two days include (Rules Implementing the Securities and 
Exchange Law): 1. Cheques issued by the company are dishonoured by non-payment by the bank 
because of insufficient deposit, the company has been rejected for transactions, or other events which 
cause the company to lose its credibility; 2. There are litigation, administrative decisions, or 
administrative litigation which has a great impact on corporate finance or business; 3. The production 
of the company is reduced substantially, the factory or the major production facilities are leased, or all 
or most of the assets are pledged or mortgaged, with an impact on corporate business; 4. There occurs 
one of the situations referred to in Article 185 of the Company Law; 5. The court, upon petition by an 
interested party or ex officio, prohibits transfer of the shares of the company during the procedure of 
corporate reorganisation; 6. The chairman of the board of directors, general manager, or one-third of 
the directors are removed; 7. The appointed certified public accountant is removed; 8. The company 
enters into an important contract, makes material changes in its business plan, develops a product, or 
takes over another enterprise; 9. Any other event likely to have a major effect on corporate operations. 
Article 185 states: "A company shall not do any of the following acts without a resolution adopted by 
a majority of shareholders present at a shareholders' meeting which represent two-thirds or more of 
the total number of issued shares: 1. enter into, amend, or terminate any contract for lease of the 
company's business in whole, for entrusted business, or for regular joint operation with others; 2. 
transfer the whole or any essential part of its business or assets; or 3. accept the transfer of another's 
whole business or assets, which has great bearing on the business operation of the company."
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shares of the company, all of whom are defined by the Law for this purpose as 
insiders.162 It also required the company to compile reports of shareholdings and file 
with the SEC a report of the changes in the number of shares held by insiders during 
the preceding month by the fifteenth day of each month.163 However, if an issuer failed 
to comply with these requirements, the SEL lacked any provision for sanctions.164
It is submitted that Article 25 served three functions. First, according to Article 
197 of the Company Law (1929), a director will ipso facto  be discharged from his 
office if he has transferred to others more than half of the shares which the company 
reported to the Department of Commerce (under the Ministry of Economic Affairs) 
and the SEC at the time he was elected. Thus Article 25 just repeats what the 
Company Law provides. Second, it provides a reference for calculating the profits 
made by insiders when the company claims disgorgement of such profits. Article 157 
of the SEL copies the American Securities Exchange Act 1934, § 16(b). For the 
purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been obtained by 
insiders because of their relationships to the issuer, any profit realised by them from 
any purchase and sale or any sale and purchase, of any equity securities of such issuer 
within any period of less than six months, shall inure to and be recoverable by the 
issuer. Third, the Law sets a special procedure for these persons to transfer their 
securities. They cannot transfer their shares as they wish at any time; instead, before
162 Article 25(1), SEL.
163 Article 25(2), SEL.
164 One point needs to be dealt with. In the Company Law, an issuer has obligations to file with the 
Department of Commerce (sub-institution of the Ministry of Economic Affairs) particulars of its 
managers' (Article 37), directors' (Article 197), and supervisors' (Article 227) shareholdings, but not 
those of major shareholders. According to Article 403, in case of any change in any of the particulars 
registered with the Department of Commerce, a company or a foreign company shall, within fifteen 
days after such change, file an application with the Department for registration of the change. If the 
shareholder or director designated to represent the company fails to comply with the time limit, such a 
shareholder or director shall be severally subject to a fine of not less than one thousand yuan but not 
more than five thousand yuan (Article 403(2)) (one yuan is equal to three NT dollars; the former is a 
unit solely for the purpose of measuring penalty, while the latter is a currency unit used in daily 
transactions).
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the transaction, they must obtain the approval from or file with the SEC.165 Thus, 
registration of their shareholdings will prevent them from evading the requirements.
What the 1988 amendment did was to increase the percentage of shareholders' 
shareholding from 5 to 10 and impose an obligation on insiders (as defined in Article 
25) to report to the company the change of their shareholdings during the preceding 
month. At the same time a provision of punishment in case of non-compliance was 
added.
No specific reason was given for the amendment of the percentage from 5 to 10.
Three possibilities could be reasonably advanced. First, it is aimed at making this
provision compatible with the "Regulations on the Administration of Unit Trusts".
Article 15(9) of the Regulations sets the maximum for investment made by such a trust
in the listed company as 10 per cent of the total issued shares of that company. In other
words, a trust can invest its funds in a listed company's shares provided that it does not
exceed 10 per cent of that company's total issued shares. Under the original Article
157 of the SEL, however, as indicated above, any profit realised by directors,
supervisors, managers, or major shareholders (those who held 5 per cent or more of
the total issued shares) was to accrued to and be recoverable by the company. Thus, it
would have to disgorge its profits to the company whenever became a 5 per cent
shareholder and transactions on shares happened within six months. This would cause
great inconvenience to a unit trust. Therefore, in the 1988 amendment, the legislature
changed the definition of major shareholders in Article 157: from holders of 5 per cent
issued shares to 10. At the same time, with regard to the obligation to file with the
SEC the shareholding of major shareholders, in Article 25, the threshold was increased
165 Article 22-2 provides that these persons cannot transfer their shares except by one of the following 
methods: 1. an offering to the public following an approval from or an effective registration with the 
SEC; 2. transfer three days following the registration with the SEC, on the stock exchange or on the 
over-the-counter market of the shares that have been possessed over a period specified by the SEC 
within a daily transfer "ration" prescribed by the SEC. This registration requirement does not apply to 
the transfer of less than 10,000 shares per exchange day; 3. to transfer, within three days following 
the registration with the SEC, by means of private placement to specific persons who meet the 
qualifications prescribed by the SEC.
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to 10 per cent in accordance with the change. This amendment, stated otherwise, was 
aimed at harmonising the definition of major shareholders in law as a whole. It was not 
really necessary to amend the law in such a way; the legislature could have chosen to 
make an exception for unit trusts in Article 157 rather than change the definition of 
substantial shareholders.
The second possible reason for the amendment is that the government intended 
to reduce the range of substantial shareholders who might fall into the restriction. 
Thirdly, the amendment may simply have resulted from the fact that the percentage 
figure set by the American Securities Exchange Act 1934, §16, is 10 per cent; thus, 
Taiwanese law should follow it.
This small alteration has in reality revealed a problem which has always existed in 
the regulation of securities in Taiwan: neither the government, nor the legislature, nor 
even academics had ever reflected seriously on the real needs of the Taiwanese market. 
The lack of policy consideration and the insufficient legal analysis show that such a law 
(securities law) does not have its own roots in Taiwan. We are not opposed to quoting 
American law as reference; our dissatisfaction lies in a lack of a persuasive explanation 
concerning the importation of such an amendment by Taiwanese legislature and 
administrators.
Regarding the new obligation imposed on insiders to report to the issuer their 
shareholdings, this is for the purpose of mitigating a practical difficulty which had 
arisen before the amendment. The old provisions required the issuer to file with the 
SEC the changes of insiders' shareholdings monthly; however, the law did not impose 
the same requirement on insiders to report to the issuer monthly. Thus, it was difficult 
for an issuer to comply with the requirements if insiders did not give information about 
it. Under the new law, insiders are obliged to report to the issuer, and violation of this 
could result in a fine of not less than 20,000 yuan but no more than 100,000 yuan (one
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yuan is equal to three NT dollars).166 One problem remains: if an issuer is not informed 
by insiders and then does not file with the SEC, will the issuer be fined? According to 
Article 178, it seems that an issuer which does not file with the SEC will be fined along 
with those who fail to report to the issuer (e.g. insiders) regardless whether the issuer 
is informed or not. Nonetheless, theoretically, if the company is unaware of the 
changes because of absence of report from insiders, the company should not be fined in 
such a case.
2.3.4 Merit Regulation or Mandatory Disclosure?
After the foregoing analysis of the disclosure requirements, we can turn to the 
question: does securities legislation in Taiwan adopt merit regulation or mandatory 
disclosure? Mandatory disclosure in the context of disclosure means a compulsory 
disclosure obligation imposed by regulators on issuers and certain other persons. 
However, in the context of granting permission for a public offer, with which the 
present section of this thesis is concerned, it goes further by meaning that once the 
required information has been disclosed, no objection should be raised against the 
public offer of securities concerned. This latter definition is what meant by this section. 
Before the 1988 amendment, the government believed in merit regulation. The original 
Article 22(1) provided:
"With the exception of government bonds and/or other securities exempted by 
the government, publicly offering and issuing of securities are prohibited 
without an approval from the Competent Authority (the SEC). Rules 
regulating the approval shall be prescribed by the Competent Authority."
It was obvious from this Article that the government adopted merit regulation. 
Merit regulation is a regulatory system that authorises state administrators to deny 
registration to securities unless: (1) the substantive terms of the offer and the 
associated transactions can ensure a fair relation between promoters and public 
investors; and (2) investors are fully informed. The SEC had the right to reject the
166 Article 178, the SEL.
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application even though all documents required had been supplied. The SEC, through 
promulgating the "Regulations on the Standard of Approval of the Application for 
Public Offers and Issues of Securities", could inspect and control the quality of 
securities and issuers.167 By way of contrast, if a government adopts mandatory 
disclosure rather than merit regulation, whenever all information required has been 
fully disclosed by submitting the required documents, the SEC cannot reject the 
application unless the admission is detrimental to investors.
The amended Article 22(1) made a change to this system. It provides.
"With the exception of government bonds and/or other securities exempted by 
the Ministry of Finance, publicly offering and issuing of securities are 
prohibited without the approval of or effective registration with the 
Competent Authority (the SEC). Rules regulating the approval and 
registration procedures shall be prescribed by the Competent Authority." 
(emphasis added)
The words "effective registration with the Competent Authority" demonstrate that the
government has substituted mandatory disclosure for merit regulation in circumstances
which the government considers to be appropriate. For the purpose of complying with
new Article 22(1), the SEC amended the above mentioned Regulations and altered
their title to the "Regulations on the Administration of the Application for Public
Offers and Issues of Securities" in 1988. According to the new Regulations,
procedurally, if a company has submitted all required documents, the SEC will grant it
167 For example, it required that if the total amount of issued shares is NT$300 million or less, the 
shares held by directors as a whole could not be less than 20 per cent of the total issued shares (Article 
3); if a previous plan for increasing capital was not carried out according to the schedule and no 
reason justified this, the SEC may reject the application (Article 6); if the material contents of the 
plan for increasing capital for this time was not submitted for approval by the board of directors and 
the general meeting of shareholders, the SEC may reject the application (Article 6); under any of the 
following circumstances, a company is not allowed to issue corporate bonds: 1. where the company 
has committed any act in breach of contract, or has been in default of payment of principal and 
interest, in respect of previously issued corporate bonds or other debts, and such a state of things still 
exists; or 2. where the company's average annual net profit, after paying tax, of the three most recent 
years or, in case the company has been in operation for less than three years, of the years the company 
has been in operation, does not reach one hundred per cent of the total amount of interest payable on 
corporate bonds intended to be issued, provided, however, that corporate bonds that are issued under 
bank guarantee shall not be restrained (Article 4); etc.
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a notice to the effect that the SEC has no objection to the public issue of the securities. 
This procedure is somewhat different from its counterpart in the USA. In the USA if, 
after the "waiting period", the SEC does not issue any "stop order", the application 
becomes effective automatically, whereas in Taiwan, companies still have to wait for 
the notice before the permission formally comes into effect.
There were two reasons for this amendment. First, the government appreciated 
that nowadays an increasing number of individuals engage in investment activities on 
the stock exchange, a fact which means that the government should no longer adopt a 
"paternalistic" approach to securities regulation. To use merit regulation to reduce the 
investment risk is not workable, because investors are more knowledgeable today, then 
the government has to leave investors to decide their investment portfolio provided 
that they are fully informed.
Second, many cases show that merit regulation cannot achieve its goal. Far from 
reducing the investment risk it rather gives investors the wrong impression that the 
securities being approved by the SEC are risk free. In effect, it is increasing the risk in 
certain situations. Thus, when a company becomes insolvent, the SEC may be 
criticised because it is deemed to have guaranteed the quality of the securities. The 
case of Wan Yi Co. Ltd.168 demonstrated this well. The company applied to the SEC 
for permission to increase its capital by the public distribution of securities and 
received approval in 1982. Two months after the distribution of securities, it was 
revealed that the company's financial situation was precarious, thereby causing a slump 
in the price of the stocks, which finally resulted in the company's liquidation on ground 
of insolvency. Many investors suffered loss which they considered was attributable to 
the negligence of the SEC officers. They petition the Control Yuan to impeach the 
SEC officers. After this event, the SEC realised that under merit regulation, it may be
168 See the Supreme Court, 74 nien tu t'ai shang tzu ti 7198 hao, 27. 12. 1985.
76
Chapter Two: A General Description
condemned unreasonably by investors and decided to give up this method to some 
extent.
For the above reasons, the government resolved to shift partly from merit 
regulation to regulation of disclosure, and as a result mandatory disclosure is now 
firmly accepted in the Taiwanese legal framework which controls the public 
distribution of securities.
However, in examining the amended Regulations, companies may be 
disappointed. First, the Regulations only apply to very limited circumstances. 
Companies are not entitled to use such a procedure if they have incurred a loss in two 
consecutive years.169 In addition, only those companies which have publicly distributed 
their shares previously and now wish to issue new shares or debentures are eligible to 
register in accordance with the new Regulations.170 In the case of secondary 
distribution of securities, issuers may not be eligible to register in accordance with the 
new procedure unless the same kind of securities have been listed on the Stock 
Exchange or traded on the over-the-counter market.171 Article 7 sets thirteen 
conditions under which the SEC can reject an application. These conditions, in fact, 
are the substantive conditions of shares,172 and cannot be thought of as bearing the 
normal meaning of regulation of mandatory disclosure, as such an Article reflects the 
spirit of merit regulation rather than mandatory disclosure.
As a result, Taiwanese legislation so far has not substituted mandatory disclosure 
for merit regulation in substance. Nonetheless, the amendment has shown that the 
trend of merit regulation has begun to change; the substitution of mandatory disclosure 
for merit regulation in certain circumstances is predictable in the near future.
169 Article 11 of the Regulations on the Administration of the Application for Public Offers and Issues 
of Securities.
170 Articles 11, 23, id.
171 Article 3, id.
172 Article 7 of the Regulations, in fact, is the combination of Articles 4 and 6 of the old Regulations, 
which dealt with the substantial conditions of issuers and securities.
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The Justification of Disclosure, especially Mandatory Disclosure
The indispensability of disclosure in the context of public distribution of securities and 
continuous disclosure of publicly issuing companies is demonstrated by legal and 
economic arguments. However, the reasons which favour disclosure do not necessarily 
support a system of mandatory disclosure. Thus, this chapter begins with an 
examination of the rationales favouring disclosure in general. It then analyses the 
reasons for mandatory disclosure which have been hotly debated for several decades.
3.1 The Justification of Disclosure
3.1.1 Introduction
This section analyses the justification of disclosure1 both on public offerings of 
securities and of publicly issuing companies from two points of view: (1) the 
protection of investors and (2) market efficiency. The justification for protecting 
investors rests on legal considerations.2 Among those most frequently advanced are:
1 Disclosure is said to have three functions: enforcement effect, public reaction, and the informative 
function. First, disclosure is an aid to the enforcement of laws against insider dealing. If insiders have 
to disclose their shareholding and transaction of securities, the law can deter them from making a 
profit out of their position; this is the enforcement effect of disclosure. The so-called "public reaction" 
is to make use of public pressure, which derives from disclosure, to prevent those who are responsible 
for disclosure from shirking their duties. For example, a company may decide to build a new factory 
in area B, but once this information leaks out, directors of the company may face pressure from the 
public to disclose more information about this plan, such as the possible occurrence of noise and 
pollution. The third function is the informative effect, i.e. the recipient may be able, by acting on his 
evaluation of disclosed information, to protect his personal interests without the necessity of altering 
the future conduct of persons responsible for disclosure. See Note, "Disclosure as a Legislative 
Device", in 76 Harvard L. R., Vol. 2, 1273-93, 1963. What interests us most in this chapter is its 
informative function.
2 See Richard C. Breeden, "Foreign Companies and U.S. Securities Markets in a Time of Economic 
Transformation" (in 17 Fordham International L. J., S77, pp. S88-S90), in Joseph J. Norton, "Foreign 
Issuer Listings on U.S. Securities Exchanges", in Z.B.B., 366-75, 1995, p. 370.
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the prevention of fraud and the equal treatment of investors. Other important 
considerations are: the change of the nature of the modern company (that is, the 
separation of ownership and control) and the right of the public to know certain 
information.
Market efficiency is a general notion under which many different concepts fall. 
Among these are: informational, allocative, and operational efficiency.3 For the 
purpose of allocative efficiency, the efficient operation of the market (or the efficient 
allocation of resources) depends on the public, as current or potential investors, being 
well-informed, and this in fact results from informational efficiency. Market efficiency 
(i.e. allocative efficiency in the context of this thesis) constantly emphasises the 
importance of disclosure. Such an argument is based on the assumption that people are 
rational maximisers of their ends in life and thus they are guided by what they conceive 
to be their self-interest; furthermore, people choose means reasonably designed to 
promote such ends.4 Therefore, an informed investor (a rational person) will have an 
optimal investment portfolio, which in turn will definitely enhance efficiency of 
resources allocation in a capital market. It appears that to make investors informed 
bears direct connection with informational efficiency: the more efficient the 
dissemination of information is, the more information investors have and the more 
informed investors become.
Although the choice among voluntary disclosure, mandatory disclosure, or merit 
regulation is a matter of policy, a thorough evaluation of these options can be made. If 
a government appreciates the importance of informational efficiency to the capital
3 Allocative efficiency means that capital resources are used in the most productive manner. 
Allocative efficiency results from informational efficiency. Operational efficiency means that the 
performance of the functions of the capital market is at lowest cost. See Christopher Paul Saari, "The 
Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, Economic Theory and the Regulation of the Securities Industry", 
in 29 StanfordL. R., 1031-76, 1977, p. 1031. Informational efficiency will be discussed at page 102.
4 Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis o f Law, 4th ed., 1992, p.l. The reason for making this 
assumption is that the rational-behaviour model generally leads to a better ability to predict the 
behaviour of and describe the industry, the market, and the whole economy. See Merton H. Miller, 
"Debt and Taxes", in 32 J. o f Finance, 261-75, 1977, p. 272.
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market and believes that it cannot be achieved by voluntary disclosure, the government 
may opt for the regulation of mandatory disclosure. By way of contrast, a paternalistic 
government may prefer merit regulation.
The sections which follow start with an examination of the protection of 
investors and then market efficiency in the context of disclosure. It then continues with 
an examination of these perspectives in the context of mandatory disclosure.
3.1.2 The Protection of Investors
The Financial Services Act 1986 was built on the principle of the protection of 
investors. This can be seen from the titles of Gower's reports, the White Paper 1985,5 
and the parliamentary debates.6 In fact, the protection of investors is a general concept 
comprising many different but related aspects, such as (1) to protect investors from 
being cheated and (2) to ensure every investor has equal information. These aspects 
are now considered.7 We will then examine the change in the nature of the company 
and the public's right to know.
5 L.C.B. Gower, Review o f Investor Protection, A Discussion Document, 1982; Gower, Review of  
Investor Protection, Report: Part I, Cmnd. 9125, 1984; Part: II, 1985; DTI, Financial Services in the 
United Kingdom, A new framework for investor protection (generally called the White Paper 1985), 
Cmnd. 9432, 1985. At the beginning of these documents, investor protection is emphasised. For 
example, Gower mentioned that he was commissioned by the Secretary of State for Trade to consider 
the statutory protection now required by private and business investors in securities and other 
property. See 1.01 of the Discussion Document. He repeated this in his Report later in 1984, p. 1. The 
White Paper 1985 reads: "In all developed countries proper regulation to protect the interests of 
investors is seen as a necessary element in the healthy development of financial services ... Our 
existing investor protection laws are outdated and incomplete. They need to be made more 
straightforward, more consistent, more comprehensive, and more suited to the present and future 
challenges facing the financial services industry." See p. 1.
6 See Parliamentary Debates, Commons, Vol. 89, 1986, p. 939. At page 990, Mr. Anthony Nelson is 
quoted as saying: "Greater protection for investors is needed urgently".
7 There is a characteristic common to all these reasons; that is, they justify the necessity of disclosure. 
"Disclosure of information is an essential part of the working of a free and fair economic system..." 
(see Company Law Reform, Cmnd 5391, 1973, p. 7, para. 10) In addition, Lord Shaughnessy argued: 
"I am one of those who believe wholeheartedly that the best protection of all is the requirement for 
prompt and complete disclosure of all material information in the most readily understandable form to 
guide the potential investor in his choice." Parliamentary Debates, Lords, Vol. 478, 1985-86, p. 628; 
see also Sir Adrian Cadbury, "Highlights of the Proposals of the Committee on Financial Aspects of 
Corporate Governance" in Contemporary Issues in Corporate Governance, D.D. Prentice and P.R.J. 
Holland (eds.), 1993, p. 47.
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3.1.2.1 The Prevention of Fraud
One of the most important reasons for disclosure is the prevention of fraud. All 
commentators recognise that with disclosure the potential for deceit is limited; and 
therefore loss to investors is greatly reduced.8 The era of the South Sea Bubble was a 
boom period, when the public distribution of securities was extremely popular; 
companies offered shares without providing subscribers with any important 
information, and the subscribers did not seek information from companies either. Thus, 
when the bubble burst, many investors were left with worthless shares. The concern 
during the next hundred years over constant occurrence of fraud scandals culminated 
in the enactment of the Joint Stock Companies Act 1844 which introduced the 
principle of disclosure as one of its main aims in the UK.9
This phenomenon of market scandal was not unique to the UK; it was also a 
common situation everywhere in the capital market such as in Taiwan and the USA.10 
The prevention of fraud is the goal of legislation in many fields of law, in particular, in 
legal systems committed to at least a minimum system of formal justice.11 The reason 
why this concern is specifically emphasised in securities transactions may be attributed 
to its notoriously high rate of occurrence.12 The genesis of law always reflects the 
expression of what is socially desirable, and the existence of disclosure laws is some
8 See Donald C. Langevoort, "Fraud and Insider Trading in American Securities Regulation: Its 
Scope and Philosophy in a Global Marketplace", in 16 Hastings International and Comparative L. R., 
175-87, Winter, 1993, pp. 175-9.
9 Before the 1844 legislation, there were several attempts made to bring companies into the regulatory 
regime; however, all these Acts (e.g. 1825, 1834, 1837) failed to contain adequate safeguards against 
fraud in the promotion or in the conduct of the business of these companies. See William Holdsworth, 
A History o f English Law, Vol. 15, 1965, pp. 45 et seq.
10 See Louis Loss, Fundamentals o f  Securities Regulation, 1988, chapter 1.
11 See, e.g., F.A. Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty, Vol. II, 1982, pp. 31, 73.
12 See Colin Chapman, How the Stock Markets Work, 5th ed., 1994, pp. 155-60; Robert C. Clark, 
Corporate Law, 1986, pp. 719-20.
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evidence that society needs more information:13 the lack of information being a reason 
for the occurrence of fraud.14
The concept of the prevention of fraud can be observed from two perspectives in 
the context of provision of information: the passive side and the active side. That is, 
anti-fraud law, as a general rule, reduces the potential for deceit but does not give rise 
to an obligation of full disclosure (the passive side). Nonetheless, given the specific 
characteristic of securities transactions, anti-fraud law should discharge its function by 
imposing certain obligations of disclosure (the active side).15
First, adopting the language of a well-known model for the marketing of 
products of varying quality, anti-fraud provisions can only passively abolish "lemons"16 
and save costs for those who wish honestly to disclose information.17 As a general rule, 
if investors can distinguish the "better" securities from other securities, they will prefer 
to buy the better ones. To enable investors to make such a judgment, sufficient 
information about securities is indispensable. In other words, investors may appreciate 
the value of the better "securities" provided that information is available. When 
information is not available, lemons will dominate the market. The reason for this is 
that in the circumstances where every investor feels his way towards investment
13 "I suppose it is fair to say that one or two scandals which affected relatively few people but received 
much publicity acted as the trigger. Following the rightly praised report of Professor Gower and the 
stock exchange agreement, to which reference has been made, it became clear that something 
approaching a revolution in the provision of financial services was on the horizon. Thus, the 
combination of isolated but serious scandals, a major change in the City's activities and the era of 
consumer protection has led to the requirement for legislative change, the manifestation of which is 
before us in the shape of the Bill (the FSA)." See supra note 6, p. 998 speech of Mr. Robert 
McCrindle. "...there must be greater emphasis on a complete and full disclosure of all the facets of a 
trade or bargain...", id., p. 1003 (Mr. John Browne). See also Arm Judith Gellis, "Mandatory 
Disclosure for Municipal Securities: A Reevaluation", in 36 Buffalo L. R. 15-73, 1987, p. 40.
14 See Parliamentary Debates, Commons, id. p. 992.
15 The same point of view is advanced by Milton H. Cohen in his "Regulation Through Disclosure", 
in J. ofAcct., Dec. 1981, 52-62, at p. 52.
16 Lemons are something unsatisfactory or worthless; for the sake of convenience here, "lemons" 
directly refer to sellers of unsatisfactory products who cheat by means of providing incorrect 
information rather than to the products themselves.
17 Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure o f Corporate Law, 1991, p. 
280.
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judgments, better securities can be sold only at the same prices as those of inferior 
securities lacking the availability of any information.18 Put another way, if better 
securities are unable to persuade investors of their superior quality, they cannot be sold 
at higher prices than those of inferior securities. Finally the bad drives the good out of 
the market.
In this case, providers of "better" securities will try to provide investors with 
more information to prove the quality of those securities. Consequently, more costs are 
incurred. However, lemons can still mimic them and disclose wrong information to 
deceive investors; therefore, either the good ends up spending even more money to 
show the quality of the security, or the good cannot survive in the competition. In such 
a situation, anti-fraud provisions, with the help of the deterrent force of penalties, can 
deter lemons from fraudulent disclosure and then save the costs of good providers.
Second, the concept of anti-fraud can actively support the importance of 
disclosure. The present prohibition of fraud by law can only passively prevent some 
people from cheating others; it does not require providers of information to disclose 
material information needed by investors. Besides that, looking into the substantive 
meaning of "fraud" shows that people are "cheated" to some extent when they cannot 
make an informed judgment of investments. This results from an important 
characteristic of securities transactions, namely, the evaluation of securities is 
extremely dependent on the provision of information. Clearly, one obvious function of 
disclosure is to help investors to assess the merits of securities, which, in turn, prevents 
them from being deceived.
18 See George A. Akerlof, "The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism", in 84 Quarterly J. o f Economics, 488-500, 1970, p. 489.
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3.1.2.2 Equally Informing the Investors
The previous section is concerned with the relationship between issuers of securities 
and investors, while the focus here lies on the relationship among investors. That is, 
investors should be treated equally.
Here it is appropriate to borrow from American experience to explain the 
relationship between disclosure and provision for equal information to investors. The 
SEC has implicitly based its regulations on a model of the informed layman making 
investment decisions in a market populated by equally informed investors. Thus, the 
SEC assumes that each investor should have equal information in promulgating 
regulations which protect them. Disclosure of information and the regulation of insider 
trading are relied upon by the SEC as two vehicles in pursuit of this goal.19
Hence, the SEC attempts to protect investors by providing them all with the 
same information; this is known as market egalitarianism.20 According to such a 
premise, only adequate and immediate disclosure of information can reduce the 
premium, which would be made by those who are the first to know information. Of 
course, the prohibition on insider dealing is indispensable for eliminating the remaining 
opportunity of unfair gain.
Equal treatment of investors is not unfamiliar to the UK. The most important 
principle of the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers is to ensure fair and equal 
treatment of all shareholders in relation to take-overs.21 This shows that equal
19 See Saari, supra note 3, pp. 1032-3. This is supported by the legislative history of the 1933 
Securities Act: "The purpose ... is to place the buyer [of securities] on the same plane so far as 
available information is concerned, with the seller." 77 Cong. Rec. 2918 (1933).
20 Louis Loss, "The Fiduciary Concept as Applied to Trading by Corporate "Insiders" in the United 
States", in 33 M. L. R., 34-52, 1970, p. 35.
21 See the Introduction (a) of the City Code. The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers is issued by the 
Panel on Takeovers and Mergers. This Panel is not a statutory body and therefore, has the advantage 
of informality, approachability and lack of bureaucracy, but it has no power to impose punishment. 
The Code, although not having the force of law, is very persuasive because of several reasons. Among
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treatment is one way of protecting investors. The Panel has several methods to achieve 
such a purpose.22 Disclosure is one of them: the Code provides that shareholders must 
be given sufficient information and advice to enable them to reach a properly informed 
decision. Moreover, information about companies involved in an offer must be made 
equally available to all shareholders as nearly as possible at the same time and in the 
same manner.23 This indicates that the UK also employs disclosure policies to protect 
investors.
3.1.2.3 The Change of the Nature of the Company
The rise of the modem company resulted in the separation of corporate ownership and 
control. When the ownership and control rested upon the same group of people, 
shareholders or members, members naturally gained access to corporate information.
Once this relationship was broken, however, it became necessary to adapt legal 
regulations to the new corporate structure. This necessity has become important as 
corporate securities have become popularly dispersed among many investors. If a 
shareholder is not automatically entitled to take part in running the company; that is, he 
or she has no direct control over the investment, in what circumstances will the
these, some examples are given: (1) Any company listed on the London Stock Exchange which does 
not comply with the Code can have its listing suspended or withdrawn; (2) The London Stock 
Exchange may, at the request of the Panel, withdraw temporarily the facilities of the market from an 
offender; (3) An authorised person under the Financial Services Act 1986 who breaches or fails to 
comply with the Code in certain respects can be called to account by his SRO (self-regulating 
organisation) and RPB (recognised professional body) and may, in extreme cases, have his 
membership withdrawn. See Graham Stedman, Takeovers, 1993, pp. 58-9. Moreover, in Re Chez 
Nico (Restaurants) Ltd. ([1992] B.C.L.C. 192), the court held that failure to comply with the Code 
may lead the court to make an order under the Companies Act 1985, s. 430C, either preventing the 
offeror from acquiring compulsorily the holdings of non-assenting shareholders under s. 429 of the 
Act or specifying terms of acquisition different from those of the offer.
22 For example, the Code provides an orderly framework within which take-overs are conducted, such 
as setting out the responsibilities of the offeror and offeree company (Rule 2), timing restrictions on 
acquisition (Rule 30), etc.
23 See General Principle 4, and Rules 3 (the board of the offeree company must provide shareholders 
with independent advice on the offer), 19 (the information given must be adequately and fairly 
presented), 25 (the board of the offeree company must circulate its views on the offer, including any 
alternative offers), and 20 (deals with the problem of equality of information to shareholders).
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shareholder still wish to maintain the investment? The answer may be two-fold: first, 
when the shareholder knows the corporate financial situation and business operation, 
and second, when he or she has some way to control those who manage the business. 
The former part of the answer apparently relates to the problem of disclosure.
Stated otherwise, disclosure in such a case has been almost universally regarded 
as indispensable to shareholders.24 The availability of information helps shareholders in 
two ways: in exercising their voting rights (shareholders need information to back up 
decisions) and in opting out when necessary (i.e. to sell securities in the open market, 
information is the basis of appraising securities market value). From the point of view 
of a company and its directors, disclosure can help the company solicit capital from the 
public and strengthen the position of directors, because investors will be willing to 
invest in an enterprise where they know its financial situation and business operations. 
They will also be inclined to support those directors who honestly and fully report to 
them. From the shareholders' point of view, since they are deprived of management 
rights, theoretically they will strongly demand that the company at the very least let 
them know the corporate situation. Disclosure thus satisfies the desire of the 
shareholders.
Thus, the evolution of the nature of the company leads the company and its 
directors to consider the necessity of disclosure to some degree. Of course, there are 
some other reasons which will hamper directors from disclosure, and this is left to the 
section below.25
24 See Russell B. Stevenson, Jr., Corporations and Information: Secrecy, Access, and Disclosure, 
1980, p. 92.
25 See infra Chapter Four.
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3.1.2.4 The Right to Know
The right to know essentially relates to the question: why should the public have 
corporate information?26 The answer can be approached from two perspectives: the 
needs of potential public investors and the needs of the general public. First, as regards 
potential public investors, this right may be deemed to derive from the extension of the 
reasoning advanced in the above section (the change of the nature of the company). 
That is, in a modem company in which corporate securities are transferred from one 
person to another quickly, potential investors' needs to obtain information might be 
considered by the company and its directors in the sense that to provide the public with 
information may encourage them to buy the company's securities. Moreover, on a 
capital market, where hundreds of thousands of securities are traded, investors, even 
though they are not securities holders of a company, still need that company's 
information to decide whether or not to acquire its securities. This helps the market to 
become efficient and also justifies the public having the right to know.
Second, the separation of ownership and control, as indicated earlier, entails a 
change in the nature of the company. This change is further examined in this section. 
One of the more recent reforms in the nature of the public company is the separation of 
ownership and function of capital.27 In the nineteenth century, all power in the 
company was to reside with the general meeting of shareholders; the philosophy 
underlying this was centred around the power/risk relationship. The persons who 
risked their capital should own the right of control and could possibly guarantee the 
proper running of the enterprise.28 However, continental European legislation, starting 
with the German law of 1937, formally repudiated the nineteenth century principle of
26 For example, the corporate financial situation, the business report, directors' and big shareholders' 
shareholdings, etc.
27 See Francisco Galgano, "The Allocation of Power and the Public Company in Europe", in 
European Company Laws, A Comparative Approach, Robert R. Drury and Peter G. Xuereb (eds.), 
1991, p. 89.
28 Id.
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general meeting sovereignty and the authority of the general meeting was 
downgraded.29
The outcome of this reform is that in some countries, directors are not obliged to 
take the shareholders' interests as the only concern when they make a business 
judgment since the interests of other groups such as employees and the public must 
also be considered. It is contended that a company has its own social function for 
which it should be liable to the public as well.30
Following this, it may be supposed that the public has the right to have a 
reasonable awareness of the company, because a decision of a company not only 
affects the interests of its shareholders, but also affects the public from time to time. 
For example, if a company declares that it will build a chemical factory in area A, the 
life of the residents in area A will be changed. They fear that they may suffer air or 
water pollution, and in some measure, the interests of this group should be part of the 
interests of the company. Therefore, the public should be allowed to enjoy the right to 
knowledge of the plan and operations. Disclosure of planning details and other relevant 
information, through the publication of prospectuses, listing particulars, and interim
29 Id., p. 87. This was triggered both by the dispersal of shareholding and the change of ideology. 
When a public company's shares are widely spread and no shareholders are the majority in the sense 
of control, management would become increasingly independent of the dictation of the general 
meeting. This results in the question of for whose benefit the company was managed. See Adolf A. 
Berle, Jr. and Gardiner C. Means, The Modem Corporation and Private Property, revised ed., 1968, 
pp. 66 et seq. As regards the change of thinking, see infra notes 30 and 181.
30 Berle and Means characterised such evolution: "Observable throughout the world, and in varying 
degrees of intensity, is this insistence that power in economic organization shall be subjected to the 
same tests of public benefit which have been applied in their turn to power otherwise located. In its 
extreme aspect this is exhibited in the communist movement, which in its purest form is an insistence 
that all of the powers and privileges of property, shall be used only in the common interest. In less 
extreme forms of socialist dogma, transfer of economic powers to the state for public service is 
demanded. In the strictly capitalist countries, and particularly in time of depression, demands are 
constantly put forward that the men controlling the great economic organisms be made to accept 
responsibility for the well-being of those who are subject to the organization, whether workers, 
investors, or consumers." Id., p. 310. Noticeably, the UK still insists that a company is "regarded as 
the property of its shareholders and the board of directors is under a duty to act in whatever way it 
considers to be in the best interests of the 'owner' ... Wider interests, such as those of the community 
in which the company operates or of the country as a whole, may not be taken into account." See 
Trade and Industry Committee First Report, Takeovers and Mergers, House of Commons, Session 
1991-92, 27 Nov. 1991, para. 9.
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reports by issuing companies, will thus provide the public with certain information that 
they may need; i.e. the form of corporate disclosure may be extended that it would 
have a socially desirable result.
3.1.3 The Improvement of Capital Market Efficiency
The history of the successive American securities acts of the 1930's indicates that one 
purpose of the legislation was to improve the economic functioning of the capital 
market to achieve better resources allocation.31 Allocative efficiency is also a concern 
in the UK32 and Taiwan. Two elements are emphasised for the achievement of the 
efficient capital market — (1) public confidence in the capital market and (2) the full 
flow of information grounded on the efficient capital market hypothesis.
3.1.3.1 Public Confidence in the Securities Market
In the parliamentary debates of January 1986, the Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry stated:
"[I]t is our responsibility to ensure that those people can have confidence in 
the good practice and honesty of those who do business in the City. That 
confidence is all the more important with the increasing competition between 
the financial centres of the world."33
Investors will lose confidence in a capital market if there is insufficient protection. The 
confidence of investors is an important and intangible element (or psychological 
element) of an efficient market. Investors, especially small and unsophisticated ones,
31"[Significant... is the wastage that this irresponsible selling of securities has caused to the industry 
... [Investment bankers with no regard for the efficient functioning of industry forced corporations to 
accept new capital for expansion purposes in order that new securities might be issued for public 
consumption. ... Whatever may be the full catalogue of the forces that brought to pass the present 
depression, not least among these has been the wanton misdirection of the capital resources of the 
Nation." H. R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., IstSess. 2-3 (1933), in Saari, supra note 3, p. 1032.
32 Parliamentary Debates, Lords, Vol. 478, 1985-86, July 7-18, p. 601. Viscount Chandos stated: 
"The role of the financial markets is to provide a safe and fruitful vehicle for individual savers and all 
other investors on the one hand, and on the other hand, to be an efficient and resourceful supplier of 
capital to productive enterprises and the Government themselves..." (emphasis added)
33 Parliamentary Debates, Commons, Vol. 89, 1986, p. 938.
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will either withdraw their capital to the detriment of the market and the economy as a 
whole when they fear that they may be exploited by better-informed traders,34 or react 
to information unreasonably and inefficiently, because they might doubt the accuracy 
of the information. Where investors react unreasonably and inefficiently to information, 
stock prices become distorted. Thus greater market distortion occurs and market 
efficiency cannot be achieved. The best way to secure investors' confidence is to create 
a transparent market, where investors obtain information they need and appreciate that 
no secret profit is made. In other words, prompt and complete disclosure can be of 
assistance here.
3.1.3.2 The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis
The importance of information to the operation of efficient markets is fairly well 
accepted because "informed" investors are essential to the fair and efficient functioning 
of a free market economy.35 Thus, the importance of disclosure is further justified from 
the point of view of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis (the ECMH),36 which was 
first propounded by economists, also being accepted later by some legal scholars, 
legislators, and administrators. The tenor of the ECMH is that a market is efficient if 
prices fully reflect all available information37 and accordingly, accurate stock prices are 
formed.38 Therefore, the quantity of information available to a market affects the
34 See Easterbrook and Fischel, supra note 17, p. 296; see also John M. Fedders and L. Glenn Perry, 
"Policing Financial Disclosure Fraud: The SEC's Top Priority", in J. ofAcct., July 1984, 58-64, p. 63.
35 See Howard Beales, Richard Craswell, and Steven C. Salop, "The Efficient Regulation of 
Consumer Information", in 24 J. o f Law and Economics, 491-539, 1981, p. 492. Here we substitute 
"investors" for "consumers" which were used in the article cited. The reason for this substitution is 
that investors are also consumers, consumers of financial services. "Given that investment represents 
deferred consumption, it is tempting to see investor protection as the other side of the coin from 
consumer protection." See A.C. Page and R.B. Ferguson, Investor Protection, 1992, p. 14.
36 Benoit Mandelbrot, "Forecasts of Future Prices, Unbiased Markets, and "Martingale" Models", in 
39 J. o f  Bus., 242-55, 1966.
37 See Jonathan R. Macey, An Introduction to Modern Financial Theory, 1991, p. 36. The meaning of 
lull reflection is that prices must behave "as if everyone knows". This explanation entails two 
equilibria: a. the equilibrium that would result if everyone knows the information; b. the equilibrium 
that is actually observed, and a = b.
38 Prices adjust rapidly and without bias to new information, and prices move randomly: these are two 
main characteristics of the ECMH. See Roger J. Dennis, "Materiality and the Efficient Capital Market 
Model: A Recipe for the Total Mix", in 25 William and Mary L. R., 373-419, 1984, pp. 374-5.
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relative efficiency of the market, i.e. a market with more information gives rise to a 
more efficient operation in the market.
The ECMH derived from the so-called "random walk theory" (which gained its 
popularity for the first time in 1953 by the paper of Maurice Kendall in the Royal 
Statistical Society). In fact, fifty-three years earlier, a Frenchman, Louis Bachelier, had 
proposed this theory in his doctoral thesis.39 Several more comprehensive statistical 
studies of the random walk theory were conducted later.40 According to this theory, 
the future price movement of a security could not be predicted by analysing its 
historical price movements (the cycle) and the successive movements of individual 
security prices were apparently patternless. The reason for this was that random price 
movements were shown to be consistent with prices that fully reflected information.41 
Accordingly, the random characteristic of stock price movements are predicated on 
two observations: (1) the movements of stock prices entirely depend on information 
and (2) the occurrence of such information is unpredictable.
The random walk theory, however, did not deal with the question what kind of 
information is reflected in prices. Instead, the further developed theory, the ECMH, 
especially the classification suggested by Fama, provided an answer to this question. 
Fama defined three levels of market efficiency: the weak, the semi-strong, and the 
strong versions. The first is the case where prices reflect all information contained in 
historical prices, a weak form of efficiency. The second of these is that prices reflect 
not only past information but also other published information, a semi-strong form of 
efficiency. The third is the case in which prices reflect not just public information but 
all the information that can be acquired by painstaking fundamental analysis of the 
company, the economy and all unpublished information. This is a strong form of
39 See Richard A Brealey and Stewart C. Myers, Principles o f  Corporate Finance, 5th ed., 1996, p. 
326.
40 Eugene Fama, "The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices", in 38 J. o f  Bus., 34-105, 1965, see 
Christopher P. Saari, supra note 3, p. 1042, footnote 50.
41 Benoit Mandelbrot, supra note 36.
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efficiency.42 As regards the strong form of efficiency, it is very difficult for the market 
to reach such an efficient level. If all the information, including inside information, is 
rapidly reflected in stock prices, insiders can hardly make any extra profits out of their 
superior knowledge and there is thus no necessity for the government to regulate 
insider dealing.43
Therefore, from a practical point of view, for the purpose of examining the 
justification of disclosure, this thesis takes into account only the weak and semi-strong 
forms of efficiency. A market may be weak efficient or semi-strong efficient; ideally, 
the semi-strong form is preferred, because it is a higher level of efficiency and is 
possible to be achieved. If the semi-strong form of efficiency is aimed at; that is, 
securities prices fully reflect not only historical prices but also other published 
information, the more information that is published, the more efficient the market will 
be. Disclosure of information is thus to be welcomed in this sense.
Finally, to clarify the concept of efficiency will make this argument more 
comprehensive. Efficiency connotes a spectrum in which there exist different degrees 
of efficiency. As a result, when efficiency is referred to in this thesis, we do not bear an 
exact degree of it in mind; rather, it is an improved degree of efficiency, more 
advanced in the spectrum towards an ideal maximum. Up to this point, the justification 
of disclosure by analysing the ECMH is affirmed. Since the ultimate purpose of 
disclosure is to allocate resources efficiently by securing "correct" securities prices in 
capital markets, information is indispensable in the process of allocating resources and 
the ECMH demonstrates such a causal relationship. The ECMH assumes that a market
42 Eugene Fama, "Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work", in 25 J. o f  
Fin., 383-417, 1970. In fact, the same idea had been invoked by Harry Roberts, "Statistical Versus 
Clinical Prediction of the Stock Market", unpublished paper presented to the Seminar on the Analysis 
of Security Prices, University of Chicago, May 1967. See Brealey and Myers, supra note 39, pp. 329- 
31.
43 In fact, in these days, it is still popularly held that insiders can make more earnings than outsiders 
on the stock market. That is, a strong form of efficiency has not happened yet. See J.F. Jaffe, "Special 
Information and Insider Trading", in 47 J. o f  Bus., 410-28, 1974; Stephen H. Penman, "Insider 
Trading and the Dissemination of Firms' Forecast Information", in 55 J. o f  Bus. 479-503, 1979.
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is efficient if prices fully reflect all available information, or in other words, information 
fully reflected in securities prices will result in an efficient capital market; by inference, 
the flow of information is the premise of such a statement which justifies disclosure in 
the sense that disclosure brings more information to the market.
Some examples may be given which illustrate this causal relationship between 
information and resource allocation. Investors, who do not have enough information to 
judge the risk and return of an investment, will seek a premium to balance the 
unknown risk. By inference, the unknown will increase an investor's feeling of risks. 
Where investors are risk neutral, then the expected return from a high risk investment 
will be equal to that on government securities or blue-chip firms which bear very little 
or even zero risk.44 On the contrary, the return will have to include the further 
premium under the assumption of investors being risk-averse. Assuming that people 
are rational and maximise their benefits, investors should be risk-averse in the light of 
the risk-premium relationship.45
Because individuals are risk-averse, the greater the risk, the higher the premium 
that can be expected;46 the greater risk includes the situation where the lack of 
information prevents a full evaluation of risk. This reasoning suggests that non­
disclosure increases the costs of capital solicitation and reduces market efficiency.47
44 See Julian Franks and Colin Mayer, Risk, Regulation, and Investor Protection'. The Case o f 
Investment Management, 1989, p. 133. See also Walter A. Morton, "Institutional Aspects of Savings 
and Investment: The Structure of the Capital Market and the Price of Money", in 44 American 
Economic R., 440-54, 1954.
45 Franks and Mayer, id.
46 Professor Posner argues that all incremental changes in risk result in differentials in interest rates 
or prices. See "The Legal Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations: An Economic Approach", in 
43 U. o f Chicago L. R., 499-526, 1976.
47 First, operational costs are increased and operational efficiency is reduced. Second, the increased 
costs may distort the allocation of resources. When a company faces the problem of corporate finance, 
it has to decide its capital structure, that is, by equity or by debt, because the choice of the capital 
structure is based on the cost problem (in other words, the asymmetric information problem). There is 
an optimal debt/equity ratio where the company can save most money. The capital structure affects 
corporate managers' investment decisions to some extent. They may decide not to take a project which 
is promising in a long term, because they need quick returns to meet the interest payment of the debts. 
Thus, the choice of investments is not based on the long term maximisation of corporate profits, but
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Company law is not expected to minimise the risk; investors' interest lies rather in 
forming an accurate assessment of the risk, which presents the problem of information. 
By implication, information is vital.
The other example is that the value of securities will be misjudged because of 
non-disclosure; this affects the optimal allocation of resources. In a world of risk and 
perfect information,48 investors are certain about corporate financial situations 
(including the risks attached to it). Therefore, the valuation of classes of securities is 
relatively straightforward. By way of contrast, when information on financial situations 
is imperfect, the uncertainty attached to the earnings may be greater. In such 
conditions, investors may undervalue or overvalue certain classes of securities 49 In an 
efficient market, this is not expected to occur.
However, whether market efficiency can be attained in fact directly relates to 
efficiency of an information market because an information market determines the 
breadth of initial distribution of information to a capital market. If the distribution of 
information is broad and fast, market efficiency can be easily achieved. Nonetheless, 
the initial distribution of information is dependent on distributional costs. Therefore, 
"from the perspective of the capital market, market efficiency is a function of the initial 
distribution of information among traders; from the perspective of the information 
market, market efficiency is a function of the costs associated with particular 
information. The common factor is information costs."50 The problem of costs of 
information relates to the problem of institutional choice; that is, the question remains 
whether the government should leave the market to function by its own regulation or
are affected by some other considerations, which partly derive from the corporate structure, and that 
in turn is partly related to the problem of costs.
48 Perfect information means that everyone can equally obtain information fully and promptly .
49 See George G. Triantis, "Secured Debt under Conditions of Imperfect Information", in 21 J. o f  
Legal Studies, 225-58, 1992, p. 229.
50 See Ronald K. Gilson and Reinier H. Kraakman, "The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency", in 70 
Virginia L. R., 549-644, 1984, p. 597.
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whether the government should intervene in the market. These questions will be dealt 
with below.
3.1.4 Governmental Policy
In developing countries such as Taiwan, the government faces a choice of policy 
whether to regulate the market. This problem can be described from two perspectives. 
First, the state must have appreciated the importance of the capital market.51 Second, 
once the importance of the capital market has been recognised, if the state intends to 
be internationally competitive in the capital market, the adoption of mandatory 
disclosure as part of a trend of internationalisation and deregulation cannot be ignored. 
This in itself may require the adoption of disclosure.
3.1.4.1 The Importance of the Capital Market
(1) definition
The financial market is made up of two parts, the money market and the capital 
market. The crucial difference between them concerns the time span. The money 
market is the market for short or medium term borrowing. In contrast, the capital 
market deals with what economists refer to as long-term "credits"; the definition of 
"long-term" is a time period which lasts over one year.52 The breadth of the capital 
market may vary. Typically, it refers to the securities market only, but now-a-days, 
when the government is concerned with the regulation of the capital market, it always 
takes into account the financial institutions (e.g. investment banks, brokers, and market 
makers) which become involved in securities transactions.53
51 The Chinese government (mainland China) may in the near future promulgate a Securities Law as 
it has appreciated that capital is an element of constructing a "socialist market economy". See Central 
Daily News, 28.11.1995, p. 4.
52 See U Tun Wai, Economic Essays on Developing Countries, 1980, p. 292
53 See Robert Burgess, Corporate Finance Law, 1992, p. 5.
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(2) evaluating the social utility of the capital market
The capital market in reality belongs in the category of services based on the above 
definition. The traditional thinking still maintains the belief that the production of 
services is less important than the production of tangible goods, such as manufactures 
"which can be seen, touched and counted".54 However, statistics help to overturn such 
traditional belief. In 1960, the proportions of manufacturing and services to gross 
domestic product (GDP) in developed countries were 40% and 54%, respectively. By
1986, these proportions had changed to 36% and 61%. Developing countries also have 
experienced similar changes, with services accounting for 48% of GDP in 1986, up 8% 
on their share in I960.55 In Taiwan, the proportion of services to GDP has exceeded 
60% since 1995.56 This situation caused Albert Bressand to predict that the role of 
financial markets in the early twenty-first century will be significant.57
Two phenomena support his view. First, today's markets allow for an 
unprecedented combination of expertise around integrated packages of goods and 
services.58 For instance, buying a car is not only the exchange of a car for payment. It 
often relates to insurance services, travelling packages, post transaction maintenance 
provision, and so forth. If the payment is a money order or a mortgage arrangement, 
then it needs the additional services of financial institutions. Hence, process and 
product innovation often cut across the traditionally defined "financial/real" border 
line.59 Moreover, modem economies are now information-intensive. Because of the
54 See Robert Sedgwick, The Changing Structure o f the UK Financial System, 1990, p. 1.
55 See Phedon Nicolaides, "Globalisation of Services and Developing Countries", in International 
Economics and Financial Markets, Richard O'Brien and Tapan Datta (eds.), 1989, p. 161.
56 In the last decade, services production has increased dramatically; from 1985 to 1995, it increased 
12.3% (from 47.9% to 60.2%). In contrast, the production of industry has dropped from 46.3% to 
36.3%. See Economic Daily News, 4.4.1996.
57 See Albert Bressand, "Wealth Creation and the Role of Financial Markets in the Early Twenty-First 
Century", in Finance and the International Economy, John Calverley and Richard O'Brien (eds.),
1987.
58 Id., p. 36.
59 Id., p. 37.
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advance of technology, the electronic network weighs increasingly in commercial 
activities. This will result in the creation of a large amount of information which is 
most easily obtained from financial markets. These developments further demonstrate 
the increasing importance of financial markets and also of the flow of information.
Narrowing the focus to the stock market, other evidence can be found which 
supports this view of the financial market. The Taiwanese stock market provides a 
good illustration. The total stock exchange tax paid by investors when each transaction 
is executed amounts to nearly 10% of the government income in Taiwan; in particular, 
in the fiscal year 1990, it came to over 12%.60 Also, the yearly turnover of stock 
exchange transactions was so large61 that it affected a significant percentage of families 
and indirectly influenced the success rate of the government in political elections. It 
also caused a great "financial storm" which forced the government to strengthen its 
control over the so-called "underground investment companies".62 During the "crazy" 
period,63 the stock exchange index of Taiwan rose from around 3,000 points to more 
than 12,000. All the above aspects clearly demonstrate that financial services are not 
less important than manufacturing and that they are worth studying in depth.
60 In 1990 (fiscal year), the stock exchange tax income was NT dollar 106,727,238,000 (the foreign 
exchange rate of sterling pound to NT dollar is 1: 40) and the revenues of taxes for the whole country 
was NT dollar 847,733,398,000. See Department of Statistics, Ministry of Finance, The Republic of 
China, Monthly Statistics o f Financial (Oct. 1991), p. 72.
61 The trading value in 1989 is NT dollar 25,673,676,333,000, but it fell down to NT dollar 
9,682,730,000,000 in 1991. See SEC, Ministry of Finance, R.O.C., 1989 SEC Statistics, p. 2, and 
1991 SEC Statistic, p. 2.
62 Running an investment business in Taiwan needs authorisation by the competent authority. 
Collecting deposits, in principle, can be done only by banks and other special financial institutions. 
During the period from 1988 to 1990, there was a company called Hon Yuan which illegally attracted 
a lot of savings and invested them in the stock market to create a bull market. At the beginning, it had 
a very high return ratio so that it paid its creditors extremely high interests, that is, 20% or ever 
higher. But after the crash of the market, it was insolvent and most of the creditors could not receive 
their principal. The reason why this event could cause a great financial storm is that the size of the 
stock market is very small and is easily manipulated.
63 From 1988 to 1991, the stock exchange index rose from 2,341.06 (January 5, 1988) to 12,495.34 
(February 10, 1991). See 1988-91 SEC Statistics. In Taiwan it was referred to as "crazy" because the 
growth of the stock market was out of proportion to the economic growth and earnings of the listing 
companies.
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(3) the function of the capital market
From the point of view of economic development, economic growth depends largely 
on investments. It is elementary that holders of surplus units wish to earn a return on 
their property; consequently, individuals with some savings invest, which allows for 
accumulated savings, and this promotes additional investment, and so the cycle 
continues. Financial markets play an important role in economic development by 
facilitating the collection of savings and by channelling funds to companies and other 
investment institutions. In addition, the benefits earned from investment encourages 
more savings and thus constitutes this "virtuous circle". The public distribution of 
securities in the capital market is the best example of this.
The history of the stock market in the UK demonstrates the importance of the 
capital market in securities transactions64 and the Taiwan stock market plays the same 
role as its UK counterpart. In the early 1950's, learning from the experience of losing 
the whole of mainland China, the KMT (the ruling party) government decided to 
redistribute agricultural land among landlords and tenants, following the principle that 
whoever cultivates the land should own it (the Land-to-the-Tiller policy). To 
compensate former landowners, the government privatised four companies managed 
and owned by Taiwan Province and issued shares to the landowners.65 Because of the 
traditional view that only tangible assets were worth holding many holders of these 
securities tried to cash them, which resulted in the creation of a trading market. To 
control these transactions, taking place for the first time in 1954, the government
64 In the UK, not until the beginning of the nineteenth century was there a formal constitution and a 
stock market building. The end of the eighteenth century was the time that suitable securities were 
provided, which was attributable to the formation of joint-stock companies and the beginning of the 
permanent National Debt. In particular, the great amount of national debts strongly demanded a 
market where these securities could be traded. After that, the preconditions for the birth of the stock 
market, such as a considerable volume of securities, a widely-distributed ownership, and the ability to 
conveniently transfer the title of securities, were progressively fulfilled. See E. Victor Morgan and 
W.A. Thomas, The Stock Exchange: Its History and Function, 1969, pp. 11, 18-9.
65 The securities offered amounted to $NT2.2 billion. See Rowley, Asian Stockmarkets, 100, in Brian 
Wallace Semkow, Taiwan's Capital Market Reform, 1994, p. 155, footnote 4.
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promulgated the "Regulations for the Administration of Securities Brokers in 
Taiwan",66 which was replaced in 1961 by the "Regulations for the Administration of 
Securities Brokers". However, there was no "Stock Exchange" at that time.
In 1962, the government established the Taiwan Stock Exchange. As mentioned 
above, to control the informal over-the-counter trading which was caused by the land 
redistribution policy, Taiwan had an embryonic regulation for brokers to ensure fair 
dealing. However, the rapid increase in private savings looking for more opportunities 
for investments and the take-off of industries which were short of capital urgently 
called for a "situs" which could fulfil both their demands. To deal with these needs, the 
government declared that "...to enhance capital formation and accelerate economic 
development, the second item of the '19 Items of the Financial and Economic 
Reformation' is to arrange for the establishment of the stock exchange market..."67
Statistics published by the UN supply further proof of the importance of the 
capital market. These statistics show the size and structure of world financial markets 
in 1982 and 1988.68 The combined size of world financial markets can be estimated at 
over $13,000 and $36,000 billion in 1982 and 1988, respectively. In 1982, capital 
markets only accounted for 35.9% of the total assets, but increased massively later, 
thus becoming over half of the total assets in 1988.69 At this point, the importance of 
the capital market to the economy and the individual company70 is self-evident.71
66 See SEC (Taiwan), The Introduction to the Securities and Exchange Commission, 1991, p. 1. The 
first four privatised companies were Taiwan Cement, Taiwan Paper, Taiwan Industry & Mining, and 
Taiwan Tea Corp.
67 See SEC (Taiwan), The Review and Prospect o f the Securities Administration, 1991, pp. 3-5.
68 See United Nations, Trade and Development Report, 1990, Report by the secretariat of the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, p. 109.
69 Id.
70 The major place where companies solicit their capital is the capital market. If a country has a well 
developed capital market, it is an advantage from this point of view.
71 Stock markets accounted for 11.5% and 26.2% of total assets in 1982 and 1988, i.e. in 1988, stock 
markets contributed to capital markets greatly (over 50%). In 1988, bond markets accounted for 
24.1% which was less than that of stock markets. This is why it is said that the 1980s had seen a 
major shift in international financial intermediaries from banking to security markets. See supra note 
68 .
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The significance of the capital market and its function fully correspond with the 
earlier section which dealt with the importance of market efficiency. In short, a 
government which wishes to develop its economy needs to develop its capital market; 
the way to effect this is to have an efficient market, and to that end, disclosure is 
indispensable.
3.1.4.2 The Deregulation of the International Capital Market
Both the enactment of the FSA 1986 and the "Big Bang"72 showed that the UK and 
the City of London appreciated the importance of the capital market and realised the 
necessity of improving the old regulations. The UK government also takes into 
account the ways in which UK regulation will dovetail with international requirements 
because virtually all the markets in the City operate on an international scale.73 
Likewise, in the last thirteen years (since 1983) the Taiwanese government has 
endeavoured to develop an internationalisation program for the securities markets. 
Initially, foreign investors were allowed to invest in the Taiwanese securities market 
indirectly by purchasing depository receipts or beneficiary certificates from open-ended 
mutual funds invested in the Taiwan Stock Exchange and issued by securities
72 This well-known expression refers to the implementation of a series of major reforms in the Stock 
Exchange. The three principal accomplishments of the Big Bang were: 1. it abolished the single­
capacity system, under which every stock exchange member or member firm could either be a jobber 
or a broker, but not both; 2. it gave access to the Stock Exchange to major British and foreign 
investment banks and commercial banks; 3. it eliminated fixed commissions. See Norman S. Poser, 
International Securities Regulation, 1991, p. 18.
73 F.W. Neate (ed.), The Developing Global Securities Market, 1987, p. 1; Paul Stonham, Global 
Stock Market Reforms, 1987, p. 13; Hamish McRae and Frances Caimcross, Capital City, 1991, pp. 
2, 135. As regards the internationalisation of securities markets, see Technical Committee of the 
International Organisation of Securities Commission, Report on Issues Raised for Securities and 
Futures Regulators by Under-Regulated and Uncooperative Jurisdictions, Oct. 1994, introduction; 
David Folkerts-Landau, Takatoshi Ito, et al., International Capital Markets Developments, Prospects, 
and Policy Issues, Aug. 1995; Andrew Large, Regulation for a Global Marketplace, Panel on 
Globalisation of Risks: Cooperation Between Banking and Market Regulators, 20th Annual 
Conference of International Organisation of Securities Commissions, Paris, 12 July 1995, para. 4; and 
Marc I. Steinberg and Daryl L. Lansdale, Jr., "Regulation S and Rule 144A: Creating a Workable 
Fiction in an Expanding Global Securities Market", in 29 The International Lawyer, 43-63, Spring, 
1995, pp. 43-4.
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investment trust enterprises; later on, from 1990 onwards, foreign investors have been 
permitted to invest in the securities markets directly (with limitations) provided that 
they are institutional investors which include foreign insurance companies, banks, fund 
managers, etc. Finally, foreign natural persons can now directly invest in the securities 
markets from March 1st, 1996. These developments have resulted in a daily report for 
Taiwan stock index by the Dow Jones world stock index from April 1st, 1996.
Interestingly, not only have the deregulation74 and liberalisation75 of the world's 
financial markets precipitated internationalisation,76 but internationalisation in turn has 
accelerated the process of deregulation and liberalisation. Increased internationalisation 
of the world's domestic markets has this effect because the players in each domestic 
financial market are unwilling to suffer the consequences of internationalisation. To 
prevent such loss, government regulations have adopted policies of deregulation and 
market liberalisation in a regulatory "race to the bottom" deemed to solicit capital. In 
other words, when internationalisation becomes widespread, old regulations which 
hamper this development must be lifted, such as prohibiting foreigners from trading on 
the Stock Exchange directly or indirectly; thus the policies of deregulation and 
liberalisation become prevalent.
Following these developments, the question of the protection of investors arises. 
The answer is simple and clear: in respect of the public offerings of securities and the 
obligation of continuous disclosure,77 disclosure is the principal regulatory tool now
74 In some academics' view, the term "deregulation" is ambiguous and in truth a misnomer. The 
correct term is "re-regulation"; in many ways, the regulatory environment is becoming increasingly 
formal and detailed, while institutions are being given more freedom over the type of business they 
may conduct. See David T. Llewellyn, "A Competition and the Regulatory Mix", in National 
Westminster Bank Quarterly R., 4-13, Aug. 1987.
75 The Big Bang demonstrates that deregulation and liberalisation have become a world wide trend in 
the financial market. Regarding deregulation of financial markets, see Alan Gart, Regulation, 
Deregulation, Reregulation, The Future o f the Banking, Insurance, and Securities Industries, 1994, 
pp. 16, 17, and chapter 3.
76 Neate, supra note 73; the necessity of internationalisation has been increasingly appreciated by 
enterprises, such as Daimler-Benz, see supra note 2, p. 370.
77 Demands for access to reliable financial information have escalated as international risks have 
grown, which results from internationalisation of capital markets. See Doreen McBamet and 
Christopher Whelan, "International Corporate Finance and the Challenge of Creative Compliance", in
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employed by most developed markets, such as the UK, the USA, and even Taiwan 
(now developing towards more disclosure instead of merit regulation). Thus, to 
employ disclosure as the vehicle of regulating the market in most developed markets 
has become the dominant policy; consequently, even if this policy is not the best 
choice, a state which aims to develop its capital market has to consider seriously 
whether to adopt disclosure regulation, and by this, disclosure is justified from the 
empirical and practical point of view.
3.1.5 The Institutional Choice
From the above section, it is clear that disclosure with respect to the public distribution 
of securities is justified by both policy and economic considerations. The next question 
is how disclosure can better be achieved — by mandatory or voluntary disclosure. 
Voluntary disclosure is defined here as disclosure which is either self-motivated or 
required by non-governmental institutions (e.g. a stock exchange) which do not act on 
behalf of the government.78
If the final goal of disclosure is to have an allocatively efficient market by means 
of informational efficiency, which is vital to investor protection, the core problem will 
be how to distribute information. Stated otherwise, the efficiency of the information 
market is determinative of the efficiency of the securities market.79 Following this, 
information costs determine the breadth and speed of such distribution; therefore 
costless, or at least less costly information, is a necessary condition for the efficient 
operation of the capital market.80 The more cheaply the information can be obtained
The Internationalisation o f Capital Market and the Regulatory Response, John Fingleton (ed.), 1992, 
p. 129. Noticeably, the regulatory schemes with respect to the regulation of broker-dealers and, 
particularly, investment companies, still include a large number of substantive requirements. Poser, 
supra note 72, p. 7.
78 If the reason is a governmental regulation for a stock exchange requiring disclosure, it is not 
defined as voluntary disclosure here; instead, it is mandatory disclosure.
79 See Stephen Breyer, Regulation and its Reform, 1982, p. 161.
80 See Sanford J. Grossman and Joseph E. Stiglitz, "On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient 
Markets", in 70 American Economic R., 393-408, 1980, p. 393.
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and distributed, the more widely it can be disseminated. Hence, the question can be 
posed: by which method will the dispersal of information be cheapest? If costs are not 
easy to measure, what other considerations should be taken into account?
Legal academics commonly advocate the necessity of mandatory disclosure, 
while some economists, on the other hand, strongly oppose the legislative policy of 
mandatory disclosure. The opponents of mandatory disclosure believe that the 
government should not intervene in market operations unless there is market 
imperfection, and generally the market itself will resolve most problems.81 They also 
assume that the purpose of regulation is to improve the "public interest": regulatory 
agencies employ the positive power of the state to take advantage of economic 
efficiencies and serve the general welfare.82 Thus, when the costs of regulation 
outweigh its benefits, the general welfare is being jeopardised and a regulatory failure 
takes place.
The main point at issue is whether the market can achieve the ideal level of 
disclosure without mandatory disclosure. If the answer is negative and mandatory 
disclosure is necessary, then mandatory disclosure may be justified; the extent (or the 
scope) of mandatory disclosure is a separate question which will be dealt with in 
Chapter Five.
3.2 The Justification of Mandatory Disclosure —  The Inadequacy of the 
General Law
3.2.1 Introduction
The above analysis affirms the importance of disclosure in the company and securities
81 Even if the market fails, in some scholars' view, it does not necessarily justify regulation for 
regulatory intervention may be even worse than market imperfection. As regards the function of 
regulation, see Manuel F. Cohen and George J. Stigler, Can Regulatory Agencies Protect Consumers? 
Rational Debate Seminars, 1971.
82 Robert Britt Horwitz, The Irony o f Regulatory Reform, 1989, p. 26.
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fields. The question is how disclosure can be achieved. Without doubt, disclosure now- 
a-days is often required by legislation and regulation. Nonetheless, its existence per se 
does not automatically imply that it "should" exist. Empirical evidence reveals that 
such legislation and regulation differ from state to state, from subject-matter to 
subject-matter; thus reflecting the different views on disclosure among different 
countries. Deliberation on the basics of mandatory disclosure is therefore the heart of 
any serious consideration of the law regarding disclosure in different countries. 
However, for the moment, the discussions of the details of the current legislation of 
mandatory disclosure are postponed until Chapter Five in order to permit analyses of a 
preliminary question of fundamental importance, namely, if mandatory disclosure had 
not been adopted, how far the need for disclosure would be satisfied by the general 
law. Clearly, if the general law cannot provide investors with sufficient protection, it is 
arguable that mandatory disclosure is required.
For the UK, "the general law" here refers to English common law in contrast to 
the FSA 1986, the Yellow Book and all other disclosure regulations, including the 
provisions of the Companies Acts so far as they are relevant.83 In Taiwan where there 
is no precise equivalent of English common law, it includes relevant provisions of both 
the Civil Code and Company Law in contrast to the Securities and Exchange Law and 
other administrative regulations promulgated by the SEC.
For the sake of clarity, we would like to emphasise that the term "mandatory 
disclosure" is used by all commentators in the context of "extra" disclosure
83 The classification of the Companies Acts in this context involves certain difficulties. The 
difficulties partly stem from the tradition that British legislators and administrators used to place (in 
fact, they are still used to it to a certain extent) securities regulations in the Companies Act because 
there was no "securities legislation" before 1986. Even after the enactment of the FSA 1986, the 
consequential amendments was first enacted in the Companies Act 1989 and brought about the 
changes in the FSA 1986. The difficulties are also due to the fact that it is not easy to partition the 
company law amendments into "the amendment to the general law" or "the new regulation springing 
from the thinking of mandatory disclosure regime". Therefore, it appears that the Companies Act 
stands in a grey area in which some provisions could be identified as mandatory disclosure 
requirements by comparing the enactment of the same or similar rules in the American or Taiwanese 
mandatory regulations.
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requirements imposed by securities legislation and regulations, specifically the US 
Securities Act of 1933, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and SEC regulations. Such 
regulations, in theory, include the Securities and Exchange Law and SEC regulations 
in Taiwan, and relevant parts of the Companies Act 1985, the FSA 1986, the Code on 
Takeovers and Mergers, the Yellow Book, and the rules regulating the Unlisted 
Securities Market (now the Alternative Investment Market) in the UK. Accordingly, 
even though disclosure requirements imposed by the general law are mandatory, the 
debate concerning the choice between voluntary and mandatory disclosure does not 
relate to mandatory disclosure under the general law; the existence of mandatory 
disclosure in the general law is taken for granted.
The question can first be examined from the point of view of the providers of 
information (here companies and directors). In the situation where the system of 
mandatory disclosure does not exist, corporate disclosure either is achieved by 
voluntary disclosure (of companies and directors) or fails (partly or totally) for the 
reasons discussed below.84 What voluntary disclosure does is to make use of market 
forces fully; that is, the competition among companies forces them to disclose their 
financial situation and business projects, and this, in turn, helps investors make well- 
informed investment judgments. However, even if corporate disclosure is achieved by 
voluntary disclosure,85 the occasional failure of disclosure will still arise and voluntary 
disclosure cannot impose any legal liability upon companies and related persons, 
because it is only an economic instrument, not a legal one. To avoid such occasional 
failure and to place the company and directors under an obligation to make disclosure, 
there must be a ultimate possibility of enforcement out of law. The consequences of 
failing to comply with mandatory disclosure requirements are usually criminal, 
administrative, or even civil liability. Thus, so far as the incentives for a company or
84 See infra Chapter Four.
85 As claimed by some economists referred to in Chapter Four.
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the directors to make disclosure is concerned, mandatory disclosure is preferred given 
the availability of legal enforcement.
Furthermore, this question can be answered from the perspective of recipients of 
information (here investors). If mandatory disclosure is employed by the government, 
the recipients' rights mostly come from statutory obligations which are imposed on 
providers of information. By way of contrast, without the system of mandatory 
disclosure, duties of companies and directors in relation to provision of information to 
investors are less certain.
The sections which follow deal with the situation where no mandatory disclosure 
is imposed on the company or directors. The analysis of the general law shows its 
inadequacy for the purpose of achieving the goals of disclosure; therefore, mandatory 
disclosure can be justified. The focus is on two main issues: (1) the relationship 
between the company and investors; (2) the relationship between directors (or 
promoters) and investors. The issues raised in the section are approached by 
comparing the difference between the UK and Taiwan legal systems. It should be 
borne in mind that Taiwan has a civil law system, judicial decisions do not have the 
legal significance as their counterparts in the UK.86
86 In a practical sense, the cases specifically chosen by the Supreme Court as "precedents" bind the 
lower courts for two reasons: (1) if the lower court does not follow a specific precedent, when any 
party appeals, it would be overruled by the Supreme Court; (2) the result of (1) is the possible effect on 
the evaluation of judicial performance of the judge in question carried out annually which affects the 
judge's promotion to a higher court in the future. Since the binding effect is limited to those chosen 
cases, it is still valid to point out that case law is not very important in Taiwan.
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3.2.2 The Relationship between the Company and its Members —  
Members’ Rights deriving from their Status of Members
This section concerns only members or shareholders87 of companies; creditors or 
potential investors are ignored. The reason for this exclusion is that if the inadequacy 
of the general law is proved concerning how to clarify shareholders' rights deriving 
from their status, then it is not necessary to go further as regards the rights of creditors 
and potential investors, which derive from their status of being creditors and potential 
investors. Members' rights hereinafter will be referred to as "members' rights qua 
member". This section demonstrates that under the general law, both in the UK and 
Taiwan, a member of a company has no clear right qua member to ask for information 
from the company.
3.2.2.1 The United Kingdom
Unlike the position in Taiwan, where members' rights are examined mainly from their 
characteristics, in the UK, the rights of a member (or a shareholder) of a company are 
determined by the contract between the company and its members, specifically, the 
memorandum and articles of the company.88 Those are the sources of the rights of the 
member unless the statute provides the member of the company with some other rights 
which are not included in the contract. In practice, a member, even of a private 
company, is not entitled to inspect the books and records of the company except to the 
extent that the Companies Act specifically provides. In other words, the spirit of
87 Shareholders are members of companies which issue shares (e.g. companies limited by shares). 
Therefore, the term "shareholders" is employed in the case where companies issue shares while the 
term "members" is maintained when referring to the other companies. Nonetheless, since shareholders 
are members, for the sake of simplicity, when members' rights are concerned, we use the term 
members' rights qua members without specifically mentioning shareholders' rights qua shareholders.
88 s. 14 of the Companies Act 1985; Hickman v. Kent or Romney Marsh Sheep-breeders' Association 
[1915] 1 Ch. 881. "Much of the difficulty is removed if the company be regarded, ... as being treated 
in law as a party to its own memorandum and articles." (per Astbury J)., p. 896. Approved Beattie v. 
Beattie [1938] Ch. 708. G.B. Parker, M. Buckley, and Sir Raymond Walton, Buckley on the 
Companies Acts, 1981, Vol. 1, pp. 66-7.
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company law is to respect freedom of contract of those people who want to form a 
company; the legislative intervention will arise if, and only if, it is necessary for the 
purpose of protecting the member of the company. Since corporate constitutions do 
not always deal with the right to information, such a right will largely depend on 
statutory intervention, i.e. mandatory disclosure requirements. For example, the 
Companies Act 198589 provides that members (and only members) of the company 
have the right to inspect director's service contracts without charge; moreover, 
information, such as registers of the director and secretary, directors' holdings and 
dealings of the company's securities, and substantial shareholders' shareholdings (above 
3%), is open to members (and the public as well). These provisions demonstrate the 
inadequacy of the general law and the necessity of governmental intervention.
3.2.2.2 Taiwan
The extent to which a member (or a shareholder) qua member may enjoy the right of 
access to corporate information becomes meaningful when the Taiwan aspect is 
examined. Under the current Taiwanese Company Law, only the right of receiving the 
information included in the annual report is recognised for companies of all types, 
while a general right of inspection at any time is granted to members of unlimited and 
limited companies and to members with unlimited liability of unlimited companies with 
members of limited liability. Two questions, however, remain unanswered. First, the 
legal basis for granting information needs clarification. Second, it is obscure to what 
extent, if any, members with limited liability of unlimited companies with members of 
limited liability together with shareholders of companies limited by shares may possess 
the right of inspection at any time as well as the right to the annual report. It is argued 
below that since the highly emphasised classification of members' rights by academics 
could not comprehensively solve such questions, mandatory disclosure is therefore 
required.
89 s. 318(7).
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Traditionally, academics90 classify members' rights into different categories and 
define them as "vested" or "non-vested" rights. Vested rights, theoretically, cannot be 
altered even by corporate memorandum or articles.91 Therefore, according to the 
classification made by academics, it is submitted that "members' right of access to 
corporate information" can be located in different categories depending on the purpose 
of exercising such a right.92 And this helps us to identify whether members should have 
such rights or not, and if in some situations, the answer turns out to be negative, what 
are the reasons for this deviation? If the classification turns out to be not meaningful, 
however, we may have to abandon it.
The relationship between the company and its members regarding the right of 
access to corporate information can be observed in the Company Law of Taiwan. 
Comparing the rights of members or shareholders in different types of companies 
reveals that their rights may vary from type to type. By means of comparison, the 
reasons underlying such differences can be pointed out; following this, it can be shown 
that shareholders of companies limited by shares do not have absolute rights of 
obtaining information unless there are mandatory disclosure requirements on 
companies. Although academics, as indicated earlier, advocate the classification of 
members' rights, they have never made this comparison to determine whether the 
classification is sound; it is intended here to clarify it with the help of this comparison.
To begin with, there are four types of companies in Taiwan: the unlimited 
company, the limited company, the unlimited company with members of limited 
liability, and the company limited by shares.93 It is worth briefly explaining their 
characteristics.
90 See, e.g., Yung-jung Lin, The New Annotation o f Commercial Law (Shang Shih Fa Hsin Ch’uan), 
4th ed., 1990, pp. 271-2.
91 Fang-chih Ko, The Company Law (Kung Ssu Fa Lun), 1987, p. 218.
92 See infra pages 116-8.
93 Article 2, CL. See also Yuan Cheng, Taiwan's Legal Framework for Foreign Investment: What 
Can the PRC Learn from It, Working Paper No. 9, SOAS Law Department, University of London, 
March 1996, pp. 5-7.
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The unlimited company is comprised of two or more members who bear 
unlimited liability for the debts of the company jointly and severally. There is no 
substantial difference between the unlimited company and the partnership except that 
the former has a legal personality distinct from its members. Members of the company 
in principle are also managers of the company.94
The limited company is incorporated by more than five but less than twenty- 
one members. It is a close company, but the control and the ownership have been 
separated already. As the maximum of the number of directors stipulated by law is 
three, not every member of the company can be a director.95 In this type of company 
there are no shares; a member cannot transfer all or part of his contribution to the 
capital of the company to non-members without the consent of the majority of all other 
members.96 Members' liability is limited to their own particular contributions.
The unlimited company with members of limited liability is organised by one 
or more members of unlimited liability and one or more members of limited liability. 
Members with unlimited liability are liable for corporate debts jointly and severally just 
as those members of the unlimited company, and members bearing limited liability are 
responsible for company debts being limited to the amounts of capital contributed by 
them. Unlimited liability members run the business, while the function of members of 
limited liability is only to provide the company with capital.
The company limited by shares is incorporated by seven or more shareholders 
with the total capital of the company divided into shares, and each shareholder is liable
94 Article 45, CL, provides: "Each member shall have the right to conduct the business of the 
company and shall be responsible therefor..."
95 Article 108(1), CL.
96 Article 111(1), CL. For directors, it is even more strict. They have to obtain the unanimous consent 
of all other members before they are allowed to transfer all or part of their contribution to the capital 
of the company to non-members. See Article 111(3).
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to the company in the amount of the shares subscribed for by him. This kind of 
company is the basis of modem enterprises; the number of shareholders is so large that 
it is impossible for every shareholder to take part in management.
The Company Law gives members of unlimited companies, limited companies, 
and also members bearing unlimited liability of unlimited companies with members of 
limited liability the right to investigate its financial condition at any time. In contrast, 
the Company Law restricts members bearing limited liability of unlimited companies 
with members of limited liability and shareholders of companies limited by shares to an 
annual inspection. The reasons for this distinction are considered below.
First, with regard to the unlimited company, Article 45 of the Company Law 
provides: "Each member shall have the right to conduct the business of the company 
and shall be responsible therefor...". Following this, Article 48 provides:
"Members who do not conduct business may, at any time, require members 
who conduct business to furnish information on the business condition of the 
company, and examine the company's assets, documents, books and 
statements."
From these two articles, it is obvious that members of the unlimited company can 
gain access to corporate information at any time. However, the reasons underlying this 
right are three-fold. First, as the management and the ownership are combined, this 
combination naturally entails such a result (i.e. all members are entitled to gain access 
to corporate information). Second, this right derives from the heavy burden of 
"unlimited liability" borne by members of the company. Since all their personal wealth 
is at stake, they are entitled to enjoy the right to ensure that the company is well- 
managed. Third, this right is owned by members of the company simply because they 
are the "members" of the company, in other words, a right qua member.
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It is difficult to tell which reason is most sound. They may be all appropriate if 
only the unlimited company is concerned (because the unlimited company fits every 
requisite of the three reasons). Nonetheless, a subsequent examination of other kinds 
of companies may help to answer this question.
Turning to the limited company, Article 109 of the Company Law provides:
"Members who do not conduct business may, at any time, exercise the right 
of supervision, and the provision of Article 48 shall mutatis mutandis apply 
to such a right." (emphasis added)
This article empowers members of the limited company to inspect the corporate 
records without any limitation. In analysing why members of the limited company have 
unlimited rights to corporate information, two reasons emerge: one based on status, 
the other on special characteristics. The status argument becomes clear from a 
comparison between the limited company and unlimited company. The control and the 
ownership in the limited company are separated as explained above; the liability of 
members of the company is limited. This, compared with the reasons mentioned above 
for members of the unlimited company to enjoy the right of information, shows that the 
most appropriate reason for providing information to members of the limited company 
may be identical to the third reason ascribed to members of the unlimited company for 
enjoying unlimited access to information, namely that, a right bestowed by the law 
simply because they are members (hereinafter referred to as "the member's status").
Accordingly, if the right of access to corporate information is a right deriving 
from members' status, it may be inferred that members in other kinds of companies, 
that is, members bearing limited liability of unlimited companies with members of 
limited liability and shareholders of companies limited by shares, should have the same 
right as that of members of unlimited companies and limited companies. Surprisingly, 
the inference is wrong. This is, however, not necessarily a drafting defect. The reasons
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for this different treatment among members of different kinds of companies will be 
developed later.
Article 118 of the Company Law gives the right of only annual inspection to 
limited liability members of unlimited companies with members of limited liability. It 
provides:
"A limited liability member may, at the end of every business year, examine 
the accounts, and the business and financial condition of the company. 
Whenever necessary the court may, upon the application of a limited liability 
member, grant him or her the permission to examine at any time the 
company's accounts, and its business and financial condition..." (emphasis 
added)
It is clear from this Article that the right of "annual inspection" is the principle; the 
court's approval is only exceptional.
Moreover, Article 229 does not provide shareholders with this court order 
exception in the case of companies limited by shares. The right they have individually is 
the right of annual inspection only.97 Another provision worth mentioning here is 
Article 210. This Article allows shareholders and creditors to require access to the 
annual balance sheet and the profit and loss account on submission of a certificate 
evidencing their interest98 involved. However, first, this is not a right without limitation 
because shareholders and creditors need to prove their interest involved; second, the 
documents available are not the current information; they are only the annual records
97 Article 229 provides: "The statements and records of accounts prepared by the board of directors 
and the report made by the supervisors shall be made available at the head office for inspection at any 
time by the shareholders, ten days prior to the annual general meeting of shareholders. The 
shareholders may bring their lawyers or certified public accountants for such an inspection." 
Regarding the definition of supervisors, see infra note 101.
98 According to administrative interpretations issued by the Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
shareholders and creditors need to show their interest when they exercise such a right under Article 
210(2), CL. However, these interpretations did not define the term "interest". The term "interest" can 
be interpreted as meaning "reasons", reasons for which shareholders and creditors wish to inspect 
corporate documents. See Ministry of Economic Affairs (Ching Chi Pou) 63.4.4 shang 08576 hao; 
72.10.11 shang 41318 hao.
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(the balance sheet and the profit and loss account) prepared since the incorporation of 
the company.
The following question, however, arises: how can the fact that shareholders in 
companies limited by shares have no right of access to corporate information beyond 
annual inspection be explained if the reasons developed earlier with regard to the right 
of members of the unlimited company and the limited company are correct? Does this 
mean that even if the right is qua member, it may be variable because of some special 
reasons? If it is, then, what are these special reasons?
Second, examining the special characteristics of the limited company helps to 
identify the reason underpinning this right of members in such a company. As indicated 
above, the maximum number of members in a limited company is twenty-one. This 
shows that such a company is generally designed for a family-type company; the 
limitation on transferring capital contribution to the company by members further 
supports this view. Therefore, it seems probable that, because in a limited company 
there is a close relationship among its members, the law decides to give members the 
right of access to corporate information. The acceptance of this reasoning suggests 
that, although members of the unlimited company and limited company have the same 
right of information, the reasons for the right are different. This further suggests that 
the rights of limited liability members of unlimited companies with members of limited 
liability and shareholders of companies limited by shares may vary from those of 
members in other kinds of companies, since companies have different characteristics. 
Thus, the question raised above regarding the right of limited liability members of 
unlimited companies with members of limited liability and shareholders of companies 
limited by shares in the light of members' rights in the unlimited company and limited 
company will not be relevant here. The answer to this question, instead, should depend 
on what rights members can enjoy in these two kinds of companies and on the 
characteristics of both kinds of companies.
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Both channels of reasoning suggest that, to see this, it is necessary to delineate 
the classification of members' rights made by academics." First, the characteristics of 
members' rights and their types are examined.
(a) the characteristics of membership rights
The membership right itself mixes the characteristics of a property right and a "status" 
right.100 To be a member of the company, one has to pay something valuable in 
exchange for the membership. The ownership of the property is transferred from the 
member to the company. The payer loses his or her title to that property and the 
company becomes the new owner. In return, the member obtains the "membership" in 
the company which allows him or her to enjoy the rights which are generally and 
commonly owned by other members of the company such as the right to vote and the 
right to manage the company. These are members' "status" rights.
On the other hand, members are entitled to the distribution of earnings (provided 
that a dividend is declared) during the life of the company, and the distribution of 
corporate assets when the company is wound-up (provided there are surplus assets 
left) after the company discharges its debts. These are members' property rights.
99 See supra note 91.
100 Rights are generally divided as "property rights" and "non-property rights" in the civil law. The 
latter includes "the rights of individual personality" and "status rights". The right of individual 
personality means those rights which come from the person, such as life, body, health, freedom, 
reputation, name, credit, etc. The status right is a right existing between two persons based on special 
personal relationship such as the parental rights (parents have rights to take care of or to discipline 
their children, e.g. Articles 1084 and 1085 of the Civil Code) and the right of the head of the house 
(Article 1122 provides that a "house" is a body of relatives who live together in a household with the 
object of sharing a life in common permanently. Article 1123 provides that each house shall have a 
head. Articles 1126 and 1127 regulate the relationship between the head of the house and the 
members of the house by stipulating, for example, that the head may order a member of frill age or a 
married minor to be separated from the house, provided that he has good reason to do so.) See Chi- 
yang Shih, General Principles o f the Civil Code (Min Fa Tsung Tse), 1983, pp. 29-30.
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(b) the kinds of membership rights
1. distinction according to the purpose of the right
At a very general level it is useful to distinguish a right which may freely be exercised 
in its holder's interest from a right which has been conferred so that it is exercised in 
another's interest. For example, a supervisor101 of the company has the right to 
investigate its business and financial condition, acting in the interests of the company, 
not his own.102 In contrast, a shareholder has the rights to request access to the 
company's books and records, acting in his own interest, not the company's.103
The same distinction can be made where members' rights are concerned. A right 
exercised for the purpose of managing the company (in the interests of the company) 
should be distinguished from a right exercised in members' self-interest only. This 
distinction echoes the characteristics of the membership right mentioned above. As a 
general proposition, a membership right bearing the characteristic of a status right is a 
right to be exercised in the interests of the company, while a membership right with the 
characteristic of a property right is a right to be exercised in the member's self-interest. 
For example, the voting right,104 the right to request the board of directors to convene
101 In Taiwan, corporate governance of companies limited by shares is a two-tier system: the board of 
directors and the supervisors. The supervisors are an "organ" of a company independent from the 
board of directors, exercising the power individually conferred on each of them by the Company Law 
(CL) (therefore, there is no meeting requirement among the supervisors) (Art. 221, CL). Supervisors 
must be the company's shareholders and are elected at the general meeting by shareholders; the legal 
relationship between a company and its supervisors is controlled by a contract of mandate (Art. 216, 
CL). The power of a supervisor includes: 1. investigating the business and financial condition of the 
company at any time (Art. 218, CL); 2. checking all statements and records of various kinds prepared 
and submitted by the board of directors to the general meeting and making a report of his findings in 
these documents to the general meeting (Art. 219, CL); 3. convening a meeting of shareholders when 
necessary (Art. 220, CL). Besides that, when a director discovers the possible serious damage that the 
company may suffer, he should report this to any supervisor immediately (Art. 218-1, CL). Finally, a 
supervisor shall not be currently a director, manager, or other employee of the company (Art. 222, 
CL).
102 See Article 218, CL.
103 See Article 210, CL.
104 Article 179, CL. It may seem odd to British lawyers that Taiwanese academics classify the voting 
right as a right in the company's interest and is a status right. In the UK, the voting right is thought of 
as a proprietary right and the holder may exercise the right in his own selfish interests even if these
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a special meeting of shareholders,105 the right to apply to the court for 
reorganisation,106 and the right to bring derivative suits107 are rights to be exercised in 
the interests of the company. The right to the distribution of earnings108 and the pre­
emptive right when new shares are issued109 are rights in individual shareholder's self- 
interest.110
2. distinction made according to whether the right can be varied or abrogated by 
corporate memorandum, articles, or resolutions of general meeting
In the UK, vested rights cannot be altered unless by general meeting. However, in 
Taiwan, academics have interpreted vested rights more restrictively with regard to this 
classification, namely, such rights are inalienable. If a membership right cannot be 
varied or abrogated by the memorandum, articles, or resolution of the general meeting, 
it is a "vested" right of a member. On the other hand, if a right can be varied or 
abrogated, it is not a "vested" right.111 This is important because Taiwanese judges pay 
attention to academic interpretations where statutory language is unclear.
The distinction between vested and non-vested rights is aimed at delimiting the 
extent of the power of the general meeting in order to protect the interests of 
shareholders. That is, the extent that the general meeting can deprive members' of their 
existing rights is limited. It is generally accepted that a right to be exercised in the 
interests of the company is a "vested" right, while a right for self-interest is not.112
are opposed to those of the company. North-West Transportation v. Beatty (1887) 12 A.C. 589; 
Goodfellow v. Nelson Line [1912] 2 Ch. 324. In Taiwan, the voting right comes with membership, 
that is, with "persons"; thus, it is a status right. In the UK, on the contrary, the voting right is thought 
to come with "shares", i.e. the "property", therefore, it is a proprietary right.
105 Article 173, CL.
106 Article 282, CL.
107 Articles 214 and 227, CL.
108 Articles 157 and 232, CL.
109 Article 267, CL.
110 See Fang-chih Ko, supra note 91, p. 216.
111 Id.
112 Id.
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However, it is now provided by the statute that the constitution of the company 
can limit the voting right of shareholders of special shares,113 and not every shareholder 
can run the company; since running the company and voting are identified as rights to 
be exercised in the interests of the company, that is, "vested rights", these are good 
examples of "vested rights" that are no longer inalienable. On the other hand, transfer 
of shares of the company limited by shares cannot be limited;114 the right to transfer 
shares is exercised in the interests of shareholders; it is thus a "non-vested right" which 
theoretically can be restricted. This demonstrates that the classification is no longer a 
clear cut distinction. It is difficult to advocate that all "vested" membership rights 
cannot be varied or abrogated; the distinction provides only a general principle. 
Exceptions may be made in certain situations.
The problem for the present purpose which arises is as follows: is the right of 
access to corporate information a right to be exercised in the interests of the company 
or a right for self-interest? To what extent can it be limited?
The right to information has both characteristics. It is a right to be exercised in 
the interests of the company when shareholders make decisions at general meeting; 
they need information to judge which resolution is good for the company. It is also a 
right in the self-interest of shareholders when they decide to buy or sell shares; they 
need this information to make a well-informed investment judgment.
If the classification developed above by academics is followed, i.e. the "vested" 
right cannot be varied or abrogated in principle, and if a right to be exercised in the 
interests of the company is usually a "vested" right, then, the question raised above can 
be partly resolved. We can distinguish the different rights owned by members of the
113 Article 157, CL.
114 Article 163, CL.
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unlimited company and limited company on the one hand, and those owned by 
members with limited liability of unlimited companies with members of limited liability 
and shareholders of companies limited by shares on the other hand.
In other words, the right of a member to gain access to corporate information on 
an annual basis is exercised in the interests of the company and cannot be taken away 
in any circumstances. But day-to-day supervision, although exercised in the interests of 
the company, appears, like the voting right, to be a limited right and thus an 
exceptional case. A possible reason for this exception is that, in a two-tier system like 
that in Taiwan, a board of directors manages the company while supervisors supervise 
this board. The Company Law authorises supervisors to check corporate business and 
financial condition at any time.115 The supervisor is independent of the board of 
directors and therefore exercises the right to check the corporate business information 
on behalf of the company, and in turn, the shareholders as a group. Thus, with the help 
of supervisors, individual shareholders do not need to be concerned with the day-to- 
day operation of the company, and this justifies depriving the shareholders as members 
of companies which have supervisors of the right of day-to-day supervision — no 
necessity of providing individual shareholders with information.
In contrast, if the right to obtain information at any time from the company is for 
the shareholder's personal interest (because he wants to make an investment decision), 
this is a self-interest right, and in turn may not be a "vested" right unless the law 
explicitly recognises it (as in the case of transfer of shares, Article 163116). In this 
situation, it is not surprising that the statute has not conferred such a right on 
shareholders.
115 Article 218(1), CL: "A supervisor may at any time investigate the business and financial condition 
of the company, examine books, records and documents, and request the board of directors to make 
reports thereon."
116 Article 163, CL: "The transfer of shares of a company shall not be prohibited or restricted by its 
memorandum and articles of incorporation, except that no shares shall be transferred prior to the 
incorporation of the company."
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Concerning the problem of disclosure for the individual shareholder's self- 
interest, the real difficulty is that in practice the constitutions of companies fail to deal 
with the question whether shareholders should have or have not access to corporate 
information. The constitutions equally never make provisions for the company's 
obligations to disclose information to shareholders. Thus, nothing is said and it is very 
difficult to answer the question as to the extent shareholders have the right to 
information qua member. Based on this, it is obvious that this right of access to 
information can be achieved only by judicial or legislative development of the right of 
shareholders and the obligation of companies.
The answer may vary from situation to situation. For example, it is 
understandable that shareholders of companies limited by shares have no right to seek 
corporate information at any time they choose. This is because of the special nature of 
such companies which are usually incorporated for the purpose of running a large 
enterprise, where shareholders come and go like flowing water. It is not appropriate to 
bestow this right on shareholders; it can endanger the company because trade secrets 
may leak out easily; it also hampers the management, because they waste time 
satisfying shareholders' inquiries.
To develop this theory, it is submitted that the right to information can be 
restricted in some situations. Hence, when, to whom, and to what extent information 
should be available are basically designed by the law. The answer cannot be given by 
considering the right of members qua member. This is not a natural right like the right 
to life. If the positive law does not delineate this right clearly, then a grey area arises. 
The problem is that it is very difficult for a shareholder to claim his or her right to 
information before the court in the situation where there is no statutory provision 
explicitly dealing with this right, because a member cannot definitively claim his or her 
right to information qua member, and the general law has not developed a
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comprehensive and exhaustive rule to regulate this issue. Accordingly, if disclosure is 
deemed indispensable, then the system of mandatory disclosure can resolve this 
problem to a large extent.
The above discussion reveals that the traditional classification of "vested rights" 
(which cannot even be altered by the memorandum, articles, or the general meeting) 
and "non-vested rights", does not help us clarify whether rights of information can be 
altered or abrogated. The special reasons which cause different treatment among 
members of different kinds of companies can be developed without the help of such 
classification. Thus it is suggested that this classification should be abolished. 
Nonetheless, it is also suggested that the classification of "rights to be exercised in the 
interests of the company" and "rights exercised in members' self-interest" be retained, 
because it relates to a more fundamental distinction made by the civil law, namely 
between non-property rights and property rights.
In summary, this section emphasises that, under the general law, shareholders 
have no clear rights qua member to ask for information from the company except on an 
annual basis. The general law can provide certain rules but these not exhaustive. So 
far, there is no case law in Taiwan concerning this issue, a fact which worries 
academics because it shows that investors are not conscious of their rights. Even if the 
case is raised, the decision should take into account such considerations as the nature 
of the company, the characteristics of investors, and the protection of the company. If 
we are correctly thinking that disclosure is of great importance, then the best way to 
achieve this may be by mandatory disclosure rather than by entrusting it to judicial 
developments or academic interpretations, since the latter cannot ensure legal 
enforcement and may result in inadequate disclosure.
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3,2.3 The Relationship between Directors (or Promoters) and Investors
The major concerns of this section include: (1) whether directors have obligations of 
disclosure under the general law; (2) whether such disclosure would amount to 
sufficient protection for investors and enhance market efficiency; and (3) to whom 
disclosure is to be made. These questions are dealt with from the perspective of 
recipients of information. Therefore, first, we classify investors into two groups: 
current investors and future investors. Current investors are those who are currently 
shareholders or creditors; and future investors are any potential investors, i.e. the 
public. Current investors, in turn, can be divided into shareholders and creditors.
Second, we examine all these concerns in each category as classified above. 
Accordingly, the structure of the section is as follows (also see Appendix):
1. current investors:
a. shareholders as a group (the company)
b. individual shareholders
c. creditors
2. future investors
3.2.3.1 Shareholders as a Group (the Company)
Regarding disclosure under the general law, there is a marked difference between
English and Taiwanese law. Under the former, where the doctrine of fiduciary duties
applied to directors of companies, directors are under strict obligations to fully disclose
relevant information to the company. In most cases such information becomes available
to shareholders as a group; hence, mandatory disclosure requirements appear
unnecessary save in the preparation of corporate accounts. Under Taiwanese law, by
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contrast, the obligation of disclosure under the general law is inadequate and unclear. 
In the context of Taiwanese law, if full disclosure is expected, mandatory disclosure is 
indispensable, excepting only in regard to the issue of corporate opportunities.
Information that shareholders as a group are entitled to obtain in the UK, as a 
general proposition, is determined by the scope of directors' fiduciary duties towards 
the company. We recognise that information disclosed to a company by its directors 
may not go directly and personally to its individual shareholders; rather, in some 
situations, such information is "known" to the company (the board of directors only). 
For example, if there is a specific provision in the articles of association which 
authorises the board to deal with the company's directors on behalf of the company 
regarding specified kinds of transactions, the disclosure made by the director in this 
situation is made to the board of the company, not to the shareholders in general 
meeting.117 Yet, despite such clear provisions, what is crucial is not so much the 
particular body to which disclosure should be made (such as a group of shareholders, 
even prior to the board)118 as the directors' obligation of disclosure to the company. If 
disclosure made to the board of the company is sufficient in the context of protecting 
investors and improving market efficiency, it is not necessary to disclose such 
information to the shareholders in general meeting or to the public in a prospectus, for 
example. Thus, the use of the term "shareholders as a group" to represent the company 
in the context of disclosure would be sustainable to a certain degree; and, in the 
situations where information is not disclosed to the general meeting, this usage would 
be safe because the recipient (the board or the general meeting) of information is not 
emphasised here.
117 s. 317 of the CA 1985.
118 For example, in the case of promoters' obligations of disclosure towards the company when self- 
interest is concerned, the English court originally ruled that disclosure should be made to an 
independent board of directors (Erlanger v. New Sombrero Phosphate Co. (1878) 3 App. Cas. 1218); 
however, the court relaxed this rule later in Salomon v. Salomon ([1897] A.C. 22) and permitted the 
disclosure to be made to the members.
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It is a generally accepted principle of company law that directors owe a fiduciary 
duty to the company.119 It has been suggested by one writer that since the company 
comprises a group of shareholders, directors also owe their fiduciary duty to the 
shareholders as a group.120 Such a view seems supported by the case Re Leeds and 
Hanley Theatres o f Varieties, L td}21 Here, the promoters purchased property to sell to 
the company when formed. The prospectus of the company, however, issued with the 
aim of inducing the public to subscribe for its shares, omitted to disclose the fact that it 
was the promoters who were the real vendors of the property to the company. The 
court held that since promoters per se stood in a fiduciary position towards the 
persons who were invited to take shares in the company, those promoters must pay the 
damages to the company. It emerges clearly from this case that "the allottees as a 
group" were regarded as an identical concept to the company. In the law of negligence 
covering auditors' duty of care, the term "shareholders as a body" has been put 
forward, possibly applicable to the situation of directors' fiduciary duty whereby 
directors owe a fiduciary duty to shareholders as a group.122 On the other hand, such a 
position would blur the important distinction between a company (with a separate legal 
personality) and its members. Nonetheless, it seems fair to analyse directors' obligation 
of disclosure from the perspective of "shareholders as a group" as in reality 
shareholders do obtain information (to a certain extent as mentioned above) resulting 
from directors' disclosure to the company.
Under English law, the nature of the director's duties can be stated in this way:
"[Directors] are persons invested with strictly defined powers of management 
under the articles of association of a statutory corporation, whose functions
119 See L.C.B. Gower, Principles o f Modern Company Law, 5th ed., 1992, p. 551. "...the directors 
stand in a fiduciary relation to the company only...", see G.B. Parker, M. Buckley and Sir Raymond 
Walton, supra note 88, p. 1009.
120 See Paul L. Davies, "Directors' Fiduciary Duties and Individual Shareholders", in Commercial 
Aspects o f Trusts and Fiduciary Obligations, Ewan Mckendrick (ed.), 1992, p. 84.
121 [1902] 2 Ch. 809.
122 see Caparo Industries Pic. v. Dickman and Others [1989] 2 W.L.R. 316, by O'Connor L.J. at p. 
354; [1990] 1 All E.R. 568 H.L.
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will readily place them in an office of trust or, to express it more widely, in 
situations of a fiduciary character S'123 (emphasis added)
It is not very apposite today to describe directors as the trustees of the company in the 
strict sense.124 With regard to their fiduciary duties of loyalty and good faith, which are 
analogous to the duties of trustees stricto sensu, the court has extended the rule of 
trusts to directors. But, in respect of their duties of care and skill, which are 
fundamentally different from the duties of normal trustees,125 it is not appropriate to 
describe these directors as trustees. Accordingly, the director is at most a quasi­
trustee.126
The rules of principal and agent apply. Specifically, "whenever an agent is liable 
those directors will be liable; where the liability would attach to the principal, and the 
principal only, the liability is the liability of the company."127
There are three conceivable situations in which directors would need to disclose 
either their personal information or corporate information to the company: (1) 
transactions between a company and its directors, or between a company and a third 
party of whom a director is the agent; (2) director's use of corporate opportunity or 
information to make a profit out of his position; and (3) events where the directors 
have obligations to prepare the accounts for the company, i.e. to disclose corporate 
information to the company itself, the duty of preparing corporate accounts. In both
123 See A. Kingcome Turner and R. John Sutton, The Law Relating to Actionable Non-Disclosure and 
Other Breaches o f Duty in Relations o f Confidence, Influence and Advantage, 2nd ed., 1990, p. 405.
124 It is easy to see how this misleading interpretation (to classify a director as a trustee) arose. Before 
1844, most companies other than chartered or statutoiy corporations had no independent legal 
personalities. They were operated under deeds of settlement with property and powers actually vested 
in trustees. Because of this, directors of the companies were equated with the trustees. See L.C.B. 
Gower, supra note 119, p. 550.
125 Id., pp. 550-1.
126 Re Forest o f Dean Coal Mining Co. (1878) 10 Ch.D. 450, cited with approval in Regal (Hastings) 
Ltd. v. Gulliver [1967] 2 A.C. 134, p. 147. In the case Re Faure Electric Accumulator Co. (1888) 40 
Ch.D. 141, at p. 151, Kay J. said: "However, it is quite obvious that to apply to directors the strict 
rules of the Court of Chancery with respect to ordinary trustees might fetter their action to an extent 
which would be exceedingly disadvantageous to the companies they represent."
127 Ferguson v. Wilson (1866) L.R. 2 Ch. App. 77, at pp. 89-90.
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the first and second situations, the director may be liable to account for the profits 
made by him either because (a) there is a conflict of interest between him and the 
company, or (b) on the rationale that he should not profit from his position unless full 
disclosure is made and specific consent is given.
self-representation and both-side representation
1. the United Kingdom
In general, whenever a transaction involves a conflict of interest between a company 
and its directors or causes the directors to violate their fiduciary duties, the law may 
choose either to prohibit any such transaction128 or to require full disclosure to be 
made by the directors. Currently, the trend of commercial practice is not to prohibit 
these transactions but to allow the transactions and require disclosure either to the 
shareholders in general meeting or, where the company's articles permit, to the board. 
That is, the articles of the association of a company may allow its directors to make a 
contract (or arrangement) or to be interested in a contract (or arrangement), with the 
company without securing the informed consent of the general meeting.129 The 
requirement of disclosure imposed by the statute justifies such a relaxation.130 Based 
on their fiduciary duties, the directors need to disclose to the company any situation 
where they may have a conflict of interest.131 These situations include the following
128 Aberdeen Ry. Co. v. Blaikie Brothers (1854) 1 Macq. H.L.S.C. 461; [1843-60] All E.R. Rep. 249. 
The headnote reads: "The director of a railway is a trustee, and, as such, is precluded from dealing, on 
behalf of the company, with himself, or with a firm of which he is a partner."
129 Guinness pic. v. Saunders [1990] 2 A.C. 663, p. 692.
130s. 317 of the Companies Act 1985 provides that it is the duty of a director of a company who is in 
any way, whether directly or indirectly, interested in a contract or proposed contract with the company 
to declare the nature of his interest at a meeting of the directors of the company. However, it is worth 
mentioning that certain types of contracts are still closely controlled by the statute, e.g. corporate 
loans to directors: s. 330 of the CA 1985.
131 Queensland Mines Ltd. v. Hudson [1978] 18 A.L.R 1; Ex parte James (1803) 8 Ves. 338. The 
headnote reads as follows: "Purchase of a bankrupt's estate by the solicitor to the commission set
aside. The Lord Chancellor would not permit him to bid upon the resale, discharging himself from the
character of solicitor, without the previous consent of the persons interested, freely given, upon full 
information."
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prototypical transactions: (1) where directors have transactions with the company 
(self-dealings); (2) when directors seek to use the corporate opportunity;132 (3) when 
directors represent both the company and the third party simultaneously in the same 
transaction; and (4) sometimes where directors receive no direct or obvious benefit 
such as a commission or share of profit but are indirectly benefited.133
In these situations, directors are under a duty to disclose all the material 
information regarding the object, transaction, or opportunity concerned. This 
disclosure should be complete, precise, and unambiguous as to every matter within the 
director's exclusive knowledge, which it is material134 for the company to know.135 
Disclosure in these cases to the appropriate body of the company (in principle, the 
general meeting, and in some cases to the board) gives the opportunity for that body to 
consent to, or ratify, the retention of the interest or advantage by the director in 
question. Otherwise, all "secret" profits must be surrendered to the company.136 For 
example, at common law, the general rule of agency law requires a director to disclose 
the contract to supply services to the company where he is the proprietor of the 
supplier. Stated otherwise, this duty comes from the fiduciary relationship between the 
company and the director governed by the law of trusts (to a certain extent) and the 
law of agency, which have been the principal sources for the rules of disclosure. As a 
result, the mandatory disclosure would have limited function here.137
132 Boardman v. Phipps [1966] 3 All E. R. 721, at p. 747; Queensland Mines Ltd v. Hudson, id., p. 8.
133 For example, in the situation where a director of the company has an interest as a shareholder in 
another company; he is the person interested.
134 The meaning of materiality is discussed in Chapter Five.
135 See Turner and Sutton, supra note 123, p. 401. See also Detlev F. Vagts, Materials on Basic 
Corporation Law, 3rd ed., 1989. p. 550.
136 See Philip L.R. Mitchell, Insider Dealing and Directors' Duties, 2nd ed., 1989, pp. 69, 79. See 
also Parker v. Mckenn, (1874) 10 Ch. App. 96, pp. 124-5.
137 Mandatory disclosure in this case, see Yellow Book, Chapter 11 (Transactions with related 
Parties).
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2. Taiwan
In Taiwan, the concept of "fiduciary duty" does not exist. Instead, these problems are 
regulated by the Civil Code; specifically, the law of representation and the law of 
mandate contract. Theoretically, the board of directors is an organ of the company (the 
organic theory); its activities on behalf of the company are deemed to be the company's 
activities; directors are like the hands, the legs, and the brain of the company, the legal 
person.138 Thus, in a strict legal sense, when the directors act on behalf of the 
company, there is only "one" legal personality involved on the company side — the 
company's. Nonetheless, the law of representation applies to the external relationship 
between a company and its directors.139
It is important to bear in mind that in Taiwan two legal relationships between a 
director and his company need to be considered. One is the external potentially 
tripartite relationship governed by the law of agency which forms part of the general 
principles of the Civil Code (for the sake of clarity, agency is better here called 
representation); the other is the internal bilateral relationship governed by the contract 
of mandate in the special part of the Code.
At a general level, representation (agency) and mandate are two separate 
relationships. Representation may or may not be accompanied by a contract of 
mandate between the principal and representative (agent) regulating the responsibilities 
of each. A contract of mandate is a contract whereby the parties agree that one of them 
commissions the other party to take charge of his affairs, and the latter agrees to do so. 
In other words, the existence of a representation relationship does not necessarily give 
rise to a contract of mandate between the representative and the principal because 
representation can be created by the principal's unilateral declaration of intention, while
138 A similar concept was mentioned in the English case Bolton v. Graham [1957] 1 Q.B. 159.
139 When an agent represents his principal to deal with a third party, theoretically, there are two legal 
personalities on the former side, the agent's and the principal's.
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the meeting of two minds is indispensable for creating a contract of mandate. For 
example, if A leaves a message for B asking B to sell A's car, although B is authorised 
to represent A should he choose to (i.e. B has A's authority to alter A's legal position), 
no contract is made. However, if B promises to sell the car for A, then, there is a 
contract of mandate between A and B as well. In such a situation, representation and 
the contract of mandate exist simultaneously.
external relationship
Following the organic theory, when the company deals with outsiders, the relationship 
between the company and the director is one of "representation". The concept of 
"representation" in the Taiwanese Civil Code is slightly different from that of English 
common law. It means that any juristic act of the representative in the name of the 
principal, within the scope of its delegated authority, takes effect directly both in 
favour of and against the principal. If the name of the principal is unknown to the party 
to the transaction, this is a juristic act of the person who acts, not of the company.140
Juristic acts (although extensively referred to are not defined by the Taiwanese 
Civil Code) have been defined as follows:
"...the notion ofjuristic act (Rechtsgeschd.fi)... This is one subcategory of the 
concept of legal act in the wider sense (Rechtshandlung), signifying any act 
of a legal person which has effects in private law ;... It is because of a person's 
declaration o f intention (Willenserkldrung) that his juristic act has its legal 
effect..."141
This relationship between a principal and a third party is made possible by the 
principal's unilateral declaration of intention to confer an authority of representation
140 Article 103 of the Civil Code.
141 See Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kotz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, 2nd ed., 1992, pp. 
348-9. The translation of "legal person" seems confusing, as the term legal person is usually used in 
contrast to the term natural person. The more appropriate translation here (at least as far as 
Taiwanese law is concerned) appears to be "persons who have legal capacity".
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upon the representative. From that moment, a representative has the power to exercise 
this authority.
One further point is relevant to the particular situations of directors' disclosure. 
In general, a representative may not, without the specific consent of the principal, enter 
into a juristic act in the name of his principal with the representative himself in his own 
name, or with a third party to whom he is the representative; in others words, he may 
not act on both sides of a transaction.142 For example, a representative cannot sell the 
principal's property to himself, or to a third party of whom he is the representative as 
well. This rule protects the principal against a representative sacrificing the principal's 
interest for his own or a third party's benefit. Consequently, in such cases, the juristic 
act is void unless consent is given by the principal, i.e. the principal's legal position as 
regards the third party is not changed by it. No disclosure requirement is explicitly set 
out here. What the law requires for such a juristic act to take effect is the specific 
consent of the principal; with regard to the conditions for obtaining such consent, the 
law is silent.
The general rule is that if the principal gives his consent freely, the juristic act is 
valid unless there is fraud or duress when the consent is given. The problem is that 
simple silence does not generally constitute fraud; if non-disclosure is made passively, 
(that is, the principal does not inquire) then, are there any specific disclosure 
obligations which should be imposed on the representative in order to establish fraud if 
the representative does not comply with them? Two different levels of disclosure are 
involved. The first level falls into the category of common sense where a representative 
has to disclose certain information to obtain specific consent of his principal, for 
example, the object of the transaction in question, the offering price and financing. 
However, this level of disclosure would not necessarily provide the principal with all 
material information which is likely to affect the principal's decision on giving consent.
142 Article 106 of the Civil Code.
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Accordingly, the second level of disclosure, i.e. fully disclosing all material 
information, plays a more important role when the so-called "informed decision" is the 
aim. The most serious problem of Taiwanese law is that it does not require the 
representative to fulfil the second level disclosure in any explicit way. For example, if a 
representative intends to purchase an acre of agricultural land from his principal, he 
will certainly disclose the location of the land, the price he offers, the market price of 
the same kind of land in the area, and possibly the reason for his purchase; this is the 
first level disclosure. However, he may withhold some material information from the 
principal, which should be disclosed if an obligation to make second level disclosure is 
imposed by law; for instance, if he know that it is likely in the near future that the 
government will change the zoning of the land from an agricultural to a commercial 
one and this will increase the value of the land substantially.
As indicated above, when considering the validity of a representative's authority, 
the representative generally owes no further obligation to the principal because the 
conferment of the authority is made by the principal's unilateral declaration. That is, the 
validity of a representative's authority to represent the principal does not depend on 
whether or not the representative owes obligations to the principal. Additionally, even 
though the principal may put a great deal of faith in the representative (which is 
sufficient under English law to create a fiduciary relationship), it is difficult to argue 
that a representative should actively disclose all material information to the principal 
because the concept of fiduciary duty does not exist under Taiwanese law. Moreover, 
there are no rules of equity in the Taiwanese legal system, in contrast with the common 
law jurisdictions. Thus, in Taiwan, for a man to give valid consent (a declaration of 
intention) he must either have the legal capacity (sui juris)143 or have secured consent 
from his legal guardian in advance.144 The law respects a person's free will provided 
that there is no fraud or duress.
143 Article 12. When a person is 20, he or she has this capacity.
144 Article 77.
Chapter Three: The Justification
In the situation where a company is a principal, one more question needs to be 
examined: from which corporate organ should a director secure the specific consent? 
Admittedly, if the shareholders' consent is given in general meeting, the transaction 
concerned should be valid. The problem is whether the board of directors can give 
valid consent as well. In principle, unless otherwise required by the statute or 
memorandum that a resolution by general meeting is required, the board of directors 
has power to decide everything for the company. Therefore, board consent satisfies 
such a requirement.145
internal relationship
Internal relationships between a company and its directors are governed by a contract 
of mandate. In fact, even if no contract is made by them, the law regulating a 
constructive contract of mandate applies.146 Based on this relationship, the director has 
a duty of care which amounts to the standard of the ability of a "conscientious and 
reasonable man".147
As discussed above, if the relationship is merely that of representative, the law 
does not require the representative to make full disclosure (the second level) to his 
principal before he secures the specific consent. The question arises whether the 
contract of mandate between the representative and principal has an effect on 
disclosure. The courts have not yet had addressed this issue. Nor have academics 
discussed the question. However, it is possible to develop a disclosure obligation from 
the mandate relationship. When there is a conflict of interest, the director should put 
the company's interest above his own. He is obliged to help the company make a well- 
informed judgment, i.e. to help the company decide whether to give consent or not.
145 Article 202, CL. Specific consents which must be given by the general meeting, see Article 209, 
CL, infra note 155.
146 Article 192(3), CL, provides: "The relations between the company and its directors shall be 
governed by the provisions of the Civil Code relating to mandate unless otherwise provided for in this 
law."
147 Article 192(3) of the CL and Article 535 of the Civil Code.
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The company can do this only with the knowledge of all material information. The 
director is under the duty of care which may require him to disclose the information to 
the company. Article 209 of the Company Law reiterates this rule. It provides:
"A director who does anything for himself or on behalf of another person that 
is within the scope of the company's business, shall explain to the meeting of 
shareholders the material contents of such an act and secure its approval."
This Article, which basically deals with the problem of corporate opportunities but is 
also of a wider application, can help the court explain why the director, based on a 
contract of mandate with the company, has obligations to disclose fully all material 
information before he obtains the consent from the company in situations where there 
is a conflict of interest.
conclusion
In short, the rationales for English and Taiwanese law appear different: English law 
establishes directors' duties by the application of the concept of fiduciary duty, while 
Taiwan approaches this problem from the interpretation of the mandate relationship. 
Nonetheless, both the UK and Taiwan can achieve the same function of disclosure with 
regard to the relationship between the company and the director.
For example, under English law, when a director (or a promoter) sells his 
property to the company without full disclosure, even if the shareholders' consent in 
general meeting is secured, the company can still set aside the transaction because the 
director has breached his fiduciary duty. In contrast, in Taiwan, although there are no 
fiduciary duties, the company should be allowed to set aside such a transaction to 
which the shareholders' consent in general meeting has been given if the non-disclosure 
has amounted to a violation of the director's duty of care, which must be exercised in 
the manner of a conscientious and reasonable person.
133
Chapter Three: The Justification
Thus, the function of mandatory disclosure under English law is subsumed under 
the idea of fiduciary duty. In contrast, in Taiwan, mandatory disclosure still has certain 
functions. First, there is no second level disclosure requirement (i.e. disclosing all 
material information) before consent is obtained in a purely representative relationship. 
The reason why a director has to make disclosure is because there is a contract (or 
constructive contract) of mandate, and thus the difficulty in a purely representative 
relationship is avoided. However, this duty comes from the interpretation of the duty 
of care and has never been articulated by the courts. Hence, it is submitted that a 
general mandatory disclosure requirement should be inserted into the statute to ensure 
that the company is fully informed.148
the use of inside information 
1. the United Kingdom
The meaning of "inside information" as used in this section of this thesis is broader 
than what we usually mean by "insider dealing". Here, the term encompasses the 
situation where a corporate opportunity is involved. The English courts have 
substituted corporate information for opportunities in certain cases where the 
companies were unlikely to enjoy such opportunities. For example, in Industrial 
Development Consultants v. Cooley,149 the court based the director's liability on 
misuse of information rather than the misappropriation of the opportunity.
148 How to secure a valid transaction in self-representation and both-side representation in Taiwan is 
tabulated below:
consent of 
the principal
hill disclosure by 
the representative
purely representation 
relationship
yes ? (may not be 
required)
contract of 
mandate
yes yes (should be 
required)
149 [1972] 1 W.L.R. 443.
134
Chapter Three: The Justification
It is an "inflexible" rule of English law that directors cannot make a profit out of 
their position, and are not permitted to put themselves in a position where their 
interests and duties conflict.150 Whenever the opportunity falls into a company's 
business scope, even if the company has no financial ability or interest to enjoy the 
opportunity, its directors cannot take over the opportunity unless full disclosure is 
made and the company's consent is obtained. Although there are good reasons for this 
rule, its application can sometimes lead to unjust results.151
Directors' use of inside information may entail a conflict of interest between them 
and the company;152 in such situations, they are under a duty to disclose all the material 
information to the company. Moreover, in cases of insider dealing,153 the application of 
such a rule should be apposite. Under English case law, a director occupies a position 
of quasi-trustee of and agent for the company. The director is a fiduciary and thus 
subject to a duty to the beneficiary not to use on his own account information 
confidentially given him by the beneficiary or acquired by him during the course of the 
fiduciary relationship. If a director violates this duty, he holds any profit as a 
constructive trustee for the company which is entitled to recover the profit; loss to the 
company is irrelevant.154 Although for directors, no obvious "conflict of duty and
150 Bray v. Ford (1896) A.C. 44, at p. 51.
151 Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v. Gulliver [1967] 2 A.C. 134. The facts, briefly cited, were as follows: 
Company A owned a cinema and the directors decided to acquire two others with a view to selling the 
whole undertaking as a going concern. For this purpose they formed company B to take a lease of the 
other two cinemas. But the lessor insisted on a personal guarantee from the directors unless the paid- 
up capital of company B was at least £5,000. The company was unable to subscribe more than £2,000 
and the directors were not willing to give personal guarantees. Accordingly the original plan was 
changed; company A took up £2,000 and the remaining £3,000 were taken by the directors and their 
friends. Later, instead of selling the undertaking, all the shares in both companies were sold, a profit 
of £2.16s. Id. being made on each of the shares in company B. The new controllers then caused 
company A to bring an action against the former directors to recover the profit they have made.
152 Industrial Development Consultants v. Cooley [1972] 1 W.L.R. 443; Canadian Aero Service v. 
O'Malley [1973] 40 D.L.R. (3d.) 371.
153 The Criminal Justice Act 1993 (the major source of legal regulation of insider dealing).
154 Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v. Gulliver [1967] 2 A.C. 134, pp. 144-5. It reads: "The rule of equity which 
insists on those, who by use of a fiduciary position make a profit, being liable to account for that 
profit, in no way depends on fraud, or absence of bona fides; or upon such questions or considerations 
as whether the profit would or should otherwise have gone to the plaintiff, or whether the profiteer 
was under a duty to obtain the source of the profit for the plaintiff, or whether he took a risk or acted 
as he did for the benefit of the plaintiff, or whether the plaintiff has in fact been damaged or benefited
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interest" occurs here, insider dealing would affect the investors' confidence in the 
market. Such an effect is not, anyhow, good for the company. Accordingly, to make 
directors accountable to the company for their benefits in insider dealing is sound even 
if the company may suffer no loss.
2 Taiwan
In the UK, the company's right to recover profits made by directors' use of inside 
information derives from the fiduciary duty of directors. In contrast, in Taiwan, the 
directors' duties derive from contractual (or constructively contractual) obligations. 
These contractual obligations require directors to exercise a conscientious and 
reasonable person's duty of care when managing the business of the company.
We first turn to the problem of corporate opportunities. If a company has any 
possibility of benefiting from an opportunity, then a director will be held liable to the 
company if he misappropriates such an opportunity. The rationale underlying this rule 
is that, benefiting from an opportunity, the director violates his obligations to exercise 
a conscientious and reasonable person's duty of care. However, whether a director can 
use the opportunity without the violation of his duty which results from the mandate 
relationship is unclear. The Civil Code does not state whether full disclosure is 
required before consent can validly be given. Fortunately, the Company Law has a 
"mandatory disclosure" requirement which solves this difficulty.155
Second, turning to "insider dealing", whether because of this contractual 
relationship, a director has an obligation to refrain from insider dealing under the
by his action. The liability arises from the mere fact of a profit having, in the stated circumstances, 
been made."
155 Article 209(1) provides: "A director who does anything for himself or on behalf of another person 
that is within the scope of the company's business, shall explain to the general meeting of 
shareholders the essential contents of such an act and secure its approval." This Article thus resolves 
the problem raised in the text by mandating directors to make disclosure to the company. If directors 
fail to do so, Article 209(5) empowers the company to recover from the directors the profits gained 
from their unauthorised act.
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general law is unclear. It is submitted that directors' contractual obligations are to 
manage the company with a conscientious and reasonable duty of care. Hence, if the 
insider dealing does not interrupt the normal operation of the corporate business, the 
director does not violate his obligation to run the business in accordance with his legal 
duty. Moreover, even supposing that we can establish a director's breach of duty in this 
situation, it is difficult to assess the company's loss from insider dealing. If a fiduciary 
duty was applicable, then the loss to the company would become irrelevant, and the 
company would be able to recover by claiming that the director had breached his 
fiduciary duty and held the profit as a trustee. However, without the help of this 
equitable concept, this avenue is blocked. The company is left with the difficult 
question whether the contract of mandate has been breached and whether damage 
ensues therefrom.156
the duty of preparing corporate accounts
1. the United Kingdom
It has been a long time since the Joint Stock Companies Act 1844 required directors to 
prepare the corporate accounts. The problem is that if there was no statutory 
requirement, would directors be obliged to prepare these documents annually based on 
their duties? The answer should be negative. The fiduciary duty of directors does not 
put them in a position that they have to prepare the balance sheet or the profit and loss 
report.157 As a result, a mandatory disclosure requirement (here respecting the 
disclosure made to all members of a company by means of preparing corporate 
accounts) is justifiable.
156 This reveals the difference between the problem in the UK and in Taiwan. Under English law, 
only a conflict of duty and interest of directors is required; loss of the company is not taken into 
account. However, in Taiwan, damage from the breach of contract is required.
157 See Nigel G. Maw, Lord Land of Horsell, and Sir Michael Craig-Cooper, Maw on Corporate 
Governance, 1994, p.4.
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2. Taiwan
In Taiwan, according to Articles 540 and 541 of the Civil Code which govern the 
contract of mandate, the mandatary must keep the principal informed of the progress 
of the affairs entrusted to him. He must render a true and detailed account of his 
principal's affairs at the end of the mandate. Besides that, the mandatary must hand 
over to the principal the money and things which he receives or collects in connection 
with the management of the affairs of the principal. According to these provisions, 
directors should prepare the accounts and the director's report to the company, this 
being the duty that directors owe to the company as their principal, not to individual 
shareholders.
Finally, both in the UK and Taiwan, directors would have no obligation to 
disclose their shareholdings to the company in the situation where they purchase or sell 
shares from the market rather than from the company itself, if the statutes or 
regulations had not so required. No conflict of interest arises in this situation; nor does 
the director make a profit otherwise out of his position as a trustee or an agent. Yet, 
disclosure of this information to the company is advisable as a matter of public policy 
because insider dealing should be prevented as much as possible.
promoters
I. the United Kingdom
In the UK, promoters have the same liability as that of company directors. Before the 
company is formally incorporated, it has no legal personality; therefore it is hard to 
describe the promoter as the agent of an unborn person. Promoters, however, can be 
deemed as constructive agents or trustees of this unborn person. The old familiar
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principles of the law of agency and trusteeship have been extended, and very properly 
extended, to meet such cases.158
Thus what has been examined above with regard to self-dealing and both-side 
representation can be extended to apply to the situation where the actors are 
promoters rather than directors. Stated otherwise, promoters owe fiduciary duties to 
the unborn company; they have to disclose all material information to the unborn 
person. As a result of this, disclosure is made either to an entirely independent board of 
directors159 or to the existing and potential members as a whole.160
2. Taiwan
It is well accepted, in the UK, that before a company is formally incorporated, it does 
not "exist". However, the Taiwanese legal concept, derived from Germany, is different 
in that it regards an unborn company as having the same "identity" as the company 
later formed; "the same identity theory". Hence, this "unborn company", theoretically, 
is endowed with a "constructive" legal personality,161 recognised by the courts as 
well.162 Expressed otherwise, an "unborn company" conceptually exists. Consequently, 
once incorporated, the company becomes liable to or entitled under contracts 
purporting to be made on its behalf prior to incorporation. Thus, no succession and no
ratification issues arise, because the "unborn company" and the "company formed
later" are the same person. There is no necessity for the company to re-sign contracts 
after its incorporation. However, this does not mean that all contracts entered into 
before incorporation will become the company's after incorporation. Only those
158 Lydney and Wigpool Iron Ore Co. v. Bird (1886) 33 Ch.D. 85, p. 94.
159 Erlanger v. New Sombrero Phosphate Co. (1878) 3 A.C. 1218.
160 Salomon v. Salomon [1897] A.C. 22; In re Leeds & Hanley Theatre o f Varieties [1902] 2 Ch. 809. 
In the latter case, it was held that promoters stood in a fiduciary position towards the persons who 
were invited to take shares in the company, and it was their duty to disclose to those persons the fact 
that they were the real vendors to the company (sale of property to the company).
161 Fang-chih Ko, supra note 91, p. 22.
162 The Supreme Court, 71 t'ai shang tzu ti 4135 hao.
139
Chapter Three: The Justification
transactions which relate to the "preparation for commencing business" are covered by 
this theory.
Besides that, promoters are required to be jointly and severally liable for debts of 
the company incurred prior to incorporation.163 Thus, although the company 
automatically becomes a party to transactions made by promoters in the situation 
where transactions were made on its behalf for preparing to commence business, the 
company will not be worse off because promoters are held to be liable as well.
Thus, promoters to an unborn company are like directors to a company; the 
former occupy the same position as that assumed by the latter when they carry on 
business on behalf of the unborn company, and the same duties are imposed on them.
3.2.3.2. Individual Shareholders
In this section, two basic issues common to both the UK and Taiwan jurisdictions are 
tackled. The first problem is whether and to what extent a director who has a 
transaction with a member involving the company's securities is bound to make 
disclosure to the individual member (or shareholder). Second, whether directors who 
only provide advice to shareholders can be held liable for incomplete disclosure of 
relevant information.
In the UK, the general view is that directors are under no obligation to disclose 
information (known to themselves personally but not to individual shareholders) to 
shareholders in securities transactions due to the absence of any fiduciary relationship. 
Although the duty owed by directors to individual shareholders has its roots in the law
163 Article 155(2), CL.
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of tort, the scope of information disclosed is considered narrower than in the case of 
such disclosure on the ground of fiduciary disclosure or mandatory disclosure 
requirements.
In Taiwan the situation is worse. With the exception of fraud, directors can 
escape liability in the majority of cases since the concept of "voluntary assumption of 
liability", not to speak of the possible arising of duty of care, does not exist.
With regard to the first problem, a preliminary distinction needs to be drawn 
between two separate situations: is the securities transaction made between a director 
and a shareholder face-to-face or is it a "faceless" market transaction? If it is face-to- 
face, the issue turns on the question of who approaches whom.
1. the United Kingdom
In the UK, generally, "...no fiduciary duty is owed by a director to individual members 
of his company, but only to the company itself..."164 Accordingly, directors' duty to 
prepare accounts is towards the company itself rather than towards individual 
shareholders.165 For example, a shareholder does not have standing to complain of the 
manner in which a company's accounts are prepared, as the duty to prepare accounts of 
the company imposed on the directors by the articles of association is a duty owed to 
the company itself and not to the shareholders individually.166
In contract, the traditional rule of sale is caveat emptor, literally translated as 
"buyer beware", under which the seller has no obligations of warranty and neither is 
the seller obliged to disclose fully material information about the object to the buyer.
164 Jenkins Committee Report, Cmnd. 1749, 1962, at para. 89; G.B. Parker, M. Buckley and Sir 
Raymond Walton, supra note 88, p 1009.
165 The preparation of accounts is deemed, in this thesis, to be a duty of disclosing corporate 
information to the company itself.
166 Devlin v. Slough Estates Ltd. and others [1983] B.C.L.C. 497, p. 497.
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Nonetheless, buyers did have some rights under the traditional common law: e.g. 
sellers could not commit fraud. For example, a seller could not actively provide some 
information which is untrue, or omit some information which renders the whole 
representation misleading, because it constitutes fraud in both situations. But, simple 
silence in no way constitutes fraud unless there is a special relationship between the 
parties, which obliges the person who occupies an advantageous position to disclose 
material information to the other party such as in a contract of the utmost good faith 
(uberrimae fidei).167 Mere non-disclosure in this kind of contract provides a basis for 
rescinding the contract in question.168
Following this, when there is a transaction between a director and an individual 
shareholder face-to-face, the director is not required by law to disclose any information 
known to him because of his position but not to the individual shareholder, which may 
be material to this transaction, because he owes no fiduciary duty to the individual 
shareholder. This rule may apply when an individual shareholder voluntarily 
approaches a director;169 however, it may not be true if the situation is reversed. In 
Percival v. Wright, it was held that the defendant directors were under no duty to 
disclose the negotiations for the sale of the undertaking to the plaintiff shareholders. It 
should be borne in mind that the fact in Percival was that the plaintiff approached the 
defendant, and the judgment did not point out whether it would have been different if 
the situation had been reversed.
When a director is the party who initiates this negotiation, the focus may be 
shifted from the traditional rule of sale to a fiduciary relationship, which may be 
created by the act of the director. That is, the director's voluntary act may in fact put
167 See Robert Upex, Davies on Contract, 6th ed., 1991, p. 103. One of the examples is an insurance 
contract. See also Bernard Rudden, "Disclosure in Insurance: The Changing Scene", in Lectures on 
the Common Law, Vol. 3, pp. 1-13, 1991.
168 Chitty on Contracts, 1994, pp. 390 et seq.
169 Percival v. Wright [1902] 2 Ch. 421. However, it is notable that where directors are agents for the 
shareholders under a pre-emption clause in the articles of association they are under a duty of 
disclosure up to the moment the shareholders agree to the sale under that procedure. See Company 
Law Monitor, 2(8), 3-4, 1994, p. A.Munro v. Bogie [1994] 1 B.C.L.C. 415
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him under a duty to make disclosure; such a duty arises because the shareholder puts 
reliance on the director. Therefore, if the director does not make disclosure, the 
shareholder should be entitled to sue for redress. The argument advanced by a New 
Zealand decision in Coleman v. Myers170 could, by analogy, be applied to this situation 
since the fact, which was present in that case, that the directors actively provided 
advice to the shareholders bears close resemblance to the situation where directors 
actively approach shareholders to enter into securities transactions with them.
However, if the transaction is anonymous, then there is no "specified and 
identified" counterparty to whom the director can make disclosure. Under this 
circumstance, the director cannot be expected to perform his duty and he should not be 
held liable to the so-called identified buyer or seller unless we adopt the "disclose or 
abstain from transactions" rule and impose civil liability on violators.171
In these two situations, (1) a face-to-face transaction initiated by an individual 
shareholder and (2) a transaction executed in an open market, the individual 
shareholder clearly has no rights under the common law. Mandatory disclosure can 
help to rectify such unfairness. The system o f mandatory disclosure can impose a duty 
upon a director, which in law is owed directly by a director to an individual 
shareholder and this duty will require the director either to make fu ll disclosure to the 
individual shareholder (in the latter situation, to the public) or abstain from  
transactions. Once the law posits an obligation of disclosure, it may further impose 
civil liability on a director for violation of this obligation.
no tl977] 2 N.Z.L.R. 225, p. 298. See also/te a Company [1986] B.C.L.C. 382.
171 If directors do not disclose, the only way they can avoid such consequences happening 
(shareholders incurring losses) is to refrain from transactions. However, the Criminal Justice Act 
1993 only provides criminal liabilities; no civil liability is available unless cases fall into the scope of 
the Financial Services Act 1986, sections 61 and 62. Thus mandatory disclosure requirements are very 
important. Although the regulations do not mandate directors to disclose to shareholders individually, 
frequent disclosure by the company to the public under such regulation can help shareholders update 
information they have. Then, with the help of the deterrence deriving from criminal liabilities, 
directors cannot cheat shareholders.
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Turning to the aspect of torts. A duty in tort to be honest, by nature, requires 
directors not to mislead shareholders. Thus, directors have to disclose information to 
shareholders to a certain extent. In Gething v. Kilner,172 Brightman J. held that the 
directors of an offeree company had a duty not just to the company but towards their 
own shareholders, which included a duty to be honest and a duty not to mislead, when 
they provided the shareholders with advice concerning the offer. Nonetheless, the 
scope of information required to be disclosed under tort duty would comparatively be 
smaller than that of information which directors have to disclose on the ground of 
fiduciary duty or mandatory disclosure requirements. In Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. 
v. Newman Industries Ltd,173 the court held that the directors, in advising the 
shareholders to support the resolution approving the agreement made by them, owed 
the shareholders a duty to give such advice in good faith and not fraudulently. The 
contents of this advice should cover all material information because the defendants' 
company was a listed company and thus was regulated by the Stock Exchange. The 
Yellow Book of the Stock Exchange sets out the full contents of the circular which 
contained this advice in the case.174 From the above statement, we observe that 
regulators are not satisfied with the contents of disclosure deriving from tort law, and 
thus impose mandatory disclosure requirements.
Furthermore, the evolution of English case law demonstrates that it may be 
possible in the future for a director to be obliged to disclose fully to individual 
shareholders even though he only provides advice.175 As English case law at this stage
172 [1972] 1 W.L.R. 337, p. 341.
173 [1982] 1 All E.R. 354, p. 366.
174 See Chapter 11 of the Yellow Book.
175 Re a Company [1986] B.C.L.C. 382. Per Hoffmann J. :"I do not think that fairness can require 
more of the directors than to give the shareholders sufficient information and advice to enable them to 
reach a properly informed decision and to refrain from giving misleading advice or exercising their 
fiduciary powers in a way which would prevent or inhibit shareholders from choosing to take the 
better price." (p. 389) This case did not use the term “directors’ fiduciary duty”; rather, it analysed the 
problem from the perspective of "directors' fiduciary power". Therefore, whether English case law will 
impose fiduciary duty on directors towards individual shareholders remains uncertain. Moreover, the 
case did not clearly separate the role a director played as a director from that he or she acted as a 
substantial shareholder. This would exaggerate the case law development in this case.
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has not gone far enough, mandatory disclosure requirements imposed by the City Code 
on Takeovers and Mergers and the Yellow Book come into play to solve the 
problem.176 The clearest and most brave case regarding directors' duty of disclosure to 
individual shareholders when they provide advice is a New Zealand decision, Coleman 
v. Myers.111 This case concerned a take-over bid. The respondents were father and 
son, directors of the company; both of them recommended to the shareholders that 
they accept a take-over offer made by the son, and all the shareholders accepted this 
offer. Later on, a minority of the shareholders brought an action for damages or 
rescission of the sale of their shares, because the statement made by the directors was 
deficient and misleading, and the directors were under a fiduciary duty to make full 
disclosure to the shareholders. The court held that the directors had a fiduciary duty 
toward the individual shareholders when a determination was partly based on 
information and advice provided by the directors. The extent of disclosure is to 
disclose material matters as to which the director knows or has reason to believe that 
the shareholder whom he tries to persuade to sell, is or may be inadequately 
informed.178 The court thus ordered damages.
From this, it appears that directors may have obligations to make full disclosure 
either based on the case law (e.g. in New Zealand, probably) or by mandatory 
disclosure requirements imposed by statutes or regulations (in the UK). In the UK, at 
this stage, the duty of directors to shareholders mainly derives from tort law unless 
there are mandatory disclosure requirements. In Coleman, the duty is based on the 
extent of confidence that individual shareholders have put in the directors. The more 
directors expect that shareholders will rely on the information they provided, the more 
likely they are to find themselves in a fiduciary relationship with those shareholders and 
are thus obliged to make honest and full disclosure. Since English common law has not 
developed to such an extent, mandatory disclosure is justified.
176 Chapters 10 and 11 of the Yellow Book; Rules 3, 8, 19, 20, 25, 27, and 28 of the City Code.
177 [1977] 2 N.Z.L.R. 225, p. 298.
178 Id., p. 333. See also .Re ChezNico (Restaurants) Ltd. [1992] B.C.L.C. 192.
145
i
I
I
Chapter Three: The Justification
2. Taiwan
In Taiwan, although the courts have raised neither of these two problems and 
academics seldom have commented on them, these problems are not easy ones. This 
thesis has emphasised many times in the previous sections that Taiwanese law has no 
concept of fiduciary duty. Therefore the only way to decide the relationship between a 
director and a shareholder is by virtue of the application of the rules of contract and 
tort in the Civil Code when the former deals with the shareholder. A director has no 
obligation to disclose material information to a shareholder during negotiations for the 
purchase or sale of the shareholder's shares. Consequently, unless fraud can be found 
(either because the director actively lied to the shareholder or kept silent when the 
shareholder stated his understanding of the object concerned and that understanding 
was wrong179) the shareholder has no remedies in tort. Moreover, in the situation 
where a director has inside information unknown to a shareholder, this kind of liability 
is unlikely to be incurred, because what the director has done is to remain passively 
silent. As regards the law of contract, since the director has no obligation to make 
disclosure, there is no breach of contract, and accordingly, no remedies in contract are 
available to the shareholder in this situation.
The final possible solution is to resort to Article 74 of the Civil Code. This 
Article is a codified equivalent of a rule of equity,180 which empowers one party who 
sustains loss to apply to the court to have the juristic act set aside or to reduce the 
unconscionable payments. Four conditions must be met before this Article is invoked:
179 For example, since a shareholder does not have the updated corporate information, he may say to a 
director: "The shares of the company are not worth holding and I would like to sell my shares to you, 
because after five years of exploration for copper, nothing has been found." When this statement was 
made by the shareholder, the director knew that a report had been received which stated that the 
substantial quantity of copper was found. However, the director did not tell the shareholder the truth 
and just bought the shares.
180 In Taiwan, as already mentioned, a set of rules of equity have never been established because 
Taiwan adopts the continental legal system. Nor does Taiwan have a court of equity. The most 
important rules of equity, such as fairness and good faith, have been codified in several articles of the 
Civil Code of which Article 74 is an example.
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(1) there must be a juristic act, (2) by which one party (the victim) delivers or promises 
to deliver property rights to the other party (the culpable one); (3) the act is done in 
situations where the victim is affected by urgency, indiscretion, or inexperience which 
is known to the culpable party and made use of by him; and (4) unfairness of the 
juristic act must be serious in relation to the concomitant circumstances. A juristic act 
made under such circumstances is obviously an unfair one, and the law gives the victim 
a right of action to apply to the court for redress.
Thus, if a shareholder deals in shares with a director in circumstances affected by 
urgency, indiscretion, or inexperience (for example, when he needs cash immediately, 
or he has no or only limited experience in securities transactions) and this is known to 
the director and he intentionally makes use of this opportunity to make a profit, the 
shareholder will be entitled to a remedy on application to the court. Unfairness caused 
by the juristic act must be serious, however, otherwise the court has no power to set 
aside the act or reduce the unconscionable payments.
As far as the second problem is concerned; that is, directors provide shareholders 
with information to help them reach decisions, directors are not held liable under the 
Civil Code unless there is deceit which is resolved by the law of torts.
To sum up, in these two situations (transactions between a director and a 
shareholder, and the provision of advice by a director) the general law cannot achieve 
the goal of disclosure because it has not enough power to force directors to make 
disclosure . In other words, mandatory disclosure based on the relationship between a 
director and a shareholder can be justified in Taiwan if the government decides to give 
more information to investors, to increase the transparency and fairness of the market, 
to stop insider dealings, or even more, to compensate a shareholder when he has 
transactions with a director in the situation where the director makes profits out of his 
superior knowledge.
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3.2.3.3. Creditors
Before an investor becomes a debenture holder of a company (i.e. becomes the 
company's creditor), he needs financial and business information about the company to 
make an informed investment decision. Furthermore, after he has acquired debentures, 
he needs continuing provision of corporate information to decide, e.g., whether to 
purchase more debentures or to sell those he has. However, in the general law, 
directors owe no disclosure obligation towards creditors; the only source from which 
creditors can obtain corporate information is to make such an enquiry during the 
negotiation of the contract of sale and lay down this kind of provision in the contract.
1. the United Kingdom
In the UK, it is clear that directors owe no fiduciary duty to the company's creditors.181 
Accordingly, creditors are left without any provision of information on the company's 
business development and financial situation if there is no mandatory disclosure 
requirement. Even if it is possible, at this stage, to advance creditors' interests by 
means of interpreting that the "interests of the company" embrace the interests of
181 "No fiduciary duty is owed by a director to individual members of his company, but only to the 
company itself, and a fortiori ... none is owed to a person who is not a member." Jenkins Committee 
Report, Cmnd. 1749, 1962, at para. 89. However, this rule may be changed. From the original view 
that directors owed no duties to creditors to the current interpretation that the interests of the company 
may embrace the interests of creditors, we can see that signs of change are on the way. The reason for 
such a change may be traced to a change in the function of the modem company. For the modem 
company, to maximise shareholders' interests may not be the only concern of directors any more. In 
the view of some scholars, a company not only bears the function of the maximisation of profits for its 
members but also bears the function as a social institution, which requires the company to take the 
social interest into consideration in its operation. See Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property, revised ed., 1968, p. 7. This can be clearly observed from 
German company legislation. See Janet Dine, "The Harmonisation of Company Law in the European 
Community", in 9 Yearbook o f European Law 1989, 93-119, 1990, pp. 93-5. Interestingly, the City 
Code on Takeovers and Mergers provides: "It is the shareholders' interests taken as a whole, together 
with those of employees and creditors which should be considered when the directors are giving 
advice to shareholders.", General Principle 9.
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creditors,182 this could not lead to a conclusion that directors owe fiduciary duty 
towards creditors regarding disclosure. As a result, only by imposing the obligation of 
disclosure on the company and its directors can creditors gain access to corporate 
information which they need just as much as shareholders.183 That is why the 
Companies Act 1985 provides that debenture holders are entitled to receive a copy of 
the company's annual accounts.184
2. Taiwan
In Taiwan, the general law has no special developments pertaining to this issue of 
disclosure. The remedies are available in the Civil Code and the Insolvency Act. First,
182 See D.D. Prentice, "Directors, Creditors, and Shareholders", in Commercial Aspects o f Trusts and 
Fiduciary Obligations, Ewan Mckendrick (ed.), 1992, p. 73; s. 309 of the CA 1985.
183 The law has chosen two methods to mitigate the shortcomings of the general law (i.e. the company 
and its directors are not obliged to disclose to creditors). One is from the case law which admits that 
directors may owe a fiduciary duty to creditors when the company is insolvent or on the verge of 
insolvency (as a result, it is possible to interpret that there is obligation of disclosure in this situation 
by liquidators). The other, which does not relate to disclosure but protects creditors by deterring 
directors from wrongful trading, is s. 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986. This section holds that directors 
are liable to make contribution to the company's assets when certain conditions are fulfilled. As 
regards judicial developments, see West Mercia Safetywear Ltd. v. Dodd ([1988] B.C.L.C. 250); 
Kinsela &Anor v. Russell Kinsela Pty Limit ((1986) 10 A.C.L.C. 395). When a company is insolvent, 
corporate assets in reality belong to the creditors, rather than shareholders. Thus, the substance of 
directors' fiduciary duties towards the company will be shifted from "shareholders as a group" to 
"creditors". Expressed otherwise, directors at this stage, manage the company's assets on behalf of 
creditors. These judicial developments aim to restrict the application of the general rule: that is, any 
act that falls within the corporate capacity of a company will bind the company if it is done with the 
unanimous consent of all the shareholders or is subsequently ratified by such consent (Salomon v. A 
Salomon & Co. Ltd. [1897] A.C. 22, p. 57, Re Horsley & Weight Ltd. [1982] Ch. 442, p. 454, and 
Multinational Gas and Petrochemical Co. v. Multinational Gas and Petrochemical Services Ltd. 
[1983] Ch. 258). Since, when the company is precarious, the persons whose interests are at stake are 
creditors rather than shareholders, shareholders should not be allowed to ratify directors' breach of 
duties which are owed by directors towards creditors. Second, regarding s. 214 of the Insolvency Act 
1986 (the details of which are not intended to be discussed here), the conditions for this liability to fall 
on directors are as follows. First, the company goes into insolvent liquidation at a time when the 
company's assets are insufficient to pay its debts and other liabilities. Second, before the company 
goes into insolvency, the director knew or ought to have concluded that there was no reasonable 
prospect that the company would avoid going into insolvent liquidation, but he did not take every step 
he ought to have taken with a view to minimising loss to the company's creditors. When both of these 
conditions are met, the court is empowered to order the director to contribute to the assets of the 
company (See D.D. Prentice, "Creditor's Interests and Director's Duties", in 10 O.J.L.S., 265-77, 
1990, p. 267. Also Re Produce Marketing Consortium Ltd. (No 2) [1989] B.C.L.C. 520). However, 
neither case law developments nor section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986 deals with the problem of 
disclosure.
184 s. 238(1)(6) of the CA 1985.
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liquidators can apply to the court to require a transaction to be set aside provided that 
the transaction is a gratuitous juristic act which is to the prejudice of creditors, or is a 
non-gratuitous juristic act but is to the prejudice of the creditors and this was known to 
the debtor and the opposite party at the time the transaction was made.185
Second, directors may be held liable based on the law of tort. About three 
decades ago, it was debated whether "claims" could be the subject matter of torts.186 
However, it is now well accepted that it can be the case; therefore, if the conditions of 
torts are met, directors will be held liable.187 Nonetheless, there is, in Taiwan, no 
equivalent provision of section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986. It is submitted that 
since it is not easy to enforce the obligation of disclosure on directors when the 
company is on the verge of insolvency, it may be desirable to insert such a provision to 
the Company Law or the Insolvency law as an alternative to disclosure legislation. It is 
more appropriate to perform this through the Company Law, because the Insolvency 
Law is applied to all debtors who are unable to liquidate their debts, and the enactment 
of director's liability would create an otherwise inappropriate exception within the 
Insolvency Law.
3.2.3.4 Future Investors
If a director owes no fiduciary duty to individual shareholders and creditors, he should 
not be liable to future individual investors. The director is not obliged to disclose 
corporate information to these potential investors; he has no legal relationship with 
such people. The only two situations where his liability may arise are when he
185 Article 78 of the Insolvency Law and Article 244 of the Civil Code. In the USA, the Uniform 
Fraudulent Conveyance Act has similar rules. See also ss. 238 and 423 of the Insolvency Act 1986 
(UK).
186 For example, A is a famous singer; he signed a contract with the manager B to perform in the 
theatre. C, who wilfully wished to harm B, induced A to sign a contract with him and break A's 
contract with B. This is a tort, of which the subject is a "claim" rather than a physical good. See Yu-
po Cheng, The General Principles o f the Law o f Obligations (Min Fa Chai P'ien Tsung Lun), 1985, p. 
152. See also Lumley v. Gye (1853) 2 E & B 216.
187 Article 184 (1) of the Civil Code.
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represents his company to enter into transactions with them (e.g. sells a company's 
shares or debentures to investors) and he deceives those people (which makes him 
liable for fraud) or there is a misrepresentation which later becomes a term of the 
contract and investors seek compensation from the company, which renders the 
director liable to the company for his breach of duty. In other words, in the former 
case, there is a liability in torts, while in the latter case, the liability is for breach of duty 
arising from the contract (or constructive contract)188 of mandate (in Taiwan) between 
a company and a director.
No duty of disclosure will arise when a director is faced with the public. If the 
law has no mandatory disclosure requirements, a director is not required to prepare 
prospectuses for the public; nor is he called upon to disclose to the public information 
periodically or in a timely manner. Admittedly, supposing he decides to disclose, the 
liability may occur should the information he provides be wrong. But there is no way 
to establish that a director ought to make disclosure to the public if the system of 
mandatory disclosure does not exist. That is to say, assuming the government intends 
the public to be well informed, then mandatory disclosure will be necessary because 
this alone can ensure that certain legal liabilities are imposed on the responsible people 
and this, in turn, considerably affects the behaviour of the latter.
3.2.4 The Obligation of the Company in the Preparation of Prospectuses
A company was not required to prepare a prospectus when it intended to issue publicly 
its securities (e.g. shares and debentures) before mandatory disclosure legislation was 
enacted both in the UK and in Taiwan. This was because at that time, the obligation 
was decided by the law of contract. As discussed above, no obligation of disclosure is
188 See supra page 132.
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imposed on contractual parties unless there is some special relationship between the 
parties such as the existence of fiduciary relationship and contracts uberrimae fidei.
In the absence of any special relationship between the company and its potential 
investors, all the obligations between them are determined by the law of contract 
where transactions are involved. Consequently, a company does not have an obligation 
to prepare prospectuses for potential investors. The general law cannot impose this 
duty on the company.
It is true that if there is any misrepresentation in a prospectus, subscribers or 
purchasers of the securities related may have the right of rescission or of damages. 
Nonetheless, these are not sufficient grounds to suggest that a company is under a duty 
to disclose all the "material" information unless non-disclosure combined with what the 
company has disclosed constitutes a false impression which misleads investors. For 
example, a pharmaceutical company has just invented a new kind of medicine which, if 
successful, will bring great profits to the company; however, there is a fifty per cent 
possibility that the medicine is not effective. In the situation where there is no 
mandatory disclosure, the company is entitled to omit such information in the 
prospectus. But once the company decides to disclose it, the company cannot tell a 
half-truth, i.e. not mentioning the possibility of failure. Accordingly, only mandatory 
disclosure can require the company to disclose certain information, which the company 
originally could choose to omit legally even though it may be important to investors.
3.2.5 Others
Under the general law, a company is not required to provide the public with 
information; all requirements found today are covered by company's legislation and 
other securities regulations. A company itself is an entity with legal personality aimed 
at promoting its members' welfare generally, and only occasionally takes the interest of
j
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employees, creditors or the public into account. If public policy requires a creation of a 
well-informed capital market, mandatory disclosure will be an indispensable tool to 
achieve this purpose.
3.3 Conclusion
The importance of disclosure is beyond doubt. After investigating the extent of 
disclosure available under the general law in both the English and Taiwanese legal 
systems, it is clear that if there is no mandatory disclosure requirement imposed by 
statutes or regulations, the general law does not provide investors with enough 
protection.
Shareholders cannot claim their rights of information by simply basing the rights 
on their status as shareholders; directors in principle owe no duty to individual 
shareholders to disclose to them even though they do have duties to prepare corporate 
accounts (in Taiwan only) and maintain loyalty towards the company; in the case of 
creditors, the situation is no better, and could even be worse, than for individual 
shareholders, since there is no duty on the part of directors to give creditors any 
information outside the current statutory requirements. All these facts demonstrate that 
the protection regarding disclosure offered by the general law is insufficient. The 
current mandatory disclosure requirements which spread over the Companies Act, 
FSA 1986, and the Yellow Book show that regulators intend to respond to such 
shortcomings by making disclosure mandatory. If mandatory disclosure is undesirable 
(e.g. too costly) then what is left to us with the sole help of the general law? It seems 
from this, that mandatory disclosure can be justified. Nonetheless, the criticism from 
economists cannot be ignored, and this will be examined in the next chapter.
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Economic Debate on Mandatory Disclosure
The opponents, especially economic opponents, of mandatory disclosure generally base 
their arguments on four rationales: the efficient market theory, cost-benefit analysis, 
portfolio theory, and agency theory. There is abundant literature on these subjects but 
limited by the space of this thesis it is impossible here to have a thorough examination 
of the topic; nonetheless, analysing such an economic debate to a certain extent is 
helpful for examining the real justification of mandatory disclosure.
4.1 The Efficient Market Theory
Economists advocate that in a free competition market, market forces drive companies 
to disclose information voluntarily, and under an efficient capital market, securities 
prices fully reflect all available information.1
Supposing that the market is efficient, all information is reflected in securities 
prices and the market itself is capable of resolving most problems. Following this, a 
company which sells good quality securities will try to distinguish itself from other 
companies, and release a certain amount of information, which can help it achieve this 
purpose. Mandatory disclosure requirements would therefore be redundant.2 The 
quantity of information being disclosed, under this model, depends on whether 
information is worth disclosing (i.e. whether disclosure of such information is to the 
advantage of the company).
1 This is the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis (ECMH). See supra Chapter Three.
2 It is specifically true when only historical (or past) information is disclosed because it has been 
reflected in stock prices already.
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Information is further available as securities analysts are much more widespread 
than before. Vigorous competitive efforts on the part of securities analysts can identify 
overvalued and undervalued securities, and by means of this processing they rapidly 
uncover all information useful in identifying mispriced securities.3 Taken together, 
these arguments point to the conclusion that mandatory disclosure is unnecessary.
Rebuttal
Two reasons are advanced which support the view that the above theory is not 
convincing.
(1) the characteristic of information and the free-rider problem
A market itself cannot produce enough information required by investors because of 
insufficient disclosure from companies and securities research. This problem is 
traceable to the characteristic of information.
Information itself has some of the characteristics of a public good. The key 
characteristic of a public good is the non-excludability of users who have not paid for 
it; consumption of the good by one user does not diminish its availability to others.4 
Information is quickly used up when it has been reflected in securities prices, and its 
non-excludability shows that it matches this characteristic of a public good so that third 
parties can benefit from other people's efforts without any compensation, the so-called 
externalities.5
3 See Christopher Paul Saari, "The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, Economic Theory and the 
Regulation of the Securities Industry", in 29 Stanford L. R., 1031-76, 1977, p. 1054.
4 See John C. Coffee, Jr., "Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure 
System", in 70 Virginia L. R., 717-53, 1984, p. 725.
5 An externality "arises where one person ..., in the course of rendering some service, for which 
payment is made, to a second person ..., incidentally also renders services or disservices to other 
persons ... of such a sort that payment cannot be exacted from the benefited parties or compensation 
enforced on behalf of the injured parties." (A.C. Pigou, The Economics o f Welfare, 1932, p. 183) in
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Suppose that the efficient capital market hypothesis is held, it can be predicted 
that information is spread as quickly as possible; also suppose that companies have 
substantial incentives to disseminate information to investors, and securities analysts 
have incentives to endeavour to search for information because they can win their 
clients' trust.6 But grounded on this public good characteristic, persons who spend 
money and labour to disclose will not gain the compensation they deserve and will 
accordingly lose the incentive to carry on further research. Information is far from free 
even when given away free, and the expenses of obtaining information are dependent 
on the sources of information, i.e. where the information comes from.7 Admittedly, the 
first group of people who acquire the information can make better profit from their 
information than those who acquire it later. However, this time span is very short. 
Whenever a piece of information is released, the person who discovers it can only 
benefit from his efforts to a small degree, because other people will know it very soon 
afterwards so that he cannot get any compensation from those people.
This phenomenon could also be described as the free-rider problem. The public 
good characteristic of information will result in information being under-produced 
because the efforts spent can be easily appropriated by a third party and as a result the 
externalities will prevent producers of information from supplying the quantity of 
information which is needed to achieve an efficient market.
C.G. Veljanovski, The New Law-and-Economics, 1982. See also Roger Bowles, Law and Economy, 
1982, p. 166; Frank H. Stephen, The Economics o f the Law, 1988, p. 28.
6 Compared with 1930s there are many more securities analysts now. "Analysts should invest in 
verifying and obtaining material information about corporate securities until the marginal cost of this 
information to them equals their marginal return. Because of the non-excludability of the use of 
information, an analyst cannot obtain the full economic value of his discoveiy, and this in turn, means 
that he will engage in less search or verification behaviour than investors collectively desire." See 
Coffee, supra note 4, pp. 725-6.
7 See Ronald K. Gilson and Reinier H. Kraakman, "The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency", in 70 
Virginia L. R., 549-644, 1984. The sequence of expenses of obtaining information from the lowest to 
the highest is financial press (e.g. newspaper, financial magazines, etc.) distributed by originators, 
information intermediaries, collectivization (public side: federal securities acts, private side: analyst 
and trade associations), and espionage (surveillance and investigative analysis).
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Applying such a theory to the case of corporate disclosure, it seems that a 
company may choose not to publish much financial data so long as other companies 
refrain from publishing similar data. Such behaviour is grounded on the recognition 
that, while the shareholders of the company pay for the production and publication of 
financial statements, non-shareholders and other competitors cannot be prevented from 
using them.8
Thus, it is a myth that an efficient market can produce enough information. On the 
contrary, the premise of an efficient market is that there is a sufficient flow of 
information. This condition, however, cannot be satisfied by the operation of the 
market itself because information is somewhat close to a public good and the ensuing 
externalities will stop information providers disclosing the necessary amount of 
information. The self-induced disclosure cannot function as well as the opponents of 
mandatory disclosure suggest.
(2) the efficient capital market hypothesis
As indicated above, one of the reasons which "backs up" economists' disagreement 
with mandatory disclosure is the efficient capital market hypothesis: under free 
competition, abundant information will be produced because the market is efficient. 
This statement fails because it confuses cause and effect.
The ECMH only states that in an efficient market, securities prices fully reflect all 
available information; it does not answer the question: how can a market become 
efficient?9 What is this process? Stated otherwise, the premise of the full reflection of 
information in securities prices is that a market is efficient. As regards the formation of 
an efficient market, this is not the concern of the ECMH. Thus, the ECMH itself does
8 See George J. Benston, Corporate Financial Disclosure in the UK and the USA, 1976, p. 102.
9 See Gilson and Kraakman, supra note 7.
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not stand on either side, mandatory disclosure or voluntary disclosure. What it really 
implies is that market efficiency is fundamental.
As explained earlier,10 information is vital to market efficiency. Its dissemination 
decides the level of efficiency: weak, semi-strong, or strong. In turn, the breadth of 
dissemination of information is decided by its costs. Therefore, using the cheapest way 
of disclosure can enhance market efficiency. It may be suggested that voluntary 
disclosure costs less than mandatory disclosure because of the extra expenses incurred 
in the administrative procedure.
However, when voluntary disclosure fails as a result of such factors as the public 
good characteristic of information, the third party effect, lemons, and agency costs, 
mandatory disclosure is thought to cure the imperfection of the market, and this does 
not conflict with the ECMH at all. On the contrary, the ECMH may support the 
adoption of mandatory disclosure, because it demonstrates the relationship between 
securities prices and market efficiency. Suffice it to say that allocative efficiency is 
desired and can be achieved by means of "correct" securities prices, to use mandatory 
disclosure for this purpose is appropriate in this situation.
4.2 The Cost-benefit Analysis
Stigler11 and Benston12 emphasised the concept of cost-benefit analysis of securities 
regulation, and cast serious doubts on the legitimacy of mandatory disclosure. Stigler 
first recognised that the paramount goal of the regulations in the securities market was 
to protect the innocent investors; nonetheless, he stated: "so far as the efficiency and 
growth of the American economy are concerned, efficient capital markets are even
10 See Chapter Three, supra pages 91-4.
11 George J. Stigler, "Public Regulation of the Securities Market", in 37 J. o f Bus., 117-42, 1964.
12 George J. Benston, "Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934", in 63 American Economic Review, 132-55, 1973.
158
Chapter Four: Economic Debate
more important than the protection of investors — in fact efficient capital markets are 
the major protection of investors."13 Then he examined the performance of newly 
issued securities before and after the 1933 Act and found that registration requirements 
for new securities had little effect on the average return for investors purchasing such 
securities, but that the costs of this registration requirement were high.
Benston initially pointed out that the rationale for the disclosure requirements 
was to allow investors to make an informed decision, but after this, he argued that the 
data required by the SEC should be "information" (i.e. something new or useful to 
investors). By implication, the financial statements must provide investors with data 
about a company that affected investors' expectations concerning corporate future 
prospects and relative risks that were not previously known.14 The problem was that, 
although the financial statements did convey some information, most of its details 
appeared to be "known" to the market by the time the statements were publicly 
released.15
Benston then applied a cost-benefit analysis. First, he showed that most of the 
benefits of mandatory disclosure could not be attained.16 He admitted that, to some 
extent, fraud and manipulation could be reduced because of mandatory disclosure 
requirements, yet fairness to non-insiders could never be achieved by means of 
mandatory disclosure. That is, even if financial statements were published on a monthly 
basis, and even if all investors received the statements simultaneously and were able to 
interpret the information equally quickly and well, investors who traded on other than 
statement publication dates would pay or receive prices that did not reflect the events 
that occurred between the statement dates.17 He also argued that, on the bases of
13 Stigler, supra note 11, p. 124.
14 Id., p. 137.
15 See Benston, supra note 8, p. 131.
16 The benefits recognised by him are: 1. the prevention or reduction of fraud and misrepresentation; 
2. fairness to non-insiders; 3 lower transaction and information costs to investors; and 4. more 
efficient allocation of the investors' resources among companies. Id., p. 97.
17 Id., p. 118.
159
Chapter Four: Economic Debate
statistical data, securities regulation did not increase the public's desire to purchase 
shares (in other words, did not increase public confidence in the capital market).18
On the other hand, he also thought that the costs of mandatory disclosure were 
obvious. These costs included direct, indirect, and opportunity costs. Direct costs were 
incurred by companies in producing and distributing the required information, 
including the additional expense of keeping records, auditing, organising accounting 
members, typing, etc. that would not have been incurred in the absence of the 
disclosure statutes. Indirect costs were the time that corporate officers, government 
officials, and investors spent to fulfil the disclosure requirements, which would not be 
wasted should there be no mandatory statutes. Finally, the opportunity costs were 
those of delay in not being able to release certain types of information, etc.19 
Therefore, Benston firmly expressed his opposition to the mandatory legislation 
because the benefits of disclosure were not obtainable but the costs were large.
Some British academics also hold the same opinion. For example, Gower's 
approach was criticised because he underestimated the problem of cost-benefit 
analysis. He stated:
"In assessing the optimum degree of regulation I  have not attempted any sort 
o f cost-benefit analysis, partly because I am not competent to undertake it 
and partly because I  am skeptical about its practicability. I can see that it 
would be practicable to analyse whether markets work more or less 
efficiently, qua markets, according to the degree of regulation to which they 
are subject. But inevitably there is a tension between market efficiency and 
investor protection which often pull in different directions."20 (emphases 
added)
18 Id., p. 145.
19 Id., pp. 154-5. For example, soft information such as projections.
20 L.C.B. Gower, Review o f Investor Protection, Report, Parti, 1984, p. 7, para. 1.16.
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Some economists disagreed that such a tension existed;21 they also condemned 
the claim made by Gower and the SIB that cost-benefit studies would not have 
contributed much because of the difficulties of analysis and data collection.22 
Moreover, Sealy, a lawyer, also doubts the effectiveness of mandatory disclosure 
requirements by company law, stating that benefits are not proportional to costs.23
Following these arguments, opponents of mandatory disclosure claim that the 
costs outweigh the benefits, even though they admit the existence of the asymmetric 
information problem.24 They still trust this problem to be resolved by the market itself.
Rebuttal
Economists (e.g. Stigler and Benston) state that costs of mandatory disclosure exceed 
its benefits. This may not be true for two reasons. First, as claimed by Gower,25 it is 
difficult to calculate the costs and benefits of mandatory disclosure. Benefits could be 
tangible or intangible; the increase of investments is observable, while investors' 
confidence in the market, investor's feeling of fairness, and the reputation of the market 
are not countable, thus making it very hard to strike a balance between costs and 
benefits as economists claim.
Second, contrary to the economists' analyses, mandatory disclosure in reality 
reduces a certain amount of costs for two reasons. First, if there is no mandatory 
disclosure requirement, information will be under produced; this was demonstrated in 
the section above. Where there is no mandatory disclosure every investor and
21 By C.G. Veljanovski, see Financial Regulation — or Over-regulation? C.A.E. Goodhart and 
Arthur Seldon (eds.), 1988, p. 11.
22 Id.
23 See Leonard Sealy, "The Disclosure Philosophy and Company Law Reform", in The Company 
Lawyer, 2(2), 51-6, 1981.
24 See Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason, "Do Firms Care Who Provides Their Financing", in Asymmetric 
Information, Corporate Finance and Investment, R. Glenn Hubbard (ed.), 1990.
25 Gower, supra note 21.
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securities analyst has to make inquiries of companies individually. Since the process of 
researching and verifying securities information consumes real resources, this outcome 
will not only waste social resources26 (because of the overlapping research) but will 
also hamper the achievement of market efficiency, because, as shown earlier, the costs 
of obtaining and verifying information determine the breadth of the information 
dissemination. Therefore, mandatory disclosure can eliminate wasteful duplication of 
research and secure a greater quantity of information. Stated otherwise, collectivisation 
minimises the social waste that would otherwise result from the misallocation of 
economic resources to this pursuit. Second, mandatory disclosure27 can also save costs 
by enforcing a uniform disclosure system. When a company voluntarily discloses 
information, every company has to design its own form of disclosure such as the 
contents, the time, the accounting standard adopted, etc. The additional costs incurred 
to the company are beyond doubt; the inconvenience of comparing different types of 
statements caused to investors should not be overlooked either.
It is true that mandatory disclosure has its own limits, which are based on the 
evaluation of information; that is, the extent to which information should be disclosed 
depends on whether that information will affect investors' judgment respecting the 
value of securities. As a result, it seems that the decision to disclose relates to the value 
of the information; cost-benefit analysis can contribute little to this issue.
Even though it is undeniable that both the legislature and administrators should 
consider regulation efficiency, other elements which deeply relate to the nature of law 
and regulation cannot be ignored either (e.g. fairness, prevention of fraud). What this 
section pursues is not the nature of law and regulation. Instead, it is intended to make 
this point: the opponents of mandatory disclosure hold that mandatory disclosure is not
i
good as a matter of policy because the costs greatly exceed the benefits. However, it is
26 See Coffee, supra note 4, p. 733.
27 Easterbrook and Fischel, The Economic Structure o f Corporate Law, 1991, p. 291.
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difficult to assess either costs or benefits. When costs and benefits cannot be precisely 
assessed, using this reason to refute the system of mandatory disclosure is not 
persuasive.
4.3 The Portfolio Theory
According to the portfolio theory, investors can eliminate unsystematic risk by 
diversification, and thus firm-specific information becomes unimportant.28 To begin 
with, from the diversification aspect, there are two risks. One is unique risk29 and the 
other is systematic risk.30 Unique risk stems from the fact that many of the perils that 
surround an individual company which are peculiar to that company can be reduced by 
diversification of investments. Systematic risk stems from the fact that there are other 
economy-wide perils which threaten all business and cannot be reduced by 
diversification.31
Why can diversification reduce unique risk? Suppose that one considers investing 
£100 in two different companies, one of which makes sunglasses and the other 
manufactures rain-coats. It is very difficult to predict next summer's weather. The 
chances may be fifty-fifty. In this situation, the safer way of investment is to diversify 
the holdings of the two investments, because an investor in such a situation can end up 
with a sure return on the investment and thus reduce the risk of investment.32
28 See William H. Beaver, "The Nature of Mandated Disclosure", in Economics o f Corporation Law 
and Securities Regulation, Richard A. Posner and Kenneth E. Scott (eds.), 1980 , pp. 326-7.
29 It is also called unsystematic risk, residual risk, specific risk, or diversifiable risk.
30 It is also called market risk or undiversifiable risk.
31 See Richard A. Brealey and Steward C. Myers, Principles o f Corporate Finance, 5th ed., 1996, p. 
156.
32 Suppose that shares of both the companies sell for £10 apiece. If it is a rainy summer, each share of 
the rain-coat company will be £20 and that of the sunglasses company will be £5 and vice versa. If 
one invests all his money in the sunglasses company, he is taking a gamble that has a 50 percent 
chance of earning £200, and a 50 percent of earning 50. The same magnitude of payoff results if he 
invests £100 in the rain-coat company: in either case he has an expected payoff of £125. But if he puts 
half of his money in each, then if it is sunny he gets £100 from the sunglasses investment and £25 
from the rain-coats investment, if it is rainy, he can earn £100 from the rain-coats investment and £25 
from the sunglasses investment, he will be sure to get £125 return. Thus diversification diminishes the
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Furthermore, in microeconomics, there is a model which measures the amount of 
risk if there is only one risky asset.33 This is called the "mean-variance" theory. 
According to the theory, standard deviation or variance is used to measure the amount 
of risk. The concept of portfolio diversification is that by diversifying investments, the 
standard deviation of that portfolio will be equal to or less than the average standard 
deviation of all investments included in that portfolio, in other words, this will reduce 
the standard deviation of the portfolio, and hence reduce its risk.
Following this theory, an investor, who originally needs corporate information to 
judge the risks and return of the investment, can now reduce his risk by means of 
diversifying his investments, and this causes the provision of individual corporate 
information to be less useful, hence mandatory disclosure requirements become 
redundant.
Rebuttal
As pointed out by some economists, diversification can eliminate unsystematic risk and 
thus specific corporate information becomes useless; this is correct to a certain degree. 
However, some investors just do not diversify their investments in securities.34 The 
reason for this is not necessarily because of their foolishness; the diversification may be 
made between real estate and one security rather than between different securities (e.g. 
purchasing a house and one kind of securities as an investment portfolio), thus, to 
reduce unsystematic risk of securities by diversifying investment on several securities 
becomes impossible in such a case, and the unsystematic risk still endangers such an 
investor.
investment risk. See Hal R. Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics: A Modern Approach, 2nd ed., 
1992, p. 221.
33 Id., pp. 227-32.
34 See William H. Beaver, supra note 28, p. 327.
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Accordingly, it is suggested that, from the point of view of protecting investors, 
those persons who are ignorant of how to diversify their investments or who choose to 
diversify them between one security and other kinds of investments, should be 
protected without discrimination.
4.4 The Agency Theory
It is argued that mandatory corporate disclosure is unnecessary because corporate 
managers possess sufficient incentives to disclose voluntarily all or most information 
material to investors.35
The argument is straightforward. First, a manager who owns 100 percent of a 
firm would directly receive all its benefits, while a manager who owns any lesser 
percentage would have to share the benefits with other owners. This gives him an 
incentive to maximise perquisites at the expense of the direct benefit claims of other 
owners.36 Second, seeing that ownership and control have divorced and a conflict of 
interest exists between owners and controllers as indicated above,37 outside 
shareholders would find it in their interest to enter into a contract to restrict the 
manager's consumption of perquisites whenever the increase in the value of the firm 
exceeds the costs of the monitoring or incentive compensation systems.
Stated otherwise, outside shareholders, for the purpose of preventing managers 
from misappropriating perquisites, have incentives to enter into contracts with 
managers. Managers, for maintaining their reputation (supposing that they are "repeat 
players") and convincing outside shareholders that they will not trade for their own
35 See Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, 
Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure", in 3 J. o f Fin. Econ., 305-60, 1976.
36 Id., p. 313.
37 See Chapter Three, supra pages 85-6.
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accounts at the expense of shareholders, also have incentives to make such contracts. 
The contract can be an incentive compensation one, or with auditing obligations. Since 
publication of material information is indispensable to ensure that managers are unable 
to trade for their own accounts at the expense of outside shareholders, "it logically 
follows that a standard feature of the monitoring contract between the manager and 
outside shareholders is the voluntary publication of such data."38
Rebuttal
Easterbrook and Fischel advocated the theory that corporate managers have strong 
incentives to disclose voluntarily all material information to investors, and mandatory 
disclosure is largely superfluous.39 However, corporate managers do have incentives 
not to disclose material information in certain circumstances; this justifies the necessity 
of mandatory disclosure.
The agency theory is based on the premise that managers are "repeat players": if 
they want to keep their posts, they have incentives to disclose information in order to 
satisfy their boss's — shareholders' interests. However, they may not be repeat players, 
especially, when hostile take-over and management led leveraged buy out are 
concerned.40 In these situations, it seems to managers that maintaining their current 
position is more important than considering the problem of future career. The conflict 
of interest between managers and investors would result in management withholding 
information from investors.
In addition, the free-rider problem mentioned above also reduces the function of 
the agency theory. For the purpose of protecting the company's shareholders,
38 Jensen and Meckling, supra note 35, p. 316.
39 Easterbrook and Fischel, supra note 27, p. 290.
40 See David J. Schutle, "The Debatable Case for Securities Disclosure Regulation", in 13 J. o f  
Corporation Law, 535-48, 1988, p. 538.
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managers have incentives to incline to non-disclosure; disclosure is at the expense of 
their own shareholders to benefit outsiders.
4.5 Others
Some research indicates that investors do not make use of information which is given 
to them by mandatory disclosure requirements.41 For example, in consumer protection, 
the purpose of mandatory disclosure is to cause consumers to change their buying 
behavior so as either to refrain from buying particular products or services that they 
otherwise would have bought, or to shop more careful 42 However, people who are 
poor or less educated cannot absorb information and thus are still cheated. That is to 
say, costs that have been spent on mandatory disclosure requirements are wasted and 
the question is raised: is it worth the effort? This question deserves pondering 
especially when extensive mandatory disclosure has been employed in today's capital 
market.
The other criticism comes from the assumption of legislature and administrators: 
every investor should obtain information equally because of the purpose of investor 
protection. Nonetheless, no layman can really understand the prospectus, the financial 
statement, and all other information documents.43 The design of the system basically 
marches in the wrong direction. This criticism in reality is against the current 
mandatory disclosure, not necessarily the idea of mandatory disclosure itself. It is also 
argued that the contents of mandatory disclosure do not provide much useful 
information to investors as they are basically historically oriented.
41 See Robert L. Jordan and William D. Warren, "Disclosure of Finance Charges: A Rationale", in 64 
Michigan L. R., 1285-322, No. 2, 1966, pp. 1320-2.
42 See William C. Whitford, "The Functions of Disclosure Regulation in Consumer Transactions", in 
Wisconsin L. R., 400-70, 1973, p. 403.
43 Homer Kripke, "The Myth of the Informed Layman", in The Business Lawyer, 631-8, 1973, p. 632.
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All these arguments are sound. For example, soft information was not allowed to 
be disclosed until the 1980's in the United States.44 Historical information may not be 
very helpful to investors because it has been reflected in stock prices already. That is to 
say, soft information may play an important role in the process of decision-making of 
investments by investors. It is also true that a layman cannot be expected to read and 
understand financial statements. Thus, we must ask; for whom is disclosure designed? 
It follows that the current forms and contents of financial statement may need to be 
reconsidered; all these are left to the next chapter.
4.6 Conclusion
The indispensability of disclosure has been demonstrated in Chapter Three. 
Nonetheless, some of the academics (e.g. Benston, Stigler, Easterbrook (although not 
wholly against mandatory disclosure, at least, with certain doubts)) do not approve the 
device of mandatory disclosure. From their point of view, the requirements of 
mandatory disclosure are superfluous, which not only cannot achieve the goals it aims, 
but also waste social resources: the benefits do not outweigh the costs. Economists as 
indicated above claim that the efficient market theory and agency theory show that 
companies have great incentives to disclose information to investors. Moreover, 
investors can reduce risks by means of diversifying their portfolio.
But what is of concern here is that market imperfection is not uncommon. When 
a market does not function well, cannot mandatory disclosure be justified? Is there any 
better alternative? Even though a market can cure its failure to a great degree, and 
suppose that the costs of mandatory disclosure under such circumstances outweigh the 
loss deriving from market imperfection, mandatory disclosure is not necessarily 
unjustifiable as costs and benefits are not the only concerns of law. Fairness is also
44 Soft information is information which relates to the future prediction of the corporate financial 
situation or operation.
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important and should not be ignored. In addition, the justification of mandatory 
disclosure should be separated from its operation; they are related but are different 
issues. The failure of the latter does not mean that the former is undesirable.
The validity and merits of the so-called cost-benefit analysis has not been proven 
so far by economists. All they have shown has been a general prediction. Stigler 
invoked the evidence which revealed that investors were not better off after the 
securities legislation because they did not earn more than before. However, he did 
point out that the variance of expected return was reduced. What does this mean? It 
means that investors have avoided risks in some measures; this should be attributed to 
the contribution of more information, which is the fruit of such legislation and 
regulation.
Nonetheless, the shortcomings mentioned by opponents of mandatory disclosure 
are quite true in some aspects. Information required to be published may not be very 
useful. The utility of information, its presentation, and the justification of mandatory 
disclosure by the courts, administrators, and legislators all warrant consideration. The 
next chapter will deal with these problems.
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The Content of Mandatory Disclosure
5.1 Introduction
As mandatory disclosure becomes a vital tool in regulating securities markets, the 
design of its content and the enforcement of its norms are the two main determinants 
of the success of the system. The subject of enforcement will be left to the next chapter 
where civil liability for non-compliance with disclosure requirements is dealt with, 
while the present chapter will focus on the problem of the content of mandatory 
disclosure.
The detailed content of corporate financial disclosure is established by 
accounting and auditing experts; i.e. accountants and their assistants decide what 
should be recorded in financial statements and annual reports, while auditors inspect 
whether these documents have reached the standard of disclosure. These processes are 
guided by well-developed accounting/auditing principles and standards which serve 
two purposes: (1) they help corporate managers make business decisions and evaluate 
performance of each corporate department; (2) they are conducive to investors making 
informed investment decisions. Hence, the specific item of accounting disclosure and 
its justification are a matter of accounting rather than legal expertise. The role of a 
lawyer is rather to examine the policy behind the regulation of mandatory disclosure, 
and from this point of view to evolve the legal principles guiding disclosure in order to 
meet the observed policy.
As already discussed in Chapter Three, the purposes of mandatory disclosure are 
to improve informational efficiency which in turn results in efficient allocation of
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resources, and to allow investors opportunities to reach informed investment 
judgments. These two aims, together with the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis (the 
ECMH), reflect the fundamental imperatives of mandatory disclosure:
(1) mandatory information must be relevant and relevant information must be disclosed 
as to investment decisions;
(2) mandatory information must be expressed in a way that is easy to understand for its 
users. Different users have different information needs. Thus, the amount, depth, 
simplicity, and clarity of information a user needs depends on who that user is; and
(3) mandatory information must be disclosed in time.
On the bases of these three principles, the content of mandatory disclosure is 
analysed and we will also examine whether the current regulations in the UK and 
Taiwan need further improvements.
5.2 Relevant Information for Investment
5.2.1 The Meaning of Relevance
In the UK, mandatory information comes mainly from the following sources:
a. the Companies Act 1985;
b. the FSA 1986;
c. the Public Offers of Securities Regulations 1995 (the POS Regulations);
d. the Listing Rules of the Stock Exchange; and
e. the City Code on Take-overs and Mergers
Theoretically, information required by these regulations should be relevant to 
investment decisions; otherwise, this would be a waste of administrative resources 
unless such disclosed information serves some other functions. For example, the 
disclosure of an internal accounting control system is important from the viewpoint of 
preparing and auditing corporate accounts because it ensures the reliability of data
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recorded in the books. This information is closely related to the management of the 
company's internal affairs and is thus indispensable to managers. Nonetheless, investors 
are more concerned with the earning ability of the company than a detailed statement 
pertaining to this system; consequently, such information, although correlatively useful, 
is of little interest to investors. Another example is the problem of disclosing the 
"environmental activities" of the company, which did not arise until the social 
consciousness of environmental protection had become an important public issue. A 
company's environmental policy, in a strict sense, does not relate to a profit oriented 
investment decision; even though there undoubtedly are people who would not invest 
in a company unless it helped environmental protection. But such social concern is a 
different issue from the original purpose of securities regulation. Over the last two 
decades, whether environmental information should be disclosed has been hotly 
debated. The American SEC finally adopted a compromise solution which asks a 
company to disclose if compliance with any federal, state and local environmental 
protection laws may have material effect upon capital expenditure, earnings and the 
competitive position of the company. As a result, the environmental issue is 
emphasised from its economic perspective.1
The current mandatory disclosure system is, in practice, a product created by the 
mutual influence of accounting and legal requirements. It can be said that the current 
system is founded on the existing accounting principles and practices. These, in turn, 
have been adjusted from time to time whenever the accounting/auditing practice shows 
or the legislature (or administrators) requires that more (or less) information should be 
disclosed or a different way of preparing accounts or reports is preferred. Such
1 For the detailed discussion, see James O. Hewitt, "Developing Concepts of Materiality and 
Disclosure", in 32 The Business Lawyer, 887-956, 1977, pp. 914-20; Richard Y. Roberts and Kurt R. 
Hohl, "Environmental Liability Disclosure and Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 92", in 50 The Business 
Lawyer, 1-17, 1994. The Taiwan SEC also compels companies to disclose environmental information 
concerning the amount of compensation and fine, estimated contingent liability, the responding policy 
for improving pollution, and the possible effect on the issuer's earnings, competitive advantages, and 
capital payment. See the Rules for Preparing Financial Reports by Securities Issuers (Art. 18), the 
Rules on the Contents of the Annual Reports of Publicly Issuing Companies (Art. 10(4)), and the 
Rules on the Contents of Public Offers Prospectuses (Art. 13(4)).
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methods of preparation and their subsequent changes could become legally effective by 
introducing them into statutes or regulations.
However, due to the origin of the accounting system, disclosed information may 
not be relevant from an investor's point of view. The original purpose of an accounting 
system was to provide managers with a comprehensive description of an enterprise's 
business and financial position, along with the analyses of the figures. Nonetheless, the 
evolution of the accounting system and the emergence in modem companies of new 
users of financial statements have required mandatory information to be limited to new 
users' needs. Accordingly, information that is only for managers' use need not be 
disclosed.
Hence, the term "relevance" here is limited to the information which is relevant to 
investors' investment decisions only. Its scope may be quite broad and the content of 
disclosure based on this term is likely to vary from situation to situation as investors 
make decisions in different circumstances (e.g. in subscribing to shares or accepting a 
take-over offer).
First, in the case of listing particulars (or prospectuses when securities are 
offered to the public in the UK for the first time (s. 144(2) of the FSA 1986), relevance 
of information is decided by the Stock Exchange by means of setting out mandatory 
information in the Listing Rules or imposing any extra requirement.2 The FSA 1986, 
nonetheless, provides a minimum (or residual) definition of relevance in s. 146(1):
"... any listing particulars ... shall contain all such information as investors and 
their professional advisers would reasonably require and reasonably expect to 
find there, for the purpose of making an informed assessment o f—
(a) the assets and liabilities, financial position, profits and losses, and 
prospects of the issuer of the securities; and
(b) the rights attaching to those securities."
2 s. 144(2) of the FSA 1986.
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Obviously, if information has any effect on making an informed measure of the above 
listed issues, it would be relevant. One point requires mention. Such a test is different 
from the "reasonable person" one, which is popularly adopted in torts; instead, it lies in 
investors' and their professional advisers' reasonable inquiries. Nonetheless, 
"reasonableness" is not a precise concept; therefore, section 146(3) states that the 
nature of the securities, of the issuer of the securities, and of the persons likely to 
consider their (the securities) acquisition should be reckoned with at the time of 
deciding disclosed information. Also, regard should be had to the fact that certain 
matters may reasonably be expected to lie within the knowledge of the professional 
advisers of any kind whom these persons (investors) may reasonably be expected to 
consult and whether information would be or have been available from other sources.3 
The most intimate situation is "insurance" misrepresentation where a prudent insurer's 
judgment is the standard for deciding the "materiality" of any misrepresentation.4
As mentioned earlier, the major body of disclosed items is specified in the Listing 
Rules and the Stock Exchange may impose further requirements on a case by case 
basis if it is considered appropriate, i.e. unspecified information is relevant. Section 
146(1) of the FSA 1986 thus serves to illustrate the situation in which information is 
relevant and closes the loopholes which might arise since the Listing Rules could not 
possibly be exhaustive. Comparing the Listing Rules with s. 146(1) of the FSA 1986 
demonstrates that the contents of the Listing Rules include more information than that 
required by s. 146(1),5 while s. 146(1) represents a stronger sense of relevance. That
3 That is, information required by the Listing Rules (s. 153) and information required under Schedule 
4, 2(2)(b), which states that "the exchange must where relevant, require issuers of investments dealt in 
on the exchange to comply with such obligations as will, so far as possible, afford to persons dealing 
in the investments proper information for determining their current value."
4 Pan Atlantic Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pine Top Insurance Co. Ltd. [1993] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 496; [1994] 3 
All E.R. 581, H.L. There are thorough analyses regarding the problems of insurance and materiality 
in Bernard Rudden, "Disclosure in Insurance: The Changing Scene", in Lectures on the Common 
Law, Vol. 3, 1991, pp. 1-13.
5 For instance, information required for the admission of shares or convertible debt securities to listing 
includes seven categories: a. the persons responsible for listing particulars, the auditors and other 
advisers; b. the shares for which application is being made; c. the issuer and its capital; d. the group's
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is, information in s. 146(1) is the core of disclosed information and therefore occupies a 
stronger position in the sense of relevance.
Second, with respect to continuous disclosure, relevance is expressed not 
infrequently in the way of "price-sensitive" information. For instance, a listed company 
is obliged to disclose immediately to the Company Announcement Office (which is the 
sub-institution of the Stock Exchange) any major new developments in its sphere of 
activity which are not public knowledge but have an effect on its assets and liabilities, 
financial position, or on the general course of its business, leading to substantial 
movement in the price of its listed securities. Price movement becomes a major signal 
to decide the relevance of information.6 If new information is required to be disclosed 
in an annual or half-yearly report, it is more similar to the situation of issuing listing 
particulars, and the meaning of relevance in this case should be the same as that of 
listing particulars.
Third, in certain situations, relevance would be defined as covering the 
information which helps investors and the company to detect certain undesirable 
transactions. The best examples are transactions made between a company and its 
related parties and insider dealing.
activities; e. the issuer's assets and liabilities, financial position and profits and losses; f. the 
management; g. the recent development and prospects of the group. But s. 146(1) only covers the 
above listed categories b, e, and g.
6 To employ the price-sensitive signal in immediate disclosure occasions is criticised by Besorai. He 
argued: "Both of the objectives of securities regulation — protecting investors and ensuring efficient 
securities markets — share the common purpose of making public sufficient reliable information to 
promote informed investment decisions; informed investment decisions not only for the purpose of 
quick financial gain but also to enable investors to appraise the position of the company with a view to 
a long-term investment. From a practical point of view, the price-sensitive test must also fail." See 
Ahal Besorai, "Disclosure of Tentative Information by Listed Companies", Part I, in The Company 
Lawyer, 16(8), 236-42, Sept., 1995; Part II, 16(9), 263-70, Oct., 1995, in Part II, p. 264.
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(1) transactions with related parties
In listed companies, related parties are persons who have influence on corporate 
management or those who are close to the companies. They include substantial 
shareholders, the company's (including its subsidiary undertaking, parent undertaking, 
and a fellow subsidiary undertaking of its parent undertaking) directors and shadow 
directors (including being directors or shadow directors within the 12 months 
preceding the date of the transaction), and associates7 of the former two groups.
A substantial shareholder means any person (a bare trustee excluded) who is, or 
was within the 12 months preceding the date of the transaction, entitled to exercise or 
to control the exercise of 10% or more of the votes able to be cast on all or 
substantially all matters at general meetings of the company (or any other company 
which is its subsidiary, parent undertaking, or a fellow subsidiary of its parent 
undertaking).8 The present provisions of the Companies Act 1985 on disclosure of 
interests in shares result from the implementation of the Directive on the Disclosure of 
Significant Shareholdings (the Major Shareholdings Directive).9 The basic differences 
between the Directive and the old UK law were that the Directive's disclosure regime
7 Associate means in relation to either a director or a substantial shareholder who is an individual: (i) 
that individual's spouse or child (the individual's family); (ii) the trustees of any trust of which the 
individual or any of the individual's family is a beneficiary or discretionary object; and (iii) any 
company in whose equity shares the individual or any member or members (taken together) of the 
individual's family or the individual and any such member or members (taken together) are directly or 
indirectly interest (or have a conditional or contingent entitlement to become interested) so that they 
are (or would on the fulfilment of the condition or the occurrence of the contingency be) able to 
exercise or control the exercise of 30% or more of the votes able to be cast at general meetings on all, 
or substantially all matters; or to appoint or remove directors holding a majority of voting rights at 
board meetings on all, or substantially all matters. In relation to a substantial shareholder which is a 
company, associate means (i) any other company which is its subsidiary undertaking or parent 
undertaking or fellow subsidiary undertaking of the parent undertaking; (ii) any company whose 
directors are accustomed to act in accordance with the substantial shareholder's directions or 
instructions; and (iii) any company in the capital of which the substantial shareholder, and any other 
company under (i) or (ii) taken together, is interested in the manner described in the third situation 
above. See 11.1(d), (e) of the Listing Rules.
8 11.1(c) of the Listing Rules.
9 Directive 88/627/EEC, OJ 1988 L 348/62 Two statutory instruments have been made to implement 
this Directive: the Disclosure of Interests in Shares (Amendment) Regulations 1993 (S.I. 1993/1819) 
and the Disclosure of Interests in Shares (Amendment)(No 2) Regulations 1993 (S.I. 1993/2689).
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was based on the possession of voting power whereas the old UK law was based on 
interest in share capital, and the threshold of disclosure was different. Accordingly, the 
UK amended the old rules and distinguished material interests from non-material 
interests. Any person who has material interests is obliged to disclose to the company 
within 2 days10 when the aggregate nominal value of the shares in which those material 
interests subsist is equal to or more than 3 per cent of the nominal value of the share 
capital; and in the case of having non-material interests, 10 per cent becomes the 
threshold of disclosure.11 Non-material interests in principle refers to investment 
managers and operators of unit trusts or collective investment schemes.12 One writer 
suggested that as the UK Companies Act 1985 did not shift to the "voting power" 
standard, the UK might be in default of its EC obligations.13
However, in the case of related persons transactions, the Listing Rules defines 
the substantial shareholders as those who are or were entitled to exercise or to control 
the exercise of 10% or more of the votes. Under the current disclosure system, 
identifying these persons is by no means easy, because all the disclosed figures are 
based on the percentage of nominal value of the shares to the nominal value of that 
relevant share capital, not voting power.
If a listed company proposes to enter into a transaction with a related party, then 
particulars of the transaction, the consideration, the name of the related party 
concerned, and the details of the nature and extent of the interest of the related party in 
the transaction are all relevant information.
10 ss. 199(2)(a), 202(1) of the CA 1985.
11 s. 199(2)(b), of the CA 1985.
12 s. 199(2)(a) of the CA 1985. As regards the amendment, see Colin Mercer, "Disclosure of Interests 
in Shares: Implementation of EC Major Shareholdings Directive", in Corporate Briefing, 7(9), 228- 
31, 1993; Allen & Overy, "Disclosure of Interests in Shares", in In-House Lawyer (IHL), 36-7, 
July/Aug., 1993.
13 See Janet Dine, "Implementation of the Acquired Rights Directive", in Corporate Briefing, 15(5), 
143-4, 1994. Mathematically, this seems very unlikely to happen.
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(2) insider dealing
To detect insider dealing, two sets of information require special attention: the change 
of shareholdings of insiders, and identification of inside information. Regarding the first 
kind of information, it relates to the disclosure of shareholdings by insiders (e.g. 
directors and substantial shareholders), which has been partly dealt with earlier. 
However, the disclosure of shareholding may not be effective in bringing other insiders 
(e.g. tippees14 and any person who has inside information by means of his employment, 
office or profession15) into the open. Consequently, the second kind of information 
would be relevant in deciding whether there is insider dealing.
In the Criminal Justice Act 1993, inside information is described as unpublished 
price-sensitive information,16 which means that if that information were made public, it 
would be likely to have a significant effect on the movement in the price of the 
securities. All these descriptions still cannot concretely delineate what "price-sensitive" 
means. The Stock Exchange published the guidance note on the dissemination of price- 
sensitive information in which precise definition of price-sensitive information is still 
missing, because "it is not feasible to define any theoretical percentage movement in a 
share price which will make information price sensitive."17 It could only be borne in 
mind that "the more specific the information, the greater the risk of it being price 
sensitive".18
It may be worth considering why the regulation focuses on the price movement 
of securities. First, such regulation reflects the ECMH. According to the ECMH, if a 
market is efficient, prices will fully reflect all available information. Thus, information
14 s. 57(2)(b) of the Criminal Justice Act 1993.
15 s. 57(2)(a)(ii), of the Criminal Justice Act 1993.
16 s. 56(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1993.
17 See Colin Mercer, "Disclosure of Price Sensitive Information: Guidance from the Stock Exchange" 
in Corporate Briefing, 8(2), 2-5, 1993, p. 2.
18 Id.
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which would cause prices to move must have a certain influence on the value of the 
securities. For the purpose of efficient allocation of resources, this kind of information 
is important, in that insiders can take advantage of the price fluctuation. Second, to 
protect investors, such information should be disseminated to all market participants 
simultaneously; it is forbidden to prejudice investors by giving insiders opportunities to 
benefit from inside information.
Finally, in take-overs and mergers, relevance refers to all information which 
could help shareholders make decisions as to the acceptance or rejection of the tender 
offer and whether or not to support the merger proposal. It follows, the target 
company's current financial position, business performance and future prospects 
constitute relevant information; the bidder's corresponding information and its plan 
following the success of take-overs are likewise relevant. Besides that, the conditions 
of tender offer should be fully disclosed.
In short, whether a piece of information is relevant depends on the circumstances 
which it relates to. As a result, the content of mandatory disclosure could have 
different versions in different situations, and the paramount guiding rule is that 
disclosure of information is compulsory for improving market efficiency and protecting 
investors.
5.2.2 Material v. Non-Material Information
5.2.2.1 Materiality in the UK
Although it is submitted that mandatory information must be relevant, the term 
"relevant" is not used often. Instead, the courts and academics have other terminology 
to classify information. One of the most frequent terms is "material" information.
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Two things should be bome in mind when English law is considered: (1) such 
classification is used mostly in cases where civil or criminal liabilities are determined;19
(2) the analysis of this classification is aimed at distinguishing different levels of 
information; thus, the classification only demonstrates that when the content of 
mandatory information is examined, the importance of information should be valued 
first, and if there is any deficiency in the disclosure of this kind of information (i.e. 
material information), the law should act to make it good. This does not imply that 
only material information will be disclosed in a practical sense. As discussed above, the 
accounting experts contribute to the current disclosure system substantially and they 
have authoritative expertise to decide what other information should be reported even 
if it may not be material (from an investor's point of view); it is also true that legislators 
or administrators may impose extra disclosure requirements which purport to achieve 
some social goals other than investment decisions. Information disclosed under these 
two latter circumstances could be omitted from our discussion provided it does not 
confuse investors.
(1) what is materiality (from the legal perspective)?
Section 47(l)(a) of the FSA 1986 provides as follows:
"Any person who makes a statement, promise or forecast which he knows to 
be misleading, false or deceptive or dishonestly conceals any material facts  is 
guilty of an offence if he makes the statement..." (emphasis added) 20
19 Notably, para. 3(4) of Part I, Sched. 4 of the CA 1985 mentions "materiality", it says: "Items to 
which Arabic numbers are assigned in any of the formats set out in section B below may be combined 
in a company's accounts for any financial year if either (a) these individual amounts are not material 
to assessing the state of affairs or profit or loss of the company for that year; or..." (emphasis added) 
However, it is not to indicate that only material information needs disclosure; rather, it only points out 
that if any amount is immaterial, it could be combined with other items.
20 See also s. 200(1) of the FSA 1986: "A person commits an offence if (a) for the purposes of or in 
connection with any application under this Act; or (b) in purported compliance with any requirement 
imposed on him by or under this Act, he furnishes information which he knows to be false or 
misleading in a material particular or recklessly furnishes information which is false or misleading in 
a material particular." (emphases added). This is, once again, a material requirement in liabilities 
rather than a standard for disclosure design.
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Unfortunately, s. 47 fails to define what "material" facts mean. Section 150(1) of the 
FSA 1986 lays out the constituents of the civil liability for compensation for false or 
misleading particulars. The wording it uses does not include any term like "material 
facts"; rather, it states:"... suffered loss in respect of them as a result of any untrue or 
misleading statement in the particulars or the omission from them of any matter 
required to be included by section 146 or 147 above". This is different from the 
provisions of the USA and Taiwan. The American Securities Act 1933, §11 provides 
that "...any part of the registration statement, when such part became effective, 
contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact 
required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not 
misleading...". Also in the Taiwanese Securities and Exchange Law (the SEL), Article 
32 provides that "should a prospectus referred to... contain false information or 
omission in its material contents..." Both of them clearly point out that "materiality" is 
the criterion.
The absence of the term "materiality" in English legislation regarding civil liability 
possibly springs from the automatic assumption that since materiality of information is 
an indispensable element when liability for misrepresentation is considered, the statute 
is not bound to repeat the requirement. Accordingly, the meaning of materiality could 
be clarified only through common law cases regarding misrepresentation. Insurance 
cases undoubtedly serve as good examples. In Pan Atlantic Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pine 
Top Insurance Co. Ltd ,,21 the House of Lords held that the test of materiality of 
disclosure is whether the non-disclosure or misrepresentation would have had an effect 
on the mind of a prudent insurer in weighing up the risk rather than the test of decisive 
influence. Therefore, in the case of securities misrepresentation, accompanied by s. 146 
of the FSA 1986, the test could be re-stated in the following wording:
21 [1994] 3 All E.R. 581.
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"The test of materiality of disclosure is whether the non-disclosure or 
misrepresentation would have an effect on the minds of investors and their 
professional advisers in weighing up the assets and liabilities, financial 
position, profits and losses, and prospects of the issuer of the securities and 
the rights attaching to those securities in order to decide whether to enter the 
transaction or, if so, on what terms."
In other words, whether non-disclosure or misstatement would affect a reasonable 
investor's (or his professional adviser's) judgment in making investment decisions 
remains the key issue as regards the establishment of liability and affects the 
preparation of disclosure.22 Therefore, a representation or non-disclosure that is not 
material would by definition be of such a trivial nature that its untruth would cause but 
little loss to the representee.23
In the cases concerning misrepresentation of corporate financial statements such as 
prospectuses, materiality is described in a simpler form. For example, in Angus v. 
Clifford,24 the court looked at the "importance of that phrase";25 and in Glasier v. 
Rolls,26 the court held that "...to convey, to the mind of an intelligent reader of this 
prospectus considering whether he should invest his money in Rolls & Sons, 
Limited' 21 In Boss v. Estates Investment Company, the question of materiality was 
thought to be "one of vital importance as inducing persons to take shares" which 
focused on the impact of information on the decision-making process as the standard 
laid out above in insurance cases and such thinking was repeated in Edgington v.
22 A "might" test was observed in one insurance case. See Locker and Woolf, Ltd. v. W. Australian 
Insurance Company, Ltd. [1936] 1 K.B. 408. "... a fact which if known to the company might lead 
them to take the view that the proposers were undesirable persons with whom to have contractual 
relations", per Slesser L.J., p. 414.
23 See David K. Allen, Misrepresentation, 1988, p. 19. There have been many cases of false 
representation in prospectuses, e.g. Ross v. Estates Investment Co. (1868) 3 Ch. 682; Central Railway 
o f Venezuela v. Kisch (1867) L.R. 2 H.L. 99; Edgington v. Fitzmaurice (1885) 29 Ch.D. 459; Arnison 
v. Smith (1889) 41 Ch.D. 348; Derry v. Peek (1889) 14 A.C. 337; Glasier v. Rolls (1889) 42 Ch.D. 
437; Angus v. Glifford [1891] 2 Ch. 449, etc. See D.L. McDonnell and J. G. Monroe, Kerr on the Law 
o f Fraud and Mistake, 1952, reprinted 1986, pp. 103-4.
24 [1891] 2 Ch. 449.
25 Id., p. 468.
26 (1889) 42 Ch.D. 437.
27 Id., p. 447.
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Fitzmaurice ,28 In some cases the courts based their finding of materiality simply on the 
fact that information is sufficient to induce the victim to enter into the transactions, or 
put in another way, is misleading.29 The court would also inspect the nature and 
character of the representation and the cumulative effect of several statements, rather 
than pinpoint any single item, because even though each specific item of information is 
correct, they, as a whole, may be misleading.30
A further examination of "the extent of influence" of information is necessary. As 
mentioned above, English law does not accept the criterion of decisive influence; that 
is, information, being material, must be such that if disclosed would cause a reasonable 
investor to change his mind; this rule is too strict to be acceptable because if such a 
standard is followed few cases could be successfully sustained. However, the "average 
prudent investor would be affected" test, deriving from the traditional tort standard31 
also seems harsh to investors. "Would" denotes a probable rather than a clear effect, 
and the question is: should we lower the threshold of the probability in securities 
cases? American law is worth noting here. American cases nowhere reveal a coherent 
and commonly accepted concept about the extent of influence. A "might" test,32 a 
"would" test33 and, in between them, a "significant propensity" test34 and a "substantial 
likelihood" test35 all exist. Currently, the rule developed in TSC Industries which 
defined a material fact as one to which it is reasonably likely that a reasonable investor 
would attach importance in making a decision because the fact would significantly alter
28 (1885) 29 Ch.D. 459. At page 471, it was stated: "How can one for a moment say that that is not a 
matter which might most seriously have entered into the consideration of a person who was 
subscribing money upon such bonds as these?"
29 Id., continued the sentence above: "If so, is not that statement, put in that way, fragmentary, 
misleading and imperfect, condescending to a particular which makes it all the more misleading"; see 
also Re Walter L. Jacob & Co. Ltd. [1989] B.C.L.C. 345, p. 345, and Arnison v. Smith (1889) 41 
Ch.D. 348, p.348.
30 Arnison v. Smith, id., p. 367; Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, id., 467; and Re Malden's application, 
Q.B., unreported, CO/108/93 (Transcript: John Larking), 27 January 1994.
31 Broome v. Speak [1903] 1 Ch. 586.
32 Affiliated Ute Citizens v. U.S., 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
33 List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2nd Cir. 1965).
34 Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Company, 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
35 TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
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the total mix of available information, has general academic and judicial support. The 
rule laid down by the SEC also provides guideline on this issue; it reads:
"whether or not a particular description, representation, illustration, or other 
statement involving a material fact is misleading depends on evaluation of the 
context in which it is made. In considering whether a particular statement 
involving a material fact is or might be misleading, weight should be given to 
all pertinent factors, including, but not limited to, those listed below."36
The SEC enumerates the situations in which the statements are material. Even more, 
the SEC specifically defines "materiality" as "when used to qualify a requirement for 
the furnishing of information as to any subject, limit the information required to those 
matters to which there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would 
attach importance in determining whether to buy or sell the securities registered".37
It seems that there is no good reason why the criterion set up by the SEC 
regarding the furnishing of information in mandatory disclosure should be different 
from the definition given by the court when civil or criminal liability is at issue. 
Otherwise, either information disclosed would be too much or too little. If more 
information is required by the SEC than by the court, it would cause administrative 
waste and overburden companies unless the SEC had better justification (such as 
public interest in social improvement). By contrast, if information required by the SEC 
turns out to be inadequate, whether companies could escape from liability on the 
ground that they rely on the SEC rules is open to question. This does not imply that 
the court should have the last word on the definition of materiality, although in practice 
this may be the case. It is submitted, the only acceptable response from the court is that 
whenever there is a gap between the court's view of materiality and the view taken by 
other institutions, the court should search for the reason causing this discrepancy and 
be prepared to change its view if some other's view is demonstrated better. Moreover, 
it is further submitted, a similar argument should be applicable in the UK. Even though
36 17 C.F.R. § 230.156.
37 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.12b-2, 230.405.
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the definition of materiality was developed by case law where civil liability has been in 
issue, mandatory disclosure requirements imposed by the Stock Exchange, guided by 
the FSA 1986 should take that definition into account and avoid over-disclosure or 
inadequate disclosure.
(2) a true and fair view
More interestingly, the Companies Acts also use the term "a true and fair view"; the 
development of "a true and fair view" in the Companies Acts and the accounting 
principles, bases, and standards, which are referred to when the court is faced with 
auditors' liabilities, provides another standard of mandatory disclosure. Thus, it is 
necessary to consider the relationship between "materiality" and "a true and fair view".
Each Companies Act has provided that the balance sheet and profit and loss 
account shall give a true and fair view ever since the Companies Act 1947 was 
enacted.38 Such a principle was subsequently adopted by the Fourth Company Law 
Directive.39 The problem is: what does "a true and fair view" mean? Could this 
question be answered by arguing that if all material information is disclosed (supposing 
for this purpose that materiality is the only element of a true and fair view), then the 
requirement of a true and fair view would be satisfied.
Legal academics insist that whether a financial statement presents a true and fair 
view is a question of law for the court.40 Therefore, it would not be right to claim that 
only accounting principles are relevant to the question of a true and fair view.41 This
38 Now is s. 226(2) of the CA 1985.
39 OJ 1978 L 78/660. Some academics suggest that since a true and fair view has become a 
Community requirement on financial statements, a Community level of interpretation of a true and 
fair view is necessary. See K.P.E. Lasok and Edmond Grace, "Fair Accounting", in J. o f  Bus. Law, 
235-9, 1988.
40 See Andrew McGee, "The 'True and Fair View' Debate: A Study in the Legal Regulation of 
Accounting" in 54 M.L.R., 874-88, 1991.
41 For the opposite opinion, see T.A. Lee, "The Evolution and Revolution of Financial Accounting" in 
9 Accounting and Business Research, 292-9, 1979, p. 294; D. Tweedie and J. Kellas, "Setting the 
Accountants' Record Straight", in Accountancy, 19-20, Jan., 1988, p. 19; and P. Walton,
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argument is logical and evident from the literal meaning and spirit of s. 226(4) and 
Schedule 4, Part II, para. 15 of the Companies Act 1985 where a departure from 
accounting principles is permitted for the purpose of complying with a true and fair 
view requirement. Stated otherwise, a true and fair view is the primary principle 
superseding any concrete rules and principles and is left to the court for final 
judgment.42 Nonetheless, a true and fair view is such an abstract concept that it is by 
no means possible to produce a satisfactory definition to identify what "true" and "fair" 
mean. For instance, Drayton criticises "fair" as an ambiguous word; Cowan, a New 
Zealander, considers the term itself lacking clear definition of the objectives of financial 
reporting; and South Africa in the early 1970s abandoned such a standard.43 On the 
other hand, some academics argue that the lack of definition of the term is in fact a 
strength of the concept,44 by which, as Popoff claims, "a stimulus for a continuing 
critical examination of accounting methods and procedures and of the quality and 
relevance of the statements" is produced.45
As a result, the practices and views of accountants and auditors are extremely 
helpful and the more authoritative these practices and views are, the more ready the
"Introduction: the True and Fair View in British Accounting", in European Accounting R., 49-58, 
May, 1993, p. 52.
42 For example, Argyll Foods Case, see P.A. Bird, "After Argyll Foods what is 'a true and fair view'?", 
in Accountancy, 80-1, June, 1982. The company, Argyll Foods, included in its consolidated balance 
sheet at 31 December 1979 the affairs of Morgan Edwards Ltd. for which negotiations to purchase 
began in November 1979 but were not finalised until March 1980. According to the legal definition, 
Morgan was not the subsidiary of the Argyll Foods by the time the consolidated balance sheet was 
prepared; as a result, it violated ss. 150 and 154 of the Companies Act 1948 and of SSAP 14. Such 
breach was clearly disclosed in the accounts and annual reports; however, the auditors certified that 
the balance sheet presented a true and fair view even with the breach. The case was heard before 
magistrates and the court held that the balance sheet did not give a true and fair view. Later on, the 
Department of Trade made it clear that the advocacy of substance over form must not be at the 
expense of compliance with law. (see The True and Fair View and Group Accounts, Jan., 1982) See 
also P. Bird, "What is 'A True and Fair View?'", in J. o f Bus. Law, 480-5, 1984.
43 See H. Drayton, "When is 'Fair' not Fair? The Auditor's Report Criticized" (in Accountant, 88-9, p. 
89, Jan., 1962); and T.K. Cowan, "Are Truth and Fairness Generally Acceptable?" in (Accounting 
Rev., 788-94, Oct. 1965, p. 788), in R.H. Parker and C.W. Nobes, An International View o f True and 
Fair Accounting, 1994, pp. 3, 5.
44 See R.H. Parker and C.W. Nobes, id., p. 13.
45 See B. Popoff, "Some conceptualizing on the true and fair view" (in International J. of Accounting, 
Fall, 1983, 43-54, p. 52), in R.H. Parker and C.W. Nobes, id., p. 13.
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court will be to follow them.46 In Odeon Associated Theatre Ltd. v. Jones47, 
Pennycuick V.-C held:48
"In so ascertaining the true profit of a trade the court applies the correct 
principles of the prevailing system of commercial accountancy. I use the word 
"correct" deliberately. In order to ascertain what are the correct principles it 
has recourse to the evidence of accountants. The evidence is conclusive on 
the practice of accountants in the sense of the principles on which accountants 
act in practice. That is a question of pure fact, but the court itself has to make 
a final decision as to whether that practice corresponds to the correct 
principles of commercial accountancy. No doubt in the vast proportion of 
cases the court will agree with the accountants but it will not necessarily do 
so."
Also the court in Lloyd Cheyham v. Littlejohn49 ruled: "While they (statements of 
standard accounting practice) are not conclusive, so that a departure from their terms 
necessarily involves a breach of the duty of care,... they are very strong evidence as to 
what is the proper standard which should be adopted and unless there is some 
justification, a departure from this will be regarded as constituting a breach of duty".50 
One the other hand, the court may challenge the statement if it is found inappropriate. 
For example, in Re Thorn EMI pic51., Harman J. criticised the phrase "written off' in 
SSAP 22 as misleading.
In addition, the amendments brought about by the Companies Act 1989 give 
statutory recognition to the existing accounting standards and thus strengthen the 
likelihood that the courts will treat compliance with accounting standards as the basis 
of presenting a true and fair view.52
46 M.H. Arden, "Accounting Standards Board, The True and Fair Requirement — Opinion", in 
Current Accounting Law and Practice, Robert Willott (ed.), 1988, [D]-008.
47 [1971] 1 W.L.R. 442.
48 Id., p. 454.
49 [1987] B.C.L.C. 303.
50 per Woolf J., p. 313.
51 (1988) 4 B.C.C. 698, p. 700.
52 s. 256 and para. 36A of Sched. 4, the CA 1985. See M.H. Arden, "The up-dated Opinion of 
English Counsel on true and fair" (21 April 1993), reprinted in R.H. Parker and C.W. Nobes, supra 
note 43, pp. 149-50.
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Since a true and fair view is elusive and cannot be covered solely by accounting 
principles, we would suggest that the question should be examined from its foundation, 
that is, the problem of materiality. Materiality, pursued by both law and accounting, is 
the other side of the coin53 and it may be easier to embark on our work from this 
perspective. Or, it may be more appropriate to argue that materiality is a tool and a 
true and fair view is the goal.
In fact, as we emphasise throughout this chapter, it is accountants and auditors 
who really construct the framework of corporate disclosure. These experts have come 
to a consensus that the principal function of financial statements in the context of 
mandatory disclosure is to provide users with a comprehensible statement of the 
corporate financial and business position (that is, to present a true and fair view) which 
can be achieved only by disclosing "material" information. Information, if less than 
necessary, would leave investors with half the truth; but if it is more than required it 
would confuse investors equally. Therefore, if it not material, it should be possible to 
disregard it.
(3) what is materiality (from the accounting perspective)?
The connection between "a true and fair" view and the problem of materiality once 
again turns on a wide open-ended debate with respect to the definition of materiality of 
information in the accounting field. Although the Statements of Standard Accounting 
Practices (SSAPs) employ the same usage as that of the legal profession by saying that 
"it is...of such materiality that its non-disclosure would affect the ability of the users of
53 This is evidenced by the statement in the "Tentative Statement on Accounting Practice" issued by 
the Board of Research and Publications of the New Zealand Society of Accountants in 1964 where it 
states that a true and fair view implies disclosure and appropriate classification and grouping of all 
material items, and consistent application of understandable, objective and significant accounting 
principles. See the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia, "Recommendations on Accounting 
Principles" (in the Accountants' Journal, 91-2, Oct., 1964), in T.K. Cowan, "Are Truth and Fairness 
Generally Acceptable?", in Accounting Rev., 788-94, Oct., 1965, p. 789.
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financial statements to reach a proper understanding of the financial position"54 
(emphasis added), this definition in no way helps accountants or auditors; nor is this 
the definition that they generally look for. This section does not plan to examine the 
accounting standards concerning the establishment of materiality; these should be left 
to accounting and auditing experts themselves. Instead, only those elements which are 
generally quoted regarding materiality are discussed and the purpose of this section is 
to further the ability of the legal profession to identify the issue of materiality and to 
appreciate its elements. To begin with, it has been said:
"[I]f financial statements are to be prepared and examined with anything 
approaching reasonable economy, and if they are to be meaningful and useful, 
such a doctrine (materiality) is indispensable."55
However, it is also stated that:
"In spite of its pervasiveness, materiality remains an ill defined concept. There 
is presently no precise definition of its meaning that is accepted within the 
(accounting) profession for determining whether a given fact or circumstance 
is material."56
Indubitably, it is almost impossible in the near future for accountants to produce a 
universal definition of materiality and it is clear that they are not working in this 
direction. They could not rely simply on the legal definition of materiality (in English 
law) which connotes a "would" effect on the decision process of a reasonable investor
54 para. 23, SSAP 17. Also "In deciding whether to qualify his audit opinion, the auditor should have 
regard to the materiality of the matter in the context of the financial statements upon which he is 
proposing to report. In general terms, a matter should be judged to be material if knowledge o f the 
matter would be likely to influence the user o f the financial statements. Materiality may be considered 
in the context of the financial statements as a whole, the balance sheet, the profit and loss account, or 
individual items within the financial statement. In addition, depending upon the nature o f  the matter, 
materiality may be considered in relative or absolute terms." (emphases added) See The Accountant's 
Manual, 1990, p. Auditing 7.
55 See Ernest L. Hicks, "Materiality" in J. o f Accounting Research, 158-71, Spring, 1964, p. 158.
56 By Peat Marwick & Mitchell, in Marianne M. Jennings, Philip M. Recker, and Daniel C. Kneer, 
"A Source of Insecurity: A Discussion and an Empirical Examination of Standards of Disclosure and 
Levels of Materiality in Financial Statements", in J. o f Corporation Law, 639-88, Spring, 1985, p. 
640.
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(or an average prudent investor); in preparing financial statements which present a true 
and fair view, they are standing in the front line. This is why they prefer to have a set 
of rules which provides instructions on each specific item regarding materiality, 
although this is also unrealistic in that no rules could be exhaustive and too many 
formulated rules concerning materiality would hamper the flexibility of accounting 
which is vital for accountants to deal with any possible occurrence of different 
situations. There is a dilemma here. The current situation turn out to be that the 
Accounting Standards Board (or Accounting Standards Committee before 1990) 
issues from time to time the principles and standards piecemeal to cover certain items 
of accounting. On the other hand, a number of articles written by accounting or 
auditing experts contribute to clarify this problem.
The Accounting Standards Board (ASB) which took over the task of setting 
accounting standards from the Accounting Standards Committee (ASC) in August 
1990 is empowered under the Companies Act to make, amend or withdraw accounting 
standards on its own authority.57 Hence, the accounting standards issued thereafter by 
the ASB (the new rules are designated Financial Reporting Standards (FRSs)) together 
with the then existing 22 Statements of Standard Accounting Practices (SSAPs)58 are 
statutorily binding.59 As the ASB's foreword to accounting standards points out:
"Accounting standards are authoritative statements of how particular types of 
transaction and other events should be reflected in financial statements and 
accordingly compliance with accounting standards will normally be necessary 
for financial statements to give a true and fair view."60
Accordingly, accounting standards mainly serve to deal with corporate transactions or 
other events in order to present financial statements in a true and fair view, and as
57 s. 256 (1) (3) of the CA 1985.
58 These SSAPs were issued by the Councils of the six major accountancy bodies following proposals 
developed by the ASC. See Current Accounting Law and Practice, supra note 46, p. [D]-002.
59 Para. 36(A) of Sched. 4 of the CA 1985.
60 para. 16 of the Foreword, see supra note 46, p. [D]-004.
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mentioned above, materiality is the other side of the coin to the problem of "a true and 
fair view", it is thus imaginable that accounting standards would center on the problem 
of materiality. A good example is the SSAP 2 (disclosure of accounting policies). First, 
three terms need clarification: accounting concepts, accounting bases, and accounting 
policies.
accounting concepts:
Accounting concepts are defined as broad basic assumptions which underlie the 
periodic financial accounts of a business enterprise; four concepts are generally 
recognised: 1. the "going concern" concept; 2. the "accruals" concept; 3. the 
"consistency" concept; and 4. the "prudence" concept. The going concern concept 
presumes that the enterprise will continue in operational existence for the foreseeable 
future when the profit and loss account and balance sheet are prepared; that is, there is 
no intention or necessity to liquidate or curtail significantly the scale of operation. 
Under the accruals concept, revenue and costs are recognised as they are earned or 
incurred, not as money is received or paid (accruals) and matched with one another so 
far as their relationship can be established or justifiably assumed and dealt with in the 
profit and loss account of the period to which they relate. The consistency concept 
means that there is consistency of accounting treatment of like items within each 
accounting period and from one period to the next. Finally, according to the concept of 
prudence, revenue and profits are recognised by inclusion in the profit and loss account 
only when realised in the form of cash or of other assets the ultimate cash realisation of 
which can be assessed with reasonable certainty; provision is made for all known 
liabilities (expenses and losses) whether the amount of these is known with certainty or 
is a best estimate in the light of the information available.61
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accounting bases:
Accounting bases are the methods developed for applying accounting concepts to 
financial transactions and items for determining the accounting periods in which 
revenue and costs should be recognised in the profit and loss account and for 
determining the amount at which material items should be stated in the balance sheet. 
In other words, they are a standard for judging materiality. Nonetheless, by their nature 
accounting bases are more diverse and numerous because "they have evolved in 
response to the variety and complexity of types of business and business transactions, 
and for this reason there may justifiably exist more than one recognised accounting 
basis for dealing with particular items".62
accounting policies:
"Accounting policies are the specific accounting bases selected and 
consistently followed by a business enterprise as being, in the opinion of the 
management, appropriate to its circumstances and best suited to present fairly 
its results and financial position."63
Based on these definitions, the SSAP 2 requires a business enterprise to disclose its 
accounting policies followed for dealing with "material and critical" items in 
determining profit or loss for the year and in stating the financial position. The ASB 
(and also the ASC) would rather spell out rules to govern materiality of an individual 
item whenever the importance of that item (i.e. its effect on a true and fair view) is 
recognised than provide a general definition of materiality. Thus, it is left to 
accountants to judge whether any specific item is material and then choose its 
accounting basis.
62 Id., pp. [DJ-013-16.
63 Id., p. [D]-16.
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How can preparers of financial statements judge an item's materiality? It is 
submitted that two elements are decisive: users' needs and corporate circumstances.64 
Even more, the current popular method of quantifying materiality and the economic 
consideration of auditing should be discussed as well.
(a) users' needs
It has become well established that the materiality of information mainly depends on 
users' needs.65 Such a statement is evident from the analysis of misrepresentation 
where information which would affect the decision-making process of a reasonable 
investor is defined as material; that is, materiality is judged from a prudent investor's 
viewpoint. Taking accounting and auditing into consideration the statement is also 
viable, as the purpose of preparing and auditing financial statements is to help users of 
the financial statements understand corporate position, and thus, users' needs stand as 
the primary concern of accountants and auditors.
The difficulty is that to clarify the meaning of "users" is easier said than done.66 
Users of financial statements are defined, for the purpose of this thesis, as investors. 
This definition could hardly be inappropriate, especially since this thesis focuses on the 
disclosure requirements of the public distribution of securities and securities
64 Tom Lee, Materiality: A review and analysis o f its reporting significance and auditing 
implications, 1984. This point of view taken by accounting experts is also shared by legal 
professionals. The Companies Act 1985 provides clues to these two elements. For example, the 
Companies Act always emphasises that to present a true and fair view is the most important thing, 
therefore, if any specific circumstances require, it is lawful to depart from accounting standards, (see 
s. 226(5), and para. 15, Part II of Sched. 4.). As regards users' needs, the FSA 1986 clearly requires 
listing particulars to provide all information which investors and their advisers would reasonably 
expect (s. 146). This demonstrates that users' needs is one of the prime concerns when financial 
statements are prepared.
65 See C. William Thomas, "Materiality guidance for auditors", in J. ofAcct., 74-7, Feb., 1979, p. 77; 
Tom Lee, id., p. 5.
66 A writer even suggested: "...recourse must be had to the views of economists, financial analysts, 
investment bankers, accountants and other concerned with the theory of investment for a 
determination of more precise rationales and guides as to the information required to make investment 
determinations". See Harry Heller, "Disclosure Requirements under Federal Securities Regulation", in
The Business Lawyer, 300-20, 1961, p 304.
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transactions thereafter in secondary markets. Nonetheless, the problem of defining 
investors yet remains.
To begin with, investors do have, among themselves, a variety of levels of 
knowledge with respect to financial statements, and this will result naturally in different 
requirements for disclosed information.67 The clearest case is the obvious distinction 
between individual investors and institutional investors. The latter, undoubtedly, enjoy 
the advantage of having experts analysing all available information and are able to 
digest much information. Individual investors (i.e. the general public), however, lack 
this facility and accordingly, too much information would not benefit them. Therefore, 
to reach a consensus among companies, regulators, and the judiciary as regards the 
definition of investors would be the first task when mandatory disclosure is designed.
We could embark on this task by classifying investors into various categories. 
The first distinction is drawn between individual and institutional investors. Then, 
individual investors could be labeled under four headings: (1) investors who do not 
appreciate the meaning of business terms and have no interest in reading financial 
statements; (2) investors who have a misty understanding of financial terms; (3) 
investors who have more understanding of financial statements than the second kind of 
investors but are not experts; and (4) investors who are markedly knowledgeable in 
financial markets, e.g. accountants, financial advisers, and securities analysts. One may 
criticise the above categorisation as arbitrary; it is, however, sustainable in the context 
of analysing users' needs. For it only serves to highlight the limitation on the range of 
disclosure.
67 See Baruch Lev, "Toward a Theory of Equitable and Efficient Accounting Policy", in 63 
Accounting Rev., 1-22, 1988, p. 13; B. Popoff, "Some Conceptualizing on the True and Fair View", in 
International J. o f Accounting, 43-54, Fall, 1983, pp. 46-7; L.E. Rockley, A Policy for Disclosure, 
1980, pp. 4-5.
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It is, then, a formidable choice to make among these different groups of investors 
to decide which group is the relevant one where mandatory disclosure is designed to 
meet users' needs. Although the statute (e.g. the FSA 1986, s. 146) and courts have 
never explicitly ruled out institutional investors as the target group of regulation, the 
implication of both the statutory text and judicial statement seems to centre on the 
protection of individual investors.68 For instance, misrepresentation could be analysed 
from both the subjective and objective perspectives. The objective aspect that we have 
already addressed is the "would be" impact of information on investors, that is, 
materiality, while the subjective aspect relates to the reliance of the investor. The 
element of reliance itself tempts us to concentrate on individual investors because 
reliance is a mental process normally appropriate to natural persons. This does not 
mean that legal persons cannot claim damages on the basis of misrepresentation; the 
point is that only a natural person's state of mind can be the base on which to judge the 
existence of reliance. Moreover, as already discussed, if the dominating purpose of 
mandatory disclosure regulation is prevention of fraud, it is the ignorant investors who 
need protection. Institutional investors seem unlikely to be regarded as the main object 
of protection.
However, if the preference is given to individual investors simply on the above 
mentioned grounds, it is far from persuasive. Two problems call for answers. First, 
even if the standard of individual investors is adopted in order to judge materiality, 
which group of investors should be identified as users? Second, why cannot 
institutional investors be accepted as the standard?
what kind of individual investor should we choose?
It appears reasonable to rule out the first and fourth group as reasonable investors 
here. The first group is not acceptable for two reasons. (1) If materiality is judged from
68 Regarding investor protection, see Chapter Three where the justification of disclosure is addressed.
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the most ignorant investors' point of view, the information they need will be 
substantially less than that of the current disclosure requirements because they cannot 
and will not read any financial statements. Consequently, the interests of other groups 
will be denied. (2) From a policy perspective, not to define users as the first group of 
investors has a positive effect on market efficiency. According to the ECMH, as more 
information is published, the market becomes more efficient. Thus, to limit the range of 
disclosed information to the needs of the most ignorant investors is unnecessarily 
narrow. In addition, these investors will benefit from more information in light of the 
availability of more accurate securities prices. These arguments have been fully 
demonstrated in Chapter Three. On the other hand, the information required by the 
fourth group of investors is no different from that of institutional investors and thus 
this group does not warrant a separate discussion.
Therefore, it follows that either the second or the third group is the ideal 
standard for deciding materiality.69 The matter becomes a policy choice, for two 
reasons. First, we lack any conclusive evidence regarding which group of investors 
represents a majority of all investors, so that it is difficult to get a sense of reasonable 
investors. Second, the number of investors may in any case not be the primary concern. 
Instead, market efficiency and investor protection stand alone as policy objectives. 
Materiality based on the needs of the third group, i.e. investors who have more 
understanding of financial statements than the second kind of investors but are not 
experts, makes more information available to the market and thus the third group is 
recommended.
69 The general survey shows that users would like more disclosure rather than less, but are not greatly 
interested in complex additional disclosures and often do not appear to use what they do receive. See 
A.J. Richardson and M. Gibbins, "Behavioural Research on the Production and Use of Financial 
Information" (Behavioural Accounting Research: A Critical Analysis, D. Ferris (ed.), 1988), in 
Michael Gibbins, Alan J. Richardson and John Waterhouse, The Management o f Financial 
Disclosure: Theory and Perspectives, 1992, p. 15. Although the articles did not specify the meaning 
of users, it seems that the second or even the third kind of investor as we describe here are the most 
possible groups the articles dealt with.
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institutional investors as a possible standard
Due to the bias in favour of individual investors referred to above, institutional 
investors are seldom considered as an appropriate standard. It seems, however, that 
institutional investors are highly suitable for this purpose.
The strongest reasoning to bolster this argument is the ECMH. The semi-strong 
form of efficiency is thought to be practical, and mandatory disclosure should be 
designed to meet this goal. In semi-strong efficient markets, all publicly available 
information is fully reflected in securities prices. It is evident that without experts' 
participation such efficiency is not attainable because ordinary investors who have 
relatively little knowledge cannot use information to its maximum. This demonstrates 
the importance of institutional investors. Supported by their experts, institutional 
investors could channel all available information into securities prices by means of 
continuous transactions. They also have the ability to perform this function of the 
ECMH because of their financial strength.
Moreover, in a market where institutional investors dominate the transactions 
and ownership of securities in the market, they are the persons who really ask for 
information. The American markets are the best examples of this. In the UK, this 
argument should also be viable because institutional investors are extremely active 
accompanied by the popularity of unit trusts. Nonetheless, whether the argument is 
applicable to the Taiwanese market will be discussed later.
Accordingly, a conclusion could be drawn from the above analyses. Two possible 
choices lie open to us: (1) individual investors with moderate knowledge or (2) 
institutional investors. If institutional investors are active and play a crucial role in the 
market, it cannot be seen why a reasonable institutional investor's judgment could not 
be used to judge materiality. The only drawback which we have to face is the problem
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of costs, costs to issuers. Since the cost-benefit analysis has been dealt with in Chapter 
Four, it is unnecessary to reiterate it here.
two specific problems in the UK
Before closing this section, two points are worth mentioning. One is the contradiction 
of the terms in s. 146 of the FSA 1986; the other is the relationship between the 
definition of users where materiality is concerned and the scope of users where the 
duty of care is examined in tort of negligence.
As regards the information that should be disclosed in listing particulars, s. 146 
lays out the supreme rule: all the information that "investors and their professional 
advisers" would reasonably require should be disclosed. Thus two groups of users are 
pointed out by s. 146. The judgment of materiality by "investors" (if the definition of 
individual investors is adopted) and "professional advisers" is different because the 
latter will definitely require more information than the former. As a result, if investors 
are considered to be individual investors who are not experts in financial markets, 
those investors who have no professional advisers will be discriminated against as 
compared with those who have advisers when materiality of information is determined. 
If the definition of "investors" refers to institutional investors, the expression 
"professional advisers" would seem to be redundant because institutional investors 
must be deemed to have professional advisers. Therefore, if the legislature intends to 
adopt the standard of institutional investors, it should make it clear by providing that 
"listing particulars should contain all such information as an institutional investor 
would reasonably require".
The second problem is the differential scope of the meaning of "users" as 
between the assessment of materiality and the extent of the duty of care. As the 
legislature and regulators are inclined to provide investors with as much useful
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information as possible, they define investors as the investing public when materiality is 
judged. This is evident from the Yellow Book in which it is claimed that information is 
for general investors, not only for shareholders. But when investors claim in respect of 
the negligence of auditors or directors, the courts limit the possible liability by 
excluding plaintiffs at the stage of "the test of duty of care" and refuse to expand the 
scope of duty of care (this will be closely analysed in the next chapter). Although this is 
a policy choice and there is a judicial tradition of limiting the liability in negligence for 
economic loss, the conflict is undeniable and calls for more attention by both regulators 
and the courts.
(b) corporate circumstances
The reason why corporate circumstances must be considered is that the significance of 
two items of same monetary value may be quite different in the situations of two 
different companies. For example, both A companuy and B company may receive a 
refund of £500,000 of income tax paid for the previous two years; if such a refund is 
material then, it should be shown as a "special credit" rather than be drawn into the net 
income as a whole for the year of receipt. When A's net income for this year (£2.5 
million) and the previous four years are examined, we find the average net income to 
be £5 million. Therefore, although the tax refund amounts to 20% of this year's net 
income, it is only 10% of net income in the light of the five-year average. By contrast, 
in company B the refund amounts to 15% both of this year's net income and of the 
five-year average income as well. Thus in A's case, the refund may be reported as part 
of the net income without specifically separating it as a special credit, while it must be 
treated by company B as a special credit.70 This example not only provides a good 
illustration of the relevance of corporate circumstances but also reveals the fact that 
quantifying the effect of an accounting item is not always workable. In addition, some 
information, although material, may not be suitable for disclosure due to the specific
70 This example is developed from the case given by Ernst L. Hicks, see supra note 55, p. 161.
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situation of the company. For example, it may be premature to disclose information 
regarding merger negotiations; it is also inappropriate to disclose business secrets, the 
disclosure of which will or may give an advantage to business rivals.
(c) quantifying materiality
The materiality of any financial item is first judged by statement preparers and 
accountants when these persons decide whether the item should be disclosed and 
whether to apply the generally accepted accounting principles (i.e. the SSAPs and 
FRSs in the UK) to the item, and if so, in what way. After the first step, materiality is 
evaluated further by auditors. These processes unavoidably involve subjective 
judgment by accountants and auditors. Accordingly, it is predictable that various 
differences will ensue among these experts.71 The possibility of reaching different 
decisions increases as there is no unified definition of materiality in accounting and 
auditing. Therefore, it is natural for these experts to search for guidelines with a view 
to ensuring a "correct" judgment on materiality. Among these, the most popular 
approach is to quantify materiality.
To quantify materiality means to set up percentage standards for specific items. 
For instance, what percentage of shares must a company hold to be deemed to have a 
participating interest in another undertaking?72 At what percentage of net income must 
an item receive separate accounting treatment? and so forth.
This method is convenient, but noticeably, has its drawbacks as well. The main 
advantage is clear enough: accountants and auditors do not need to make difficult 
judgment. Its drawbacks are even clearer and may substantially dilute this advantage. 
In the first place, the fixing of percentages is necessary arbitrary.73 Why 10%, not 8%?
71 See Bart H. Ward, "An Investigation of the Materiality Construct in Auditing", in J. o f  Accounting 
Research, 138-52, Spring, 1976.
72 ss. 258, 260, and Sched. 10 of the CA 1985.
73 See Benzion Bariev, "On the Measurement of Materiality", in Accounting and Business Research, 
194-7, Summer, 1972, p. 194.
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Or why 20% rather than 15%? We could never on any economic ground justify the 
differentiability between 9% and 10%, or 14% and 15%. Would such a difference of 
one percent affect users' needs as being the most dominating factor as regards 
materiality? Even though a range of percentages could be advanced to increase the 
flexibility of this approach, the range is still arbitrary and the threshold is doubtful. The 
provision of a graduated range of percentage would thus not remedy the defect of this 
method.
Second, quantifying materiality hampers the flexibility of accounting and auditing 
which is at the centre of accounting and auditing business. The only goal for 
accountants and auditors to achieve is to prepare financial statements which present a 
true and fair view, and thus subjectivity is indispensable when exercising such 
professional judgment. From the point of view both of users' needs and corporate 
circumstances, whether or not an item has reached a specific percentage does not 
necessarily show its materiality or immateriality. Moreover, percentage is not the main 
concern. For example, "sensitive payments" to public officials by the management of 
the company could be material even though they represent a trivial percentage (e.g. 
5%) of the net income because such payments relate to the integrity of the 
management.74
Because of these two drawbacks, we would not suggest that quantitative dividing 
lines are ideal. Nonetheless, in a practical sense, they have become more and more 
popular in GAAPs75 and this demonstrates the way in which practical convenience may 
compromise an ideal theory.
74 Sensitive payments refer to questionable, improper, or illegal corporate payments or practices. In 
the USA, this problem surfaced at the time of Watergate Investigation. "During the course of those 
investigations it was determined that a number of American corporations had illegally made 
contributions to various political campaigns, notably the Presidential campaign of 1972. The 
Commission became interested in such contributions as a consequence of its concern with the 
adequacy of corporate disclosure." See James O. Hewitt, supra note 1, pp. 920 et esq.
75 For example, SSAP 1 (20% as a standard to identify associated companies), SSAP 3 (dilution of 
5% or more of the basic earnings per share is regarded as material...), SSAP 21 (90% for lease 
definition), SSAP 23 (accounting for and acquisitions and mergers), SSAP 24 (defined benefit 
scheme), SSAP 25 (segmental reporting), FRS 2 (subsidiary undertaking), etc.
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(d) economical and efficient auditing
Auditors who are responsible for delivering auditor's reports have to make an 
economical and efficient auditing plan before they embark on any auditing business. 
Theoretically, auditors are not obliged to search diligently for fraud in financial 
statements unless required by legislation or contract. Nonetheless, if there is 
misrepresentation or omission in a financial statement and it has lost its true and fair 
view, auditors must qualify the report. Otherwise, they may be sued by the company or 
investors concerned at a later stage. Since there are thousands of items in a financial 
statement, it is impossible for auditors to check them all thoroughly. In essence, the 
auditor would establish a preliminary estimate of allowable error for individual 
components of the financial statements based on his preliminary estimate of materiality 
for the financial statements taken as a whole.76 Thus, Boatsman and Robertson identify 
eight variables which professional literature considers relevant to materiality 
judgment.77 This demonstrates that in a practical sense the requirement of materiality 
would be discounted to a certain extent.
Second, the judgment of materiality would also be affected by the relationship 
between the company and its auditors. This possibility has been demonstrated by 
research.78 This is why the Companies Act always emphasises the independence of 
auditors79 and confers power on auditors to ask information from the company.80
76 See George R. Zuber, Robert K. Elliott, William R. Kinney, Jr., and James J. Leisenring, "Using 
Materiality in Audit Planning" in J. o f Acct., 42-54, March, 1983, p. 46.
77 See James R. Boatsman and Jack C. Robertson, "Policy-Capturing on Selected Materiality 
Judgments" (Accounting Review, April, 1974, pp. 342-3), in C. William Thomas, see supra note 65, 
p. 75. They are: nature of the item, relationship of item to current year net income, relationship of 
item to total revenue or expense, effect of item on net working capital, earnings growth rate, whether 
the item reverses the earnings trend, absolute (net-of-tax) size of the item and relative risk of the 
stock. As regards the materiality in auditing planning, see W. Wade Gafford and D.R. Carmichael, 
"Materiality, Audit Risk and Sampling: A Nuts-and-Bolts Approach", Part I, in J. o f  Acct., 109-18, 
Oct., 1984; Part II, 125-38, Nov., 1984; and Carl. S. Warren, "Audit Risk", in J. o f Acct., 66-74, Aug. 
1979.
78 See Homer L. Bates, Robert W. Ingram, and Philip M.J. Reckers, "Auditor-Client Affiliation: The 
Impact on Materiality'", in J. o f Acct., 60-3, April, 1982.
79 s. 27 of the CA 1989.
80 s. 3 89A of the CA 1985.
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5.2.2.2 Materiality in Taiwan
As a general proposition, Taiwanese law embarks on defining materiality mainly from 
the perspective of users' needs; unfortunately, the message carried by the term "users' 
needs" is diluted by the misuse of the term "interested parties". On the other hand, 
although the statute (the SEL) does employ the word "material contents" on some 
occasions, the Law does not go further to provide a satisfactory definition for it.
The definition of materiality is covered both by legislation (the SEL) and 
regulations (promulgated by the SEC) in Taiwan. The former, when it deals with this 
problem, could be likened to English law (the FSA 1986) in the sense that materiality is 
emphasised when civil or criminal liability is at issue. By contrast, the regulations, 
either declaring the general purpose of a financial statement (which could be treated as 
a statement of materiality) or laying down the disclosure details (which show the 
importance of certain information), in reality serve a better understanding of materiality 
and thus are the main concerns of this section. However, provisions in the SEL need 
general examination first.
the SEL
The SEL mentions materiality of information in two contexts: (1) the design of the 
content of mandatory disclosure; and (2) in relation to material misrepresentation in 
civil or criminal liability. As regards the design of the content of mandatory disclosure, 
although the statute requires publicly issuing companies to issue prospectuses at the 
time of the public distribution of securities and to prepare annual, half-yearly, 
quarterly, monthly, and immediate financial statements or reports,81 materiality is 
inserted not into normal financial statements but immediate reports. The second
81 Article 13 of the SEL requires issuers to publish prospectuses whenever public distribution of 
securities is concerned; Article 36 asks all publicly issuing companies to prepare annual, half-yearly, 
quarterly, monthly (para. 1), and immediate financial reports (para. 2).
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paragraph of Article 36 (2) provides that "any matter, the occurrence of which has a 
significant impact on shareholders' equity or the price for the securities, should be 
reported to the SEC within two days from the date of its occurrence". The phrase 
"impact of information on shareholders' equity or the price for securities" embodies the 
concept of materiality in such special circumstances where an immediate disclosure is 
demanded. Nonetheless, it is not a general definition of materiality and nor is the term 
"materiality" explicitly used. But at least a good illustration has been provided.
The concept of materiality is more often employed in the SEL where civil and 
criminal liability is imposed. Article 32 sets out civil liability for misrepresentation in 
prospectuses where it states that "[sjhould a prospectus...contain false information or 
omission in its material contents the following persons shall be liable...", (emphasis 
added) Unfortunately, the Article does not go further to clarify the meaning of 
"material contents". In contrast, Article 157-1, where civil liability for insider dealing is 
contemplated, like Article 36(2), adopts a "concrete" standard: inside information is 
relevant only where it has a material impact on the securities price, and as the Article 
points out that information is material when it relates to corporate finance, business, or 
market demand for securities and has a significant impact on securities prices or on 
investment decisions.
From the above, it could be reasonably argued that the SEL is inclined to 
introduce the criterion of "price-sensitive" information into the statute when the more 
general definition of materiality is not employed. Such a method has its counterpart in 
English law. For instance, the Criminal Justice Act 1993 enumerates the criteria for 
determining "inside information",82 among which, the requirement of "a significant 
effect on the price of any securities"83 is the same as that of Article 157-1 of the 
Taiwanese SEL. Even more, the immediate disclosure obligation imposed by the UK
82 s. 56 of the Criminal Justice Act 1993
83 Id., s. 56 (1) (d) and (2).
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Yellow Book on listed companies is similar to that of Article 36 (2).84 The drawback 
of such a standard is that there is no absolute measure of significance. Supposing that a 
company's shares are £5 per share, will a £0.2 price movement constitute a "significant 
effect"? Besides that, it may be asked why only information with a "significant effect" 
is material. Even though the price movement is not substantial, investors' investments 
are still at stake and the loss to them (investors) may not be insignificant if a large 
amount of money is involved.
the regulations
Turning to the regulations promulgated by the SEC where materiality is dealt with, 
four regulations are relevant: (1) the Rules for Preparing Financial Reports by 
Securities Issuers (1991); (2) the Rules on the Contents of the Annual Reports of 
Publicly Issuing Companies (1988); (3) the Rules on the Contents of Public Offer 
Prospectuses (1984); and (4) the Rules Implementing the Securities and Exchange Law 
(1988). They are all promulgated by the SEC under the authorisation of the SEL. The 
common feature of these four rules is that the required information, which is presumed 
to be important from regulators' point of view, is specified in detail. However, a 
general statement of the purpose of financial statements is missing from the above 
mentioned Rules. The Rules for Preparing Financial Reports by Securities Issuers (the 
RPFRSIs) happen to be the only Rules which contain the statement. Therefore, going 
straight to the RPFRSIs immediately highlights the basic assumed purpose of the 
financial reports; we then briefly examine other Rules as illustrations.
84 "A company must notify the Company Announcement Office without delay of any major new 
developments in its sphere of activity which are not public knowledge which may: (a) by virtue of the 
effect of those developments on its assets and liabilities or financial position or on the general course 
of its business, lead to substantial movement in the price of its listed securities; or (b) in the case of a 
company with debt securities listed, by virtue of the effect of those developments on its assets and 
liabilities or financial position or on the general course of its business, lead to substantial movement 
in the price of its listed securities, or significantly affect its ability to meet the commitment." See 9.1 
of the Yellow Book.
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The RPFRSIs85 are aimed at providing securities issuers with a detailed picture 
concerning what kind of information should be disclosed whenever a financial report is 
demanded. Article 5(1) declares that the contents of the financial statements should be 
able to "fairly and appropriately present" the issuer's financial situation, operation 
results, and cash flow, and should not mislead the judgments and decisions of 
interested parties. This is the fundamental principle underpinning and justifying the 
thereafter required information, like the "true and fair view" requirement in the British 
Companies Act 1985.86 It should be noted that the Taiwanese Accountants Law 
suggest another standard that auditors should fulfil when they audit financial 
statements. That is, auditors, in their auditing reports, should address the question 
whether information provided by companies "fully" articulates the corporate financial 
status.87 In addition, the Taiwanese GAAP 2 provides that the recording and 
presentation of enterprises' accounts should be based on objective facts. It is the so- 
called "principle of objectivity". Academics interpret the term "objectivity" as fairness 
and without bias.88 All these terms, including "fairness and appropriateness" are highly 
abstract concepts. As discussed above in relation to English law, we would prefer to 
shift to the other side of the coin, "materiality". But at least, it is clear that a similar 
idea of "a true and fair view" does appear in Taiwanese law as well.
At first sight, a general definition of "materiality" is missing from this Rules. 
However, Article 4(1) reveals a clue to this question when it states that financial 
reports refer to financial statements, important accounting items and any other 
disclosed events and explanations which help users when making decisions. An impact 
on "users' decision-making" is the leading factor guiding the design of mandatory 
disclosure of the RPFRSIs. It is true, nonetheless, that such a provision was not
85 Authorised by Article 14 (2) of the SEL.
86 s. 226 (2).
87 Art. 26(3) of the Accountants Law. It would be interesting to point out that in English law before 
1900 the Companies Act (1844 (s. 35), 1862 (para. 94, Table A), and 1879 (s. 7, concerning banking 
companies)) repeatedly referred to such a standard.
88 See Jing-liang Hsu, The Interpretation and Comments on the GAAPs (I Pan Jung Jen K ’uai Chi 
Yuan Tse Chih Ch'iian Shih), 1989, pp. 16-7.
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carefully thought through at the time it was made and it does worry us whether this 
provision was enacted by design or by accident. The reasons for this suspicion spring 
from both the formative and substantive aspects.
From the formative perspective, users' needs or "fairness and propriety" are never 
set out in the SEL (the legislation), but are found in one of numerous regulations 
(which are inferior to legislation) and not89 repeated by any other important regulations 
relating to the public disclosure of issuing companies. To find such an important 
provision only in regulation rather than in the text of principal legislation is abnormal. 
Even though this gives rise to no contradiction between the SEL and the RPFRSIs due 
to the fact that the SEL is silent as regards the general standard of disclosure, it is 
unsatisfactory in that we should not leave such an important principle to a regulation 
that it will not attract much attention. One point is worth noting: the Accountants Law, 
Article 26, requires accountants to opine whether the financial reports fairly present 
the operation results and the financial situation at the end of the fiscal year. Such a 
provision, although it reminds accountants of their duty, does not map out the full 
picture of the purpose of financial statements, especially their reliability. After all, the 
SEL is a more appropriate legal instrument for regulating this issue.
Furthermore, from the substantive point of view, the "impact on users" is itself 
too rough an idea because it does not clarify the extent of the impact envisaged by 
regulators. As examined earlier, American law adopts a spectrum from the "would" 
test to the "might" test (English law adopts the "would" test). Thus, Taiwanese law 
should be criticised; the lack of a clear criterion would leave the courts in great 
difficulty if they ever had to deal with this problem.
89 Noticing the Rules on the Contents of Public Offer Prospectuses, Article 2.
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The other problem concerns the term "interested parties". The term "interested 
parties" is not found in the SEL although it is popular in other fields of legislation. It 
generally refers to those persons who are at stake with respect to a specific legal 
relationship. The employment of this term in the Taiwanese Company Law is a good 
example. Article 393 provides that only "interested parties" can apply for access to 
registered information at the Competent Authority.90 The purpose of this provision is 
to prevent the public from gaining access to corporate information and the term 
"interested parties" with its natural character of limitation performs this function. 
However, in the case of publicly issuing companies, the SEL adopts an the entirely 
opposite position, evidenced by Articles 13, 36, and 157-1. Thus, the restrictive 
character of "interested parties" does not seem to fit into the disclosure system. 
Nonetheless, it is very logical to interpret Articles 4 and 5 of the RPFRSIs in the light 
of seeing them as a whole, and to connect "users" with "interested parties". The 
limitation of "users" to "interested parties" makes the purpose of disclosure 
incomprehensible. Therefore, it may be safe to conclude that it is highly possible that 
regulators borrow the idea of users' needs from the accounting principle where users' 
needs are stressed, and misuse the term of interested parties without any second 
thought.
The definition of users is missing from the Rules and the courts. Following the 
discussion in the earlier section, users could be individuals or institutional investors.91 
Currently, institutional investors, although strongly encouraged by the SEC to 
participate in securities markets, play a very limited role in the Taiwanese markets. The 
statistical data revealed that more than 83% of corporate shares were in the hands of
90 In the central government, it is the Ministry of Economic Affairs; in the province, it is the 
Department of Construction; and in the municipal government, it is the Bureau of Construction. See 
Article 5 of the Taiwanese Company Law.
91 Institutional investors are defined as including domestic investment trust companies which 
establish open-ended mutual funds or closed-ended mutual fund, domestic securities dealers, and 
foreign investment companies. Therefore, if securities are held or transacted by banks, normal non­
investment oriented companies, governmental institutions, and other legal persons are not considered 
by this section.
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individual investors; the share of institutional investors (only around 1% in 1994) is far 
less than that of normal corporate shareholders (i.e. whose business is not investment 
business).92 Even if we analyse capital sources of listed companies, individual investors 
generally hold half the portion of capital provision, whereas governmental institutions 
and normal (i.e. non-investment oriented) companies contribute the other one quarter. 
In short, institutional investors have no more than 8%.93 Looking at the turnover of 
securities transactions, 92% of the turnover of the Stock Exchange was transacted by 
individual investors, while institutional investors only contributed around 3% in 
1994.94 In 1995, the turnover of securities transactions made by institutional investors 
in the market increased but not much.95 Noticeably, in March 1996, it (the turnover of 
securities transactions performed by institutional investors) increased to 12% because 
the government strongly encouraged institutional investors to participate in the stock 
markets.96 In this situation, it is still far too early to advocate that in Taiwan users of 
information should be identified as institutional investors when the content of 
mandatory disclosure is concerned.
In addition to declaring the general purpose of preparing financial reports, the 
RPFRSIs also indicate that financial reports should be prepared based on the Rules and 
relevant legislation97 and regulation, and if no provision available therefrom, resorting 
to the GAAPs issued by the Committee of Accounting and Auditing Standards.98 Thus, 
comparison of English law as analysed above demonstrates that Taiwanese law regards 
the GAAPs as a supplementary source of law and emphasises the hierarchic priority
92 See Y. Chang and W. Chen, "The Current Analyses of the Structure of Taiwanese Securities 
Investors" (Tang Ch'ien Wo Kuo Cheng Chtian T'ou Tzu Jen Chih Fen Hsi), in 401 Materials on 
Securities Transactions (Cheng Chtian Tzu Liao), 14-23, 1995. The statistics are of the year of 1994.
93 See Economic Daily News, Finance and Securities Yearbook o f  the Republic o f China 1995, 1995, 
p. 694.
94 See Y. Chang and W. Chen, supra note 92, p. 19.
95 See Securities Management (Cheng Chtian Kuan Li), 13(4), 1995, p. 127.
96 Economic Daily News, 17.4.1996.
97 For example, the Commercial Accounting Law.
98 It is the sub-organisation of the Accounting Research and Development Foundation of Taiwan, 
established by accountants and took over the function of issuing accounting standards from the 
Committee of Financial Accounting of the National Federation of CPAs' Association; the issued 
accounting principles are called Bulletins on Financial Accounting Standards.
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among different sets of rules. In practice, when the courts come across accounting or 
auditing issues they may consult the National Federation of CPAs' Association as the 
Association[sic] is thought to be the authoritative institution with respect to 
accounting issues. Nonetheless, it is worth mentioning that accountants are also used 
to seeking advice from government taxation departments whenever the application of 
GAAPs is unclear as regards whether the application of a Principle would comply with 
regulations."
Such a methodology reveals two significant phenomena underlining the 
legislation: (1) an undervaluation of the importance of accounting and auditing 
professionals; (2) the direct incorporation of most of the accounting and auditing 
principles and bases into the law. These two points are evidenced by the fact that the 
law always sets out detailed disclosure items and identifies the accounting bases for 
each of them. This reflects two further phenomena: the weakness of accounting and 
auditing practices among professionals, and the basic belief that binding rules should 
spring mainly from the public authority rather than a self-regulating body.100 The lack 
of good accounting and auditing practices has lasted for decades and is still 
unresolved. Some scholars attribute this to the crude contents of the GAAPs,101 the 
low quality of accountants and auditors, a lack of knowledge of business, and the low 
pass rate on the CPA examinations which has deterred students with formal university 
education from entering the accounting profession, in which retired military or 
government officials can easily obtain an accountant licence by satisfying some simple 
criteria.102 The last factor has been alleviated to a certain extent since 1989 as the pass
"  73 nien tu shang su tzu ti 2060 hao.
100 The Taiwan legal system rarely has self-regulation.
101 It is said that the published accounting and auditing standards of the National Federation of CPAs' 
Association were only thirty-four pages in length. See Jane Kaufman Winn, "Banking and Finance in 
Taiwan: The Prospects for Internationalization in the 1990s" (in International Lawyer, 25/4 (winter, 
1991), 947), in Brian Wallace Semkow, Taiwan's Capital Market Reform, 1994, p.204, footnote 146.
102 See Brian Wallace Semkow, id., 184. Regarding the special easy test of obtaining accountant 
license, see Article 2, the Accountant Law.
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rate was increased to 20%. Nonetheless, as regards other factors, there is a long way 
to go before any visible improvement can be made.
It is suggested that the traditional culture of the "personal relationship net" 
cannot be ignored when the above mentioned problem is contemplated. People in 
Taiwan are used to "massaging" the figures (i.e. "adjusting" any financial statements) 
without fearing any possible punishment because it is outweighed by the concerns of 
commercial profits and personal relationship. People would not conceive this kind of 
dishonesty as socially disapproved; rather, they would perceive it as a favour done to 
friends. The bribe payments in political elections provide another similar ideology: 
receivers of payments treat the money as "transportation fees". Therefore, without a 
change of such attitude, improvement is unforseeable. Although the law has imposed 
an "independence" requirement on accountants103 and the SEC has commissioned the 
National Federation of CPAs' Association [sic] to upgrade its standards, the results 
remain to be seen.
Consequently, it is understandable that administrators and legislators are inclined 
to encompass these accounting and auditing rules under the umbrella of law, rather 
than entrusting them to professionals; that is, the traditional preference for 
governmental intervention is strengthened by accounting malpractice and low 
professional standard. This in turn justifies the insertion of accounting and auditing 
rules into legislation. Ironically, however, the SEC, for the purpose of improving the 
reliability of financial statements by means of strengthening a company's internal 
accounting system, has stated its intention of relying on professional knowledge of 
accountants and auditors to review a company's internal control and auditing system 
within six months after the re-election of directors and supervisors.104 Although
103 Article 23 of the Accountant Law, and Article 22 of the RPFRSIs.
104 See Economic Daily News, Taipei, 24.12.1995.
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desirably this policy may be, it is difficult to see how it can be carried out given the 
current development of accounting and auditing profession.
The RPFRSIs were amended recently105 to oblige companies to disclose 
information regarding investment in China.106 Such a region-specific rule reveals that 
the tense relationship between China and Taiwan may have material effect on investors 
investment judgments if the political situation deteriorates. The amendment also 
reflects anxiety about the unstable economic reform in China.
The next two regulations mentioned are the Rules on the Contents of the Annual 
Reports of Publicly Issuing Companies (RARs) and the Rules on the Contents of 
Public Offer Prospectuses (RPOPs). Each of them emphasises the principle of honesty,
i.e. there should be no fraudulent statement in or omission from prospectuses or annual 
reports.107 They also enumerate all items of information which must be disclosure.108 
Like the RPFRSIs, the RPOPs employ the term "interested parties"; it reads:
"...Before publication of the prospectus, if there is any transaction or event 
which is sufficient to affect the judgment of interested parties, it should be 
disclosed."109
Thus, "materiality" of information is implied here; as regards the defects of the term 
"interested parties", it has been analysed earlier in this section.
105 07.11.1995.
106 Article 6(18) of the PRFRSIs.
107 Article 3(1) of the RARs and Article 2(1) of the RPOPs.
108 In principle, the mandatory information includes: corporate general information (e.g. general 
introduction of the company, company's organisation, capital and shares, corporate debentures and 
bonds, and special shares), operational situation (e.g. the corporate operation, fixed assets, and other 
real estates, important investment, significant contracts, and other necessary supplementary 
information), business plan, financial situation (e.g. financial information, the accounting and 
auditing results, departmental financial information), etc.
109 Article 2(2) of the RPOPs.
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The last set of regulations to be mentioned are the Rules Implementing the 
Securities and Exchange Law (RISEL). The Rules themselves do not provide any 
general guideline of materiality as they only deal with several separated issues in order 
to clarify some provisions in the SEL. Notably, there are two articles setting out: (1) 
the situations in which the financial reports must be re-prepared and re-published; and 
(2) what constitutes so-called price-sensitive information.
First, Article 6 of the RISEL requires the company to re-prepare and re-publish 
its financial reports in any one of the following events:
1. the corrected amount of profit (loss) is overNT$10 million;
2. the corrected amount of profit (loss) is over 1% of the original net income; or
3. the corrected amount of profit (loss) is over 5% of the paid-in capital.
This provision is a very good example of quantifying materiality as a number or The 
RPFRSIs, likewise, include many illustrations of quantifying materiality110 which show 
that the Taiwanese government has accepted this measure of materiality; unfortunately, 
it seems that no one has ever challenged the inflexibility of this method.
Second, Article 7 of the RISEL supplies a definition for the expression "price- 
sensitive" information which occurred without definition in Article 36(2)(ii) where an 
immediate disclosure obligation is imposed on companies. Nine events are laid down:
1. Cheques issued by the company are dishonoured by non-payment by the bank 
because of insufficient deposit, the company has been rejected for transactions, or 
other events which cause the company to lose its credibility;
2. There is litigation, administrative decision, or administrative litigation which has a 
great impact on corporate finance or business;
110 For example, para. 1, subsections 5 and 7, para. 2, subsection 2 of Article 8; para. 1, subsections 5 
and 7 of Article 9.
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3. The production of the company is reduced substantially, the factory or the major 
production facilities are leased, or all or most of the assets are pledged or mortgaged, 
with an impact on corporate business;
4. There occurs one of the situations referred to in Article 185 of the Company Law;
5. The court, upon petition by an interested party or ex officio, prohibits transfer of the 
shares of the company during the procedure of corporate reorganisation;
6. The chairman of the board of directors, general manager, or one-third of the 
directors are removed;
7. The appointed certified public accountant is removed;
8. The company enters into an important contract, makes material changes in its 
business plan, develops a product, or takes over another enterprise;
9. Any other event likely to have a major effect on corporate operations.
To sum up, accounting and auditing development in Taiwan is still in its early 
stage and most of the accounting principles have been incorporated in law. This fact of 
itself hampers the modernisation of the rules because the law cannot be easily changed. 
Moreover, although it is not the object of this thesis to suggest that there should be a 
unified definition of materiality, in the Taiwanese case, it is difficult even to discern a 
general definition of materiality at first sight. Our analyses has revealed that a general 
meaning of materiality can be extracted from the concept of users' needs though it is 
confused by the introduction of "interested parties", although this problem has been 
resolved to a certain extent by laying down the detailed items of information required. 
Nonetheless, users' needs are insufficiently clear. As a result of which it is still 
impossible to identify the precise scope of disclosure on a logic basis. Finally, the 
unsatisfactory quality of accountants and auditors has frustrated substantially all the 
efforts made to the improve mandatory disclosure system so far as statements are not 
as reliable as the law expects.
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5.3 The Layout of Mandatory Disclosure
The problem of the layout of financial statements and business reports is closely related 
to users' needs. Different users have different requirements both of the content of 
disclosed information and of the method of expression (the layout). Institutional 
investors (or professional investors) and the most ignorant individual investors stand at 
the two ends of the spectrum, as discussed above, showing their entirely different 
attitudes towards the content requirements. This phenomenon reappears when the 
layout of information is in issue. For institutional investors, complicated expression of 
information would not impede their understanding. On the contrary, they appreciate 
the provision of abundant information in this way; whereas the most ignorant 
individual investors can only digest information presented in the simplest language if at 
all.111 Thus, regulators face a formidable choice.
Supposing that institutional investors are targeted when contents of disclosure 
are enumerated, there is a great amount of information calling for disclosure. The 
question is whether a simple method of expression will suffice. If abundant financial 
information is to be disclosed, it is almost inevitable that complexity of expression and 
jargon will be used.112 Since it seems impossible to combine simple expression on the 
one hand with disclosure of sufficient information (from institutional investors' point of 
view) on the other, this in practice demonstrates an unobserved point ubiquitous in 
regulations: the scope of mandatory disclosure is broad enough to cover much 
information of no interest to ignorant individual investors whereas regulations reiterate 
and emphasise that information should be disclosed in a simple and understandable
11 daymen would not be able to understand complicated financial statements. See L.E. Rockley, supra 
note 67, p. 10.
112 See Homer Kripke, "The Myth of Informed Layman", in The Business Lawyer, 631-8, January, 
1973.
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form. This point is true both in English and Taiwanese law. The British Yellow Book 
provides:
"Particulars must provide factual information, in as easily analysable and 
comprehensible a form as possible. Such information must be set out in 
words and figures. Pictures, charts, graphs or other illustrations must not be 
included (except as a result of the requirements of paragraph 5.24) unless the 
Exchange is satisfied that it is the only way in which the relevant factual 
information can be clearly and fairly presented. The Exchange may require 
that prominence be given in the particulars to important information in such 
manner as it considers appropriate."113 (emphases added)
English law stresses clearly the simple expression of mandatory disclosure 
because it is "logical" that only analysable and comprehensible statements can help 
investors make decisions. However, such an argument fails to appreciate that a 
financial statement carrying complicated information is not susceptible of analysis and 
comprehension in view of the lack of professional knowledge of individual investors. 
Undoubtedly the difficulty could be resolved if investors in this case are defined as 
institutional investors. Unfortunately, for whose benefit the statements are analysable 
and comprehensible is unclear in the regulation. In the light of the spirit of the 
regulation, the requirement of "easiness" seems redundant if the regulation aims at 
protecting institutional investors; however, taking individual investors as the protected 
group falls into the "impossibility trap", in a practical sense, as we have demonstrated 
above.
The same myth is repeated in Taiwanese law. Both in the RARs and RPOPs, the 
layout of annual reports and prospectuses is required to be simple and 
understandable.114 More interestingly, the RARs require publicly issuing companies to 
use pictures, charts, graphs or other illustrations, apparently in the belief that they are 
easier for investors to understand. As the securities markets are dominated by
113 Para. 5.7 of the Yellow Book.
114 Article 3(2) of the RARs; Article 2(1) of RPOPs.
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individual investors, the definition of investors in Taiwan at this stage unambiguously 
refers to individual investors with no professional knowledge, and this, again, casts 
doubt on the reality of the regulation.
Finally, the "position" (i.e. prominence) of any important information and the 
balanced presentation of conflicting facts bear some weight in the design of mandatory 
disclosure. A piece of indispensable information would lose its function if buried 
amongst numerous other items without any special emphasis. Also, if conflicting facts 
are not presented in a balanced manner under an "equal prominence rule", investors 
may easily be misled.115 That is why the Yellow Book declares that the Stock 
Exchange may require prominence to be given in the particulars to important 
information. It is also possible to deter preparers of financial statements from burying 
important information by the threat that this kind of activity may be interpreted as 
misrepresentation, especially omission.116
5.4 Timely Disclosure
One of the severe attacks advanced by economists is that mandatory disclosure is often 
too late to be helpful. Such a question could be thought of through two streams: (1) 
immediate disclosure requirements; and (2) listing particulars (as well as prospectuses) 
and other periodic mandatory disclosure.
The emergence of important information (which is defined as price-sensitive 
information in most cases) is required to be disclosed immediately both in English and 
Taiwanese law. In this sense, timely disclosure would not cause any significant trouble 
and is achievable. The real difficulty lies in the periodic disclosure and listing
115 See Marianne M. Jennings, et al., supra note 56, p. 652\Arnison v. Smith, supra note 23, p. 370.
116 See Roger J. Dennis, "Materiality and the Efficient Capital Market Model: A Recipe for the Total 
Mix", in 25 William and Mary L. R., 373-419, 1984, p. 385. American cases are good examples, see 
Gould v. American-Hawaiian Steamship Co. 535 F.2d 761 (3rd Cir. 1976).
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particulars (prospectuses) which are prepared for the purpose of presenting a 
company's financial and business circumstances over a period of time or its position on 
a specific day. Thus, inevitably, most of the information disclosed is historical.
The strongest argument proposed by some economists is that since information 
has been fully reflected in securities prices already, such disclosure would not serve 
market efficiency in any sense. Nonetheless, it has been established that historical 
information is still helpful in the light of reviewing securities price movements, 
evaluating investment risks of individual companies, and comparing previously 
available information with the authentic information released by companies to see if the 
previous information was correct. That is, two functions are asserted: (1) the function 
of supplementing information which was partially uncovered before the release of 
mandatory disclosure;117 and (2) the function of verification.
These two functions can be placed in a broader context. First, as we have 
examined in Chapters Three and Four, voluntary disclosure fails to supply all the 
information required by investors. This is known as market asymmetry. Thus, 
mandatory disclosure fills the gap left by incomplete information available through 
research by market participants. Moreover, securities prices reflect information but do 
not, by themselves, tell investors the way the prices are formed; in other words, exactly 
what the risk is attached to an investment is not detectable merely through the 
observation of price movements.118 Investors require detailed information of corporate 
capital structure, cash flow, industrial performance, and so forth, which can only be 
obtained as a whole from such mandatory disclosure. Second, as mentioned above, 
under voluntary disclosure, fraud is widespread and this can be alleviated by mandatory
117 See Jeffrey N. Gordon and Lewis A. Komhauser, "Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and 
Securities Research", in 60 N.Y. U. L. R., 761-849, 1985, p. 796.
118 See John C. Coffee, Jr., "Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure 
System", in 70 Virginia L. R., 717-53, 1984, pp. 748-51.
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disclosure backed by legal penalties.119 As a result, information contained in mandatory 
disclosure is likely to be more correct and will reduce the possibility of providing false 
information before periodic disclosure. Accordingly, the merits of such periodic 
disclosure easily outweigh any shortcoming due to the gapping time between the time 
which information relates and the time of its disclosure.
5.5 Conclusion
In examining the content of mandatory disclosure, it is clear that both English and 
Taiwanese law are defective in dealing with the materiality problem. English law fails 
to make it clear, in the FSA 1986, that materiality should be the criterion of mandatory 
disclosure; far less does it provide a definition of what is material. Even though the 
case law has provided some explanations of the term, there is a lack of thorough 
analysis. Materiality is further blurred by the concept of "true and fair view". As both 
the terms, "materiality" and "a true and fair view", are highly abstract, their relationship 
is unclear. The ignorance of "users' needs" also highlights this problem.
Taiwanese law, on the other hand, does employ the term "materiality" to a 
certain extent. Nonetheless, the same defects which are observed in English law are 
repeated in a slightly different form in the Taiwanese jurisdiction. In particular, the 
term "users" is confused with the concept of "interested party", a term incompatible 
with a general obligation of disclosure.
Thus, it is suggested that both jurisdictions should introduce "materiality" and 
"users' needs" into their statute comprehensively and fully delineate the relationship 
between "materiality" and "a true and fair view" (or, in Taiwanese law, "a fair and 
appropriate presentation"). In addition, as regards the definition of users, it is
119 See Joel Seligman, "The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System", in 9 J. o f  
Corporation Law, 1-61, No. 1, Fall, 1983, pp. 9, 18 et seq.
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reasonable to propose that English law should adopt the "institutional investors" 
definition while Taiwanese law may opt for the "individual investor with moderate 
financial knowledge" standard. As regards the form of financial statements, it seems 
appropriate to prepare an abridged version in which financial jargon is avoided for the 
benefit of individual investors. However, a detailed copy should be attached to it and a 
statement which specifically draws investors' attention to the risk of simply relying on 
the abridged copy should be included.
For English law, one further observation may be made. Only listed companies are 
obliged to prepare half-yearly reports in relation to consolidated financial statements. It 
seems that all publicly issuing companies should bear the same obligations, and 
furthermore, quarterly and monthly reports should be available to the public 
concerning any individual company's position.120
Taiwan suffers from widespread accounting malpractice which causes financial 
statements to be unreliable. The Taiwanese legislature also faces the dilemma of 
choosing between a capital market where individual investors prevail and abundant 
disclosure requirements designed to improve market transparency and efficiency, as 
these two (individual investors and complicated disclosure) can never function properly 
at the same time. Maybe it would be a good proposal to recommend that individual 
investors should be encouraged to consult securities analysts who can digest financial 
information for them in order to reach informed decisions.
120 See Carol A. Frost and Grace Pownall, "Accounting Disclosure Practices in the United States and 
the United Kingdom", in J. o f Accounting Research, 32(1), 75-102, Spring, 1994.
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Civil Liability for Non-Disclosure and Untrue Statements
6.1 Delimiting the Scope of Research
A wrong generally gives its victim two possible rights: to removal of such an 
infringement privately or judicially, and to compensation (if there is any damage, 
except where it is actionable per se or where nominal damages are available).1 This 
chapter is concerned solely with compensation and thus the first limb of the rights 
(removal) is only treated briefly and other forms of remedy (e.g. restitution and 
rescission) are excluded.
Removal (abatement of injury)
It is fair to describe the right of removal of an infringement as a right available only 
when law specifically so provides. For example, a person may regain his chattel in hot 
pursuit from the tortfeasor who has tortiously deprived him of his possession.2 
However, while compensation is a general remedy which the law gives whenever all 
the conditions of liability exist, the right of removal does not appear to have any 
function at all in relation to non-disclosure and untrue statements in English law and 
plays a limited part in Taiwan.
1 See John Cooke, Law o f Tort, 2nd ed., 1995, p. 3. A similar classification is advanced. Nominal 
damages may be awarded in all cases of breach of contract and in torts actionable per se. See Harvey 
Mcgregor, McGregor on Damages, 15th ed., 1988, p. 249. Since this chapter focuses on damages for 
non-disclosure and untrue statements, emphasing the aspect of tort, nominal damages will not be 
analysed.
2 In Taiwan, the Civil Code, Article 960(2); in the UK, self-help is permissible so long as it is 
peaceful and involves no more force than is reasonable. See B.S. Markesinis and S.F. Deakin, Tort 
Law, 3rd ed., 1994, p. 410. Also one may seek an injunction where a trespass to land is threatened. 
See Llandudno UDCv. Woods (1899) 2 Ch. 705.
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It is submitted that the contents of such a right (removal) could cover only two 
things: to require the wrongdoer to disclose what he should have disclosed or to 
require the wrongdoer to correct an untrue statement which he should not have made. 
Consequently, the fact that the right of removal in the light of non-disclosure or untrue 
statements does not function in English law can be analysed from these two 
perspectives.
First, as regards compelling disclosure, no individual investor has such a right of 
action under English law.3 In Devlin v. Slough Estates Ltd.* the plaintiff shareholder 
complained that the directors did not prepare the corporate accounts properly.5 But the 
court ruled that the standing of an individual shareholder to bring a personal action to 
challenge the form of a company's accounts was not unlimited in scope; that is, the 
individual shareholder did not have the standing to complain about the non-disclosure 
of certain information.6 Obviously the result would be the same if the shareholder 
brought an action requiring the directors to correct any untrue statements in the 
accounts.7 By inference, nor can non-shareholding investors complain about corporate 
accounts.
3 Some public authorities in certain situations have such a right. For example, the Secretary of State 
can apply to the court for granting an injunction restraining the contravention of s. 47 (about 
misleading statements) in s. 61(1) of FSA 1986. The Stock Exchange may itself publish the 
information which it considers appropriate for the purpose of protecting investors and maintaining the 
smooth operation of the market if the issuer fails to comply with such a requirement of publishing 
information. See Yellow Book, 1.7. However, these are not private rights and are not taken into 
account here.
4 [1983] B.C.L.C. 497.
5 The directors of the company omitted in the accounts all references to possible contingent liability 
for damages in an action commenced against the company and one of its subsidiaries in France for 
breach of contract.
6 See supra note 4, p. 497.
7 Under s. 245 of the Companies Act 1985, the directors may voluntarily prepare revised accounts or a 
revised directors' report when they find the document not complying with the requirements of the Act 
(misleading statements are included, because the Act provides that these reports must give a true and 
fair view). If the directors do not do so, the Secretary of State and the Financial Reporting Review 
Panel may apply to the court for an order requiring the directors to prepare revised accounts (not 
including directors' reports). See ss. 245A, B, and C. The Financial Reporting Review Panel was 
delegated such a power by the Secretary of State according to s. 245 C and the Companies (Defective 
Accounts) (Authorised Person) Order 1991 (S.I. 1991/13). Its main duty is to receive and investigate 
complaints regarding the annual accounts of companies.
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Second, whether a subscriber or purchaser can require the company to disclose 
or to correct untrue statements in listing particulars or prospectuses is uncertain. No 
case has ever specifically dealt with this problem. It might be thought, at first sight, 
that the rectification of documents is a possible means to that end. The listing 
particulars and the prospectus are required to be registered with the Registrar of 
Companies. As there is no equivalent of amendment provisions available in respect of 
annual accounts in the Companies Act, it seems that a subscriber or purchaser may 
allege such an equitable remedy to require full disclosure or correction of listing 
particulars and prospectuses. However, the court may not grant it because in this 
situation the removal of the wrongful act (i.e. ordering the company to disclose or 
correct the untrue statement) will not help victim investors in any way; they need 
compensation.8
By way of contrast, in Taiwan, the final version of annual accounts and reports 
must be approved by a general meeting of shareholders.9 If there is any untrue 
statement or omission in the said documents, the shareholders can propose changes 
that need to be made and if the memorandum or articles of the company does not 
provide otherwise, the change should be decided by the votes of the shareholders. It 
needs shareholders holding and representing a majority of the total number of issued 
and outstanding shares to attend the meeting in person or by proxy, and at which a 
majority of the votes held by the shareholders present is cast in favor of such a 
resolution.10 Here is revealed a great difference between English and Taiwanese law. 
The reason why shareholders have the opportunity to correct misleading statements in 
annual accounts and reports is due to the fact that they have an opportunity to approve 
the documents while the shareholders in the UK do not.11
8 For rectification, see I.C.F. Spry, The Principles o f Equitable Remedies, 4th ed., 1990, chapter 6.
9 Art. 230, CL. See also supra Chapter Two about the procedure set in Art. 36 of the SEL.
10 Art. 174, CL.
11 Even though they do have an opportunity to raise queries about the statements in the general 
meeting, this does not mean that they have rights to ask directors to correct the misleading statements.
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However, non-shareholders would not have the same right. Besides that, as 
regards prospectuses, not being documents which need to be approved by 
shareholders, subscribers or purchasers have no standing to require directors to correct 
them. Even more, the right of removal is not helpful because investors are looking in 
fact for compensation.
On the other hand, among the many forms of remedy, compensation is the most 
relevant to securities transactions cases. Rescission is not impossible if 
misrepresentation is material, e.g. where the plaintiff subscribed in reliance on a 
prospectus; nonetheless, as privity is indispensable in this situation, i.e. between a 
subscriber and company, as long as we focus on the statutory compensation provisions 
and common law liability regarding continuous disclosure where a contractual 
relationship mostly is not required or does not exist, we shall not examine this problem 
in-depth even if we may come across it occasionally. As regards restitution which 
denotes a response aligned with compensation and other forms of remedy,12 there is 
hardly any important scenario where restitution is claimed (although we cannot deny 
its existence, especially after rescinding a contract) in the field of litigation over 
securities transactions. Accordingly, this chapter is concerned only with the question of 
damages for non-disclosure or untrue statements. The legal sources of damages and 
their elements are well developed by the laws of contract and tort. However, these 
rules springing from normal civil liability may not fit with the civil liability for 
misrepresentation on securities transactions. They need to be closely examined.
12 See Peter Birks, An Introduction to the Law o f Restitution, 1989, pp. 9-10. The elements of 
restitution are : (1) the defendant is enriched; (2) at the expense of the plaintiff; (3) the enrichment is 
unjust; and (4) no other considerations which are obstacles to the claim. And the term "unjust 
enrichment at the expense of another" provides generic conception to all events giving rise to 
restitution. Id., pp. 16-22.
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(1) the United Kingdom
Damages (or liability for compensation in the words of the statutes) are imposed both 
by English common law and statutes. The latter mainly13 refer to the Companies Act 
1985 (now to the Public Offers of Securities Regulations 1995) and the Financial 
Services Act 1986 (the FSA 1986). Section 67 of the Companies Act 1985 imposed 
the liability for compensation on the persons responsible towards subscribers of any 
shares or debentures on the faith of prospectuses. Section 150 of the FSA 1986 on the 
other hand controls misrepresentation in listing particulars; responsible persons are 
liable to acquirers of any shares and debentures on the faith of listing particulars. 
Since 1995 June, the Public Offers of Securities Regulations 1995 (the POS 
Regulations)14 have replaced Part III of the Companies Act 1985 and employ similar 
wording to that of s. 150 of the FSA 1986. Hence in English law, we will concentrate 
on s. 150 of the FSA 1986 in order to elucidate liability for damages regarding 
misstatement in prospectuses and listing particulars;15 in addition the rules developed 
by the common law will be examined simultaneously. As regards continuous 
disclosure, common law is the only source because statutes do not specify any such 
liability.
(2) Taiwan
Four liabilities provided by the Securities and Exchange Law (the SEL) are discussed 
in this chapter: (1) the liability for compensation should prospectuses not be delivered 
to subscribers before they subscribe securities; (2) the liability for compensation in the
13 Doubtlessly, the Misrepresentation Act 1967 is also one of the statutory sources; this thesis will 
touch upon it in a later stage.
14 reg. 14.
15 By fault to make any misleading, false, or deceptive statement, promise or forecast is prohibited by 
s. 47 of the FSA 1986. And s. 61 provides remedies for such contravention, which is also the basis of 
civil liability in the cases of take-over or market manipulation. However, the application can only be 
brought by the Secretary of State, not private investors; therefore, it is not the concern of this thesis.
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case of misstatement in prospectuses;16 (3) the liability for compensation in the case of 
misstatement in any continuous disclosure documents; (4) and the liability for 
compensation in insider dealing.
First, Article 31 provides that before subscribers subscribe for securities, they 
should be given prospectuses. Otherwise, persons who do not fulfil this statutory duty 
are liable to bona fide subscribers if any damage ensues from such a breach. A liability 
of this kind is now imposed in the UK but is slightly different. It is unlawful in the UK, 
before the time of publication of the prospectus, to offer the securities to the public; 
any contravention of this shall be actionable at the suit of a person who suffers loss as 
a result of the contravention subject to the defences and other incidents applying to 
actions for breach of statutory duty (s. 156B(5), the FSA 1986). At a very general 
level, under mandatory disclosure requirements, both jurisdictions compel issuers to 
prepare prospectuses. However, the Taiwanese SEL requires issuers or underwriters 
not only to publish prospectuses but also to deliver them to subscribers, while English 
law only requires prospectuses to be published and available. Nonetheless, the civil 
liability in the UK only applies to prospectuses required under the FSA 1986, not to 
the POS Regulations. Thus, for unlisted securities, the old rule has not been altered.17 
Here, whether there is any untrue statement or omission is not at issue. What these 
persons are breaching is the obligation to publish in the UK (or deliver to investors, in 
Taiwan) prospectuses before subscribers make investment decisions.18
16 In Taiwan, no distinction between listing particulars and prospectuses is made; whenever public 
distribution of securities is concerned, prospectuses should be prepared. Even though application of 
listing is submitted, still only prospectuses are required (no documents called listing particulars exist 
in Taiwan). In other words, no double paper work is necessary.
17 Although the repealed ss. 56(2) and 72(5) of the CA 1985 (the UK) made it unlawful to issue any 
form of application for securities of a company unless the form was issued with a prospectus. The 
penalty for contravention was a fine, not civil liability towards investors. The new rule provides that 
when securities are offered to the public in the UK for the first time the offeror shall publish a 
prospectus by making it available to the public (reg. 4(1) of the POS Regulations); there is still no 
civil liability for non-compliance.
18 Both English and Taiwanese law require issuers to prepare and publish prospectuses; as well as to 
give a notice regarding where copies of prospectuses are available. But Taiwanese law imposes an 
extra requirement: before subscribers subscribe for securities, they must be given (i.e. deliveiy of 
prospectuses by issuers or underwriters) prospectuses by issuers or underwriters.
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Persons who are liable for delivery include issuers and underwriters, according to 
the academics' interpretation.19 And persons entitled to compensation are subscribers 
who suffer loss as a result of not being given prospectus.
Second, Article 32 of the SEL, similar to the two sections mentioned above in 
the UK POS Regulations and FSA 1986, provides that those responsible persons are 
liable to any "bona fide counterparties" who suffer loss as a result of material false 
statements in or omission from prospectuses unless they can prove that they have no 
fault (the proviso). The scope of "bona fide counterparties" is unclear; it is analyzed 
below.
Third, Article 20 of the Act provides:
"In the course of public offering, issuing, and trading of securities, falsity, 
fraud and other misleading behaviour are prohibited. (Art. 20(1))
Untrue statements or omissions in the financial reports or any other business 
documents filed or published by an issuer are prohibited. (Art. 20(2))
Persons who violate any of the preceding two paragraphs are liable for 
damage sustained by bona fide buyers or sellers of the securities in question."
(Art. 20(3)) (emphasis added)
The first paragraph is a general anti-fraud provision. It encompasses a broad scope of 
liability. If a wrong cannot be complained about under any other more "specific" 
provisions, such as misrepresentation in prospectuses and insider dealing, this general 
provision can be resorted to.
It is manifest from Article 20(2) that if there is any misrepresentation in 
continuous disclosure documents, such as annual, half-yearly, quarterly, and monthly
19 Yin-chao Lai, The Interpretation on the Securities and Exchange Law (Cheng Chtian Chiao I  Fa 
Chu T'iao Shih 1), 5th ed., 1990, Vol. 2, p. 239; Hsueh-ming Yu, The Securities Administration 
(Cheng Chtian Kuan Li), revised ed., 1983, p. 540.
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reports, and any immediate reports,20 certain persons are made responsible. This will 
be dealt with in a later section.
The wording of Article 20, second paragraph, raises an interesting question: is this 
a strict liability? Or is "scienter"21 a necessary element of the liability? First, comparing 
this paragraph with Article 32 where liability on prospectuses is stated reveals that no 
proviso similar to that in Article 32 is laid out in this paragraph. Therefore, it seems 
that such a liability is a strict one. However, for two reasons this should not be a strict 
liability: (1) both in Article 32 and this paragraph, the wording "untrue statements or 
omissions are prohibited" is identically used; and (2) there is no reason to impose a 
greater liability on responsible persons regarding continuous disclosure documents than 
regarding prospectuses, especially as in some countries, e.g. the UK, there is still no 
statutory liability for compensation concerning misrepresentation in continuous 
disclosure documents. Consequently, the liability under this paragraph could not be a 
strict liability; it might be a negligence liability like that in Article 32. Moreover, as no 
proviso is provided, it may be inferred from general principle that the plaintiff has to 
prove the fault of the defendant.
Nonetheless, if American law is taken into account, something more than 
negligence on the part of the defendant may be required. Although American law has 
no authority in Taiwan, that Taiwanese securities legislation and administration usually 
follow the American track is a fact without doubt. According to the American 
Securities Exchange Act 1934, §§ 10b and 18(a),22 where similar liability is provided,
20 See Art. 36 of the SEL, regarding its details, see supra Chapter Two.
21 Lat. knowingly, knowledge by the misrepresenting party that material facts have been falsely 
represented or omitted with an intent to deceive. This term, as applied to conduct necessary to give 
rise to an action for civil damages under the US Securities Exchange Act 1934 refers to a mental state 
embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. See Black's Law Dictionary, 6th ed., 1990.
22 The Securities Exchange Act 1934, § 18(a) provides: "Any person who shall make or cause to be 
made any statement in any application, report, or document filed pursuant to this chapter or any rule 
or regulation thereunder ... which the statement was at the time and in light of the circumstances 
under which it was made false or misleading with respect to any material fact, shall be liable to any 
person (not knowing that such statement was false or misleading) who, in reliance upon such 
statement, shall have purchased or sold a security at a price which was affected by such statement, for
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the courts held that mere negligence was insufficient.23 In other words, there should 
exist "scienter" on the part of the defendant. The lower courts have in some cases ruled 
that scienter includes "recklessness". The problem is that there is no unanimous 
definition of application of the recklessness standard by the courts.24 In Taiwan, 
however, no such term like "scienter" exists. As a result, it is unclear whether intention 
is required, or gross negligence suffices.
Fourth, Article 157-1 prohibits certain persons25 from insider dealing; therefore, 
insiders who violate this provision are held liable to bona fide counterparties who have 
traded for damages to the extent of the difference between the buying or selling prices 
prior to the disclosure and the average of the last reported selling prices for ten 
business days after disclosure. The court may also, upon the request of the bona fide 
counterparties, treble the limit of the liabilities of the said persons should the violation 
be very serious.
This brief comparison shows that the scope of civil liability in Taiwan is broader 
than that in the UK. To say the least, liabilities for continuous disclosure documents 
and insider dealing have been codified in Taiwan, while in the UK, the common law is 
still struggling with the former problem,26 let alone the problem of insider dealing.27
damages caused by such reliance, unless the person sued shall prove that he acted in good faith and 
had no knowledge that such statement was false or misleading." See also Louis Loss and Joel 
Seligman, Securities Regulation, Vol. IX, 3rd. ed. 1993, pp. 4296-300; Note, "Civil Liability for 
Misstatements in Documents Filed under Securities Act and Securities Exchange Act", in 44 Yale L. 
J., 456-77, 1935.
23 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Magna lnv. Corp. v. John Does One through Two 
Hundred 931 F.2d 38 (11th Cir. 1991).
24 See Paul G. Mahoney, "Precaution costs and the Law of Fraud in Impersonal Markets" in 78 
Virginia L. R., 623-70, 1992, pp. 648-9.
25 See supra Chapter Two.
26 See infra pages 240-46.
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After delimiting the scope of research, the next step is to structure the remaining 
sections of the chapter. Defining the "nature" of or characterizing liabilities for 
damages is very important, seeing that different sources of liability result in emphases 
being laid on different elements of liability thus causing variant standards to be applied 
when elements are judged.
Hence, the following text of this chapter is divided into four parts: (1) 
characterising these liabilities in the UK and Taiwan; (2) going further to abstract the 
important elements of liabilities in different sources to analyse the problem of 
establishing liabilities; (3) measuring damages; and (4) scrutinising the difference 
between liabilities for insider dealing and misrepresentation in prospectuses (and listing 
particulars in the UK).
6.2 Characterising the Nature of Liability for Damages
Obligations to pay damages spring from three sources of law: torts, breach of contract. 
and statutes. Non-disclosure and untrue statements may breach any of the three. For a 
long period of time English law concerning securities transactions cases has brought 
liability for damages in line with tortious measures while Taiwanese law has swayed, 
but is yet to settle, regarding the nature of damages liability. Nonetheless, it could be 
strongly argued that to characterise such a liability as a statutory one, would be most 
appropriate in Taiwan.
listing particulars continuous insider
prospectuses disclosure dealing
UK V
?
very limited
X
Taiwan V V V
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(1) the United Kingdom
In English law, there is next to no argument about the nature of liability for damages in 
this kind of case. Misrepresentation in securities transactions, i.e. non-disclosure and 
untrue statements, may constitute breach of contract; nonetheless, as the topic of this 
thesis covers information whose disclosure is mandated in listing particulars, 
prospectuses, annual reports, and other continuous disclosure documents, 
misrepresentation in such cases has, for a long time, been defined by the courts as 
tort.28 Even though this liability has been introduced into the statutes (the POS 
Regulations, reg. 14; the FSA 1986, s. 150), the case law still emphasizes that they are 
statutory tort cases.29 Such a position does not deprive plaintiffs of the right to rescind 
the contracts made between them and the company (or the underwriter, if the latter is 
the principal). However, this problem is not the focus of the thesis.
(2) Taiwan
Insufficient effort has been made in characterizing these liabilities. Three possible 
answers may be suggested: torts, breach of contract, and statutory liability.
First, tort is considered. The simplest situation is that by deceit, documents are 
misleading. Deceit, originally giving rise to a right of rescission to a plaintiff was 
interpreted by the court as also being a tort.30 Consequently, if cases fall into this
28 Derry v. Peek (1887) 37 Ch.D. 541; Clark v. Urquhart [1930] A.C. 28; Doyle v. Olby [1969] 2 
Q.B. 158; Smith New Court Securities Ltd. v. Scrimgeour Vickers (Asset Management) Ltd. and 
another [1994] 4 All E.R. 225. The Directors Liability Act 1890 was passed as a result of the decision 
in Derry v. Peek which exposed the inadequacy of the common law tort of deceit as a remedy for 
investors who suffered loss as a result of misleading prospectuses. See L.C.B. Gower, Principles o f 
Modern Company Law, 15th ed., 1992, p. 344.
29 McConnelv. Wright [1903] 1 Ch. 546; Clark v. Urquhart [1930] A.C. 28.
30 The courts swayed on this issue. They first admitted that deceit constituted a tort. See 45 Judicial 
Juan Public Report, pp. 29-30. They later, however, overruled this point of view. See 66 t'ai shang tzu 
ti 1552 hao, 1977. The latest opinion came back to the first one and confirmed that deceit was tort. 
See 67 t'ai shang tzu ti 434 hao, 1978, and the resolution of the Thirteenth Supreme Court Civil
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category, they can be characterised as tort cases. This does not help, however, in the 
situations of negligent misrepresentation and insider dealing. If they are treated as 
torts, the next question following this is what kind of right is infringed? It is 
questionable whether "the availability of correct and full information" can be 
recognised as a right.
Second, the problem of breach of contract comes into play. Taking the simplest 
case, the public distribution of securities in which contracts are made between 
investors and the company (the wrongdoer), can investors claim that the company has 
breached the contracts because it did not properly provide them with information? 
Although it is true that a company has an obligation to disclose under the mandatory 
disclosure regulations; however, whether this legal obligation can be treated as part of 
the obligation of contract is not without doubt.31 In other cases where no contract 
between wrongdoer and victim is made or it is very difficult to identify the 
counterparty of the contract (e.g. insider dealing), breach of contract may not be 
alleged. For example, a company publishes false information which causes investor A 
to purchase securities from B. The contract is between A and B, not A and the 
company. No breach of contract can be claimed by A as against the company. Or in 
insider dealing, given a stock exchange market, there is no way to identify the "real" 
sellers or buyers to the transactions. Even if insiders have obligations to disclose to 
their counterparty, the counterparty is not identifiable. In these situations, to base 
liability on breach of contract is very tenuous.
Judicial Conference, 1978. See also Ming-hsien Wu, "The Co-existence of Deceit and Tort" (Cha Ch'i 
Hsing Wei Yii Ch'in Chi'iin Hsing Wei Ping Ts'un), in The Law Monthly, 147-9, 47(3), 1995. In fact, 
if the reason against the concept that deceit is tort is scrutinised, it reveals that the courts which held 
that deceit was not tort were based on the fact of no damages existing. Therefore, it did not in reality 
rule that deceit was not tort; instead, it emphasized an indispensable element of tort liability being 
damage. Accordingly, if a deceit causes damage, it amounts to a tort.
31 In the USA, some scholars characterise this as a form of breach of contract, because "one party fails 
to furnish another with information required in the regular course of dealing, or he furnishes 
information but default in his duties, making the information inaccurate". See Frank H. Easterbrook 
and Daniel R. Fischel, "Optimal Damage in Securities Cases", in 52 U. o f Chicago L. R., 611-52, 
1985, p. 614.
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Third, turning to statutory liability. If the legislature aims to impose a certain 
civil liability, it can do so by legislation, no matter whether the wrongdoing constitutes 
torts, breach of contract or neither of them. Should liability in damages on securities 
transactions cases be treated as statutory liability, all elements of liability are decided 
by statutes. When elements are not clearly set out by statutes, the closer standard of 
torts or breach of contract should be referred to. As mentioned above, four kinds of 
liabilities exist in Taiwan. It is very difficult to advocate that they all constitute torts; 
seeing that the kind of right being infringed may not be recognised by ordinary tort 
law. On the other hand, contracts are not often found between wrongdoers and victims 
in these cases; even though there are contracts, whether statutory disclosure 
obligations automatically become part of contractual obligations is obscure. Even 
more, as discussed in Chapter Three, if there is no mandatory disclosure requirement, 
in most situations disclosure is not compelled according to the general law; by 
inference then, no liability occurs. Thus it is argued that characterising these liabilities 
as statutory ones is most apposite; when the elements of liability are not clear, the 
standards used by torts or breach of contract (depending on which one is closer to the 
liability under certain circumstances) should be referred to.
The liability for damages resulting from misrepresentation in securities 
transactions is characterised as tortious in the UK, while in Taiwan there is no clear 
answer as yet. Setting aside the problem of characterisation, three elements are 
common to all sources of liability and are examined carefully. They are: fault (the duty 
of care), causation and damage. Damage, is common to all three sources of liability in 
damages, while causation, as will be shown below, is of specific interest to the thesis in 
measuring liability for damages in securities cases.
A duty of care is the prerequisite of the liability. For negligence cases, only where 
a defendant has a duty of care which he breaches, will there be fault. Accordingly, the 
logical order is followed to examine these three topics sequentially: starting from "a
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duty of care", ending with damage, and in between examining causation (its first 
angle).
6.3 The Duty of Care
It is clear that, in the UK, persons responsible for listing particulars or prospectuses 
owe a duty of care to any acquirers of securities in question; however, the courts are 
inclined to limit (or reluctant to admit) the duty of care when continuous disclosure is 
scrutinised. Such a discriminatory treatment demonstrates a conflict between the 
statute where liabilities are extended and the attitude of the courts fearing the so-called 
floodgate effect. It is proposed that the legislature may have to consider whether to 
introduce liabilities for continuous disclosure into the statute. By way of contrast, 
Taiwanese law provides equal protection to both situations but lacks the clarity as 
regards the strictness of the liabilities for misrepresentation in continuous disclosure; 
nor is the scope of responsible persons in the context of continuous disclosure sharply 
drawn.
6.3.1 The United Kingdom
When liability regarding a negligent untrue statement or omission is tackled, a duty of 
care should first be considered. Not every person who has made an untrue statement or 
omission of information should be liable to those who suffer loss as the consequence; 
he must owe the victim a duty of care when he provides such information but fails to 
fulfil that duty. A duty can be imposed by statute, by contract, or by some other 
relationship, such as fiduciary relationship.
The duty of care on disclosure in the situations of public distribution of securities 
and the obligations of publicly issuing companies can be discussed in two parts. The 
first part covers the issue of listing particulars and prospectuses; while the second part
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is concerned with continuous disclosure by publicly issuing companies, because these 
are the two situations where civil liabilities will arise in securities misrepresentation 
cases.
6.3.1.1 The Duty of Care in Relation to Listing Particulars and Prospectuses
Whenever a company publicly offers its securities, it is unlawful to offer the securities 
in question to the public before the time of publication of the prospectus, and the 
prospectus should be available to the public at an address in the UK from the time the 
company first offers the securities until the end of the period during which the offer
remains open.32 Listing particulars are required to be published should the company
apply for listing on the Stock Exchange except where a public offer is made in the UK 
for the first time.33
This section focuses on defendants' statutory liabilities. However, liabilities under 
common law are not affected. For listing particulars, admittedly, to allege the statute is 
to the plaintiffs advantage. Nonetheless, if the POS Regulations regarding 
prospectuses are narrowly interpreted (this will be dealt with later), market purchasers 
may have to rely on the common law liability and thus rules developed in section
6.3.1.2 is applicable in this situation.
a. who is responsible
It is clear by the statutory provisions34 that all who have consented to be named on the 
listing particulars or prospectuses are liable for untrue statements and omission, i.e. a 
statutory duty of care. They are the issuer of the securities, the person who has 
authorised himself to be named in the listing particulars or prospectuses as a director
32 s. 156B(1), FSA 1986 and reg. 4(1) of the POS Regulations (the UK); Article 31, Taiwan SEL.
33 ss. 144(2A) and 144(2), the FSA 1986.
34 ss. 152 and 154A of the FSA 1986, and reg. 13 of the POS Regulations.
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or as having agreed to become a director of the corporate issuer, the person who 
accepts responsibility for any part of the listing particulars or prospectuses and so 
stated in them, and any other person who has authorized the contents of any part of 
these statements.
Directors attract special attention. As a general rule, directors issue all these 
documents on behalf of a company; thereby they are responsible in principle. However, 
the statutes (reg. 15 of the POS Regulations and ss. 151 and 154A of the FSA 1986) 
give them an opportunity to prove the opposite situations which exempt them from 
liability. That is, should the publication of these documents be made without a 
director's knowledge or consent and on becoming aware of the publication he 
forthwith gives reasonable public notice that the documents are published without his 
knowledge and consent, the director is not liable.35
Where a person has accepted responsibility for, or authorised, only part of the 
contents of any particulars, he is responsible for only that part and only if it is included 
in (or substantially in) the form and context to which he has agreed.36
The statute has conferred on these persons a duty of care to those who acquire 
the securities. In other words, they have to exercise a reasonable person's ability of 
care because this is not a strict liability. According to ss. 151 and 154A of the FSA 
1986 and reg. 15 of the POS Regulations, they have statutory defenses.37
35 ss. 152(2) and 154A of the FSA 1986; reg. 13(2) of the POS Regulations.
36 s. 152(3) of the FSA 1986; reg. 13(3) of the POS Regulations.
37 The statutory defences are classified into seven groups: defendant's reasonable belief, the 
reasonable reliance on an expert's statement, correcting the defect, false statement coming from 
official statements and documents, plaintiffs knowledge of the truth, permitted omission, and no 
requirement for supplementary listing particulars. See s. 151, the FSA 1986 and reg. 15 of the POS 
Regulations.
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b. to whom they are liable
The scope of persons entitled to compensation in the situation of listing particulars was 
broader than that of prospectuses before the enactment of the POS Regulations. But 
now any person who has acquired any of the securities in question and suffered loss in 
respect of them as a result of any untrue or misleading statement in particulars or 
prospectuses or the omission from them of any matter required to be included by the 
FSA 1986 and the POS Regulations is entitled to compensation.38
The meaning of acquiring securities is not limited to subscription for securities. 
It, instead, also refers to investors' contracting to acquire securities or interest in 
securities.39 For example, investors who subscribe for options to subscribe for the 
securities fall into the protective scope of this statutory liability because investors have 
an interest in corporate securities by means of exercising options. However, options 
should be exercised within a reasonable time of the offer.40 Although the statute does 
not set a time limit for compensation, it is suggested that a reasonable time limit should 
be imposed; otherwise, the effect of misrepresentation on securities prices will be 
diminished (because whenever new information becomes available, prices will reflect it; 
and as time passes, it becomes increasingly difficult to recognise the impact of the 
wrong information on the prices).
Whether subsequent purchasers of securities, relying on the listing particulars and
purchasing from markets or previous subscribers who subscribed for securities directly
from the issuer or intermediary, are also protected needs to be considered. The 
common factor of these purchasers is that they purchase securities in reliance on the 
contents of the listing particulars. Will such reliance entitle them to compensation? 
Section 150(1) of the FSA 1986 does not explicitly set out the scope of persons from
38 ss. 150(1) and 154A, the FSA 1986; reg. 14(1) of the POS Regulations.
39 ss. 150(5) and 154A, the FSA 1986; reg. 14(5) of the POS Regulations.
40 Louis G. Doyle, "Liability for Listing Particulars, Part I" in Law for Business, 3 [2], 70-2, 1991, p. 
71.
237
Chapter Six: Civil Liability
whom the securities are acquired, instead, the provision only states that "... acquired 
any securities ... as a result of any untrue or misleading statement in the particulars or 
the omission from them of any matter..." According to the wording of the provision, all 
these purchasers are treated in the same way as the first subscribers of the securities. 
However, for prospectuses, there is a different interpretation of acquirers. The key lies 
in the extra words of "to which the prospectus relates" after "acquired any securities" 
(reg. 14(1), the POS Regulations). Thus, the acquirer is defined as "the placee in 
respect of the shares originally allotted to them".41 This thesis, nonetheless, defines 
acquirers in both cases as meaning the same. If subscribers are intended by the new 
legislation, there is no reason to substitute "acquirers" for "subscribers" for two 
reasons: (1) the term acquirers literally denotes a broader meaning; (2) replacing the 
old term by using the word employed in the FSA 1986 implies that the legislature aims 
at bringing prospectuses in line with the listing particulars.
Following this, those who purchase the securities from the market in reliance on 
the contents of the listing particulars or prospectus, it is submitted, should also be 
within the definition of acquiring the securities as a result of the misrepresentation of 
the listing particulars or prospectus. Any argument which tries to distinguish these 
market purchasers from the earlier category purchasers (i.e. who purchase securities 
from the first subscribers and their derivative purchasers) is not convincing.
In case Al-Nakib Investments (Jersey) Ltd. v. Longeroffi2, the court held that 
directors did not owe a duty of care to shareholders or anyone else who relied on the 
prospectus for the purpose of deciding whether to purchase shares through the stock 
market. In this case, the prospectus and interim reports were drawn for the purpose of 
a rights issue; in consequence the court ruled that there was insufficient relationship
41 Possfund Custodian Trustee Ltd and another v. Diamond and others [1996] 2 All E.R. 774, p. 783.
42 [1990] 3 All E.R. 321. As regards eligible plaintiffs, see Anthony Hofler, "Company Securities —  
misinformation and litigation", in The Company Lawyer, 16(3), 67-71, March, 1995, p. 71. Cf. Cullen 
v. Thomson (1862) 6 L.T. 870. See also Simon Morris, Financial Services: Regulating Investment 
Business, 2nd ed., 1995, pp. 288-9.
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between the directors and the shareholders. This case dealt with the misrepresentation 
of the prospectus and according to the Companies Act 1985 which has been 
repealed,43 liability for compensation was owed by directors to "subscribers" of 
securities only. That is to say, the scope of protection was limited to those transactions 
directly related to the prospectus in question. Therefore, the court have recourse to the 
common law rule where negligence liability was closely scrutinized; proximity should 
be found. But as noticed, the POS Regulations have replaced Part III of the Companies 
Act 1985 and responsible persons in both prospectuses and listing particulars have 
become subject to the same liability, i.e. responsibility to acquirers. The scope of 
"acquirers" therefore needs to be re-identified. Securities flow on a stock market. Their 
identity is of no concern for securities transactions; this causes the identity of sellers to 
be meaningless. Thus, the distinction made above is not acceptable and accordingly, it 
is suggested that market purchasers should also be protected.
Even though there is no "market" (Stock Exchange or the AIM), securities being 
purchased from original subscribers and securities being purchased from someone else 
have no substantial difference. To accentuate the providers of securities seems 
unjustifiable. The real problem is whether the transaction in question has any 
connection with the listing particulars or prospectuses, rather than its connection with 
the sellers of securities.44 The protection of the former group of purchasers logically 
will bring about the protection of the latter group, that is, market purchasers.
The only problem accompanying this argument is whether such a definition of 
protection will be so broad as to make it unreasonable and unjust to those responsible
43 s. 67.
44 Happily, such a proposal is supported by Possfund (supra note 41). In that case, Lightman J. has 
endeavoured to extend the scope of duty of care to include market purchasers mainly from the 
perspective of defendants' intention. The difference between the argument in this thesis and that case 
is that this thesis interprets acquirers broadly while in that case they are limited to the placees and 
thus the court has to apply the common law rule. However, the idea of extending the scope of 
protected persons to market purchasers is shared.
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persons. This question should be answered in connection with the discussion of the 
second part of this section which is dealt with below.
6.3.1.2 The Duty of Care in Relation to Continuous Disclosure
A company, especially a listed company, has continuous obligations of disclosure. In 
the UK, however, every company, except listed companies (and companies which have 
securities traded in a UK regulated market, e.g. AIM, according to the Traded 
Securities (Disclosure) Regulations 199445), has only annual obligations regarding 
continuous disclosure. Listed companies, under the listing rules, have extra obligations 
of preparing half-yearly disclosure and timely reports when certain events happen.46 
The question is whether those who are responsible for preparing these continuous 
disclosure documents are liable to pay compensation if any investors acquire (or even 
sell) the securities in reliance on the misleading contents of these documents; put 
another way, whether these persons have a duty of care in this situation.
There is no such statutory liability to private investors imposed on these persons 
(the issuer, the directors, and the experts who consent to be named on the 
documents)47 as the statute provides in the case of listing particulars and prospectuses. 
Therefore, in order to see whether such a duty of care exists it is necessary to resort to 
the common law.
Misrepresentation is in three categories, namely, fraudulent misrepresentation, 
negligent misrepresentation (i.e. honest but careless) and innocent misrepresentation 
(i.e. honest and careful). This section concentrates on negligent misrepresentation for 
two reasons. (1) the longest established category, among these, is the fraudulent one in 
which an intention is required and obligations deriving therefrom have been well
45 S.I. 1994/188.
46 See Yellow Book, Chapter 9.
47 s. 61 of the FSA 1986, see supra note 15.
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recognised;48 (2) for innocent misrepresentation, there is no common law liability, but 
the equitable right to rescission of the contract and to indemnity continues. Damages is 
available in lieu of rescission since the Misrepresentation Act 1967 (s. 2(2)). However, 
all these are proceedings arising out of the contractual relationship. As this chapter 
focuses on the tortious measure of damages, this category is excluded.
In the 1960s, the common law developed a liability for negligent 
misrepresentation. In Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners*9 the defendants 
(Heller & Partners), merchant bankers, at the request of the plaintiffs bank, gave 
references regarding the credit-worthiness of Easipower Ltd. (the plaintiffs customer). 
The plaintiff relied on such references and as a result it suffered loss when Easipower 
went into liquidation. The House of Lords held that "a negligent, though honest, 
misrepresentation, spoken or written, may give rise to an action for damages for 
financial loss, ... since the law will imply a duty o f care when a party seeking 
information from a party possessed o f a special skill trusts him to exercise due care, 
and that party knew or ought to have known that reliance was being placed on his 
skill and judgment,"50 (emphases added)
This case was a good starting point, but it did not clearly define the conditions for 
such a duty to occur. It emphasized that a duty of care may arise not only from 
fiduciary relationship but also voluntary assumption of liability.51 The defendants' act 
has constituted the latter relationship, and they knew or at least ought to have known 
that the reliance was being placed on them. All these made them liable; the only reason 
that finally relieved them from liability was an express disclaimer of liability.
48 Derry v. Peek (1887) 37 Ch.D. 541; McConnell v. Wright [1903] 1 Ch. 546; Doyle v. Olby [1969] 
2 Q.B. 158.
49 [1964] 1 A.C. 465.
50 Id., p. 466.
51 Id., by Lord Reid, pp. 486-7.
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In effect, it is nearly impossible to have a set of rules about the situations where a 
duty of care arises in the case of given information containing a misrepresentation. 
Before Hedley, Denning L J. in Candler v. Crane Christmas & Co.52 had put forward 
several elements of such a duty. First, he limited the responsible persons to those who 
had special skill, such as accountants, surveyors, valuers and analysts. Second, these 
persons should exercise the duty of care not only to their employers and clients, but 
also to any third person to whom they themselves showed the statement, or to whom 
they knew their employer was going to show the statement as to induce him to invest 
or take some other action on them. And finally, there must be a specific transaction 
within the knowledge of these professionals.
These requirements were clarified in the later cases. Just as Judge Cardozo in 
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche53 held, that it was undesirable to recognise liability in an 
indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class, the English 
courts also aim to develop these rules more reasonably and comprehensively. In Anns 
and others v. Merton London Borough Council,54 proximity was advanced as a 
criterion to judge the existence of duty of care. Between the alleged wrongdoer and 
the person who has suffered damage there must be a sufficient relationship of 
proximity or neighbourhood such that, in the reasonable contemplation of the former, 
carelessness on his part may be likely to cause damage to the latter.55
Additionally, in JEB Fasteners Ltd. v. Marks, Bloom & Co.,56 foreseeability was 
stressed:
52 [1951] 1 All E.R. 426.
53 255 N.Y. 170, (1931). To limit liabilities in negligent misrepresentation is also supported by the 
scholars who apply the economic analysis to this kind of case. See William Bishop, “Negligent 
misrepresentation: an economic reformation”, in The Economic Approach to Law, Paul Burrows and
C.G. Veljanovski (eds.), 1981.
54 [1977] 2 W.L.R. 1024. This case was overruled by Murphy v. Brentwood District Council ([1990] 2 
All E.R. 269), but is not on the basis of whether proximity should be an element for duty of care. The 
concept of proximity is not new to the law of negligence, e.g. Le Lievre v. Gould [1893] 1 Q.B. 491, 
497 (per Lord Esher MR), see B.S. Markesinis and S.F. Deakin, supra note 2, p. 80.
55 Id., p. 1032.
56 [1981] 3 All E.R. 289.
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"Whether the defendants owed a duty of care to the plaintiff in regard to their 
preparation of the accounts of the company depended on whether they knew 
or ought reasonably to have foreseen at the time the accounts were prepared 
that persons such as the plaintiffs might rely on the accounts for the purpose 
of deciding whether to take over the company and might suffer loss if the 
accounts were inaccurate."57
It shows that, from JEB, the foreseeability of possible reliance is insufficient; the 
foreseeability of a specific transaction is also required. The foreseeability of a specific 
transaction is in fact the problem of proximity.
The most important case Caparo v. Dickman and others58 has finally discussed 
these elements in detail. At Court of Appeal, three issues were considered as the 
elements of a duty of care: foreseeability, proximity, and reasonableness and justice of 
imposing the duty.
Regarding foreseeability of reliance, it is agreed that defendants usually have this 
ability. The spread of information is easily foreseeable even though such dissemination 
may not be wished by the providers of information. Therefore, proximity is a tool used 
to limit the excessively broad liability brought about by the first requirement. And this 
in reality is the real point which affects judgments in many different cases.
Lord Atkin in Donoghue v. Stevenson59 explained the term proximity as:
57 Id., p. 289.
58 [1989] 2 W.L.R. 316, at Court of Appeal; [1990] 1 All E.R. 568, at House of Lords. "The Caparo 
decision has proved controversial within the accounting profession and outside it. Generally auditors 
have welcomed it, bankers dislike it, and many commentators have called for a change in the law... It 
is understandable that people believe the court's interpretation is too narrow and that it disregards 
commercial practice." See Paul Rutteman, "Corporate Governance and the Auditor", in Contemporary 
Issues in Corporate Governance, D.D. Prentice and P.R.J. Holland, 1993, pp. 64-5. C f Scott Group 
Ltd. v. McFarlane [1978] 1 N.Z.L.R. 553; Dixon v. Deacon Morgan McEwan Easson et al. [1990] 70
D.L.R. 609.
59 [1932] A.C. 562.
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"...such close and direct relations that the act complained of directly affects a 
person whom the person alleged to be bound to take care would know would 
be directly affected by his careless act."60
There is proximity between parties to contracts and between fiduciaries and their 
beneficiaries. A person who voluntarily assumes responsibilities also has proximity in 
relation to the person for whose benefit the responsibility is assumed. In other cases 
the absence of proximity serves to limit the duty of care in order to prevent the 
undesired situations described by Judge Cardozo.
Accordingly, should there be no contract, no fiduciary relationship, or no 
voluntary assumption of liability, to establish proximity is not easy. Bingham L.J. in 
Caparo ruled that the duty to use due care in a statement arose from the fact that the 
person who made it knows, or ought to know, that others, being his neighbours in this 
regard, would act on the faith of the statement being accurate.61
However, the House of Lords later in Caparo rejected the concept of 
"proximity" as unhelpful and replaced it with:
"the defendant knew that his statement would be communicated to the 
plaintiff, either as an individual or as a member of an identified class, 
specifically in connection with a particular transaction or transactions of a 
particular kind."62
Looking into the substance of this requirement, it just reflects the general description 
of proximity in this kind of case, not a real objection to the traditional standard. 
Moreover, in McNaughton Papers Group v. Hicks Anderson,63 the Court of Appeal 
held that the purpose for which the statement was made, the purpose for which the 
statement was communicated, the relationship between the maker or giver and the
60 Id., p. 581.
61 [1989] 2 W.L.R. 316, p. 327.
62 [1990] 1 All E.R. 568, pp. 576, 589, 607.
63 [1991] 1 All E.R. 134.
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recipient, the size of any class to which the recipient belonged, the state of knowledge 
of the maker or giver, and any reliance by the recipient should all be considered when a 
duty of care was decided. All these show that it may be impossible to have a very 
general rule to decide whether there is a duty of care; to make a judgment on a case by 
case basis may be a more appropriate solution.
For example, in Morgan Crucible Co. Pic. v. Hill Samuel Bank Ltd. and others, 
in the Chancery Division,64 Hoffmann J. (now Lord Hoffmann) ruled that the profits 
forecasts, financial statements and defence documents of the target company prepared 
by the directors and financial advisers were to advise the shareholders of the target 
company whether to accept the bid, and they were not meant for the guidance of the 
bidder. Hence, it was held that there was no sufficient proximity between the directors 
and financial advisers of the target company and the bidder to give rise to a duty of 
care. While at the Court of Appeal,65 the court clearly indicated that there may be 
proximity. The attitude of the House of Lords so far is inclined to admit such a duty of 
care only in exceptional cases. Why the House of Lords holds this position is not clear. 
It may base its position on a traditionally restrictive attitude towards negligence cases; 
possibly it prefers to trust the Secretary of State and the Financial Reporting Review 
Panel to correct misleading statements rather than allow too many actions for 
compensation to be commenced.
All these cases reveal the phenomenon of judicial opinion affecting the judgment 
on the existence of proximity. The precedents seem to leave the courts in later cases 
flexible in order to make different decisions which meet a policy choice. For example, 
in securities transactions cases, when negligent misrepresentation comes into play, the 
court may be reluctant to find proximity between the parties. Consequently, the
64 [1990] 3 All E.R. 330.
65 [1991] 1 All E.R. 148. The proximity resulted from the fact that the defendants voluntarily 
provided the advice. See A.J.E. Jaffey, The Duty o f Care, 1992, p. 136.
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legislature faces a policy choice as regard whether to enact a statutory duty of care in 
this kind of case.66
6.3.1.3 The Inconsistency of the Rules
As discussed above, the responsible persons under the FSA 1986 are liable to any 
investor who acquires the securities in reliance on the contents of the listing particulars 
if there is any misrepresentation in such particulars. Since academics67 alledge that the 
definition of acquiring securities is quite broad, thus the later purchasers from the first 
subscribers and their derivative purchasers are also under the protection of the Act, 
though, possibly not so for market purchasers. Nonetheless, it is submitted that no 
distinction between the subsequent purchasers mentioned above and market purchasers 
should be drawn. The reason proposed is quite simple: seeing the impossibility of 
identifying securities in the market, market purchasers who make such investment 
decisions in reliance on the listing particulars are no different from those who also rely 
on the listing particulars and purchase from the first subscribers. Accordingly, either 
both groups should be protected, or neither should be protected.
However, when continuous disclosure comes up for discussion, the courts show 
a reluctance to impose any broad liability and, an inconsistency between the statutory 
liability for listing particulars and the common law liability as regards the continuous 
disclosure is unearthed.
The publication of listing particulars is for the purpose of protecting investors in 
the primary market, while the publication of continuous financial statements and 
business reports is to protect investors in the secondary market. Securities do not end
66 See A.J.E. Jaffey, id., chapter two.
67 Louis G. Doyle, supra note 40, p. 71; Robert R. Pennington, The Law o f Investment Markets, 1990, 
pp. 322-3; Stephen Griffin, “Damages for Misstatements in Company Prospectuses”, in Company 
Lawyer, 12(11), 209-12, 1991, p. 211.
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their life after their public offer; the transaction market (the secondary market) is no 
less important than the primary market. If investors in the primary market are well 
protected, why should investors in the secondary market be treated any worse? It is 
even more odd when investors may be shareholders as opposed to strangers. In other 
words, in the secondary market, those who claim compensation may already be 
shareholders or public investors, while in the primary market, subscribers will not 
become shareholders before they enter into transactions.
Why does the law give persons relying on listing particulars privileges? Why do 
the courts declare that it is unreasonable and unjust to impose unlimited liability 
towards unlimited number of persons about continuous disclosure while the 
interpretation of the statute about listing particulars marches in an entirely opposite 
direction? It is submitted that the historical factors and the varying attitudes of 
legislature and judges towards different markets contribute to such a discrimination.
First, historically, scandals of fraud on listing particulars or prospectuses have 
attracted the most attention. This has caused legislature and judges to make great 
efforts to reduce them. The contents of listing particulars or prospectuses are 
becoming more and more complete, the civil liabilities increasingly strict. By way of 
contrast, the regulation on continuous disclosure seems to be lagging behind.
Second, regulation of disclosure on the secondary market has long been ill 
established. For example, in the UK, if a publicly issuing company is not a listed 
company, regardless of its size, there is no disclosure obligation imposed on it beyond 
annual statements. If no mandatory disclosure is introduced, no civil liability for its 
contravention will be established. In such a situation, continuous disclosure, as a 
whole, could be said to be ignored even though for listed companies more obligations
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of disclosure are imposed. Therefore, the legislature would not consider making the 
violation of continuous disclosure obligation a civil liability, and the courts will try to 
limit these makers' liability as they always do in other negligence cases.
Is the ignoring of liability in continuous disclosure a defect? Not necessarily. 
From the policy point of view, to limit liabilities, sometimes, may be more just. 
However, the issue of consistency should be taken into account, especially as the 
secondary market is no less important than the primary market; the interpretation of 
statutory liability for compensation in respect of listing particulars should be 
reconsidered together with the common law liability to continuous disclosure.
6.3.2 Taiwan
First, since civil liability is imposed with respect to both prospectuses and continuous 
disclosure documents, here it is unnecessary to separate the discussion into two parts 
as was done for English law. Second, all these liabilities are codified, so the existence 
of a duty of care is beyond doubt. The only questions left are the scope of responsible 
persons and the scope of protected investors.
a. who is responsible
The persons responsible for any misrepresentation in prospectuses are clearly set out 
by Article 32 of the SEL. Generally, as in English law, persons who sign prospectuses 
are liable. Therefore, issuers and their responsible persons68 are liable; any employees 
of the issuer, accountants, lawyers, engineers, and also any other persons who sign 
prospectuses. What marks the difference from English law is that in Taiwan such a 
liability is imposed on underwriters as well. The purpose of bringing underwriters into
68 Responsible persons, according to Article 8 of the Company Law, are directors, promoters, and 
supervisors.
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line with all persons mentioned above is to enhance the protection of investors by 
means of making the financial intermediary discharge their duty of supervision. 
Underwriters have been widely employed to assist companies to publicly distribute 
their securities. Although they are not responsible for drafting prospectuses, most 
prospectuses are sent out by them. That is why the law makes them responsible for 
misrepresentation in prospectuses.
Regarding continuous disclosure documents, however, the Act provides only that 
financial statements or any other business reports filed or published by an issuer should 
not contain any misrepresentation. It does not specify the responsible persons. Some 
academics69 interpret this Article as meaning that only issuers are responsible persons. 
Disagreement, however, exists. Theoretically, prospectuses and continuous disclosure 
documents share the same function — providing investors with information about the 
corporate financial and business position. By inference, if persons signing prospectuses 
are liable, they should be held liable when they sign continuous disclosure documents. 
Issuers (usually, companies) themselves cannot draft any documents because they are 
not natural persons. All their business is run by directors and employees. Therefore, it 
is submitted that any persons who make such misrepresentation should be liable.70 
Since continuous disclosure documents do not go through underwriters, underwriters 
are outside the scope of regulation in this case.
As noticed earlier, whether the liability for compensation in continuous disclosure 
documents is a negligence liability or more than that is uncertain. Here is revealed 
another possible line of thought on the question. It may be helpful to characterise this 
liability as a negligence or gross negligence one and limit the liability on the basis of the 
frequency of published documents. Prospectuses are published only when public issues 
of securities are concerned, while the continuous disclosure documents are published
69 Yin-chao L ai, supra note 19, Vol. 4, 1991, p. 109.
70 Cf. American Securities Exchange Act 1934, § 18(a).
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monthly, quarterly, half-yearly, and annually. If such a heavy liability is imposed on 
every occasion, costs may be too high and the liability may be too great. Accordingly, 
a new standard could be propounded. It is proposed that the criteria be based on 
whether the said document is audited. An audited document is always prepared more 
carefully, thus persons who draft it know the importance of the documents. Making 
them liable if they are at fault is not too burdensome. On the other hand, if a document 
is not audited, it is usually a monthly, quarterly, or immediate report. Persons who 
make it cannot be expected to exercise such a high standard of care because the work 
is urgent or more routine. Unless guilty of wilful conduct or gross negligence is found, 
they should not be condemned.
b. to whom they are liable
If the UK POS Regulations and the FSA 1986 are compared with the Taiwanese SEL, 
it is easy to see that in Taiwanese law the term "bona fide" accompanies the word 
denoting the counterparty all the time. At the stage where prospectuses should be 
delivered to investors, only a bona fide counterparty can bring an action for damages; 
when misrepresentation in prospectuses is in question, only bona fide counterparties 
have a right of action for damages; in continuous disclosure, bona fide buyers and 
sellers are investors being protected; and in the case of insider dealing, bona fide 
counterparties exclusively have a right for compensation.
The substantive meaning of such wording relates to the burden of proof laid on 
plaintiffs as part of the normal civil procedure rules. Generally, in provisions regarding 
civil liabilities the bona fides of plaintiffs is presumed.71 Defendants cannot dispose of 
liabilities unless they can prove that plaintiffs knew the true information. This is to 
protect plaintiffs by means of shifting the burden of proof. Even though it is only a
71 Cf §§ 11, 12(2) of the Securities Act 1933 (the USA).
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procedural change and has nothing to do with the substance of liabilities, it does have a 
certain effect on the latter.
By using the term expressly, however, the statute means that good faith is not 
presumed; plaintiffs have to prove that they did not know the true position (where the 
delivery of prospectuses and insider dealing are concerned) or that they were unaware 
that there was any misrepresentation in prospectuses or continuous disclosure 
documents when they entered into the transactions. This, doubtlessly, weakens the 
function of the civil liability provision and should be amended.
The next problem which arises from the provisions is the scope of 
"counterparties". This problem does not arise where the continuous disclosure 
obligation and insider dealing are taken into account. Because in these situations, any 
buyers or sellers during the period when information is misrepresented or omitted fall 
into the scope of protection, and are all named as counterparties. However, if 
prospectuses are considered, the scope needs to be clarified.
Does the word counterparty mean subscribers or broader acquirers? Academics 
interpret the term "counterparties" as being subscribers who subscribe directly from 
issuers or underwriters.72 According to Article 31, the persons who are entitled to 
obtain prospectuses are subscribers. When the liability directly comes from the 
contravention of this requirement, to interpret the scope of protected investors as 
being only these persons is not unsound. However, to restrict the civil liability to the 
above mentioned persons when misrepresentation is committed in prospectuses shows 
the policy is still quite conservative in this field, and academics do not wish to extend 
it. Unfortunately, the courts have not yet come across this problem and have had no 
opportunity to interpret the law.
72 Yin-chao Lai, supra note 19, Vol. 2, p. 252.
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6.3.3 Conclusion
The comparison between English and Taiwanese law shows that Taiwanese law 
generally provides more comprehensive protection for investors as regards 
misrepresentation in securities transactions and insider dealing. Taiwanese law imposes 
civil liability on responsible persons regarding continuous disclosure and insider 
dealing, while the UK in this respect lags behind.
However, Taiwanese law does not shift the burden of proof concerning the 
mental condition of plaintiffs (bona fide or not); moreover, Taiwanese law, unlike the 
UK, which extends protection to acquirers, also limits the scope of investors to those 
subscribers who subscribe directly from issuers and underwriters. If the consistent 
policy of Taiwanese law is to extend the scope of protection, it should extend the 
scope of protected investors to cover any purchasers who rely on the prospectus in 
question. If it is true that the UK government wishes to enhance the protection of 
investors as it has often proclaimed, it may have to amend its current law with respect 
to continuous disclosure as well as insider dealing.
6.4 Causation
So far as misrepresentation is concerned, a plaintiffs subjective state of mind, reliance, 
is required to establish the liability for damages. Nonetheless, it seems that English law 
opts for presuming its existence whenever there is a misrepresentation and reverses the 
burden of proof to a defendant. In contrast, Taiwanese law does not take such a 
position; a plaintiff needs to prove his reliance. On the other hand, reliance could also 
be shown by having recourse to "the fraud on the market theory" and accordingly, the 
defendant would not be able to get rid of his liability by showing that the plaintiff did 
not read the misrepresented documents. Such a new theory could possibly find its 
applicability in the UK, but possibly not in Taiwan. Besides the element of reliance, a
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further examination of the causal links between the wrong and reliance and reliance 
and investment is called for. The fact that a specific plaintiff relies on the 
misrepresentation could not by itself predict that the same result would occur to other 
people. A causal connection that a reasonable person would normally rely on the same 
statement should also be demonstrated in the meantime. It is submitted that English 
law follows the foreseeability theory in the case of negligence while taking the 
directness theory in fraudulent situations. Taiwanese law applies the adequacy theory 
in all events.
6.4.1 Introduction
Causation serves two functions in civil liability for damages: being an element of 
establishing liability and helping to decide the extent of liability (the measure of 
damages). At this stage, where establishing civil liability is the subject, the first function 
of causation will be examined. The second is left to the section which deals with 
measure of damages.
In misrepresentation, causation as an element required on the part of the plaintiff 
is referred mainly to the problem of "reliance". Because of the misrepresentation, the 
plaintiff put his faith in it; because of such reliance, the plaintiff made the investment 
decision. Causation as an element required generally in establishing liability for 
compensation is related to the causal theories. These two problems are separately dealt 
with in sections 6.4.2 and 6.4.4.
6.4.2 The Fraud on the Market Theory
The requirement of reliance in fraudulent securities transactions cases is as tricky as it 
normally is in other fraudulent cases. Normally, no plaintiff in front of the courts would 
admit that he did not read or rely on the information documents. But the question
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could also be presented in the way that as most investors do not read these disclosure 
documents, reliance has become an insurmountable burden for the plaintiff to prove. 
Either way, reliance relates to a plaintiffs subjective state of mind which by no means 
is easy to prove or overturn.
In the United States as the class action is permitted in securities cases, one 
further difficulty arises. Class action is allowed in the USA because it helps to simplify 
the complicated situation of actions which involve too many plaintiffs. But if every 
plaintiff is required to prove his state of mind, individual issues would then have 
overwhelmed common ones which are the prerequisite of the class action. 
Accordingly, some courts have developed the "fraud on the market" theory to resolve 
this problem,73 and the Supreme Court in Basic Inc. v. Levinson74 for the first time 
adopted this theory.
The tenor of "the fraud on the market theory" is that even if investors have not 
read the documents in question, this will not bar them from compensation. When they 
purchase or sell securities, they rely on the securities prices which fully reflect all 
available information in the market, including the wrong one. Hence, investors rely on 
the information in the form of relying on securities prices. Reliance is thus established
73 The strongest support for a generalised ffaud-on-the-market theory comes from the Ninth Circuit. 
See case Blackie v. Barrack 524 F. 2d 891 (9th cir. 1975). About this theory, see Daniel R. Fischel, 
"Use of Modem Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities", in 
38 The Business Lawyer, 1-20, 1982; Note, "Fraud-on-the-Market Theory", 95 Harvard L. R., 1143- 
61, 1982; Bradford Cornell and R. Gregory Morgan, "Using Finance Theory to Measure Damages in 
Fraud on the Market Cases", 37 U.C.L.A. L. R., 883-924, 1990. As regards the opinion against this 
theory, see Paul G. Mahoney, supra note 24. It is said that the fraud on the market theory has no 
application in the primary public distribution of securities since in the USA the burden of proof 
regarding reliance has been shifted to the defendant. However, this does not seem to be right. Because 
even if the burden has been shifted, the problem whether the defendant can get rid of his liability by 
proving that the plaintiff did not read any documents still remains unresolved. Also, in the case where 
the burden of proof has not been shifted to the defendant, whether the plaintiff can prove his reliance 
simply by referring to the fact that he is a price-taker merits discussion.
74 485 U.S. 224 (1988). The facts of the case in brief are as follows. Some one-time shareholders in 
Basic, a publicly held firm whose shares were traded on the New York Stock Exchange, brought a suit 
against the officers and directors for fraudulently denying the on-going merger negotiation of 1977 
and 1978. Because in 1978 Basic announced that its board of directors had approved a tender offer by 
Combustion Engineering for all of Basic's outstanding shares. These shareholders had sold their 
shares between the denial and the announcement date and thus suffered the loss.
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by showing the fact that transactions were made and the information was material. In 
other words, the Supreme Court substituted the reliance on market integrity for the 
actual reliance on disclosed information and the plaintiff had to demonstrate that the 
market was efficient.
The argument developed by the Supreme Court has been criticised by the 
academics that it misplaced the emphasis on an efficient market although the academics 
agree with the theory itself.75 They correctly point out:
"This focus on efficiency unnecessarily complicates the inquiry. The Court 
erred by confusing reliance on the efficiency of the market in pricing certain 
securities with reliance on the fact that important news will be incorporated 
quickly into the prices of affected securities."76
"Thus, plaintiffs must prove to courts applying the fraud-on-the-market 
theory ... that the particular misrepresentation or omission pertained to the 
kind of information that the market find worthwhile to decode."77
Therefore, even if a market is efficient in general terms, a specific security is not 
necessarily efficient unless many and constant transactions are made in the market. It is 
also true that even if a security is hotly traded, a specific piece of information may not 
be reflected in the price efficiently. For example, according to the method of event 
study, the information concerning a stock split is always quickly reflected in the price 
of the securities in question while the quarterly earnings announcement is not so 
reflected.78 Accordingly, the "efficiency" which should be taken into account is not the 
efficiency of the whole market; it is rather, the efficiency of a specific piece of 
information regarding a specific kind of securities.
75 See Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, "Good Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of the 
Fraud-on-the-Market Theory", in 42 Stanford L.R., 1059-92, 1990; Jonathan R. Macey, Geoffrey P. 
Miller, Mark L. Mitchell, and Jeffry M. Netter, "Lessons from Financial Economics: Materiality, 
Reliance, and extending the Reach of Basic v. Levinson", in 77 Virginia L. R., 1017-49, 1991.
76 See Macey, Miller, Mitchell, and Netter, id., p. 1021.
77 See Macey and Miller, supra note 75, p. 1084.
78 Id., pp. 1083-5.
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Would this theory have its application in the UK or Taiwan, especially when the 
application of reliance meets some difficulties? In principle, two issues are taken into 
account here. First, the problem of the burden of proof; second, whether defendants 
can be freed from liabilities by means of showing that plaintiffs did not read any 
misstated documents.
(1) the United Kingdom
First of all, it is obscure whether the burden of proof regarding reliance has been 
shifted from plaintiffs to defendants. Section 150(1) of the FSA 1986 states that 
persons responsible for listing particulars are liable to pay compensation to any 
acquirers who suffer loss "as a result of' any untrue or misleading statement in the 
particulars or the omission from them. The section does not manifestly allocate the 
burden of proof concerning reliance on either side. However, the term "as a result of' 
does imply that misrepresentation in listing particulars is the cause, while the loss is the 
consequence. In between them, reliance is the connection. The question is who bears 
the obligation to prove it.
Section 151(5) of the FSA 1986 (also reg. 15(5) of the POS Regulations) states 
that the defendant can dispose of his liability if he can prove that at the time of 
transaction the plaintiff knew the truth. Supposing that the burden of proof is on the 
plaintiff, then in which case the general rule that the defendant can prove otherwise is 
self-evident; s. 151(5) looks redundant. On the contrary, if the defendant, rather than 
the plaintiff, bears the burden, the plaintiff is presumed to put his faith in the 
documents and the defendant cannot be exonerated unless the contrary is shown; s. 
151(5) in this situation makes sense. Hence, once there was a material 
misrepresentation in listing particulars and the plaintiff suffered loss, the reliance of the
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plaintiff was presumed.79 However, this does not imply that the plaintiff has no 
obligation to prove the causation. It is submitted that "the requisite causation will be 
established if the price at which he (the plaintiff) acquired the securities was materially 
affected by the defect of the failure to correct it".80 Such reasoning seems to support 
the fraud on the market theory discussed above.
Second, it is questionable whether the defendant can free himself by proving that 
the plaintiff never read the document. As a general rule, that the plaintiff does not 
know the truth arises from two situations: he reads the documents and believes them, 
or he never reads the documents and is unaware of anything. In the latter case, there is 
in effect no reliance and in the normal legal sense, no causation exists. Even though the 
plaintiff "need not establish that he relied on the particular defect in the sense that he 
observed it and took it into account or that he even read the particulars containing the 
defect",81 it is uncertain if the causal connection could be broken by evidencing the 
actual non-reliance.
According to the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis and the fraud on the 
market theory analysed above, prices fully reflect all available information, misleading 
or not. It follows, persons who purchase or sell securities from the market might claim 
that they rely on securities prices even though they do not read any documents (the 
fraud on the market theory).
Such an argument can be supported when that particular misleading disclosure or 
omission has been efficiently reflected in the securities prices. Thus, it may not be
79 It is argued that the statute has in fact changed the common law rule evolved by Smith v. Land and 
House Property Corporation (1884) 28 Ch.D. 7, p. 16. "... I cannot quite agree with the remark of the 
late Master of Rolls in Redgrave v. Hurd, that if a material representation calculated to induce a 
person to enter into a contract is made to him it is an inference of law that he was induced by the 
representations to enter into it..." per Bowen L.J.
80 See E.Z. Lomnicka and J.L. Powell, Encyclopedia o f Financial Services Law, 1987, Vol. 1, p. 2- 
537.
81 Id.
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necessary to require plaintiffs to read the disclosure documents; their purchase and sale 
will prove their reliance on prices, and indirectly on the documents provided that they 
can prove that concerning that information, the market is efficient. In consequence, it is 
for the defendant to prove that the plaintiff knew the information to be misleading, i.e. 
no reliance on securities prices, or the market itself is not in fact efficient.
Nonetheless, difficulties may arise when the primary market is concerned. In 
some situations, there may be no market prices upon which investors can rely. For 
instance, there are no market prices formed yet at the time of first public distribution of 
securities. It is also possible that the subscribing or purchasing price is not the same as 
the price of the same securities in the market. The latter situation happens often as 
companies usually discount securities prices at initial public offer.82 Thus, it is hard to 
say that plaintiffs rely on any market "prices". It is the selling price in which they put 
faith; unfortunately, such a price could be arbitrary and has no direct connection with 
information. In addition, s. 151(5) of the FSA 1986 does not mention that defendants 
can dispose of liabilities by proving the plaintiffs did not read disclosure documents. 
Therefore, if the point of view that plaintiffs need not put reliance on information by 
reading documents is taken in a situation where the application of the fraud on the 
market theory has difficulties, the reason supporting this view may be that the 
legislature intends to maintain the integrity of the market.83
In insider dealing or misleading information in continuous disclosure documents, 
plaintiffs should be entitled to claim that they rely on securities prices. No civil liability 
so far on insider dealing has been introduced, and only in very limited situations will 
the liability as regards continuous disclosure documents be admitted. Consequently, the 
fraud on the market theory deriving from the ECMH has limited effect on English law.
82 See T.J. Jenkinson, Initial Public Offerings in the UK, USA, and Japan, 1990; Saul Levmore 
"Efficient Markets and Puzzling Intermediaries", 70 Virginia L. R., 645-67, 1984.
83 See Louis Loss, Fundamentals o f Securities Regulation, 1988, p. 961. This can be shown by 
comparing s. 150(5) of the FSA 1986 with § 11 of the USA Securities Act 1933.
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(2) Taiwan
The Taiwanese SEL does not shift to the defendant the burden of proof concerning 
reliance. Plaintiffs have to show that they rely on misleading information at the time of 
transactions. The problem is whether investors in Taiwan can apply the fraud on the 
market theory in actions for damages arising from prospectuses, misleading continuous 
disclosure documents and insider dealing, and thus discharge the onus of proof by 
merely proving that the securities price has reflected the misleading information 
efficiently.
As a general proposition, manipulation is widely spread in the market; any trivial 
rumors can affect the market seriously.84 This could be interpreted as that the market is 
not efficient because the securities prices are not driven to the level where they would 
reflect the securities value. This, however, also demonstrates that the Taiwanese 
markets are highly sensitive in some situations. Thus, it fully depends on whether the 
plaintiff can prove that the particular misleading information or omission was 
incorporated into securities prices at the time the plaintiff traded in the market. If the 
plaintiff can, there is no reason why the plaintiff could not rely on "the fraud on the 
market theory". Neither is it reasonable to allow the defendant to prove that the 
plaintiff in fact did not read the documents. The defendant has to demonstrate either
84 On October 6, 1994, the stock index slumped by 291.27 points, dropping further by 674.17 points 
in the succeeding three days to 5982.15. This was caused mainly for two reasons: the rumor that the 
Chinese leader, Xiaoping Deng, was dead, and a securities broker (Hong Fu) controlled by the Hualon 
Group failing to honour a $200m cheque. The latter incident "highlights the fragility of the financial 
system's regulatory framework and its ability to cope with the underground financial markets". See 
Financial Times, October 10, 1994. The Taiwanese financial market is easily manipulated; therefore, 
a minor default of payment by one broker could greatly affect the stock market. Since the broker Hong 
Fu is controlled by the Hualon Group, and the controller of Hualon in turn is a very famous player on 
the Stock Exchange, his default would easily cause investors to over react and lead the stock index to 
slump. This is only one example among numerous events; hence, the writer cannot agree that 
Taiwanese Stock Exchange has been an efficient market. However, the fraud on the market theory is 
not necessarily inapplicable.
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that the plaintiff knew the truth or that the specific piece of information was not 
efficiently reflected in the securities price at the time the plaintiff traded in the market.
6.4.3 Theories on Causation
The theories of causation require discussion at this point for two reasons: (1) to 
complete the examination of causation in establishing liability; (2) more important, at 
the stage of deciding the extent of liability (measure of damages), such theories provide 
the tests for remoteness of damages. Damage regarded as too remote will not be 
compensated. Therefore, the theories of causation and remoteness of damages diffuse 
into the problem of measuring damages, and play a very important role.
To analyse these theories will help to identify the conflicts between the method 
currently well appreciated by the courts regarding the measure of damages in securities 
transactions cases and the theories adopted by the courts as regards the remoteness of 
damages in other cases. Therefore, it is justifiable to analyse these theories here 
because they have been developed under the title of causation and remoteness of 
damages.
The five main theories (notions may be a preferable term in common law 
countries85) of causation have been advanced; they are "condition", "adequacy", 
"foreseeability", "directness", and "statutory purpose" theory (or notion).
85 One prominent distinction between civil law and common law is that the former usually tries to 
construct a scientific theoiy for causation, while the latter entrusts causation to common sense and the 
normal "notions" of judges. See H.L.A. Hart and Tony Honore, Causation in the Law, 2nd ed., 1985, 
pp. 1, 432.
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6.4.3.1 The Theory of Conditions and the Adequacy Theory — the Civil Law 
System Approach
(1) the theory of conditions
The theory of conditions was first expounded by the Austrian writer Glaser in 1858; 
von Buri in Germany adopted a similar view later on.86 Any factors which contribute to 
the incidence of damage are all treated as the "conditions" of damage in question. 
Nonetheless, not every condition is necessarily a cause. Only those conditions which 
cannot be eliminated in thought without eliminating the consequence also, are 
equivalent and therefore regarded as causes of the consequence {conditio sine qua 
non)P
According to the theory of conditions, any person who is responsible for any 
condition (cause) should be held liable for the final damage entailed, no matter how 
remote it may be. The threshold of this theory is too low and the extent of liability is 
too broad. It causes people to feel unsafe because they may have to compensate some 
victims not yet imagined. Thus, this theory has been abandoned as the only test of 
causation, at least in Germany and Taiwan regarding civil cases.
It has become customary for English law to analyze the question of causation in 
two stages.88 The first, factual causation, is essentially concerned with whether the 
defendant's fault was a necessary "condition" of the loss occurring.89 The test used is 
the 'but-for" cause: would the loss have been suffered but for the relevant act or 
omission of the defendant? If the answer is negative, then factual causation is 
established. So far as this stage is concerned, the condition theory is decisive.
86 H.L.A. Hart and Tony Honore, id., pp. 442-3.
87 By Tamowski, in id., p. 444.
88 Markesinis and Deakin, supra note 2, p. 163.
89 Id.
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However, the second stage, legal cause, shows that English law is not satisfied with the 
condition theory; any factual causation which cannot pass the test of legal cause is left 
as "mere condition" and liability will not be attached. As regards legal cause, it will be 
discussed below.
(2) the adequacy theoiy
In 1886 German scholar J. von Kries propounded that any given contingency would 
not be regarded as the adequate cause of damage unless it was a sine qua non of the 
damage and it increased the objective probability of the damage (one of the probability 
theories).90 Put another way, the defendant is held liable if his act or omission is the 
adequate cause of the damage. This theory immediately became the leading authority in 
civil cases in Germany thereafter until it was amended in the middle of 20th century.91
Like other theories of causation, this theory is too obscure and abstract. First, the 
meaning of increasing the objective probability of the damage is unclear. It has been 
suggested that whether the probability of the damage has been increased depends on 
whether a most prudent man who has a very sound knowledge of law and 
generalisations, both before and after the wrong act, would predict the increase in 
probability.92 This is abstract. Second, in certain situations, for justice, there must be 
some exceptions when the theory is applied. For example, A negligently left the hole he 
dug on the road uncovered. B intentionally pushed C down the hole. According to a 
most prudent man's knowledge, A has increased the probability of C's injury. But it 
would be too severe if A is held liable for C's harm. Third, the judgment of increasing 
the probability may turn on the judge's subjective impression. Sometimes, sympathizing
90 Hart and Honore, supra note 85, p. 469. See also Shih-hsiong Tseng, The Principles on Damages 
(Sun Hai P'ei Ch'ang Fa Yuan Li), 1986 (reprinted), p. 63.
91 See Tseng, id.
92 A.M. Honore, "Causation and Remoteness of Damage", in International Encyclopedia o f 
Comparative Law, Torts, Andre Tunc (ed.), 1981, pp. 48-52.
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with the plaintiff will give judges the impression that the wrongdoing adequately 
caused the damage.
6.4.3.2 Foreseeability and the Direct Consequences Theory — English Law 
Approach
(1) the foreseeability theory
The traditional standard for determining legal causation in English law is whether the 
defendant can reasonably foresee the ensuing damage in question, i.e. the foreseeability 
theory (it is also one of the probability theories). Interestingly, the foreseeability theory 
sprang from French law; the French Civil Code, Article 1150 provides:
"A debtor is held only to damages which are foreseen or which could have 
been foreseen at the time of the contract, when it is not by his willfulness that 
the obligation is not executed."93
Nonetheless, Article 1151 adds:
"Even in the case where the inexecution of the agreement results from the 
willfulness of the debtor, damages are to include with regard to the loss 
incurred by the creditor and the gain of which he has deprived, only what is 
an immediate and direct consequence of the inexecution of the agreement."
This shows that French law imposes stricter liability on those with greater fault and 
adopts the direct consequences theory in the situation of wilful breach of contract (and 
torts as well by extension).94
In English law, this theory was first formulated in a case involving breach of 
contract. Hadley v. Baxendale95 firmly stated that liability for damages in breach of
93 The English translation, see The French Civil Code, translated by John H. Crabb, 1995.
94 A.M. Honore, supra note 92, p. 43.
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contract would be established only when the damage was within the reasonable 
contemplation of the defendant at the time of the contract being made. The court 
stated such an objective standard regarding causation:
"Where two parties have made a contract, which one of them has broken, the 
damages which the other party ought to receive in respect of such breach of 
contract should be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either 
arising naturally, i.e. according to the usual course o f things, from such 
breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been 
in the contemplation o f both parties at the time they made the contract, as the 
probable result of the breach of it." (emphasis added)
Since the loss of profits in this case could not be reasonably foreseen by the 
defendants, the defendants were not liable to this special damage. Unlike the French 
Civil Code, the English courts did not distinguish willful from negligent breach of 
contract. Causation in both situations was judged by foreseeability.
What degree of likelihood of the loss occurring was required to have been 
reasonably contemplated by the defendant at the time of the contract was clarified in 
Heron IP 6 to some extent. It was ruled that a higher degree of likelihood than required 
in tort should be required. And in Parsons v. Uttley Ingham,91 Orr L.J. and Scarman 
L. J. made it clear that a serious possibility was required in breach of contract.
The reason for emphasizing the likelihood degree of foresight is because for a 
long time, the foreseeability theory was believed to apply in both cases of torts and 
breach of contract. In between Re Polemis98 and Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd. v. 
Morts Dock & Engineering Co. Ltd., the Wagon Mound (No. I),99 the direct 
consequences theory was propounded and some change was made, which will be
95 (1854) 9Exch. 341.
96 [1969] 1 A.C. 350.
97 [1978] 1 All E.R. 525.
98 [1921] 3 K.B. 560.
99 [1961] A.C. 388.
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discussed below. Here it is sufficient to state that the rule in Re Polemis for torts of 
negligence was overruled by the Wagon Mound (No. 1). It was held by the court that 
the liability of the defendant in negligence turns on whether the damage in question can 
be reasonably foreseen by him at the time of wrongdoing. Moreover, only a slight 
possibility of foreseeability is required. This case left the courts great discretion as to 
the judgment on the possibility of foreseeability. Therefore in the Wagon Mound (No. 
2),100 the Privy Council exercised such discretion (based on further evidence) and ruled 
that the defendant should be able to foresee the possibility of fire.
Both the Wagon Mound (No. 1) and (No. 2) were concerned with the same 
event. While an oil-burning vessel, of which the defendants were the charterers, was 
taking in bunkering oil in Sydney Harbour a large quantity of the oil was, through the 
carelessness of the defendants' servants, allowed to spill into the harbour. The escaped 
furnace oil fouled the wharf of the plaintiffs of the first case. The defendants told such 
plaintiffs that the oil could not be ignited. The plaintiffs thus continued their welding 
work on two ships owned by the plaintiffs of the second case. But the oil was ignited 
by a piece of molten metal and the wharf and the two ships were consumed in the 
resulting fire.
In the Wagon Mound, (No. 1), the Privy Council held that the defendants could 
only reasonably foresee the result of fouling the wharf, not the fire; therefore, they 
were not liable; while in the Wagon Mound, (No. 2), the Privy Council instead ruled 
that the defendants could reasonably foresee the fire which destroyed the two ships and 
then judged in favor of the plaintiffs, the owners of the two ships.
Here a question is raised: why could the so-called "objective test" (the requisite 
foresight being that of a reasonable man) be judged in such a different way in the two 
cases which bore the same story? The reason for this is that in the Wagon Mound (No.
100 [1967] 1 A.C. 617.
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2), the foreseeability of the fire was thought by the Privy Council to be sufficiently 
established, while in the Wagon Mound (No. 1) it was not. But still, since Walsh J. in 
the Wagon Mound (No. 2) (who based his judgment on the same evidence as that of 
the Privy Council) held that there was no foreseeability of fire, while the Privy Council 
treated the evidence as sufficient to prove the foreseeability. It was revealed that the 
objective test was influenced by judges' subjective notions.101 This unearths part of the 
puzzle which is brought about by the concept of "causation"; its obscurity and 
uncertainty. The term "foreseeability" is not exactly objective. On the contrary, it is 
vague.102 The vagueness of this criterion partly springs from the fact that it is not only 
a causal test but also a theory where legal policy and justice come into play.103 
Therefore, based on policy choice, the courts may in some cases hold that there is 
foreseeability but not in other situations.104
The vagueness may also result from the fact that the courts sometimes mingle the 
practical foreseeability with the theoretical foreseeability when they simply refer to the 
term "foreseeability". In some situations, the defendant has no foreseeability about 
certain damage until the wrong has happened. In this situation, there is no 
foreseeability in a practical sense; but the foreseeability may exist in a theoretical 
sense.105 For example, in Re Guardian Casualty Co.,106 a taxi-cab was forced across 
the pavement and against the stone stoop of a home due to the defendant's negligence. 
While the cab was being removed, without any negligence on the part of those helping, 
a stone which had been loosened by the impact of the cab fell and struck the deceased 
who was standing 20 feet away. The defendant was held liable because he must have
101 See R.W.M. Dias, "Trouble on Oiled Waters: Problems of the Wagon Mound (No. 2)", in C.L.J. 
62-82, 1967, p. 63.
102 See K.M. Stanton, The Modern Law o f Tort, 1994, p. 96; Nicholas J. Mullany, "Common Sense 
Causation - an Australian View", in 12 O.J.L.S., 431-9, 1992.
103 Lord Denning M.R. in Lamb v. Camden London Borough Council [1981] 1 Q.B. 625, p. 637 et 
esq.; March v. Stramare, [1991] 171 C.L.R. 506, pp. 531, 533.
104 Lamb, id.
105 See Hart and Honore, supra note 85, p. 266.
106 (1938) 253 App. Div. 360, 2 N.Y.S. 2d. 232.
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foreseen the removal of the vehicle and he in turn might reasonably have anticipated 
the drop of the stone.
In fact, the defendant could not foresee all these until the accident really 
happened. Thus, his foreseeability was constructed in a theoretical sense rather than in 
a practical sense. Accordingly, if the courts follow the theoretical foreseeability, the 
liability will be extended;107 on the contrary, if the practical foreseeability is adhered to, 
the extent of liability would be limited.108 This causes the term "foreseeability" to be 
unclear and subjective because of the different usage of the courts. The English court 
in Cambridge Water Co. v. Eastern Counties Leather p ic .109 seems to suggest that the 
Wagon Mound rule should also be applied to strict liability torts.
As such it is submitted that the foreseeability theory is now used in both breach 
of contract and non-intentional torts (negligence torts and strict liability), but with a 
different standard of foreseeability. In breach of contract, a higher standard is required, 
while in the latter situation, the law is more generous to the plaintiff.
(2) the direct consequences theory
The direct consequences theory seems to be applied in tort cases, especially in deceit 
and probably other intentional tort probably.110 It was established by the leading case 
Re Polemis,m  where the defendant was held to be liable for all damage directly 
coming from his wrongdoing.
Literally, this theory is very favorable to a tortfeasor because it suggests that the 
tortfeasor be only liable for his own conduct. However, the English courts extended it
107 Chapman v. Hearse [1961] 106 C.L.R. 112.
108 Woods v. Duncan [1946] A.C. 401, 431, per Lord MacMillan.
109 [1994] 1 All E.R. 53.
110 Andrew Burrows, Remedies for Tort and Breach o f Contract, 2nd ed., 1994, p. 45.
111 [1921] 3 K.B. 560.
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to a great extent in Re Polemis. Thus, this standard of liability becomes quite strict for 
the defendant, seeing that he has to make all damage good even if it is not within his 
expectation. The justification of the theory lies in the distribution of risks and loss. 
Neither party can predict the incidence of damage, so it may be just to order the party 
who has greater fault, or in another way, who initiated the trouble (especially, in deceit 
and other intentional tort, the tortfeasor must have been willful when he committed the 
tort) to bear the ensuing consequences of his own fault rather than to leave it with the 
innocent party, who suffered loss but had no chance to prevent it in advance.
In Re Polemis, the direct consequences theory was not limited to deceit and 
other intentional torts; it was supposed to be applied to negligence torts as well 
because Re Polemis itself was a negligence case. It was not until the Wagon Mound 
(No. I )112 that the courts overruled it. As indicated above, the Wagon Mound (No. 1) 
insisted that the foreseeability theory should be used instead of the direct consequences 
theory.
It is, however, unclear whether in the Wagon Mound (No. 1) it was thought that 
all torts should be treated in the same way. As the Wagon Mound (No. 1) is a 
negligence case, it was fair to say that at least it re-established the test of causation for 
negligence torts. In the later case, Doyle v. Olby (a case of deceit),113 the Re Polemis 
rule was employed by the court as follows:
"That the proper measure of damages for deceit, ... was all the damage 
directly flowing from the tortious act of fraudulent inducement which was not 
rendered too remote by the plaintiffs own conduct, whether or not the 
defendants could have foreseen such consequential loss."
Therefore, the direct consequences theory has not been wholly abolished; at 
least, in the case of deceit, it is still the effective rule.
112 [1961] A.C. 388.
113 [1969] 2 Q.B. 158.
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6.4.3.3 The Statutory Purpose Theory (The Scope of Rule Theory)
In Germany, the statutory purpose theory has become increasingly popular used by the 
courts to supplement the adequacy theory.114 It was first propounded by Ernst Rabel 
and further interpreted by von Caemmerer.115 Its tenor is that causation should be 
determined from the meaning and purpose of the tort statute in question, especially the 
interest which the statute intends to protect.
The real purpose of this theory is to break free from the conceptual puzzles. The 
real function of causation is to "limit" liability, both as to its establishment and as to its 
scope. If all the theories about causation cannot provide a satisfactory solution, it may 
be more appropriate to embark on this problem "by deploying the meaning and range 
of the particular rule, not by applying the general causal formulae."116
According to the statutory purpose theory, compensation will not go to the 
extreme of all or nothing. For instance, if A negligently hurts B, A's liability is 
concerned with B's injury; should B have committed suicide therefrom, A's liability for 
this later damage is not established because from the point of view of the tort statute, 
there is no liability. The tort statute which imposes liability on A regarding his 
wrongdoing of injuring B is to protect any person from being unlawfully injured by 
another, not from getting hurt by himself. It is fair to claim that this theory is not a 
"causal" test but a policy choice.
114 See Hart and Honore, supra note 85, p. 476.
115 See Tseng, supra note 90, p. 79. The other title of this theory is the "scope of the rule" theory, 
which can be found in English law, e.g. Gorris v. Scott (1874) L.R. 9 Ex. 125 and Close v. Steel 
Company o f Wales [1962] A.C. 367. See F.H. Lawson and B.S. Markesinis, Tortious liability for 
unintentional harm in the Common law and the Civil law, Vol. 1, 1982, pp. 123-5.
116 See E. Rabel, "Die Grundzuge des Rechts der unerlaubten Handlungen", Deutsche Ref. Int. Kong. 
Rechtsvergl, 1932. In Hart and Honore, supra note 85, p. 476.
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It is well accepted that in principle a cause must be a conditio sine qua non. 
From that point, however, different jurisdictions adopt different legal causal theories, 
such as the direct consequences theory, the adequacy theory, or the foreseeability 
theory. But all these legal causal theories are no longer purely "causal" tests. Legal 
policy and justice have been the real subject matter of judgments when the extent of 
liability has been decided under the guise of "causation" and "remoteness of damages", 
or "the breaking of the chain of causation". That is why some academics suggest 
adopting the scope of rule theory instead continuing the confusion of causation with 
legal policy or justice. Since most of the types of civil liability in securities 
misrepresentation cases have been introduced by statute, to decide the extent of 
liability the statutory purpose theory would be very helpful.
6.4.4 Causation on Non-Disclosure and Untrue Statements
(1) the United Kingdom
In Doyle v. Olby, the direct consequences theory in Re Polemis was followed. In other 
words, the establishment of liability regarding causation will depend on whether the 
harm in question has a direct relationship with the event.117 Coming to the substance of 
"directness", it is an unclear word. In this context, "directness" is limited to the 
meaning of not being too remote. The defendant in a deceit case is exposed to a 
greater scope of liability because of his malice. Therefore, in a case of intentional 
misrepresentation, whenever a plaintiffs reliance is the direct consequence of a 
defendant's misrepresentation and the investment decision is the direct consequence of 
the reliance, there is sufficient causation.
On the other hand, in case of negligent misrepresentation and issuers' absolute
liability (in listing particulars) the Wagon Mound (No. 1) will be followed, i.e. the
117 See also East v. Maurer [1991] 1 W.L.R. 461; Davis v. Churchward (May 6, 1993) (unreported); 
P.A. Chandler, "Fraud: Damages and Opportunity Costs", in 110 L.Q.R., 35-8, 1994.
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general rule of causation for torts of negligence. That is, causation would be 
established if a defendant can reasonably foresee that a plaintiff will make an 
investment decision in reliance on the misrepresentation he made. Only a slight 
possibility of damage needs to be foreseen.
(2) Taiwan
The situation in Taiwan is simpler. Only one standard of causation is adopted, the 
adequacy theory. Therefore, willful and negligent conduct is all judged by the same 
test. If a defendant's conduct is the adequate cause of a plaintiffs reliance and the 
investment decision therefrom, i.e. the conduct increasing the objective probability of 
the occurrence of reliance and investment, there is causation.
6.5 Damage
Whether there is damage and to the extent to which there should be compensation for 
it are closely related to the definition of damage. If damage is defined as the difference 
between the position of the injured party as it is and what it should have been had the 
wrong not been committed, this inevitably will take many supervening events into 
account (denominated as the subjective standard). If damage is defined so as only to 
focus on the objective loss of assets (denominated as the objective standard), this will 
exclude many supervening events. As regards damages in securities transactions cases, 
the English courts have constantly followed the objective standard while Taiwanese 
law inclines to the subjective test. An inevitable contradiction (which will be addressed 
in section 6.6) between the objective test taken by the English courts in securities cases 
and the rules adopted by the same courts in respect of foreseeability and directness of 
other forms of tortious damage is revealed. On the other hand, the subjective test in 
Taiwanese law also possesses its drawbacks. All these problems may end up with
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better solutions if the statutory purpose of securities damages is taken into 
consideration and this again is analysed in section 6.6.
6.5.1 The Kind of Damage discussed in this Chapter
The final element of civil liability is damage. Damage, as noticed above, is common to 
all three sources of civil liability, torts, breach of contract, and statutory liability. After 
fault and causation are established, if there is no damage, no civil liability will ensue 
though sometimes nominal damages will be available in English law. Hence, damage is 
indispensable in establishing civil liability. However, to define and identify it are by no 
means easy.
Damage is generally classified as pecuniary and non-pecuniary. Pecuniary damage 
ordinarily arises from property damage or financial loss, but it is not unusual to see it in 
personal injury cases. For example, medical expenses and loss of earning ability both 
stem from personal injury.
Non-pecuniary damage, on the other hand, is not physical and cannot be measured 
by any objective standard, for example, pain, mental distress, and discomfort. It always 
accompanies physical or psychological harm. In the English law of contract and tort, 
non-pecuniary damage may be redressed on the basis of deceit or breach of contract.118 
This is quite different from Taiwanese law; the Taiwanese Civil Code enumerates all 
situations where non-pecuniary damage is recoverable,119 namely injuries to rights of 
personality, name, life, body, health, freedom, and reputation. Following this, any non- 
pecuniary damage resulting from financial loss is not protected by law. In other words,
even if financial loss is inflicted by deceit, no non-pecuniary damage such as mental
distress is remedied.
118 Shelley v. Paddock [1980] Q.B. 348; Saunders v. Edwards [1987] 1 W.L.R. 1116; Hobbs v. L.S. W. 
Ry (1875) L.R. 10 Q.B. I l l ;  Bailey v. Bullock [1950] 2 All E.R. 1167.
119 Articles 18, 19, 194, and 195.
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Therefore, for the sake of clarity, this thesis deals only with the problem of 
pecuniary damage in actions for compensation on the basis of securities 
misrepresentation and leaves out non-pecuniary damage which may be available under 
English law but is definitely not allowed in Taiwanese law.
6.5.2 The Meaning of Damage
Damage exists, it is said, in two forms: (1) the reduction of a plaintiffs total amount of 
wealth, and (2) the increase that should have, but did not, take place to the total 
amount of a plaintiffs wealth. In Twycross v. Grant,120 the plaintiff was induced to 
purchase shares which were overpriced. The damage incurred by the plaintiff was the 
reduction of his total wealth (the first form): money was spent in exchange for much 
less valuable shares. By contrast, if the defendant bragged that the price would double 
within a short period of time, then the plaintiff also suffered the expectation damage 
(the second form).
This general description is not new to English law; common law usually refers to 
the terms "expenses", "cost of repair or replacement",121 and "loss of business 
profits".122 The expenses caused by torts are usually for keeping the damage within 
reasonable bounds;123 for example, when a plaintiffs motor car is destroyed, he may 
have to hire or buy one in its place. Or, when the plaintiff is injured, he may have to 
take medical care to prevent infection. Both of these cause the reduction in the 
plaintiffs total wealth. A plaintiff may also suffer the loss of business profits. For 
instance, the plaintiffs factory was burned; the plaintiff lost the business profits which
120 (1877) 2 C.P.D. 469.
121 See Lim Poh Choo v. Camden and Islington Area Health Authority [1980] A.C. 174; Tate & Lyle 
Food and Distribution v. Greater London Council [1982] 1 W.L.R. 149.
122 See The Kate (1899) 15 T.L.R. 309; Liesbosch Dredger v. S.S. Edison [1933] A.C. 449; The Soya 
[1956] 1 W.L.R. 714.
123 See Harvey McGregor, McGregor on Damages, 15th ed., 1988, p. 75.
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he should have made if the wrong had not been committed.124 It is, however, true that 
a general and comprehensive definition of damage has never be found in either the 
English or Taiwanese jurisdictions. Even so, three possible ways of describing damage 
are suggested.
First, damage represents an "interested relationship" between the victim and the 
incident. That is, damage is a lost "interest" suffered by the victim because of the 
incident in question (damage = interest). The so-called "interest" is the difference of 
the total amount of wealth that the victim has after the incident and what he should 
have had if the incident had not happened.125
For example, A has a book worth £10, B likes it very much and offers £20 to buy 
it. If C destroys A's book, the interest A loses is £20, not £10, because A's interest in 
the book is £20. The difference of A's total wealth before and after C's wrong is £20. 
By contrast, A's house is going to be demolished in a few days. If B sets fire to the 
house, A's lost interest is not great at all, seeing that his interest in the house is trivial. 
Thus, A is entitled to the difference between his position as it is and as it would have 
been had the wrong not occurred.
Accordingly, in actions for compensation for securities misrepresentation, a 
plaintiffs lost interest will be the difference between the total wealth that he has after 
the transaction and what he would have had if the transaction had never been carried 
out. Therefore, if a plaintiff finally sells the securities at a good price resulting from 
other economic factors, there is no damage at all. If, on the contrary, the price falls 
further due to reasons other than the misrepresentation, the defendant is liable for all 
consequential loss. The difference between the purchase price and the sale price
124 Some academics interpret loss as being that the plaintiff has to purchase a substitute or the 
plaintiff would have been wealthier if the wrong had not been committed. See S.M. Waddams, The 
Law o f Damages, 2nd., 1991, p. 1.
125 This is called the theory of interest or the theory of difference in Germany, first propounded by F. 
Mommsen, Zur Lehre von dem Interesse, 1855. See Tseng, supra note 90, pp. 27 et seq.
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provides a good reference for measure of damages. If the plaintiff does not sell his 
securities at the time of judgment, the value of the securities is decided by the price at 
that time. This definition of damage conceptually can be understood as a ” subjective” 
test of damage. To call it subjective is because all the plaintiffs special circumstances 
are taken into account, not only the market price at the time and place of the wrong. It 
is possible to argue that this description is an "objective" test; however, such an 
argument is only meaningful in the sense of evidence and proof.
Such description of damage has its shortcomings. A defendant may need to 
account for any unexpected fall of the price; he may also dispose of liability due to the 
thereafter prosperous market. To define damage in this way may cause difficulties 
where measure of damages is concerned because of unfairness in certain situations.
Second, damage can be described as a harm done to an injured party's specific 
assets. The victim is entitled to the value of his assets at the time and place when 
damage was incurred.126 This description thus solves the problem mentioned above. 
For example, A negligently destroyed B's stamps which B had collected for many 
years. B's sadness was disclosed by newspapers; as a result, hundreds of stamps were 
sent to B by sympathisers. If the difference of B's wealth before and after the wrong is 
calculated, B suffered no loss. But, if the damage is measured as what the "objective 
asset test" describes, B's damage is what he lost at the time and place of destruction. 
Consequently, the second description excludes the special situation of B (i.e. people 
gave him stamps). Given the examples about the book and house mentioned above, the 
damage to the book is £10 and the damage to the house is its objective market value. 
Based on this description, the fact that the injured party sold the securities at a good 
price should be excluded when damage is assessed. According to the tenor of this
126 This is called the "objective asset test" (or the theory of items) in Germany, advanced by P. 
Oertmann, in Die Vorteilsausgleichung beim Schadensersatzanspruch, and R. Neuner, Interesse und 
Vermogensschaden. See Tseng, supra note 90, pp. 35 et seq; A.M. Honore, "Causation and 
Remoteness of Damages" in International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Torts, Andre Tunc 
(ed.), 1981, p. 81.
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description, it is appropriate to call it an "objective" test, because it does not take 
cognisance of the plaintiffs special circumstances.
Third, if the right of compensation has been introduced into the statute (or in 
common law, established by cases) it may be apposite to look into each statutory 
provision (or in common law, the rules developed by cases) to define damage.127 For 
example, in torts, no one should harm others; thus damage caused by wrongful 
conduct covers medical expenses because in ordinary situations, the victim needs 
medical treatment. It also includes the loss of earning ability if the victim has normal 
work; the pain and discomfort sustained are also within the scope of the statute 
(common law rule) because it is the natural result of this kind of harm.
In securities transactions, the statutes intend to prohibit any fraud or negligent 
misrepresentation which naturally results in financial loss to plaintiffs. Therefore, 
financial loss is the damage defined in this situation. As regards its scope, statutory 
purpose should also be resorted to. This will be discussed later.
Accordingly, if the first and second descriptions cannot provide a good guideline 
in securities cases, it would be more just to define damage by means of analysing the 
purpose of statutes than by applying the traditional definition of damage which fits 
traditional civil actions for damages, but not securities cases.
The English courts, as noticed above, adopt the direct consequences theory and 
foreseeability theory in deceit and negligence torts respectively. Under these two 
theories, whether a plaintiffs special circumstances should be taken into account 
depends on whether the harm resulting from such circumstances is the direct 
consequence of the defendant's wrong or could have been reasonably foreseen by the 
defendant. Comparatively, the foreseeability theory is a more "objective" test, seeing
127 See supra notes 114, 115.
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that it stresses a reasonable man's foreseeability. The harm coming from the wrong will 
be compensated provided that it is foreseeable. As regards securities misrepresentation 
cases, English law adopts the second description of damage (the objective asset test) 
revealing a possible contradiction between the theories employed by the English courts 
in normal cases (the direct consequences and foreseeability theories) and the measure 
of damages where the second description of damage is followed; this will be analysed 
in due course below.
In Taiwan, the objective test in principle is not adopted.128 Therefore, in 
securities actions, what one needs to consider is whether the first description of 
damage can solve the problem and whether there are any other criteria that should be 
taken into account.
Finally, one has to bear in mind that damage is changeable as time passes. In 
securities transactions, especially as listed securities, prices of securities are changeable 
every minute. After the plaintiff purchases or sells the securities in question, the price 
will go up or down quickly; therefore, the plaintiff may sell the securities at a good 
price and in consequence suffer no loss at all. It is also possible that after the purchase, 
the price keeps falling which exaggerates the loss. Because of such a characteristic of 
price movements, the question of how to identify damage becomes very difficult, and 
in fact this may turn on a policy choice.
If the plaintiff finally gets a handsome return, will the loss previously existing at 
the time of transaction be remitted? On the other hand, if the loss is aggravated by 
other factors, should the defendant be liable for it as well? These questions relate to 
two issues: (1) the time of measuring damages; and (2) the intervening events. Damage
128 See Tseng, supra note 90, p. 44. Only in exceptional cases, is the theory of items adopted. For 
example, Article 638 of the Civil Code provides that in carriage, damage coming from loss, injury, or 
delay of goods shall be calculated in accordance with the value which the goods would have had at the 
place of destination and at the time when delivery was due.
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varies from time to time; the use of different times leads to different measures of 
damages. Damage is also affected by factors other than the wrong. Hence the statutory 
purpose may be very helpful in this aspect.
6.6 Measure of Damages
Once a defendant's liability is established, that is, all elements such as fault, causation, 
and damage present, the measure of damages is the sequential problem remaining to be 
discussed.
First, as mentioned above, causation serves two functions: one of them concerns 
the establishment of liability, which has been analysed in section 6.4; the other is to 
provide criteria for judging the extent of liability, which is focused on in this section. 
Second, section 6.5 has dealt with the problem of defining and identifying "damage". 
Several issues were left to this section, i.e. the time for measuring damages and the 
effects of supervening events, i.e. those occurred between the date of the transaction 
and the date of judgment. These combined with the theories of remoteness of damages 
mentioned above are discussed here to resolve the problem of measuring damages. 
Third, the extent of damage varies from person to person as noticed above in section 
6.5 concerning the definition of damage; this is also closely connected with measure of 
damages.
If all damage directly flowing from the wrong is what the law intends to 
compensate, then the scope of liability may be extended to cover the damage that the 
defendant cannot foresee at the time of the wrong (the subjective test). On the other 
hand, should the law emphasise its deterrent function, it may not order the defendant 
to compensate for damage which the defendant cannot reasonably foresee in advance 
(the objective test). In securities cases, the capital sources of purchasing securities, the 
purpose of purchasing securities, and the proportion of investment in securities to the
278
Chapter Six: Civil Liability
total wealth of the plaintiff are all special circumstances to an investor that outsiders 
cannot fully perceive. Only if the subjective test is adopted would these heads of 
damage be considered. Therefore, the choice of different standards to measure 
damages fully lies in the policy of risk distribution and the nature of compensation. No 
choice is absolutely correct.
According to English law, damages in securities cases are measured by 
calculating the difference between the price paid by the plaintiff for the securities and 
the "real" value of the securities at the time of allotment or transaction plus interest 
(the out-of-the-pocket method) (an objective standard). It will be argued that this 
simple formula deserves criticism. Following the distinction between normal damage 
and consequential damage made by the thesis and the proposed specific characteristics 
of securities transactions, the time for measuring damages should be set at the time for 
judgment. Only in this way can the hypothetical concept of the real value of securities 
be estimated more reasonably, and contradictions between this rule and the theories of 
foreseeability and directness can be addressed.
In addition, even though English law may maintain its objective test, it is due to 
the specific characteristics of securities transactions rather than due to the concept that 
economic loss is less important than physical loss. Taiwanese law adopts the subjective 
standard for measuring damages by calculating the difference between the price paid 
and the selling price or the market price (if not yet sold) of the securities at the time of 
judgment. This rule obviously suggests a lack of understanding of the characteristics of 
securities transactions and signals a need to cut out supervening events when 
measuring damages.
It is submitted that in light of the statutory purpose of compensation provisions, 
for both jurisdictions, consequential loss should be ruled out from the scene as much as 
possible on the one hand, and based on the causation theories (i.e. in the UK, the
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directness and foreseeability theory; in Taiwan, the adequacy theory) and 
characteristics of securities transactions, damages are estimated in the sense that we do 
put the plaintiff back into the position that he would have been in had the wrong not 
happened on the other hand.
6.6.1 The Effective Law
Unlike the American Securities Act 1933 which codifies the measure of damages in 
relation to false registration statements,129 the UK POS Regulations 1995, FSA 1986, 
and Taiwanese SEL do not specify the methods to measure damages. In such a 
situation, the general rules of measuring damages prevail.
(1) the United Kingdom
As discussed in section 6.2, securities cases about misrepresentation are characterised 
either as common law or statutory torts. Therefore, the tortious measure of damages is 
adopted by the courts. Compensation is aimed at putting the plaintiff* into the position 
that he would have been in if the misrepresentation had not been made to him. And 
generally the courts calculate the difference between the price paid by the plaintiff for 
the securities and the "real" value of the securities at the time of allotment (or 
transaction) (price paid less value received) plus interest as the damages.130 It is called 
the out-of-pocket method.
129 § 11(e) of the Securities Act 1933. It provides that a plaintiff may recover such damages as shall 
represent the difference between the amount paid for the security (not exceeding the price at which the 
security was offered to the public) and (1) the value thereof as of the time such suit was brought, or (2) 
the price at which such security shall have been disposed of in the market before suit, or (3) the price 
at which such security shall have been disposed of after suit but before judgment if such damages shall 
be less then the damages representing the difference between the amount paid for the security (not 
exceeding the price at which the security was offered to the public) and the value thereof as of the 
time such suit was brought. But a defendant need not account for the depreciation of securities prices 
not resulting from his false statements provided that he can prove this.
130 Davidson v. Tulloch (1860) 3 Macq. 783; Twycross v. Grant (1877) 2 C.P.D. 469; Edgington v. 
Fitzmaurice (1885) 29 Ch.D. 459; Cockett v. Keswick [1902] 2 Ch. 456; McConnel v. Wright [1903] 
1 Ch. 546; Clark v. Urquhart [1930] A.C. 28; Doyle v. Olby [1969] 2 Q.B. 158; Smith New Court 
Securities Ltd. v. Scrimgeour Vickers (Asset Management) Ltd. and Another [1994] 4 All E.R. 225.
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As a general rule, English cases in respect of securities transactions choose the 
time of the transaction as the time for calculating damages. This rule, however, is valid 
only in the context of "normal damage". The English courts sometimes also take into 
account the events happening after the transaction date and other losses, i.e. 
consequential damage. Nonetheless, in securities transactions cases, regarding price 
movement losses, it is not practical to distinguish consequential damage by price 
movement from normal damage by price movement because: (1) the real value of 
securities at the time of transaction could not be assessed unless events occurring later 
are considered; (2) all losses resulting from price movement are "normal" if there is a 
causal connection between the misrepresentation and the price movement; (3) the 
English courts have never specifically segregated part of the price movement loss as 
consequential loss. For the sake of clarity, we therefore define all price movement 
losses which have a causal connection with the misrepresentation as normal damage; 
and we classify the non-price movement losses and abnormal price-movement as 
consequential damage. The subsequent discussion of time for measuring damages is 
based on such a definition.
Moreover, in normal cases of tortious misrepresentation, the English courts
distinguished two methods of assessing loss: (1) no-transaction method; and (2)
successful-transaction method. The first method refers to cases where, if
misrepresentation had not been made, there would have been no transaction. The
second method applies in cases where, if misrepresentation had not been made, there
would have been a transaction but on different terms. The courts order the defendant
to compensate the plaintiff for all the loss he has suffered if the case falls within the
category of the no-transaction method, i.e. market fluctuation is included (the
subjective test). According to the successful-transaction method, the loss is assessed at
the date of the transaction (the objective test).131 However, it is of great interest to
notice that in securities transactions cases, such a distinction has never been mentioned
131 See Hayes v. James & Charles Dodd [1990] 2 All E.R. 815 (per Staughton LJ, at pp. 818-9); 
Banque Bruxelles Lambert SA v. Eagle Star Insurance Co. Ltd. [1995] 2 All E.R. 769.
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by the courts in the context of measuring damages even though the courts sometimes 
have had to consider the contention that the plaintiff would not have entered into the 
transactions but for the defendant's wrong.132
The real difficulties that the courts have not in fact tried to solve are: (1) What is 
the "real" value?; (2) Why have the courts chosen the time of allotment (or transaction) 
as the time for measuring damages?;133 (3) What is the effect of events happening later 
but affecting the price of securities?; (4) How about the plaintiffs personal special 
circumstances which may enlarge or reduce the amount of damage?
In an early securities case, the courts dealt with the first question by saying that 
the market value of securities was only evidence of value, not proof of it, and if the 
jury thought that the quotation on the Stock Exchange did not show a real, but only an 
illusion, value caused by the fraudulent nature of the prospectuses, the jury should 
ignore it.134 It is true that market value can be influenced by all publicly available 
information, including a false one, so that the "price" is not reliable in this sense. The 
courts also state that events happening later such as the insolvency of the company can 
be taken into account when the "real" value is measured135 because it helps to prove 
that at the time of allotment or transaction the shares were in effect valueless. 
However, the courts still do not provide clearer criteria as regards estimating the "real" 
value. As the Court of Appeal in Smith New Court Securities Ltd. v. Scrimgeour 
Vickers136 admitted, information would be quickly reflected in securities prices. In 
other words, the court implicitly accepted the ECMH. Then, the "real" value of 
securities should be the price the shares would fetch in the market if the truth was
132 Comparing Banque Bruxelles with Smith New Court ([1994] 4 All E.R. 225, CA) demonstrates 
this strange phenomenon. In Banque, the court held that "it seems clear on English authority that 
effect will be given to the restitutionary principle by awarding the buyer all he has paid out less what 
he has recovered" and this includes the later fluctuations in the market. On the other hand, in Smith 
New Court the later market fluctuations were excluded.
133 "...in practice, as a matter of convenience, the date is taken to be that of the day after the posting 
of the notice of allotment." See Stevens v. Hoare [1904] 20 T.L.R. 407, p. 409.
134 Twycross v. Grant, supra note 130, pp. 489-90.
135 Peek v. Derry (1887) 37 Ch.D. 541, p. 592.
136 [1994] 4 All E.R. 225.
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revealed and all the facts were known. The problem is what is the best date to see the 
effect the true information would have had on securities prices if it had been disclosed 
at the time of the transaction or allotment.
Would this be the day of disclosure of the real information? or several days after 
disclosure? Theoretically, the court may use the day of disclosure or several days after 
the disclosure as the time of deciding the real value of the securities. What the court 
should consider is market efficiency, i.e. in the specific case how long it takes for the 
market to react and for the price to reflect the information. This may vary from case to 
case but the fundamental rule is the same.
What would happen if there is no "exact" disclosure day? For instance, if a 
company has been under merger negotiations for a long time and instead of releasing 
such information, when asked about the negotiation, it denies that there is any meeting 
about the merger. Nonetheless, one day the company suddenly declares that it has 
entered into the merger agreement and the securities price goes up substantially. B is 
an investor who sells his shares at the time the company denies the merger information. 
The real value of the securities at the time of transaction cannot be known, because at 
the time of disclosure there is an agreement, while at the time of transaction there is 
only a possibility to merge.
Another example may be given. An oil company publicly declares that its oil well 
has an 80% possibility of striking oil. Later the company is informed by some experts 
that there is only a 30% chance, but the company chooses to keep silent. B buys the 
shares at the time the company knows the true information. The oil well finally turns 
out to be barren and the price of shares falls to zero. What is the real value of securities 
at the date of transaction? it is not susceptible of proof. Clearly, real value itself is a 
very artificial concept.
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The more difficult problem is: how can one be sure that there are no other factors 
which cause the price to fall further? How can these factors be determined?137 This is 
why the English courts have chosen the date of allotment or transaction as the basis of 
measuring real value in order to exclude all other factors which affect securities prices 
but have no bearing on the false statement. This, nonetheless, reveals that the courts 
have ignored a very important problem, namely that the real value is quite hypothetical 
and cannot be measured unless the prices at the time of disclosure, or even before or 
after it are taken into account, and the real challenge here should be to find a more 
rational way to exclude the non-false-statement factors.138
Another questionable position adopted by the English courts is why the date of 
allotment or transaction is taken as the date for calculating damages. As noticed above, 
damage is changeable perpetually, especially in securities markets. The implication of 
this position is that the courts treat damages in securities transactions in a way 
analogous to the valuation of physical goods without allowing for the much greater 
price fluctuation in securities markets. Can this be challenged on the bases of the 
characteristics of securities transactions which will be examined below? This point also 
relates to the third and fourth questions proposed above; that is, will supervening 
events and a plaintiffs personal special circumstances affect the measure of damages?
137 In American law, a suggested method for the estimation of real value is by applying the "market 
model". Since that there are two lines: a value line and a market line; before the false statement is 
made, two lines coincide. However, the market prices are inflated because of the misrepresentation. 
Based on the ECMH, when the real information is disclosed, these two lines will converge. Then, in 
between this period, to subtract the real value from the market price at the date of purchase will be the 
damage. Hence, how to calculate a value line is a clue to the measure of damage. A value line is not 
estimated based on either the assets value or the earning data of the company; it is, rather, drawn by 
calculating securities prices data adjusted for movement in the market and industry, which can be 
done by financial experts. Sneed J. in Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corporation (541 F.2d 1335 
(1976)) advocated this method. See also Philip J. Leas, "The Measure of Damages in Rule 10b-5 
Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities", in 26 Stanford L. R., 371-98, 1974, pp. 386 et seq.; Jared 
Tobin Finkelstein, "Rules 10b-5 Damage Computation: Application of Financial Theory to Determine 
Net Economic Loss", in 51 Fordham L. R., 838-70, 1983.
138 Id.
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(2) Taiwan
The Taiwanese Civil Code provides: "Unless otherwise provided by law or by contract, 
damages should be limited to compensation for the losses incurred and gains 
foregone."139 Despite the word of limitation, it seems that Taiwanese law aims to 
compensate the whole damage suffered by the plaintiff,140 including loss accruing from 
his special circumstances. This is very different from that of English law. Taiwanese 
law does not specify the time for measuring damages, but it is obvious that it would 
not be the date of transaction or allotment. Moreover, if the law had intended to 
exclude loss arising from the special plaintiffs circumstances, it would have specifically 
spelt this out.141
Therefore, it is uncertain as to how the courts would measure damages in 
securities cases. As a matter of principle, the time of the conclusion of the oral 
proceedings in the last appeal where facts of cases are allowed to be considered by the 
courts (in Taiwan, this generally is the end of the oral proceedings in the court of 
appeal) is the proper time for the calculation of damages. Therefore, if plaintiffs have 
sold securities by this date, the selling prices provide good criteria; if not, then the 
market prices at that time will be considered.142
The courts will not consider whether the market price is a real one; nor will they 
take into account the ECMH and observe the price fluctuation during the period in 
question143. Accordingly, the defendant may not be liable to pay any damages at all if 
at the proper date the price of the securities is higher than the purchasing price; the
139 Article 216(1).
140 See Tseng, supra note 90.
141 Article 638 as mentioned above (supra note 128) is a good example.
142 In case Hsin Po (74 nien tu su tzu ti 15521 hao, 21.4.1986), the court measured the damage by 
subtracting the sold price from the purchasing price and then added interest since the last day of the 
oral proceedings. From a comparative point of view, this kind of method was also seen in American 
cases. See Chasins v. Smith Barney & Co. (438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970)). Thomas J. Mullaney, 
"Theories of Measuring Damages in Security Cases and the Effects of Damages on Liability", in 46 
Fordham L. R., 277-94, 1977, p. 287.
143 See Hsin Po, id.
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defendant also may have to account for more damages if other factors come into play. 
Whether the defendant can prove that there is no causal connection between a further 
drop in the price and the original wrong is unclear. But since he may be relieved of 
liability for compensation when the price goes up, by inference, he should not be 
allowed to avoid the full liability when the price goes down further.
6.6.2 The Characteristics of Securities Transactions
Three characteristics that we suggest here are discussed sequentially below.
(1) parties to securities transactions are uncertain and sometimes numerous
In transactions where many people become involved, it is impossible to know the 
background of the opposite party and the special circumstances surrounding him. This 
emerges even more clearly when the parties are uncertain. For instance, for purchasers 
of tickets in cinemas or railway stations, identity is not usually the concern of the seller. 
If tickets are lost, there is no remedy. The same characteristic is found in securities 
transactions. The public distribution of securities always attracts a great number of 
investors to take part. Further, transactions on the stock exchange are made by 
unspecified investors (in the sense that computers do the "match"). These factors will 
influence the relationship between the transaction parties; that is, no one has any 
specific knowledge about the other; the only connection between them is the exchange 
of securities and money. Therefore, one party's personal circumstance such as capital 
sources and purpose of investment are outside the other party's knowledge.
(2) the objects of securities transactions are "intangible"
Although certificates of securities are pieces of paper and are tangible, the main objects 
transferred are the "rights" attached to the certificates and a right is intangible. 
Shareholders and debenture holders on the bases of these rights can claim dividends
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(given a declaration of dividends) and interest payment; they can also vote if the rights 
so provide.
The importance of securities certificates in the modem world is decreasing. In 
particular, the highly developed technology permits electronic transactions without any 
necessity for the parties to hand over securities certificates. This emphasises more than 
ever the conceptual difference between damage to the value of securities and damage 
to tangible property. Consequently, it would be surprising that the same method is 
used to measure financial loss in securities transactions and loss flowing from physical 
damage.
(3) securities flow like water
Although not negotiable instruments, securities do share certain characteristics with the 
former. First, securities, especially as they are traded on the stock exchange, are 
expected to transfer often like negotiable instruments in commercial usage. Hence, for 
the sake of enhancing such "movements", damages in principle should be measured by 
way of focusing on the value of securities. Any intention to recover the consequential 
damage will be an obstacle to constant movements of securities.
Second, civil law countries, for example Germany and Taiwan, treat these 
transactions (the transactions of negotiable instruments and securities) as "juristic acts 
regardless of their cause". Therefore, the legal reason which leads the holder to possess 
the instruments is not taken into account when the question of whether the holder 
owns the legal title of the instrument is decided. Based on such a characteristic, holders 
who obtain securities in good faith will get a good title. This device is intended mainly 
to help the flow of securities. Consequently, where measure of damages is concerned 
in securities cases, it may be appropriate, from the policy point of view, to exclude any 
consequential losses from the transactions in question.
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As mentioned earlier, English law in most cases is inclined to use the objective 
standard (foreseeability) to measure damages. According to the three characteristics 
examined above, in securities transactions, individuals' special circumstances cannot be 
appreciated by opposite parties to the transactions. Hence, although financial loss is 
always connected with the change to the whole wealth of a plaintiff, it would be more 
appropriate to exclude those personal special circumstances which in normal situation 
cannot be foreseen by defendants in these transactions.
6.6.3 Specific Problems regarding Measure of damages
Based on the analyses of the characteristics of securities transactions and the problems 
identified in section 6.6.1, it is now appropriate to consider the inter-relationship of all 
these problems and propose certain solutions.
(1) subjective circumstances v. objective standard
Damage in securities misrepresentation cases can be classified into two groups: 1. 
damage flowing from non-price movements losses (for example, for the purpose of 
obtaining capital to purchase securities, the interest payment of the loan or the loss of 
selling a house at a lower price suffered by the plaintiff); 2. damage flowing from price 
movements losses; this in turn can be divided into two classes: a. loss caused by 
misrepresentation and b. loss caused by supervening events (e.g. economic depression, 
the intentional or negligent conduct of third parties). The first group of damage will be 
analysed (consequential damages springing from the personal specific circumstances).
a. the United Kingdom
First, the second function of causation is to govern the measure of damages. Securities 
transactions are rapid and often involve substantial amounts and the damage they entail 
is "pure economic" loss. Therefore, it has been long established that the defendant
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must take the plaintiff as he finds him144 in physical damage cases is not applicable 
when pure economic loss is in issue. This results from the Liesbosch145 case which was 
decided before the rule in Re Polemis (1921) was overruled by the Wagon Mound 
(1961); this explains why the concept of "reasonable foreseeability" did not form part 
of the court's reasoning. It was, however, obvious that the court distinguished Re 
Polemis on the ground that in Liesbosch the economic loss suffered by the plaintiff was 
an extraneous matter (personal financial weakness) which was not covered by Re 
Polemis where the causation problem was concerned with immediate physical 
consequences.
This attitude was criticised in the Wagon Mound (No. 1), where it was reasoned 
by the court that such distinction has no justification. Nonetheless, in H. Parsons Ltd. v 
Uttley Ingham & Co. Ltd., Lord Denning intended to establish a standard for causation 
not based on whether the event was a breach of contract or a tort, but rather on 
whether the damage was physical or economic.
This raises a further problem. Lord Denning drew a distinction between physical 
damage and pure economic loss in breach of contract. He held that in relation to 
physical damage, both in breach of contract and in tort the same test of remoteness 
applied, that is, the tort test; the defendant was liable for all damage which could 
reasonably have been foreseen at the time of the breach as a possible consequence of 
the breach even if the possibility was only slight. For economic loss, on the other hand 
a stricter test was substituted; the defendant was liable only if the damage was such 
that at the time of the contract he could reasonably have contemplated it as a serious 
possibility in the event of a breach occurring. Lord Denning did not make it clear what
144 This is the eggshell skull rule. In Smith v. Leech Brain & Co. Ltd. ([1962] 2 Q.B. 405) the court 
reached a position that it was sufficient to establish liability so far as the defendant could foresee the 
type of damage, the extent of which did not need to be foreseen, if physical damage was taken into 
account. In this case, the plaintiff was burned on the lip by molten metal, inducing a cancer from 
which the plaintiff died. The court made the defendant responsible for the plaintiffs death.
145 [1933] A.C. 499.
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standard he would apply if damages for pure economic were claimed in tort. But he 
appears to envisage a stricter criterion of causation in pure economic loss cases. One 
academic suggests that from Lord Denning's point of view, in the case of pure 
economic loss, the stricter standard of contract should be applied, or, if there is any 
contractual or like relationship between the parties and economic loss is involved, the 
contract standard should be preferred.146
The point made by Lord Denning seems difficult to justify. First, why should it be 
more difficult to obtain compensation for pure economic loss than for physical damage 
if they are both "normal" forms of damage? The missing point in Lord Denning's 
opinion and the Liesbosch case is that the real problem is not whether the damage is 
physical or economic; the real problem is whether the damage is normal or 
consequential. In most cases, pure economic loss or financial loss is consequential 
damage, which may not be foreseen by the defendant at the time of the wrong because 
it usually relates to the plaintiffs special circumstances. Hence, the reason for non­
compensation is not because the damage is economic, the real reason being that it is 
too remote.
But in securities transactions, pure economic loss is the normal form of damage, 
and physical damage is the exception, in contrast to ordinary cases. What a subscriber 
or purchaser loses is the higher price he paid for the securities; thus, he suffers pure 
economic loss which can easily be reasonably foreseen by the persons who made the 
misrepresentation. The plaintiff should be compensated as far as this damage is 
concerned. On the other hand, supposing that the victim got his capital, for the sake of 
purchasing securities, from a "loan shark" and as a result of default, he was injured by 
the creditor's "enforcers", the damage he suffered from personal injury would be 
consequential damage. The defendant should not be liable for this, even though it was 
a form of physical damage.
146 See Andrew Burrows, supra note 110, pp. 48-53.
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Second, in the 20th century, pure economic loss is in no sense less significant 
than physical damage. It could be argued that to apply the eggshell skull rule to 
physical damage but not to pure economic loss is reasonable (the eggshell skull rule 
itself is intended to give greater protection to personal injuries plaintiffs) because 
maintaining respect for human life has a special meaning, especially when machines and 
technology replace human labour. Highly developed society makes human beings 
distinct, and human beings sometimes wonder about the value of personal existence. 
Thus imposing such liability is in reality to remind people that the moral value is not 
yet lost. But if such a distinction is further employed to decide the remoteness of 
damages, it is to ignore the real world where financial loss becomes widespread 
following the development of financial markets and industry.
It is submitted that when the extent of liability is measured, the law regarding 
causation should apply the same standard to both pure economic loss and physical 
damage. After this principle has been established, the characteristics of securities 
transactions come into play. Capital resources and the proportion of investment to the 
whole wealth of the plaintiff are both special circumstances and thus any loss incurred 
of this kind is consequential. For example, the plaintiff borrowed money with high 
interest to purchase securities, then the interest he suffered would be special damage. 
The plaintiff sold another kind of investment, e.g. a house, and used that amount of 
money to buy securities; however, the house price increased dramatically after he sold 
it, then the expected profits he lost would also be consequential damage.
The most important point accompanying the above characteristics of securities is 
that all such consequential damage should be excluded in principle. According to the 
foreseeability theory in this kind of case, they (consequential damages) are excluded 
because there is not the slightest possibility that the defendant could foresee them. 
However, in the situation where the direct consequences theory applies, all direct
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consequences flowing from the wrong should be compensated. The courts, in this 
situation, should bear in mind the characteristics of securities transactions and interpret 
some damage as so remote as to sever the causal relationship in order to meet the 
special characteristics of securities transactions.
If the statutory purpose is observed here as opposed to the directness theory and 
the foreseeability theory, the answer may be more straightforward.
First, English law has extended the scope of persons who are entitled to ask for 
compensation when misrepresentation in listing particulars is involved. When the scope 
of protected persons is enlarged, it may be inferred that the extent of liability to each 
individual person is to be reduced. An example of this tendency is the compensation in 
public transportation cases (e.g. aircraft accidents) today.
Second, the Companies Act 1985 allows shareholders to sue the company for 
compensation without rescinding the contract first. Any investors who are induced to 
subscribe for the securities by fraudulent misrepresentation can now sue the company 
(the issuer) for compensation. This was not possible before 1989147 because of the rule 
in Houldsworth v. City o f Glasgow Bank}A% In that case, the plaintiff was barred from 
compensation based on the fact that he did not rescind the contract of sale, and to 
allow a shareholder to bring an action against the company was inconsistent with his 
membership and interest in the company.149
So, an increasing number of persons are now entitled to seek compensation in 
securities cases. Therefore, to exclude damage which comes from the plaintiffs special
147 The Companies Act 1989, s. 131(1) amended the Companies Act 1985, s. 111A.
148 (1880) 5 A.C. 317.
149 See Louis G. Doyle, "Liability for Listing Particulars", Part II in Law for Business, 3 [3], 124-6, 
1991, p. 125.
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circumstance is justifiable in light of the statutory purpose (e.g. the FSA 1986, s. 
150(1)).
b. Taiwan
In Taiwan, the second function of causation, i.e. in measuring damages, appears to 
have been ignored. This does not mean that academics or the courts have claimed no 
such function in causation. It is, instead, due to the fact that the law of damages is not 
fully developed in Taiwan. Therefore, people may be interested in how damages is 
measured. The answer is that Taiwanese law generally adopts the first description of 
damage mentioned above (the theory of interest), i.e. special circumstances of the 
plaintiff are taken into account. Thus in practice the time for measuring damages is at 
the end of the oral proceedings in the last factual appeal; consequently, all factors 
occurring in between the wrong and judgment are relevant.
Therefore, the price paid by the plaintiff for the securities less their market value 
at the end of the oral proceedings in the court of appeal represents the damage suffered 
by the plaintiff. Should the calculation prove zero or negative, the damage is nil and the 
case is dismissed.
So far, only a few judgments have been delivered. In the Hsin Po150 case, the 
plaintiffs did not claim special financial loss; therefore, it is hard to conclude at this 
moment that all consequential damages which relate to the plaintiffs special 
circumstance will be excluded. However, the special financial loss obviously should not 
be redressed if the characteristics of securities transactions are acknowledged.
It is thus clear that although special circumstances may be considered in physical 
damages cases (e.g. the eggshell skull rule), they should be disregarded in securities
150 See supra note 142.
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misrepresentation cases. This is not based on the concept that economic harm is less 
important than physical harm; rather, it is based on a policy choice which closely 
relates to the characteristics of securities transactions.
(2) time for measuring damages
According to the characteristics that securities flow like water and that their prices 
change constantly, the later the date on which damages are calculated, the more factors 
the prices reflect. English law fixes the date of allotment or transaction as the time for 
measuring damages; it aims to exclude all factors other than the false information when 
measure of damages is at issue.
First, as examined earlier, English law adopts the directness theory of causation 
in respect of intentional tort. This may bring about an anomaly. For instance, a 
company fraudulently published that its oil well had an 80% possibility of striking oil; 
this not only induced the plaintiffs to subscribe for its securities but also induced a bank 
to promise to honour the company's overdraft cheques. Later, the true information was 
released, and the securities price fell. In addition, the price dropped further because the 
bank stopped honouring cheques.
Based on the directness theory, the further drop in the price is the direct 
consequence of the wrong and should be redressed. Yet if the date for measuring 
damages, as the courts have held, is the time of the transaction, it seems that such 
damage should not be compensated because the real value of the securities at the time 
of the transaction was the price that securities would have had if the misrepresentation 
had not been committed.
Second, in negligence cases, the defendant is liable for damage that he can 
reasonably foresee at the time of wrong. Supposing that the defendants disclosed the
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earning of this quarter to increase by 30% over the same period last year and predicted 
(without reasonable ground) that this would happen over the remaining fiscal year. 
However, if the defendants had not been negligent, they would have foreseen that the 
whole industry would decline substantially for the second half of the year. The 
securities price went up from £10 to £15 (per share) because of the information. B 
bought shares at £15. Towards the beginning of the second half of the year, the coming 
depression became known to the public, and the price dropped to £12. It appears 
reasonable to presume that the real value of securities at the time of the transaction 
would only have reflected part of the depression if it had been disclosed, and thus the 
possible price would have been £14. Therefore, if the courts follow the securities cases 
rule, the defendants only have to compensate B for £1 (£15-£14) per share. However, 
according to the foreseeability theory, the difference should be £3 (£15-£12) per share.
Third, in section 6.5 it was suggested that the real value of securities cannot be 
decided unless the price movements in the later stage are taken into account. Fourth, 
damage is constantly changing.
For all these reasons, it is argued that although setting the time for measuring 
damages as the time of allotment or transaction may meet the objective standard 
preferred by English law, the inconsistency between this choice and the theories 
mentioned above, the ignoring of the nature of damage, and overlooking the 
importance of the later events to the measure of real value, are not acceptable. 
Therefore, for the purpose of taking these factors into account, it would be better for 
the English courts to calculate the measure of damages as at the end of the trial.151
151 In reality, the attitude of the English courts is not inflexible. In cases other than securities 
transactions, the courts have suggested that the time of loss is not the only timing available to the 
measure of damage; other timing such as the time of judgment may be adopted in certain situations. 
Wroth v. Tyler [1974] Ch. 30; Johnson v. Agnew [1980] A.C. 367; Dodd Properties v. Canterbury 
City Council [1980] 1 All E.R. 928.
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(3) supervening events
English law excludes supervening events when the damages for misrepresentation in 
relation to securities transactions are calculated, while Taiwanese law still encompasses 
them in this case. Here two steps of reasoning are proposed. First, based on the 
characteristics of securities transactions, it should be appreciated that there is a 
"moderate" way of measuring damages which is different from the current law both in 
the UK and Taiwan.
deceit
In English law, following the ordinary theories of remoteness, if the remoteness of 
damage is judged based on the direct consequences theory, then the defendant should 
be responsible for the damage that he cannot reasonably foresee at the time of wrong 
but which directly flows from the wrong. Therefore, in intentional tort cases, if the 
damage is not too remote, the defendant has to answer for them. In securities 
transactions, if the price further drops because of some other factors, the defendant 
may have to compensate this damage unless it is too remote. However, there is no 
objective standard forjudging whether a specific item of damage is too remote. On the 
other hand, should the price go up, can the defendant allege that no damage is entailed 
in fact? From common notions of fairness and justice, it seems appropriate to suggest 
that the defendant should not be freed from the liability because harm has already 
occurred, even though it is mitigated by other factors. In particular, on the basis that 
the price is changeable, no one can ensure that the plaintiff secures more benefits until 
he sells them.
negligent misrepresentation
By way of contrast, when the foreseeability theory is in use, the defendant will not be 
held liable for the damage that he could not reasonably foresee in advance. Hence if the 
real value of securities at the time of judgment is lower than what the defendant can
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reasonably foresee in advance, that unforeseeable part of the damage should be 
excluded from calculation. Market risks are thus borne by the plaintiff. However, if the 
price goes up, the plaintiff can still claim full compensation, unaffected by other 
factors; the reason is the same as mentioned above.
In Taiwan, under the current law, supervening events are not excluded; and the 
adequacy theory has not yet been analysed by the courts. However, because of the 
characteristics of securities transactions, a line should be drawn to limit the defendant's 
liability. The solution should be similar to what has been suggested above as a desirable 
change in English law, except that the misrepresentation must be the "adequate" cause 
of the supervening events, and when "adequacy" is decided, the courts must bear in 
mind that liabilities cannot be extended to the extent they ordinarily do in normal cases.
Secondly, if the analysis above is correct, it is more just to measure damages by 
calculating the difference between the price paid and the real value of securities at the 
time of judgment than to calculate it as at the time of the transaction. According, in 
cases of intentional torts (such as deceit), it seems just to allocate the risk of market 
fluctuation to the defendant and ask him to compensate the further damage; whereas in 
cases of negligent misrepresentation, the defendant is not required to make such 
damage good. However, for two reasons, any supervening events which affect 
securities price but are not related to the false statement, as a general rule, should be 
excluded. First, the scope of liability in relation to listing particulars and prospectuses 
has been extended in English law by the enactment of the FSA 1986 (s. 150) and the 
POS Regulations (reg. 14); therefore the limitation of damages by excluding 
supervening events can be justified. Second, Investment always is accompanied by 
risks, a moderate obligation to look after the investment may be imposed on investors. 
Nonetheless, between the transaction and the date of judgment, there may arise 
complex or unusual sets of circumstances in the market, which justice would require to 
be taken into account in assessing the plaintiffs damage. But by their very nature and
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unpredictability, such cases will be the rare, though necessary, exceptions to the 
general rule.
This proposal intends to adjust the current English rule which exclude all 
supervening events in relation to misrepresentation in securities transactions. 
Undoubtedly, it may not be easy for the English courts to make such change.
In Taiwan, how should the normal damage be assessed if the statutory purpose 
rather than the theory of interest is considered? First, respecting prospectuses, the SEL 
provides that only bona fide counterparties are under protection, and the academics 
interpret this as being that only the persons directly subscribing to the company or 
through underwriter are within the protection of the law.152 If the courts also take this 
position, then Taiwanese law will not extend the scope of protected persons; 
accordingly, damage that results from non-misrepresentation factors may not be 
required to be excluded. The current doctrine (i.e. supervening events are not 
excluded) does not contradict to the statute.
On the other hand, if one day the statute is amended (as suggested above) to 
include subsequent acquirers of securities, the courts may have to adjust the measure; 
to say the least, the extent of liability to individual investors would have to be reduced 
and accordingly the price at the time of judgment would not the only criterion of 
measuring damages. The events happening in between the period of the transaction and 
judgment also need to be assessed.
Second, where there is misrepresentation in continuous disclosure documents, 
the Law153 empowers any buyer or seller to claim compensation. These are investors 
who buy or sell in the market, not necessarily trading with the defendant. Therefore, in
152 Article 32. of the SEL.
153 Article 20(2) of the SEL.
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this situation, the scope of protected persons is extended and the courts should follow 
the principle of excluding consequential damage as discussed above when they deal 
with such cases.
The Taiwanese legislature must realise that the law is not intended to protect 
investors from all risks and investors must understand that they themselves have 
certain obligations. Therefore a moderate distribution of risks in such a situation is 
welcomed.
Finally, it is difficult to understand why the courts have held that in the case of 
actions brought under the Misrepresentation Act 1967, s. 2(1), the direct consequences 
theory should be the standard forjudging causation.154 It may be a misunderstanding of 
the Act.155 The purpose of the section in question should be read as to make negligent 
misrepresentation actionable by statute, not only under case law. In all negligence 
cases the same standard should be employed; it is hard to find any justification for this 
deviation.
6.7 Insider dealing
In English law, no liability for damage to individual investors is imposed on insiders 
when they embark on insider dealing. There are criminal liabilities;156 there are also 
civil liabilities imposed on an "authorised person" if it violates the Core Conduct of 
Business Rule of the SIB which requires authorised persons to comply with the 
Criminal Justice Act 1993.157 That is, if the authorised person, its associate, or an 
employee of either effects for itself or himself, or for a client, a transaction which the
154 Royscot Trust Ltd. v. Rogerson [1991] 3 All E.R. 294.
155 Professor Treitel argues that the fiction of fraud in s. 2(1) may be misconceived. See G.H. Treitel, 
Law o f Contract, 9th ed., 1995, pp. 325-6.
156 Criminal Justice Act 1993, Part V.
157 s. 62 of the FSA 1986 and the Core Rule 28. See Michael Blair, Financial Services: The New 
Core Rules, 1991, pp. 121-4.
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authorised person knows would be an offence under the Criminal Justice Act 1993, the 
authorised person is liable to pay compensation to persons who suffer loss because of 
insider dealing. However, these liabilities are beyond the scope of this thesis.
On the other hand, in Taiwan, insiders face a severe civil liability if they make use 
of inside information to sell or purchase listed corporate shares or shares traded in the 
over-the-counter market. This section concentrates on the measure of damages 
regarding insider dealing. Unfortunately, despite the general belief that insider dealing 
is common in the market, not a single civil case dealing with this question has been 
reported.
According to Article 157-1 of the Taiwanese SEL, the amount of compensation 
is limited as follows:
(selling price less the average of the last reported selling price for ten business 
days after disclosure) x ( number of shares)
or,
(the average of the last reported selling price for ten business days after disclosure 
less purchasing price ) x (number of shares)
Upon the application of the bona fide counterparties, the court may in its discretion 
increase the compensation up to treble the limit should the violation be very serious.
This formula sets out only the maximum extent of compensation that the defendant has 
to pay; it does not provide a means of measuring the plaintiffs damage. Therefore, the 
measure of damages still follows the method used in the other cases as discussed 
above: price paid less the market value at the time of judgment, or, if the plaintiff has 
sold the securities, the selling price.
If one hundred plaintiffs sue and the total amount of their damages exceeds the 
limit of the defendant's liability, how should the court act? It is obvious from the
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provision that the law wishes to make the defendant disgorge his benefits rather than 
compensate the plaintiffs.158 Stated otherwise, insider dealing liability is not like the 
normal actions for damages where the defendant is ordered to make the damage good. 
The provision shifts the focus from compensating the plaintiffs to depriving the 
defendant of an improper benefit; this is a deviation from the normal nature of damages 
(the general principle for the assessment of damages is compensatory). Consequently, 
when the money available for compensation cannot satisfy all claims, it may be fair to 
distribute it pro rata to all plaintiffs.159
There is a serious defect here. Class actions are not allowed in Taiwan; there is 
no provision to force all plaintiffs to bring suit together. In other words, the action of 
an investor has no effect on the position of others; the latter can initiate proceedings at 
some other time. Thus, in the practical sense the court has no chance to distribute the 
money pro rata to all investors. Therefore, if the money can only satisfy ten victims, 
how about the eleventh investor who brings action one year later?
Why does the statute adopt such a formula? The most probable reason is that the 
opposite parties to the transactions are not identifiable. Securities transactions carried 
out on the stock exchange or in the over-the-counter market are not face to face. The 
computer system arranges the transactions automatically. Grounded on this fact, any 
investors who trade during the period of insider dealing are the possible sellers or 
buyers of the insiders. Since no one can prove that he or she is the person who trades 
with insiders, the law allows all of them to claim their rights.
As a result, a director who buys or sells only one time may end up facing 
hundreds of "counterparties". It seems unfair to order him to fully compensate all
158 The same thinking exists in the USA, see Donald C. Langevoort, "Fraud and Insider Trading in 
American Securities Regulation: Its Scope and Philosophy in a Global Marketplace", in 16 Hastings 
International and Comparative L. R., 175-87, Winter, 1993, p. 181.
159 See Arnold A. Jacobs, "The Measure of Damages in Rule 10b-5 Cases", in 65 Georgetown L. J., 
1093-169, 1977, pp. 1130-7.
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investors; hence the law shifts its focus from "damage" to "benefit", taking the point of 
view of the defendant. The law, however, does not step into the face to face 
transactions, which as discussed in Chapter Three will not impose on insiders any 
liability.
The last point made here is that the ECMH is seen in Article 157-1. Even though 
the reasoning of the ECMH can be seen in this provision, this does not mean that the 
Taiwanese SEC has really adopted this theory; nor is the theory diffused into the 
judicial thinking of the courts or academics. No case has ever mentioned this theory so 
far. Therefore, Article 157-1 can be treated only as an incidental case; it cannot be 
inferred from this Article that Taiwanese law holds faith in the ECMH.
6.8 Conclusion
English law characterises actions for compensation in securities misrepresentation as 
torts (common law or statutory torts); while Taiwanese law leaves it undecided. Based 
on the facts that to define cases of this kind as torts or breaches of contract may not be 
apposite in certain situations, it is suggested that these liabilities should be 
characterised as statutory liabilities in Taiwan. However, no matter what the nature of 
these cases is, they have to meet certain elements before liabilities are established. Here 
three elements are focused on: the duty of care, causation, and damage.
More than thirty years after Hedley Byrne English law continues to show a 
reluctance to admit the existence of a duty of care in relation to misrepresentation in 
securities transactions cases. This causes a serious defect when the protection of 
investors is concerned. Securities holders are quite often injured in the trading market, 
which may result from the fraudulent information of the provider, but it may also come 
from its negligence. Since the statutes (e.g. the FSA 1986) do not impose any such 
liability on these providers, the only help investors can resort to is common law.
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Therefore, the reluctance of common law to establish this duty in reality has barred 
investors from compensation.160
Admittedly, whether to impose this duty is a policy choice. It is, however, 
suggested that the English legislature should reconsider this problem. Seeing that the 
trading market is no less important than the issuing market, why cannot investors be 
given the same protection as they have in the issuing market? Moreover, it can be seen 
from existing legislation that the trend is to enhance investors' protection (acquirers 
substituting for subscribers in listing particulars and prospectuses cases).
After the problem of the duty of care is solved, the ensuing problems of causation 
and damage occur. Unlike the traditional civil liability in misrepresentation where the 
plaintiff has to prove his reliance on the false statement, in securities cases this kind of 
reliance may be presumed. Especially, if there is an efficient market, such a 
requirement may even be remitted unless the plaintiff knew the truth when the 
transaction was made. First, the legislature can choose to shift to defendants the 
burden of proof based on a policy choice.
Second, if the ECMH is adopted, then whether investors have read the misleading 
documents is not relevant because prices have fully reflected all information. But the 
problem is that in the cases where no market prices are available or they are reliable 
such as in the initial public offering, the ECMH cannot be alleged. Accordingly, if the 
legislature wishes to omit this requirement, the maintenance of market integrity would 
provide a good reason.
Although the Taiwanese market is not very efficient, given widespread 
manipulation and insider dealing, it seems possible to abolish the requirement of
160 The recent development in Possfund (see supra note 41) seems very encouraging to the argument 
of this thesis because Lightman J. suggested a broader scope of duty of care.
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proving reliance provided that a specific piece of information concerning a specific 
kind of securities has been efficiently reflected in the securities price.
Since to define the concept of "damage" is by no means easy, it is wise to look at 
the statutory purpose when the definition is made. Obviously, the statutes (the English 
POS Regulations and FSA 1986, and the Taiwanese SEL) require defendants to 
compensate financial loss suffered by investors. The statutes also extend the scope of 
persons being protected. It is thus argued that the extent of liability should be limited.
Furthermore, the characteristics of securities have to be weighed. The parties in 
securities transactions are numerous and uncertain, and securities are designed to be 
traded frequently; consequently, all special circumstances surrounding a plaintiff which 
result in consequential losses should be excluded from the scope of compensation. As a 
general rule, any damage flowing from securities price movements but not relating to 
the misrepresentation should be excluded from compensation to a great extent. The 
exclusion of these various factors cannot be explained by the theories of remoteness of 
damages; the only argument advanced is a policy choice. In addition, damage is not 
necessarily fixed at an arbitrary date such as the date of the transaction; to measure 
damages at the time of judgment may be more just and compatible with the 
characteristics of securities transactions.
However, events happening in between the period of a transaction and judgment 
had better be excluded as far as possible in the UK even though the direct 
consequences or foreseeability theory is taken into account. It is the same in Taiwanese 
law. If one day more investors are within protection, it has to adjust its standard and 
exclude supervening events unrelated to the misrepresentation concerning the 
compensation for misleading prospectuses.
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Changing the time for measuring damages to the time of judgment is justified for 
four reasons: (1) this thesis never suggests that supervening events should be excluded 
entirely, but only as a general rule; (2) this new time solves the contradiction between 
the old time and causation theories; (3) only by this change, there will be a possibility 
of considering subsequent events even though this may be a rare case; (4) the new time 
reflects the fact that damage in securities transactions changes constantly.161
Finally, English law has not ordered insiders to account to individual investors, but 
Taiwanese law has done so even though it may have some problems. Greater 
importance has been attached to depriving insiders of the benefits of their illegal 
transactions than to compensate their victims. This deviation from the traditional 
principle of compensation reflects a dilemma that to compensate investors in full may 
be unfair to insiders. Therefore, such a compromise is concluded.
161 Securities prices are affected by many factors, such as the perceptions of stock market analysts, 
financial commentators, business journalists, etc. (see Lonrho pic and others v. Fayed and others (No 
5) [1994] 1 All E.R. 188, 196) By inference, prices always fluctuate.
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Conclusion
This thesis, grounded on the examination of the substantive laws of the UK and 
Taiwan, analyses step by step the justification for mandatory disclosure regulation, the 
principles on which the content of mandatory disclosure are designed, and civil liability 
for breach of mandatory disclosure requirements. In the course of comparison, the 
merits and shortcomings of both English and Taiwanese law have been identified and 
possible improvements have been suggested.
The results of the research suggest that even though legal academics and 
economists continue to debate the necessity of mandatory disclosure, this practice 
gains its justification from the inadequacy of the general law, thus marginalising the 
arguments propounded by each side. Under the definition of mandatory disclosure put 
forward in the thesis, mandatory disclosure regulation is a set of rules added to the 
general law and in the context of the work comprises the Companies Act 1985, the 
FSA 1986, the POS Regulations 1995, the Yellow Book, and the Code on Takeovers 
and Mergers in the UK, and the Securities and Exchange Law and various regulations 
promulgated by the SEC in Taiwan. It has been demonstrated that without mandatory 
disclosure requirements, investors cannot obtain sufficient information on the basis of 
the law of contract or tort. This problem, moreover, is manifested in highly developed 
financial markets because more information is required in those markets following the 
emergence of numerous new financial products.
Taking the UK as an example, although in accordance with their fiduciary duties, 
directors must make full disclosure to the company in the case of self-representation 
and both-side representation, and are not allowed to profit from their position by
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making use of corporate information. Yet, individual shareholders or potential 
investors have no right to ask information from the company concerning either the 
company itself or its directors, since the fiduciary relationship exists only between the 
director and the company. Daily information is not available to shareholders. Under the 
general law, their only source is that of annual accounts and reports. This illustrates the 
defects of the general law. On the other hand, in Taiwan where there is no legal 
concept of fiduciary relationship, Taiwanese investors are worse off than their 
counterparts in the UK. As a result, it is submitted in the thesis that before economists 
are able to provide more persuasive evidence regarding cost-benefit analysis, 
mandatory disclosure should surely be accepted. Even if some day such evidence is 
produced, whether cost-benefit analysis could be relied upon as the only basis negating 
mandatory disclosure is not beyond doubt.
Nonetheless, it is undeniable that the existing disclosure regulations are defective 
in the light of the content of mandatory disclosure, the method of disclosure, and its 
timing, making the goals of mandatory disclosure (the protection of investors and the 
achievement of market efficiency) partially unachievable. The content of mandatory 
disclosure, for a long time, has been excessively concerned with reporting historical 
facts, triggering serious criticism from opponents of mandatory disclosure. The reason 
for regulators to adopt this conservative stance discouraging the disclosure of soft 
information was to protect investors from being misled because of the natural 
uncertainty of this kind of information. The opponents, on the other hand, maintained 
that what investors need was soft information rather than historical reports. In 
addition, since the contents of disclosure are complicated and far from easy for laymen 
to understand, the practical effect of a pile of documents aimed at helping investors 
make investment judgments becomes increasingly questionable and worth re­
consideration. The most sensitive issue has been the timing of disclosure. The timing of 
disclosure not only affects investors' investment interests but is also closely connected 
with corporate business interests. For instance, in the process of merger negotiation, if
307
Chapter Seven: Conclusion
information is disseminated prematurely, on the one hand bidder's costs increase, while 
on the other hand shareholders of the target company as a whole might suffer loss 
should the bidder withdraw its offer owing to the market reaction. Also, supposing a 
company finds new mines, immediate disclosure of this information may increase the 
cost to the company of purchasing adjacent land.
Therefore, the thesis argues that the law should not be encumbered with details 
of the concrete items to be disclosed but instead, should concentrate on identifying the 
fundamental guiding principles for the design of the necessary content of disclosure. 
Accordingly, materiality has been proposed as the supreme guiding rule. Because of 
the abstractness of materiality and its lack of unanimous definition, however, users' 
needs and corporate circumstances must, in practice, serve as guidelines. Where legal 
regulation should intervene is in the situation where investors need information and 
given due consideration to the corporate environment disclosure is permissible. As 
regards other information, it should be left to the company and its accountants to 
decide whether to make it public. However, the law must ensure that material 
information is clearly described in a prominent position in the disclosure document lest 
it be buried in a mass of less important information. If material information is not 
presented properly, it should be deemed to be non-compliance with disclosure 
requirements.
The most difficult problem is that as financial statements contain more 
information, they become more complicated. It seems that in reality it is impossible to 
combine "simple presentation" with "full disclosure". Even though currently all 
regulations emphasise the importance of simplicity of information disclosure, it remains 
a remote ideal. The only solution to this dilemma is to simplify the financial statement 
to the maximum possible extent on the one hand, and to encourage and supervise the 
establishment and operation of investment consulting companies and professional 
investors on the other. If individual investors could have recourse to these experts for
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help in analysing financial and business reports, they would be more capable of 
reaching informed decisions. The popularity of professional investors will contribute to 
the improvement of market efficiency seeing that they have the skill to select better 
securities for investment; this in turn, enables securities prices to fully reflect all 
available information and reach their fair prices, as a consequence of which individual 
investors will benefit from trading at fair prices.
There is a specific phenomenon in Taiwanese society which demands the 
attention of regulators, that is, the improvement and supervision of accountants. The 
reliability of any financial statements entirely depends on the proper function of a 
company's internal accounting system and auditors' fair and independent investigation. 
If any of them is inadequately regulated, disclosure of more information would only be 
to the detriment of investors, for financial statements might contain misleading 
information.
Finally, any regulation, no matter how strict it is, requires a comprehensive set of 
enforcement rules; among these, civil liability is highly important. Traditionally, 
theories concerning civil liability for tort, contract, and other statutory liability have 
been well developed; however, such theories may not fit properly into securities cases 
and thus are unable to resolve the whole range of problems. For instance, in England, 
the courts are used to taking a conservative attitude towards the tort of negligence, 
and accordingly they often rule out the possibility of civil liability at the first stage of 
enquiry, namely, the existence of the duty of care. However, legislation has constantly 
expanded the scope of protection, especially in the public offer of securities in the 
primary market. As a result, there is a gap between the different levels of protection in 
the primary market and the secondary market. The thesis disagrees with such 
discriminatory treatment. Setting aside the legal inconsistency for a moment, there is 
no convincing reason even from the perspective of policy choice as to why the courts
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opt for this position, it being commonly accepted that the secondary market is as 
important as the primary market.
A more obvious defect of English law appears in measuring damages. The rules 
for normal cases are that the foreseeability theory deals with the issues of breach of 
contract and the tort of negligence, while the direct consequences theory decides the 
scope of liability in intentional tort, such as deceit. Now, if these rules are applied to 
securities cases and identify the extent of damages, it is found that the result would 
conflict with the principles developed by securities cases; that is, damage is measured 
based on the difference between the price paid and the real value of the securities at the 
time of allotment of securities or transactions. It is clear that if the time for measuring 
damages is fixed at the time of transactions, all supervening events and specific 
circumstances of the plaintiff must be wholly excluded from the consideration, but if 
the foreseeability or direct consequences theory is followed, these events may be 
included in the scope of liability.
The thesis, thus, concludes that the time for calculating damages should be 
changed to a later stage, i.e. immediately before judgment (in Taiwan, it is generally 
before judgment of the court of appeal). If the new time is adopted, the contradiction 
between the traditional rules and the securities cases principles would be avoided. The 
suggested time also reflects the fact that securities prices change constantly and this 
risk should not be borne solely by the victim. Nonetheless, based on the characteristics 
of securities transactions, it is proposed that in assessing damages personal 
circumstances of plaintiffs should be entirely excluded from consideration and that 
supervening events should be ignored as much as possible by the court.
Taiwanese law, on the other hand, makes the diametrically opposite error of over 
emphasising the subjective aspect of damage and thus possibly over- or under- 
compensating the plaintiff. In other words, the defendant bears all the market risks.
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Consequently, if the current time for measuring damages in Taiwanese law is retained, 
the courts should endeavour to distinguish misrepresentation factors from non­
misrepresentation factors, and fairly distribute market risk to both parties; only in this 
way, will a just compensation system be established.
When civil liability is examined, the concept of damage plays a key role regarding 
the later discussion about the measure of damages. The thesis points out that both 
English and Taiwanese law lack an in-depth theoretical structure for defining the 
concept. The thesis tries to clarify its concept and help understand the close 
relationship between these two issues. The fraud on the market theory is also 
introduced with the aim of mitigating the difficulties stemming from the proof of 
reliance when civil liability is established. This is an example of a ' financial economic 
theory which may shed useful light on legal thinking.
Finally, to revert to the point mentioned at the very beginning of the introduction, 
namely that the topic could be researched by financial economists, accountants, and 
corporate finance experts, it is expected, here, that these experts in the future could 
provide more inspiration for legal studies. Even more, the theories of regulation, the 
role of competent authorities, and other enforcement methods such as criminal liability 
for non-compliance are all relevant subjects of the topic and are worth researching. 
Academics could analyse the efficacy of the enforcement methods and then propose 
some innovative ideas or embark on how to strengthen administrative powers in such a 
way as to bring the market into order. It is hoped that all these possibilities will 
encourage researcher to further develop the subject.
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Appendix
The justification o f disclosure
mandatory
economic (chapter 4)
voluntary
creditors members the public
members
v.
members
v.
members
v .
company
impossible in the UK: O 
unclear in Taiwan: O
directors promoters
shareholders 
as a group
individual
shareholders
self-dealing: O 
advice: O
self, both-side rep. 
UK: X 
Taiwan: O
use of inside infor. 
insider dealing 
UK: X 
Taiwan: O
corporate opportunity 
UK: X 
Taiwan: X
preparing acct. 
UK: O 
Taiwan: X
O: denoting the need for mandatory disclosure
X: denoting sufficient disclosure under the general law, and no need for mandatory 
disclosure
